



UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF
7701 TAMPA POINT BOULEVARD
MACDILL AIR FORCE BASE, FLORIDA 33621-5323

August 29, 1997

Pete

Dear General Schoomaker,

Thanks for providing a copy of "Psychological Operations into the 21st Century," by the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School. It is a superb assessment and clearly represents a lot of hard work and thought.

Like you, I feel that many of these issues deserve a wider audience, particularly development of a national information strategy and potential establishment of a joint psychological operations organization. I will ensure that these joint issues are properly addressed by USSOCOM and other members of the joint community.

Please convey my appreciation to Bill Tangney and his folks for publishing such an important and useful document.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Henry H. Shelton".

Henry H. Shelton
General, U.S. Army
Commander in Chief

Lieutenant General Peter J. Schoomaker
Commanding General
United States Army Special Operations Command
Fort Bragg, North Carolina 28307-5200



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES ARMY
SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND
FORT BRAGG, NORTH CAROLINA 28307-5200

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:

Office of the Commanding General

General Henry H. Shelton
Commander in Chief
United States Special Operations Command
7701 Tampa Point Boulevard
MacDill Air Force Base, Florida 33621-5323

Dear General ~~Shelton~~ *Shelton*:

I am forwarding for your consideration and review an assessment of Psychological Operations into the 21st Century that was prepared by the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School. The assessment is presented in the context of Joint Vision 2010 and the likely operational environments we will encounter over the next several decades. It provides the next level of detail below Army Special Operations Forces Vision 2010 for Psychological Operations-specific capabilities.

The assessment presents a number of issues and recommendations which I believe warrant serious consideration as we think about today's and future Psychological Operations capabilities.

Some of the issues raised in the assessment such as those associated with Army Special Operations Forces doctrine, force structure, and training and education fall squarely in my domain and I will tackle them. However, some of the issues and recommendations have larger contexts--such as coordinating a national information strategy and establishing a Joint Psychological Operations organization. I believe discussion of these higher level issues deserves a wider audience. I welcome your consideration on the Joint issues addressed in this document.

I look forward to your perspectives on this important subject.


Very respectfully,

Peter J. Schoomaker
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army
Commanding Officer

Enclosure

Psychological Operations into the 21st Century

A Critical Assessment



June 1997

US Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School
Ft. Bragg, North Carolina

As Commander of Joint Task Force 180 during Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, it is my belief that the integration of Psychological Operations (PSYOP) early in the planning process was critical to the successful execution of the operation. Long before any American military forces stepped ashore, PSYOP helped us quickly accomplish our political and military objectives by laying the foundation for transition from forced entry to semi-permissive operations. Without a doubt, PSYOP won the hearts and minds of Haiti's citizens, as well as setting the stage for the peaceful accomplishment of the Joint Task Force's mission... There is no question PSYOP saved lives, on both sides, during Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY. It proved to be the unsung, yet vitally important, factor in this operation – a true force multiplier.

Lieutenant General Henry H. Shelton, USA
Commanding, XVIII Airborne Corps and Ft. Bragg
4 May 1995

PREFACE

The Secretary of Defense's Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and the congressionally-mandated National Defense Panel (NDP) are conducting far-reaching assessments of US defense strategies, concepts, forces, and systems in order to *shape* the security environment, *respond* to threats to US national interests, and *prepare* for the future. The QDR and NDP are considering reductions in both active and reserve force structures of all Services, reductions in infrastructure to include additional base closings, and a hard look at the entire modernization program that will carry the US defense establishment into the 21st century.

This document provides a critical assessment and makes recommendations for improving psychological operations (PSYOP). PSYOP have proven their utility in war and peace to diplomats and battlefield commanders alike. When implemented, these recommendations will improve PSYOP as instruments of US national security policy and as essential and integrated capabilities for warfighting Commanders in Chief.

The assessment was developed in the context of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's *Joint Vision 2010*, and the emerging dynamics that will face US national security and military planners in the future.

Although US Army psychological operations forces, both active and reserve, possess the most significant concentration of PSYOP capabilities in the US government today, this assessment provides recommended changes to a broad range of joint and interagency activities associated with improving this vitally important and interconnected diplomatic and battlefield capability.

This assessment was prepared under the auspices of the Office of the Commanding General, US Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Ft. Bragg, North Carolina.

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1.0 SETTING THE STAGE

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John Shalikashvili, has published his vision of the future, entitled *Joint Vision 2010*. *Joint Vision 2010* takes the *National Security Strategy* and the *National Military Strategy* as its start point and focuses on the concepts and the means of achieving these strategies over time. Joint and combined forces, fully trained and equipped with state-of-the-art technology enabling them to exploit imaginative concepts of operation in a highly ambiguous and uncertain security environment, are fundamental ingredients. These forces must also be rapidly deployable and capable of planning and executing sophisticated and effective military operations in support of worldwide US national security objectives.

Joint Vision 2010 develops four operational concepts that are the heart of 21st century US military capability in support of the *National Security Strategy*: dominant maneuver, precision engagement, full dimensional protection, and focused logistics. These four concepts produce what the Chairman calls full spectrum dominance, "...the key characteristic we seek for our Armed Forces in the 21st century."




Figure 1. Joint Vision 2010

One of the most important capabilities the US military possesses in support of full spectrum dominance is its long standing experience and expertise in the formulation and conduct of psychological operations (PSYOP). PSYOP are defined in Joint Pub 1-02 as:

Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives.

PSYOP have had an impact far beyond the small number of forces involved, and the effects of these operations contributed substantively to the success of US national security activities over the past several decades. Looking to the future, the demand for essential capabilities associated with how the US government conducts its diplomatic and military affairs will only increase. Therefore, *Joint Vision 2010* provides the most appropriate context in which to discuss PSYOP capabilities. To begin the discussion, it is useful to examine the environment that may be encountered as the nation moves forward into the first decade of the next century.

1.1 THE ENVIRONMENT IN 2010

The portfolio of US military operations conducted over the past nine years – Panama, Kuwait, Iraq, Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, Bosnia – is instructive in many ways. The issues underlying the commitment of US forces and the environmental attributes that characterized these operations are harbingers of what the US will likely encounter in the future.

The following synopsis of major trends – political, economic, military, and information – reflects current forecasts that predict salient features of the global future. It is important to not take any one feature as a given, but rather to gain a sense of likely directions and potential outcomes that will face US national security decision makers in the early part of the 21st century. US experiences to date in the Balkans, Southwest Asia, the Caribbean, Africa, and elsewhere provide important points of comparison with the potential dangers that may affect our national interests.

POLITICAL

- As cultural and religious separatism, political discrimination, and ethnic, demographic, and geographic pressures mount, there will be new challenges to the nation state as we know it today.
- We can anticipate continuous change and revision to international alliance structures, as social, economic, and cultural interests manifest changes in political systems and alignments.
- Threats to US national interests abroad will become increasingly diverse, to include transnational terrorism and crime.
- The ability to recognize and influence the “human factors” inherent in foreign political and military leadership and organizations will increase in importance as an essential element of plans designed to achieve US national security objectives.
- Core themes will continue to challenge efforts at peacemaking and reconciliation: tribalism, ethnic nationalism, and exclusionary political and social practices.

ECONOMIC

- Economic and environmental resource issues – particularly those associated with water and food production – will increase.
- Uneven distribution of key natural resources – oil, timber, coal, precious metals – will continue to be the source of regional and global economic tensions.
- Desiccation of forests and arable land will exacerbate problems in some areas, as rural populations are forced to migrate to cities that are unprepared for the population explosion.
- Tensions between and among regional parties will form the basis for continued conflict in regions where large economic or natural resource imbalances exist and populations are precariously supported in both rural and urban areas.
- Environmental hazards worldwide will continue to pose daunting resource requirements for reclamation to already fragile economies.

MILITARY

- Military operations will take place in increasingly complex and entangled environments, where traditional applications of force may not be in the best interests of US national security objectives, and may in fact be counterproductive.
- We can anticipate the unrestrained proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, particularly from “rogue” states and transnational actors which remain estranged from the community of nations.
- Missions will become more complicated because they will require increased coordination and integration of joint, combined, and coalition forces, US interagency activities, and diverse international government and nongovernment agencies and entities on a global scale.
- Decreased numbers of permanently forward deployed US forces will place a premium on rapid and effective force projection capabilities.
- Technological advances in precision weapons, nonlethal capabilities, information fusion, and systems digitization have potentially far-reaching effects on military plans, operational concepts, and force structures.
- Available resources for US defense capabilities will most likely continue to decline, placing an increased emphasis on new concepts and technology that achieve effective results at reduced cost and involvement of US forces – the demand for efficiency with constrained resources will only increase.

INFORMATION

- Information availability and access will continue to proliferate as technology improves and costs decrease, speeding the communication of events and the impressions of people to events as they happen in real time or near-real time around the world. National policies will be affected by this information “common denominator.”
- Information management within the defense community will be at a premium on and off the battlefield. Protecting information assets will be increasingly critical to the success of planning, adjusting, and executing operations.

- Information warfare strategies and command and control warfare will be integral parts of US defense planning and capability for all operations.
- Threats to US commercial and government information infrastructures will increase both at home and abroad.

These assessments, while individually interesting, do not carry the weight of an integrated portrayal of potential global difficulties. One such rendering comes from Dr. Brian R. Sullivan, who writes starkly in the May 1996 issue of Special Warfare magazine:

Our grandchildren and great grandchildren may live in a far happier world, thanks to the anticipated mid-21st-century easing of demographic pressures and to the continued advances of technology. But the next several decades are likely to witness human misery on a scale unprecedented in history. Famine, pestilence and death, three of the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse, probably will ravage hundreds of millions – perhaps billions – of human beings. And the fourth horseman is war.

Food and water shortages may prompt desperate invasions by people seeking escape from hunger and thirst. Deadly plagues may prompt mass flight across even well-guarded borders. Crime may appeal to many as the only relief from poverty, leading entire societies away from the rule of law to the law of the jungle. Cities in the impoverished world may become the scene of huge riots directed by demagogues whose aim is to topple governments. Religious fanatics may turn against the adherents of other religions, claiming divine sanction as an excuse for plunder, rape and murder. Weakened by economic decline, many central governments may be unable to control long-festered ethnic and regional hatreds, with large-scale slaughter as a result. Massive illegal immigration into the developed world could take on similar aspects of the tribal invasions that toppled the Roman and Chinese empires. A desire either for vengeance or extortion could generate widespread terrorism by the poor against the rich.

It is within the context of this uncertain future that we now turn our attention to the importance and value of information as a tool of our national security apparatus and to the decision makers who will be faced with the possible scenarios described above.

1.2 A NATIONAL INFORMATION STRATEGY — IS IT TIME?

Given the likely trends, we can be assured of multiple threats posed to US national interests. The *National Security Strategy* and the *National Military Strategy* recognize these fundamental challenges. What, then, are some of the necessary steps to ensure a fully coordinated and effective set of capabilities that promote and protect US national interests worldwide? This question is made even more pressing because the information age is upon us, and information warfare is a natural and obvious consequence of our information dependence in all aspects of defense, commerce, and national decision making.

One point of view about the importance of information to our national defense was provided by General Richard G. Stilwell, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy during the Reagan Administration. He wrote pointedly in 1989 about the fundamental problem that accrues to the US as a result of not having an integrated national information strategy and the attendant organizations and processes needed to manage and exploit this potential. Although he wrote principally in the context of the Cold War, General Stilwell argued forcefully that such a strategy is a powerful asset in a complex, rapidly changing, and, at times, overtly antagonistic international environment:

To forego the use of certain tools that would facilitate the pursuit of national objectives is one thing. To fail to recognize – let alone take measures to counter – psychological and political warfare waged against our policies with the intent to undermine them is quite another; here the cost of inaction is real and heavy... Although there is no excuse for not doing our best in this field, we are very far from that point. How can we begin to systematically exploit this long-neglected tool of statecraft?

To begin with, National Security Decision Directive 130 should be dusted off and made required reading throughout the executive and legislative branches. This landmark document established international information as a major instrument of national security policy, and the responsibility of no single agency of the government. It also assigned a number of specific tasks. It is time for a detailed review and accounting by the relevant agencies of progress in carrying out these tasks. Such an accounting can be expected to show that implementation to date is far from satisfactory across the board.

General Stilwell went on to conclude:

... the process requires continuous monitoring, decisions on redirection of effort, and general oversight that only an interagency group, properly chartered and empowered, can provide. A campaign of this magnitude involves a mixture of political action, psychological warfare, exercise of the channels normally available to our official representatives abroad, covert action, and – we hope – expansion, elaboration, and interpretation of thematic output by the private sector. That is the way it should be if the nation is really serious about fully exploiting our enormous international communications capabilities in furtherance of our nation's security policies.

Underlying General Stilwell's call to action are three essential design principles:

- First, understanding the full range of human factors that drive the decisions of our adversaries is critical to the success of US efforts to halt or degrade their efforts. The US, therefore, requires people and organizations specifically trained to engage in this highly complex and difficult undertaking, capable of shaping and understanding alternate courses of action as they will most likely affect the decisions of target audiences, and determining the impact on ongoing and planned US operations.
- Second, given an understanding of these human factors, the US must be able to respond effectively – reaching and persuading target audiences to support, or, at a minimum, not impede or disrupt US government activities and those of its allies and coalition partners in pursuit of national and international objectives. US diplomatic efforts are clearly the instruments of choice to carry out these important activities, and all government efforts, to include the military, must be synchronized and aligned to support these national undertakings. In other words, the government must play as an orchestrated, sequenced enterprise if a national information policy is to be effective.
- Third, given the ability to reach and persuade target audiences, the menu of political and military options available to senior US decision makers is significantly broadened. Consequently, the US must be prepared to conduct information operations on the strategic, operational, and tactical levels, assessing complex situations and formulating plans to achieve US political and economic objectives. Psychological strategies and operations provide situational multipliers that contribute significantly on a

wide political-military front to achieving the operational objectives of national decision makers and battlefield commanders.

These design principles embrace the importance of psychological operations as fundamental building blocks to solving the problems General Stilwell described so clearly in 1989 – problems that continue today but are more complicated, and for which PSYOP have compelling applicability.

Taken singly, each principle evokes an array of current shortfalls and deficiencies, some minor, some major. Collectively, however, these principles pose a substantial challenge to the national defense community if PSYOP are to be employed in the near and distant future at anywhere near the effectiveness required by *Joint Vision 2010*. These top-level design principles, therefore, are the yardstick used to measure all recommended changes to PSYOP capabilities.

1.3 JOINT VISION 2010 – PSYOP AS AN ENABLER

Maintaining and enhancing psychological operations capabilities are essential to meeting the Chairman's intent for *Joint Vision 2010*. In order to achieve this vision, it is important to understand the operational environment in which US PSYOP capabilities will be employed:

- Operating in joint, combined, and interagency environments

PSYOP forces do not go it alone. PSYOP are most effective when conducted as fully integrated US government operations. These have and will continue to include the participation of all Services, various allies, coalition partners, government and nongovernment organizations.

- Supporting the complete range of national options

PSYOP forces must participate in the full range of operations from peacetime, to escalation and war, through post-conflict termination, and the return to peace. This requires PSYOP support to all options developed in response to the direction of the National Command Authorities (NCA) and the combatant Commanders in Chief.

- Employing and leveraging relevant and available technology

There is a clear requirement for PSYOP to use all applicable off-the-shelf technology and to direct and leverage the application of new technology developments to correct current and anticipated PSYOP materiel capability shortfalls and deficiencies.

- Communicating in multicultural environments

There is incredible ethnic, linguistic, religious, and cultural diversity worldwide. The US must be able to infuse PSYOP capabilities into these wide-ranging and complex environments where US national interests are at stake.

- Addressing contingencies promulgated by non-state actors

Some crises will be caused by individuals or groups without a "country of origin," for example, terrorist use of a biological or chemical weapon of mass destruction. The US must be prepared to conduct PSYOP that are sensitive to the peculiarities of these transnational circumstances.




Figure 2. The Joint Environment for PSYOP

It is also important to recognize explicitly the contributions PSYOP make to the four operational concepts that underpin *Joint Vision 2010*, given the operational characteristics described above.

DOMINANT MANEUVER

Within the operational concept of dominant maneuver, the ability to move and position US military capability in anticipation of and in reaction to potential threats or enemy action is essential. PSYOP, when fully integrated into operations and campaign plans, provide commanders with the added dimension of:

- enhancing maneuver within the total battlespace, to include deception operations;
- capitalizing on the psychological value of timing;
- employing knowledge of indigenous peoples and their customs to best advantage and to minimize casualties; and
- the psychological impact of destroying some targets but not others.

Dominant maneuver is focused on the destruction of the enemy's will to fight by containing and destroying his ability to resist. The psychological value of being able to maneuver at will, bringing to bear the full range of US capabilities, is enormous. PSYOP capitalize on successes achieved through dominant maneuver, making clear the tremendous advantage and capability that rests with US and allied or coalition forces. No commander is unimpressed by the ability of his adversary to maneuver at will, and PSYOP can help to cement that reality in the minds of the enemy's national and battlefield leadership.

PRECISION ENGAGEMENT

The selection and engagement of specific leadership, materiel, industrial, and personnel targets, when made within the broader context of their psychological value, have enormous benefit. The availability of more and better precision strike weapons, as with all instruments of physical destruction, has both undeniable results and interesting consequences when employed over prolonged periods of time. Their initial employment has tremendous physical and psychological effects, related to the sudden, violent destructive power unleashed directly and precisely against military and national targets. PSYOP add another dimension of sophistication to precision engagement across the entire spectrum of conflict, as the relative value of targets is assessed against the war-making potential and will of our adversaries. Sometimes, PSYOP are the principal means of precision engagement, achieved through carefully crafted messages directed at

target audiences we wish to act or react in a specific way. This includes, for example, pre-strike warnings of intended artillery fires or aerial bombardment, demonstrating complete command of terrain, targets, and compassion for hapless combatants and innocent civilian populations. Other examples include messages directed specifically at the leadership of enemy forces who we want to direct the cessation of hostilities or at enemy soldiers who we want to surrender.

FULL DIMENSIONAL PROTECTION

PSYOP have direct contributions to the full dimensional protection aspects of *Joint Vision 2010*. From the information provided to local populaces about the status and intentions of US forces, the announcement of the timing and sectors of US fires in order to avoid civilian casualties, to the education and training of indigenous populations regarding mines, other harmful or lethal devices, and toxic environmental hazards, each of these elements helps protect American forces deployed in support of US security objectives. PSYOP provide useful information within areas of operation and help clarify and solidify US intentions. Particularly within the context of peace engagement and peace enforcement operations, the use of PSYOP keeps US soldiers alive and operating effectively within areas of assigned responsibility. Furthermore, PSYOP are an essential counterweight to enemy propaganda directed at US, allied, and coalition forces.

FOCUSED LOGISTICS

In overseas areas where US forces are deployed, proactive PSYOP directed at local populations provide additional sources of intelligence, information, service, and support. When local businesses and entrepreneurs can understand US objectives, they are far more willing to cooperate and provide indigenous supplies and services that would otherwise be deployed from the US or other theaters of operation. The use of such indigenous support, both materiel and labor, has a marked impact on reducing US personnel and strategic lift requirements. Furthermore, positive effects are gained by integrating local efforts to support US objectives and plans within the theater. PSYOP help to focus and tailor the receptivity of host nations and local populations to provide useful and timely support to US forces.

SUMMARY

In each of the four *Joint Vision 2010* concepts of operation, PSYOP provide enabling means to commanders that enhance their ability to plan and conduct operations. Because PSYOP are inherently activities directed at "hearts and minds," they have a far different utility than the violent and destructive potential that accompanies the full use of American military power. As noted earlier, use of destructive military power is sometimes inappropriate and counterproductive – PSYOP provides an effective tool at the disposal of commanders to achieve operational objectives through the use of information and persuasion.

I don't know how people would have gotten the message initially when IFOR came here [without the PSYOP effort]. The [CJIICTF-PSYOP] news is unbiased and informative. The "Herald of Peace" [CJIICTF newspaper] is a wonderful document. In fact, it is passed from person to person.

Admiral Joseph T. Lopez, USN
Commander, NATO Implementation Forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina
October 1996

2.0 PREREQUISITES FOR SUCCESS

The long history of psychological operations suggests four prerequisites for success as shown in the outer ring of the figure below:




Figure 3. Prerequisites for Success

Barriers to achieving these four prerequisites to success exist today. Each of the prerequisites is discussed below. Recommended actions are offered in the next section to get beyond the limitations in order to improve overall PSYOP capabilities and potential.

ACCESS TO, AND PARTICIPATION IN, THE PLANNING PROCESS

It is essential that PSYOP plans and considerations be incorporated into the front-end planning process for any US operation abroad. PSYOP must be a part of an overall national information strategy, formulated and managed at the interagency level cascading down into theater/regional level plans and operations. Routine access to senior leaders in this interagency environment is essential.

PSYOP planners bring much to the table in terms of human factors analysis and assessments and can formulate plans to enhance the development and effectiveness of flexible deterrent options and other courses of action, prior to, during, and after the deployment of combat forces. The PSYOP view expands and enhances the sophistication of planning in a complex world and helps to identify the full range of potential reactions to US plans. Information preparation of the battlefield, concurrent with intelligence preparation of the battlefield, is a key enabler for decision makers and commanders, requiring clearly articulated and specific PSYOP guidance in planning and warning orders. When the PSYOP perspective is not incorporated at the beginning, and is "added on" as an afterthought, opportunities are missed and commanders are not provided with the full range of advice and capabilities they need.

When PSYOP are an integral and early part of the deliberate and crisis planning process, the breadth of potential options expands. When PSYOP forces conduct the information preparation of the battlefield before forces deploy, many benefits accrue. PSYOP contribute directly to deterrence by enhancing the perceived strength of US capabilities during force deployments, reassuring and enlisting the cooperation of allies and coalition partners, and preparing the populace for the arrival of US combat forces.

As Commander of Joint Task Force 180 during Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, it is my belief that the integration of Psychological Operations (PSYOP) early in the planning process was critical to the successful execution of the operation. Long before any American military forces stepped ashore, PSYOP helped us quickly accomplish our political and military objectives by laying the foundation for transition from forced entry to semi-permissive operations. Without a doubt, PSYOP won the hearts and minds of Haiti's citizens, as well as setting the stage for the peaceful accomplishment of the Joint Task Force's mission... There is no question PSYOP saved lives, on both sides, during Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY. It proved to be the unsung, yet vitally important, factor in this operation – a true force multiplier.

Lieutenant General Henry H. Shelton, USA
Commanding, XVIII Airborne Corps and Ft. Bragg
4 May 1995

ACCESS TO RELIABLE, TIMELY INFORMATION AND INTELLIGENCE

When dealing with potential actions and reactions of a target audience, from both the planning and execution perspectives, it is essential to have access to both current information and intelligence. The effectiveness of an integrated PSYOP campaign is directly proportional to (1) the ability to exploit information about people, situations, and events that bear directly on the objectives of the PSYOP plan, and (2) the ability to adjust "the message" based on feedback from the target audience.

Much of the information about "message" effectiveness comes directly from the intelligence community, gathered through various technical and human means, and is of vital importance to shaping and adjusting the PSYOP plan as strategic, operational, and tactical situations unfold. Regular and timely access to relevant information and intelligence, particularly human and signals intelligence, is essential if PSYOP plans and operations are to be developed and conducted effectively and efficiently.

INDIVIDUALS AND ORGANIZATIONS CAPABLE OF PLANNING AND EXECUTING PSYOP

To realize the full potential of PSYOP demands:

- a broad range of modern individual PSYOP skills,
- state-of-the-art technology applications,
- access to contract service providers, and
- trained and ready military units and civilian organizations.

The need for state-of-the-art individual skills, tactics, techniques, procedures, systems, and organizations is clear. PSYOP must have the ability to contract with companies both in the US and overseas on short notice to provide necessary equipment and capabilities, such as audio visual, broadcast, and print production. Furthermore, PSYOP soldiers and civilians and PSYOP organizations must be positioned and embedded in the key front-end thinking, processes, and activities that support strategic, operational, and tactical planning to ensure the maximum, timely effect of PSYOP capabilities.

To the degree any of these elements atrophies in effectiveness, there is an opportunity for a potential adversary to negate or counter the effects of US PSYOP.

MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS

It is critical to the success of any psychological operation or campaign to assess the effectiveness of PSYOP strategies, products, individual skills, tactics, techniques, procedures, and the utility of technology and systems employed. These measures of effectiveness (MOEs) are at the heart of "course correcting" for the future, adjusting to refine and improve capabilities and overcome shortfalls and deficiencies.

As an example, the current procedures for pre-test and post-test activities, used to judge the effectiveness of PSYOP products, must be thoroughly evaluated to determine which private sector techniques can be adapted usefully to military PSYOP. Furthermore, ensuring routine coordination of PSYOP MOEs with intelligence activities will produce additional information to evaluate the success or failure of PSYOP activities, in both open and denied areas.

3.0 REQUIRED CAPABILITIES

...The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives.

Joint Pub 1-02

As described in the prerequisites for success, PSYOP capabilities must include the ability to coordinate, integrate, deconflict, and synchronize strategic, operational, and tactical psychological operations activities within the context of a broader national information-based strategy and other government agency operations, including required linkages to international, government, and nongovernment organizations. Furthermore, enhancing PSYOP contributions to the four key operational concepts of *Joint Vision 2010* requires improvements on a broad front. The PSYOP design principles discussed in Section 1 are useful to assess the merits of any recommendation for change, and were used as the basis for all proposed enhancements to PSYOP capabilities presented in this section.

Six key areas related to PSYOP are shown in Figure 4 below, and discussed in this section: doctrine, training and education, leadership, organization, materiel & technology, and soldiers and civilians.




Figure 4. Required PSYOP Capabilities

organization, materiel and technology, and soldiers and civilians. Each area contributes directly to the ability of military PSYOP forces to plan and conduct successful operations. Within each area, a series of recommendations is made that form the basis of an action plan that will require prioritization and resource requirements to redress today's PSYOP shortfalls and deficiencies and to enhance these capabilities in the future.

3.1 DOCTRINE

Traditionally, any discussion of doctrine has begun with an overarching view of likely areas of operation and a detailed appreciation of opposing forces and capabilities. Today, this is not easy. Potential threats range from transnational terrorists to heavily mechanized/armored forces of the types encountered in Operation DESERT STORM, with many variants in between. Because of the ambiguity and uncertainty associated with threats to US national interests, the "spectrum of engagement" has become a useful device to describe the likelihood of events and the corresponding range of capabilities that the US should possess to deter would-be aggressors and to defeat enemy forces should hostilities occur.

Figure 5 displays the spectrum of engagement as it moves from left to right in complexity and intensity of activities. At the far left are




Figure 5. Spectrum of Engagement

operations associated with peacetime engagement and enlargement (such as the Peacetime PSYOP Program), followed in turn by flexible deterrent options, battlefield preparation, war, and finally, consolidation activities to return to peace. For PSYOP, there is a clear requirement at each phase of the spectrum, with specific activities becoming more numerous and complex as the US approaches war, and, upon conflict termination, consolidates the peace.

Within the context of this spectrum of engagement, Figure 6 shows a stylized view of how the operational processes flow and of the key players who participate in the development and execution of PSYOP. These activities take place in the broad context of national information operations and battlespace management. Depending on the size and severity of the situation or crisis, the number of players vary in proportion to the real and potential harm or danger to US national interests and the direction of the National Command Authorities (NCA). Shown on the figure are those who participate in the development and formulation of PSYOP policy and plans, to include the coordination and integration of US government information and diplomatic and military PSYOP activities, the conduct of research and analysis, the development and crafting of PSYOP products, the dissemination operations that place PSYOP products with target audiences, and the feedback and assessment process that evaluates and adjusts the content of those products.




Figure 6. PSYOP – A Joint Enabler

Each of the five major PSYOP functions is summarized on the following pages, with recommended improvements appropriate to extending PSYOP capabilities into the 21st century.

POLICY AND PLANNING

The most important element in the planning function is having a properly constituted interagency body, operating under the aegis of the National Security Council, that is charged with the responsibility for developing, implementing, and monitoring the information policies, programs, and activities of the US government as a whole. The consequence of not having such a body that functions at all times is to operate sub-optimally, and occasionally at cross purposes. The demand for national coherence on information policy and programs only increases as friends and foes alike assess US positions for inconsistency and contradictions. All diplomatic and military information operations must be coordinated and integrated within the context of this national information strategy.

To be most effective, PSYOP must be an on-going topic within interagency policy discussions, and military and civilian PSYOP experts must be present to participate. This front-end, continuous, interagency dialogue reduces the miscues and non-mutually supporting activities that characterize many information programs of the recent past. Also, on the military side, PSYOP aspects of operations plans (OPLANs) and Concept Plans (CONPLANs) benefit from a greater national-level integration that ensures all government activities are coordinated, and that strategic, operational, and tactical PSYOP are planned and conducted to maximum effect. Promoting an active, participatory PSYOP place at the strategic, operational, and tactical planning tables is an essential feature of ensuring effective PSYOP.

Psychological operations (PSYOP) were a key Battlefield Operating System used extensively to support Unified Task Force (UNITAF) Somalia operations. In order to maximize the PSYOP impact, we established a Joint PSYOP Task Force (JPOTF) under the supervision of the Director of Operations, integrated PSYOP into all plans and operations... Psychological operations do not accomplish missions alone. They work best when they are combined with and integrated in an overall theater campaign plan. In Operation RESTORE HOPE, we were successful in doing that.

Major General Anthony C. Zinni, USMC
Director of Operations, Unified Task Force Somalia
4 May 1993

RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS

Research and analysis activities must continue to take full advantage of wide-ranging sources available to conduct regional area studies, to produce leadership profiles, and to develop country-specific databases. One issue is how much of the research and analysis function must be performed by government employees, such as today's Strategic Studies Detachment, and how much can be gained through nongovernment means. In some situations, certain PSYOP functions, such as print and broadcast, lend themselves directly to contract outsourcing, while others, such as product development and PSYOP research and analysis, are less easily contracted out for a variety of reasons, not the least of which is operational security.

Nonetheless, there are vast numbers of regionally-focused academic departments, "issues" institutes, and commercial economic and political assessment firms worldwide. As the interdependent characteristics of the global economy continue to play a larger role in international relations, the availability of key information for economic assessments will also increase. Much relevant data and expertise are available electronically through the Internet on topics that feed the basis of PSYOP plans and assessments. Two key questions are: To what degree should these capabilities be kept on retainer to ensure timely access as situations develop? And, are there more cost-effective approaches to identifying and selecting willing partners in this important information gathering process?

It must be remembered, however, that just as our ability to gather information is improving, so is our susceptibility to disinformation and simple errors of fact or omission. The need for cross-checks and filters, referential integrity of information, and source rules, is a burgeoning requirement for "safe-use" of the open information explosion.

There is also a pressing need for further development and access to government Intranets, that allow interagency information to flow back and forth in a secure communications environment, and then to be passed to the operational and tactical levels. The ability to assemble information situationally is at a premium and the information technologies are now coming on-line to help make this a reality.

PRODUCTION AND APPROVAL

The ability to produce PSYOP products (such as leaflets, broadcasts, newspapers) remains a function of design, development, coordination and approval, and the means of production based on media type. Streamlined, effective coordination and approval processes need to be ensured in the context of keeping "the message" nested logically within the overall information strategy for the operation. It is essential that each product fills a clearly articulated diplomatic and/or military objective that flows naturally from the strategic level to the tactical level. Furthermore, the approval process and control of PSYOP products must be made clear to all responsible parties, particularly tactical commanders who want PSYOP to be responsive to their requirements for US force protection and operational effectiveness in their areas of operation.

As an early commander of Combined Task Force PROVIDE COMFORT, it is my belief that much of the success achieved during Operation PROVIDE COMFORT can be attributed to the successful integration of psychological operations (PSYOP) in support of the overall humanitarian assistance mission. Over five million PSYOP products were dispersed over northern Iraq and southeastern Turkey in support of the Operation's goals and objectives. PSYOP is a true force multiplier.

General John M. Shalikashvili, USA
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
March 1994

Traditional paper-based products such as leaflets, newspapers, handbills, and posters, have always posed the greatest challenge to tactical PSYOP because of the traditional requirement to carry production capabilities into the field. As discussed later in the Materiel and Technology area, indigenous, commercially available state-of-the-art print, graphics, and multimedia production capabilities are mushrooming, and the ability to contract locally for these services may predominate in many situations.

Some Third World states have little of the production capabilities required by PSYOP, and PSYOP forces will need their own organic equipment or equipment contracted in the US or elsewhere for deployment. For remote, immature theaters of operation where capabilities are few or non-existent, new technology applications must provide small, lightweight, robust multimedia production systems.

These systems must be capable of receiving secure, electronically-delivered, approved products from points of origin (e.g., national level, theater level geographic combatant command, or joint task force) and integrating them with other materials, akin to today's desk-top publishing systems, and rolling out world-class materials. Document development and management systems available from commercial information technology and communications firms worldwide make clear the helpful trend for production capabilities available for future PSYOP, capabilities that PSYOP must take advantage of to remain effective.

DISSEMINATION

Dissemination of military PSYOP products is the responsibility of the Joint Psychological Operations Task Force operating in support of the regional CINC or Joint Task Force Commander. Conceptually, however, there is nothing to preclude any soldier, squad, or patrol in the area of operations from being an effective PSYOP "delivery platform." Simple, direct messages delivered by American soldiers are enormously powerful. Other US government agencies also produce and disseminate their own PSYOP products, and can be used to disseminate military PSYOP products.

Experimentation with new modular body systems being tested for Army XXI (e.g., Land Warrior), provides opportunities for including small, digitized loudspeakers that can broadcast information as soldiers make the rounds of camps, villages, hamlets, and other places where local populations are encountered. Television, radio, and shortwave broadcast capabilities, whether ground, sea, air, or space-based, can take advantage of the improved technologies for transmission and local override.

New media, such as cheaply produced CD ROMs or locally-targeted homepages on the Internet, are high-potential examples of reaching information-savvy and "on-line" target audiences. There is a clear requirement to be able to produce products for these modern message venues.

TESTING AND ASSESSMENT

A critical feature of PSYOP effectiveness is recognizing and quickly adjusting when "the message" is not producing intended results. Pre-testing and post-testing assessments are conducted through a variety of

means: surveys, interviews, focus groups, and Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW) interrogations. Ensuring that these means are culturally appropriate is an imperative to effective feedback.

Today's commercial marketing firms and political polling organizations – both at home and abroad – have amassed impressive successes through their methodologies and approaches for selling products and candidates. Continued review and analysis of these techniques in the context of evolving PSYOP doctrine remains essential. Taking advantage of all available, situationally relevant techniques in this complicated business of assessing the impact and improving the effectiveness of the PSYOP message is key, and must be incorporated into PSYOP doctrine.

3.2 TRAINING AND EDUCATION

The senior leadership of the DoD and the Army must be approached with the proposition that it already possesses an essential ingredient to successful 21st century operations. The likely environment of 2010 provides a compelling reason to leverage and improve the capabilities and characteristics of today's PSYOP force structure, embodied in the active and reserve component PSYOP soldiers and civilians who bring special skills and depth to US national security planning and decision making. Several recommendations are made in this section to improve the professional development of PSYOP specialists.

DELIBERATELY FOSTER "WORLD CLASS" EXPECTATIONS FOR PSYOP PERSONNEL BY ESTABLISHING A SEPARATE PSYOP FUNCTIONAL AREA

Today, PSYOP and Civil Affairs (CA) are combined in a single functional area, and are commanded within the structure of a Major Subordinate Command of the US Army Special Operations Command, the US Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC). Although PSYOP skills and their application are separate and distinct from those of Civil Affairs, PSYOP and CA have become synonymous and interchangeable for the predominance of senior military and civilian leaders, resulting in loss of PSYOP identity and effectiveness, as well as confusion and misunderstanding. PSYOP and CA do not perform each others functions, but rather support and complement each other. Consequently, PSYOP doctrine is distinct from CA doctrine, just as both are distinct from Special Forces doctrine. The mission and employment of PSYOP and CA units are significantly different and require different specialized skills and a radically

different mind set. Establishing a separate PSYOP functional area would clearly and unambiguously emphasize this needed separation from CA. It is, therefore, appropriate to consider establishing Psychological Operations as its own functional area within the Army, an initiative that is currently being studied within the US Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School in the context of PSYOP and CA professional development.

PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND EXPOSURE

For PSYOP military officers, soldiers, and civilians to be world-class information warriors, as called for in *Joint Vision 2010*, they need more opportunities to get advanced degrees, work with industry and academia, as well as hone their military PSYOP skills.

It is essential that the PSYOP functional area develop senior officers in order to establish and maintain the necessary balance within this specialty, and place more PSYOP officers and noncommissioned officers at geographic combatant commands. This will not be easy. But, to achieve sustainable, competent PSYOP skills, the steady maturation of soldiers in this functional area is a necessity and must be managed selectively and advocated carefully by its proponents.

A key element in this maturation process is to establish and maintain positions for PSYOP officers at the national level in appropriate activities and agencies (e.g., on the National Security Council, Department of State, Central Intelligence Agency, United States Information Agency, Drug Enforcement Agency, and National Security Agency), and at all joint headquarters and defense organizations (e.g., Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Joint Command and Control Warfare Center) to promote increased participation, exposure, and understanding of PSYOP capabilities in the development of information strategies and courses of action in these important interagency and national-level forums. Most helpful would be to establish a Joint PSYOP Command, discussed later in Section 3.4, Organization, to coordinate national-level, strategic PSYOP requirements with the Joint Staff, OSD, and the interagency community.

Furthermore, institutions of higher learning and selected faculty members, political polling and strategy organizations and consultants, and high technology companies and experts are an invaluable source of

unorthodox, "out-of-the-box" ideas and potential technology applications to support psychological operations. Establishing routine contact and interaction appears promising, to include having PSYOP military and civilian personnel serve "apprenticeship/familiarization tours" with these types of organizations and individuals as part of their continuing professional education and training. Clear separation from operational matters must be maintained for obvious reasons of security, but this should not pose an insurmountable barrier to such interactions.

PROGRAMS OF INSTRUCTION

Today, there are several principal sources of training and education that contribute to the professional development of PSYOP personnel. Looking specifically at PSYOP officer training in the Army, for example, shows the following major programs of instruction:

- PSYOP Officers Course (POOC)
- Regional Studies Course
- Foreign Language Training
- PSYOP Master's Program
- Joint PSYOP Staff Planning Course

These courses should be evaluated for curriculum adequacy, applicability, and potential redundancy. It may be that the POOC, the Master's Program, and the Regional Studies Course can be combined into a more concentrated and wide-ranging offering. Also, course and program availability need to be evaluated to determine whether increased numbers of students, both active and reserve, can be accommodated. Essential information, including the following, should be explored for course enhancement and focus:

- In-depth PSYOP campaign planning to include interaction with and familiarity with the full range of information activities and decision nodes at work throughout the joint, combined, and interagency environment – to include PSYOP support to the full range of operations, including those directed by the NCA.
- Relevant multicultural, social, and language exposure to overcome communications barriers with target audiences in assigned areas of operation.

- Mass media management, marketing, polling, and other modern techniques for enhancing understanding and analysis of product feedback, in order to improve product dissemination cycle times.

Furthermore, current Professional Military Education (PME) programs of instruction at Service and Joint schools, national-level defense colleges and universities, General Officer/Flag Officer CAPSTONE and Joint Warfighter courses, and the Foreign Service Institute should be reviewed to ensure all students receive a more thorough appreciation for the full dimensions of PSYOP and its inherent capabilities. Assigning PSYOP cadre with extensive experience to these institutions should be assessed as a means of improving PSYOP exposure and instruction. By more thoroughly educating all professional military and civilian personnel about PSYOP, they will carry this knowledge into their next assignments. There, they can promote and leverage PSYOP actively where appropriate, in contrast to having to learn its capabilities "on the job," a condition that predominates today.

JOINT TRAINING

It is also essential that PSYOP continue to be included regularly at the appropriate level in Service and joint training exercises in order to achieve realistic and effective training. When PSYOP is not part of the exercise plan, then practice is limited and exposure of participants to actual PSYOP capabilities is minimal. The consequence is to push PSYOP to the side of tactical and operational thinking instead of being a fully integrated battlefield capability. Combat Training Center rotations are an excellent means for "training as we will fight and inform." Like the PME institutions, increases to the small cadres at the training centers go a long way towards improving the coordination and integration of PSYOP into training programs and exercises.

3.3

LEADERSHIP

As the US military evolves its doctrinal concepts to align with *Joint Vision 2010*, there is no more important task than educating the current and future leadership about the changing world environment and the conditions and circumstances they will face. As both military and civilian leaders progress through their careers, some will be called upon to do the nation's business in some distant and unfamiliar places. For future PSYOP leaders, this is a given.

In order to develop world-class PSYOP capabilities, we must have competent PSYOP leaders, capable of contributing substantively at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels, both as diplomats and as soldiers. In the discussion above on training and education, the theme is to improve not only the depth of PSYOP-specific skills, tactics, techniques, and procedures, but also to broaden the PSYOP professional's exposure to information strategies and operations throughout the government.

However, PSYOP leadership skills can be maintained, trained, and honed only if the Army is willing to deliberately attract and recruit qualified individuals into PSYOP. At the same time, the Army must recognize these officers and noncommissioned officers may not be in the mold of typical infantry, artillery, armor, or special forces soldiers. This must be accepted and not career-ending. PSYOP soldiers must be able to make colonel and general officer rank if there is to be any chance of attracting and retaining a world-class PSYOP capability.

To achieve this higher (strategic level) skill capability, more selective criteria must be established for PSYOP officers, soldiers, and civilians. These criteria must be applied consistently through a rigorous assessment and carefully orchestrated selection process to develop a core of highly trained and certified personnel, with top-notch PSYOP functional expertise, regional and cultural experience, and appropriate linguistic capabilities.

In Section 3.6, Soldiers and Civilians, the information-related skill sets of the 21st century are discussed. These must be the core competencies of the next generation of PSYOP leaders. The ability to conceptualize innovative approaches to the employment of PSYOP, leveraging available technology, and conducting creative, tailored information operations within the operational environment of the 21st century is no easy undertaking. The challenge is significant and poses real dilemmas for current practices in terms of gaining and then keeping qualified, interested, and motivated practitioners and leaders.

3.4 ORGANIZATION

The conduct of PSYOP is complex and interrelated at many levels and with many organizations. PSYOP success has often come at the price of "working around" the problem because of inherent limitations associated with organizational placement and dispersal of PSYOP units and assets. To improve the effectiveness of PSYOP in the future, it is

useful to consolidate a list of the organizational capabilities that would be present in an "ideal" PSYOP structure, from the strategic level to the tactical. From this list of capabilities, organizational alternatives can be explored as potential means of achieving these enhanced capabilities.

PSYOP ORGANIZATIONAL CAPABILITIES

Some of the most important capabilities for future PSYOP organizations are:

- Achieve full integration with the interagency community in the Washington, DC area and elsewhere, by assigning PSYOP detailees to all major agencies and activities involved with national information policies and strategies, programs, and operations.
- Provide real-time communications links for all media product development and review. Keep PSYOP products flowing on a schedule that enables them to meet US/partner time-phasing requirements, while also staying sufficiently within the decision cycle timelines of target audience leadership groups to influence their perceptions and actions.
- Provide radio and TV broadcasts from ground, sea, air, and space-based platforms, irrespective of time of day, weather, permissive/nonpermissive environments, and other situational factors that impede reaching target audiences in a timely fashion, particularly when keyed to schemes of maneuver and fires.
- Maintain access to a series of launch platforms (e.g., unmanned aerial vehicles, guided precision aerial delivery systems, precision guided canister bombs) for print and broadcast dissemination, particularly for denied area operations, or when manned aircraft are not available.
- Ensure joint interoperability and integration of product development and dissemination, to include combat camera, shipborne broadcast capabilities, and other important joint technical assets that can contribute to leveraged US PSYOP capabilities.

- Maintain access to the following:
 - Worldwide command, control, communications, and intelligence linkages to ensure timely, precision-crafted niche target products, and rapid turnaround to remote producers and disseminators.
 - National and theater intelligence links to ensure essential situational awareness and feedback on PSYOP product effectiveness as the campaign plan is developed and refined.
 - Native linguists and regional cultural specialists from all Services and other government agencies, as well as contract hires who may have high demand or low density language/cultural skills particularly appropriate to ongoing or planned operations.
 - Regional and cultural expertise from civilian academic institutions and private sector organizations.
 - Mass marketing, polling, assessment, and feedback expertise from private sector organizations.
 - CONUS-based or regional private sector contract service providers, foreign-owned or US-owned, for PSYOP production work in areas of operation.
- Provide a research and analysis capability with assigned personnel having requisite intelligence clearances to access and evaluate all open source and classified data relevant to ongoing PSYOP and for PSYOP in the planning stages, and the technical capability to assemble situational data and profiles from diverse sources for immediate use.

ORGANIZATIONAL OPTIONS

The list of “ideal” PSYOP capabilities described above exists to some extent within the individual Services today. But no Service has the combined and integrated capabilities suggested by the list above. The Army comes closest with its active and reserve PSYOP force structure, but it is missing significant capabilities that reside in the other Services. In order to achieve some measure of the capabilities described above, three organizational options are suggested that warrant further exploration.

JOINT PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

Based on the prerequisites for success discussed earlier, it is prudent to examine the formation of a Joint Psychological Operations Command (JPOC) under the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). Because of the increasing demand for PSYOP, and the requirement to address strategic and transnational issues during peacetime operations and operations other than war, the central focus for the Joint PSYOP Command would be to coordinate PSYOP support for national strategic-level as well as theater operational plans and operations. The Joint PSYOP Command would adjust resources based on competing demands from the national level and the geographic combatant commands. A Joint Command would provide the PSYOP community with unmistakable recognition of the importance of this capability to the US defense establishment, and solidify the absolute requirement for world-class performance in this difficult and complex undertaking.

Although the vast majority of PSYOP forces are in the Army, there are significant PSYOP capabilities spread throughout the other Services and in joint organizations, such as the plotting of radio and television broadcast patterns provided by the Joint Command and Control Warfare Center. A Joint PSYOP Command charged with coordinating and integrating these capabilities DoD-wide would significantly improve the responsiveness and depth of PSYOP forces, and would go a long way towards generating the proposed PSYOP capabilities described earlier. If established, it is recommended that the JPOC be commanded by a PSYOP general officer, which has its own intrinsic value to the PSYOP community and puts the reward mechanism in place for sustained excellence in this demanding business.

The following organizational actions would be required:

- A joint headquarters and staff, established as a subordinate command of USSOCOM.
- Liaison elements assigned to all key intergovernmental agencies and joint military headquarters and their corresponding components as required (Marine Expeditionary Forces, Air Forces, Fleets, Army Corps).
- PSYOP teams forward deployed to all theater SOCs to coordinate and participate in deliberate and crisis planning to ensure PSYOP participation on the front end and as the lead

elements for the formation of Joint Psychological Operations Task Forces (JPOTFs) when called for by OPLANs.

The list of capabilities described earlier for future PSYOP organizations is incomplete. However, a sense of the dimensions and capability of such an organization as a national, strategic, operational, and tactical enabler can be gained from even this brief description.

STATUS QUO (PLUS)

As an alternative to the first recommendation, if we leave Service PSYOP organizations and capabilities as they are today, certain adjustments can be made to accommodate and enhance planning capabilities for future operations.

Under this scenario, for example, Army PSYOP planning elements would be deployed forward to ensure front-end planning and coordination:

- Six to eight strategic planners would be forward deployed on theater Special Operations Command (SOC) staffs.
- They would be reinforced by planners/units from CONUS as required during crises and contingencies.

These elements would also be responsible for coordinating with PSYOP units and capabilities from all the Services as they arrive in theater. Their location in the theater SOC staffs would also facilitate coordination with other theater staff elements for intelligence, C4I, and contracting authority, much as is done today. Just as the Special Operations Theater Support Elements (SOTSEs) have improved the logistics interface with the Army Service Component Commanders (ASCC), the PSYOP theater support elements would help to alleviate current shortfalls and deficiencies associated with communications and intelligence linkages, and would help to streamline the arrangements for support to PSYOP forces as they deploy into theater.

Given the importance of PSYOP as a national-level capability, increased presence within the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS) is seen as an important consideration. One approach to enhance visibility of PSYOP at the national level would be to create a Psychological Operations Division (POD) within the J3 Operations Directorate. Such a division would act as the focal point for all military PSYOP within the JCS, facilitating planning, participation, and exposure of PSYOP

capabilities to all joint staff activities. Furthermore, such a division could act as the focal point for PSYOP discussions in the interagency community and facilitate the coordination, integration, and deconfliction of national level information activities where PSYOP plays such an integral part. The Joint Staff is currently assessing whether to increase PSYOP officer, enlisted, and civilian positions in the J3, and to convert the PSYOP branch to a division.

In addition, it may be useful to reconsider the presence of a PSYOP staff element on the USSOCOM Joint Staff (the former J9 organization). Such an element would prove useful to ensuring the coordinated and integrated use of PSYOP capabilities within the SOF community and to improve coordination and integration with assets external to USSOCOM.

US ARMY 4TH PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS GROUP INTERNAL RESTRUCTURE

As a complementary effort to either of the two previous organizational recommendations, the Tables of Organization and Equipment (TO&E) for PSYOP active and reserve forces should be reviewed in their entirety to take into account new operational realities, concepts of operation, active and reserve component integration, new skills, and new materiel system capabilities discussed in this assessment. The advent of new materiel systems may well yield manpower savings that can be refocused to other critical areas of the force where there are current manpower shortfalls.

For example, the US Army 4th Psychological Operations Group is stretched significantly today trying to meet the demands for PSYOP support from the geographic combatant Commanders in Chief (CINCs). There are only three active regional battalions being shared and apportioned among the competing demands of five combatant CINCs. There are obvious individual language and regional/cultural skills that do not necessarily move easily between and among theaters. When spread too thin, or when the operational tempo remains high over long periods of time, the units are hard-pressed to maintain their effectiveness.

As an interim measure, the 4th Psychological Operations Group should be restructured internally to create one additional active regionally-oriented operational battalion in order to meet the current demands placed on the group, and a robust plans section to provide group-level oversight of all combatant command (and their subordinate components) and Joint Task Force OPLANs and CONPLANs. These

changes provide the ability to better use the active and reserve component PSYOP structure to meet continuing demands for PSYOP support from the NCA and CINCs.

3.5 MATERIEL AND TECHNOLOGY

The future effectiveness of PSYOP, beyond the skills of individual PSYOP soldiers and civilians, will, in large measure, be driven by the state-of-the-art of PSYOP technical capabilities. The development and acquisition of modern PSYOP technology must be commensurate with the likely environments where PSYOP will be employed, the range of sophistication of target audiences that may be encountered, and the state-of-the-art of adversaries who will attempt to negate and disrupt the conduct of PSYOP. In order to get on the leading edge of this continuing dynamic, it is imperative to focus on off-the-shelf and new technologies in concert with compelling concepts of operation.

Perhaps the most important factors driving the configuration of future PSYOP materiel system capabilities are:

- requirements by geographic combatant commands to deploy PSYOP forces with their print and broadcast capabilities into theaters with little if any infrastructure or support available for these functions;
- strategic lift necessary to deploy organic PSYOP equipment; and
- availability of state-of-the-art technology and bandwidth to transmit products from point of origin to remote locations, to include ground, sea, air, and space-based platforms.

Although we should use all available in-theater support, we must be tempered by reality and not over-rely on capabilities that may not exist, may be incapable of providing the support we require, or may be unavailable.

INDIGENOUS CAPABILITIES

In many places in the world today there are locally available production and broadcast capabilities for much of the US PSYOP product that is printed and transmitted. As modern communications capabilities proliferate, this production situation will only improve. The availability of such local capability can in some cases be arranged

through Host Nation Support (HNS) agreements, or can be contracted with local service providers. Furthermore, US and international document management companies are expanding their services worldwide and are likely to have some capabilities available in even some of the most remote areas. It is important to be able to establish relationships quickly with these national or contract service providers to deliver capabilities in concert with the schedules called for in PSYOP plans. These indigenous and rapidly available services from the commercial sector lessen the requirement to move US military equipment into theater to actually conduct PSYOP production activities. To date, contractual services seem to work best in a permissive environment provided the proper level of security and security classification can be maintained. In time of war, PSYOP will require a robust production capability leveraged from CONUS or deployed on short notice.

STRATEGIC LIFT

To the extent PSYOP materiel loads remain outsized and heavy, requiring significant numbers of dedicated lift sorties to arrive in theater, they will continue to compete with other wartime capabilities that must be deployed by our over-utilized strategic transportation system. Outsized, bulky cargo tends to go by sea rather than by air, and this immediately compromises the effectiveness of early-on PSYOP activities by limiting the dissemination of certain types of materials.

Future PSYOP materiel system requirements must minimize, to the greatest extent possible, the lift requirements associated with those capabilities necessary to execute the PSYOP plan. Lift minimization can be achieved in several ways. One is to develop smaller and lighter production capabilities for printed materials (leaflets, newspapers, etc.), with significantly enhanced internal processing capabilities to receive centrally-developed products and allow remote production in those locations where no alternate production capability exists or is accessible. A second method is to pre-position materiel forward on the ground or afloat as a means of reducing the requirements for strategic lift. Some pre-positioning of PSYOP-related materiel, such as print and broadcast equipment, is absolutely critical in selected locations, in particular those theaters with Major Regional Contingency requirements or that have frequent peacetime deployment requirements to employ those assets. A third method is to establish, where possible, pre-existing arrangements for HNS or contractor support which capitalize on the indigenous capabilities discussed above.

COMMUNICATIONS BANDWIDTH

For each operation, there is a limited amount of available bandwidth to support diplomatic and military communications. This poses a problem for communications managers who must analyze requirements for traffic and transmissions times, recommend allocations, and assign bandwidths, frequencies, and other spectrum-related characteristics, while guaranteeing the priority command and control requirements of the operation. Supporting activity requirements often are placed lower down on the priority list and scheduling of dense communications traffic often becomes a problem for those who must operate within these constraints. For example, one of the biggest communications drains for remote operations in Bosnia and other locations is associated with video teleconferencing. When there is a compelling need to reallocate or reprioritize bandwidth, the theater CINC makes that decision.

PSYOP product development takes place centrally, normally from the same location where the product or actions are approved, either the geographic combatant command or Joint Task Force. Having state-of-the-art telecommunications equipment and adequate bandwidth would facilitate the process, and allow PSYOP products to be produced at remote locations. This significantly reduces transportation requirements from the Psychological Operations Task Force headquarters to outlying sectors. However, unless the bandwidth is available, the product will not move. Long distance communications requirements can be significant, particularly when multimedia messages are being transmitted from point of origin to point of production. As the sophistication of the PSYOP product increases, to include, for example, text, pictures/graphics, video and sound, the communications transmission and receipt requirements also increase. This condition places a premium on developing more sophisticated message packets and encryption algorithms that maximize the fidelity and security of transmissions within available bandwidth, and establishing PSYOP Statements of Requirements with the J6s in each theater.

MATERIEL SYSTEM AND TECHNOLOGY CAPABILITIES

There are three major areas where current deficiencies exist and off-the-shelf and new technology applications can decidedly improve the ability of PSYOP forces to produce, disseminate, and communicate:

PRODUCTION CAPABILITIES

- Automatic language translation is an important capability for producing and adjusting content in near real time, although the requirement for "man-in-the-loop" verification of content will always remain.
- Centralized multimedia production capabilities must be capable of transmitting to and being received at forward areas for remote production.

DISSEMINATION CAPABILITIES

- All-media broadcast and dissemination capabilities must operate in a range of environments (permissive and nonpermissive), in different geographic locations (from a central, forward deployed location to remote locations), and from different platforms (to include ground, sea, air, and space-based platforms, including unmanned aerial vehicles, balloons, and airborne pods). These capabilities are critical for delivery of printed and broadcast products.
- Man-portable, multifunctional dissemination systems that include real-time embedded voice translation (for languages that have adequate translation programs) and print capability facilitate early entry and effective PSYOP.
- Directional broadcasts must be effective within various electronic environments, to include consideration of platform-generated signal interference.
- Low-cost, multichannel, scatterable loudspeakers or radio receivers that can be launched by balloons, artillery, or other indirect fire weapons may prove useful for denied area operations.
- Technology improvements are needed to increase significantly the fidelity of those loudspeakers used for battlefield deception operations.
- Lightweight, long-lasting power sources for loudspeakers are needed to replace conventional batteries for remote operations.
- A capability is needed to project messages onto the wall of a building or other surfaces above the heads of a target audience.

COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITIES

- Improved capabilities are required to influence media, communications, radio, TV, Internet, and private networks in target countries.
- Secure communications and database access capabilities are needed to integrate situational data from multiple sources more quickly and efficiently.
- A capability to communicate new or adjusted PSYOP products simultaneously to multiple tactical dissemination elements is needed in the immediate area of operations.
- Communications capabilities organic to PSYOP units must be significantly upgraded if units are to work detached from Joint Task Forces in subordinate sectors, tap into maneuver force communications networks, and be able to handle incoming multimedia message traffic for remote production and dissemination.

3.6 SOLDIERS AND CIVILIANS

The success of PSYOP, as with all complex human endeavors, is dependent on the quality, imagination, sophistication, perseverance, and knowledge of those charged with its conceptualization, planning, and execution. To realize the full potential of PSYOP, a wide array of individual skills is required, many of them, like cultural anthropology, are not typically found in military organizations. To the extent these skills are not current and situationally responsive and relevant, there are opportunities for potential adversaries to counter or negate the effects of US psychological operations.

Gregory R. Copley, writing in the March 1996 edition of Defense & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy, observes:

... psychological strategy and its operational arts are something which cannot be conducted well if they are conducted in accordance with strict doctrine, nor with intellectual conformity. The success of all psychological strategies and psy-ops lies in their inherent element of surprise, subtlety and (very often) obliqueness. That is not to say that discipline is unimportant, or that rules do not exist. On the contrary. But they are rules which, for their very success, rely upon different approaches to those adopted by conventional elements of society, whether civil or military.

Psychological strategy and psychological operations must, by their nature, be apart from the mainstream operational military doctrines and political practices. They are also, by nature, strategies and operations of indirect approach, through which results are achieved by the manner in which target audiences are directed, re-directed or paralysed without their conscious awareness of the source or means of their manipulation.

The requirements placed on PSYOP personnel are peculiarly demanding. PSYOP personnel must be adept at the conceptualization and development of compelling PSYOP strategies and plans, sufficiently familiar with the capabilities (and shortfalls) of current organizations and available technology to develop executable plans, and they must have sufficient professional credibility within military structures to "carry the message" in that environment. These individuals are not, by and large, typical soldiers. To be successful, PSYOP personnel – both military and civilian – must be regionally expert and culturally aware, articulate, usually foreign language trained, and at ease with media production, analysis techniques, and tools – in essence, they must embody a set of skills critical to the success of US diplomatic and military operations throughout the 21st century world. These are skills that must be cultivated and husbanded.

The information you [PSYOP soldiers] have put out to the Former Warring Factions, the Coalition Forces, as well as the civilian agencies allows us to speak with one voice and has promoted cohesion and solidarity among all the forces.

General George A. Joulwan, USA
NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe
October 1996

Recent operational experience suggests that we have achieved a high level of competency in tactical level skills. Loudspeaker teams get the job done. However, it is only when PSYOP plans are approved by the geographic combatant commander or JTF commander, that the full potential of PSYOP is achieved. The real issue comes at the front end of the planning process, where there are very few individuals with the full range of skills needed to conceive and plan imaginative and productive PSYOP. This is the hardest part of the equation, where sophistication, expertise, and "feel" are essential elements necessary to ensure that PSYOP plans are carefully articulated and integrated with the rest of the operational planning process. Communicating how PSYOP can be employed up front is the essential requirement: to shape the political

and social information environments of target audiences, and to influence the human factors associated with opposing political leaders and military commanders, as well as their external sources of support. In other words, what can we do to influence the political, military, and intellectual battlespace to our advantage? Individuals who can explain and perform these tasks are the essential front-end players who develop the information-related courses of action in all operations and contingency plans as we move to the future.

Because of the long lead times to develop and complex nature of some PSYOP skills, it may be more appropriate to consider some of them in terms of situational contract hires or as permanently outsourced capabilities that are kept on retainer – in other words, using nongovernment personnel. Some skills are more appropriate for government civilians, in lieu of military, and could be augmented to TO&E organizations in order to have required expertise available in times of crisis or contingency operations. Other skills, like those associated with intelligence specialties, require security clearances that involve long vetting processes. Still other skills are essential to maintain in strictly military organizations, where nonpermissive environments demand that soldiers be present. The skill groups shown in Figure 8 on the opposite page suggest the kinds of capabilities needed to exploit PSYOP into the 21st century.

This is a very special group of people – soldiers and civilians – with special talents and skills. To acquire and keep people with these qualities and interests is essential if we wish to achieve and sustain PSYOP effectiveness at levels beyond the tactical. Not meeting these fundamental skill requirements places the effectiveness of PSYOP in jeopardy.

- Information Management
 - Information/Data Modeling
 - Relational Database Development
 - Situational Information Integration
 - Artificial Intelligence
- Information Warfare/Command and Control Warfare
 - National Information Strategy
 - PSYOP Strategy and Campaign Planning
 - Attack/Protect/Exploit Operations
- Area & Cultural Studies
 - Multicultural/Regional Expertise
 - Relevant Languages
 - Cultural Anthropology
- Mass Media/Multimedia
 - Graphics Arts Design
 - Print Journalism
 - Radio/TV Broadcasting
 - Internet/Intranet Designers
- Marketing and Polling
 - Research and Analysis
 - Social Psychology
 - Clinical Psychology
 - Behavioral Science
 - Negotiation/Interpersonal Skills
(including persuasion and influence techniques)
 - Scientific Survey/Polling Methods
- Intelligence
 - Strategic Intelligence
 - Intelligence and Electronic Warfare (IEW)
 - Electronic Intelligence (ELINT)
 - Human Intelligence (HUMINT)
 - Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)
 - Imagery Intelligence (IMINT)
 - Technical Intelligence (TECHINT)
 - Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence (C4I)
 - Security (OPSEC, INFOSEC, COMSEC, etc.)
 - Interrogation
- Production and Dissemination
 - Communications
 - Production/Duplication
 - Multimedia Transmission/Receipt/Integration
 - Platform Specialization
(e.g., aircraft, UAV, balloon, parachute riggers)
 - Product Specialization
(e.g., leaflet, cassette, CD ROM, radio/TV broadcasts)
- International Law

Figure 8. 21st Century PSYOP Skills

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4.0 CONCLUSION

This document is a call to action to improve US government PSYOP capabilities. It describes the circumstances and trends likely to be faced by US defense planners in the 21st century. Within that context, the importance of psychological operations to the success of *Joint Vision 2010* cannot be overly emphasized. The senior officers quoted earlier addressed the critical part that PSYOP played in operations for which they had responsibility. In every case, PSYOP provided a unique and invaluable capability available nowhere else in the military structure. Had PSYOP forces and their special talents and capabilities not been available, outcomes may well have been different – perhaps greater numbers of casualties, perhaps longer periods of conflict, perhaps longer times required to achieve stability and conflict resolution.

This assessment provides a significant number of recommendations to improve US PSYOP capabilities. They warrant careful and serious consideration by defense planners as the nation looks forward to an uncertain and potentially threatening future. US interests will surely be challenged on a broad front and from many directions. PSYOP can produce the diplomatic and military multipliers necessary to help prevent and deter conflict, and, when deterrence fails, to shape the information battlespace in such a way as to guarantee victory and to reestablish the peace.

There will be no better time to take on the challenges to improve US PSYOP capabilities from the perspectives of doctrine, training and education, leadership, organization, materiel and technology, and soldier and civilian capabilities. When achieved, these improved capabilities will assure the continued contribution of PSYOP to achieving **full spectrum dominance** for US operations well into the 21st century.

Joseph S. Nye and William A. Owens, writing in the March/April 1996 edition of Foreign Affairs, remind us:

Knowledge, more than ever before, is power. The one country that can best lead the information revolution will be more powerful than any other... This information advantage can help deter or defeat traditional military threats at relatively low cost. In a world in which the meaning of containment, the nuclear umbrella, and conventional deterrence have changed, the information advantage can strengthen the intellectual link between U.S. foreign policy and military power and offer new ways of maintaining leadership in alliances and ad hoc coalitions.

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APPENDIX A. REFERENCES

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APPENDIX B. NSDD 130

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 6, 1984

NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION
DIRECTIVE NUMBER 130

US International Information Policy (U)

International information is an integral and vital part of US national security policy and strategy in the broad sense. Together with the other components of public diplomacy, it is a key strategic instrument for shaping fundamental political and ideological trends around the globe on a long-term basis and ultimately affecting the behavior of governments. (U)

While improvements have been made in US international information programs and activities over the last several years, there is a need for sustained commitment over time to improving the quality and effectiveness of US international information efforts, the level of resources devoted to them, and their coordination with other elements of US national security policy and strategy. The role of international information considerations in policy formulation needs to be enhanced, and wider understanding of the role of international information should be sought within the Executive Branch as well as with the Congress and the public. (U)

The fundamental purpose of US international information programs is to affect foreign audiences in ways favorable to US national interests. Such programs can only be credible and effective by respecting accuracy and objectivity. At the same time, the habits, interests, expectations and level of understanding of foreign audiences may differ significantly from those of the domestic American audience, and require different approaches and emphases in the selection and presentation of information. While US international information activities must be sensitive to the concerns of foreign governments, our information programs should be understood to be a strategic instrument of US national policy, not a tactical instrument of US diplomacy. We cannot accept foreign control over program content. (U)

International Information Strategy

Essential to a successful global information strategy is recognition of the diversity of the audiences the US seeks to address. Beyond the obvious differences among Western,

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(F87-1035)

Communist country and Third World audiences, there are significant ideological and cultural differences within countries and regions and between elites, key opinion sectors, and the general population. Programming must be more effectively differentiated to reach these audiences. The critical importance of elites in the formation of public opinion must be recognized. At the same time; intensified efforts must be made to address the general population in areas where government control of elite communications is strict. Specific information themes and strategies outlined in the study accompanying this directive should serve as the general basis for US international information programming. (S)

International Radio Broadcasting

International radio broadcasting is the US Government's most effective means of communicating the truth directly to the peoples of the world. Improvement in the US international broadcasting effort must continue to enjoy the highest priority. National Security Decision Directive 45 affirmed the essentials of existing US policy relative to US international broadcasting and, among other things, authorized a major, long-term program of modernization and expansion, approved revised guidance for determining languages and broadcast hours, and called for a major effort to overcome jamming of US broadcasts and ameliorate its effects. A review of implementation of NSDD 45 should be undertaken by the Senior Planning Group. Such a review should include a revision of current language guidance, to include recommendations concerning the possible initiation of new language services. It should also incorporate reports on programming policy and objectives relating to international audiences of the Radio in the American Sector of Berlin and our Armed Forces Radio and Television Service. (S)

Other International Information Instruments

Several other instruments of international information merit special attention and long-term planning and development. (U).

More systematic thought needs to be given to the opportunities offered by international television broadcasting. A conceptual study should be undertaken of technical and political options for US international television broadcasting over the next several decades. (U)

In the area of publications, steps should be taken to reconstitute as a major ongoing program support for publishing and disseminating abroad books and other publications. This includes strengthening a working partnership between the USG and the private sector to make available broad serious works on American or Western institutions and principles. (U)

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In addition to the traditional instruments of international information, new technologies (particularly in the area of audio and video tape cassettes) have created new instruments whose potential should be explored. (U)

It is important to recognize that information disseminated by private and commercial organizations is likely to have special credibility with many audiences. A high priority should be placed on improving liaison and cooperation with, and support of, appropriate private sector information efforts. (U)

An interagency study in support of US objectives relative to the free flow of information and the potential of new communications technologies should be carried out under the auspices of the Senior Planning Group. Special attention shall be given as to how to overcome barriers to information flow and how to utilize communications technologies to penetrate closed societies. (U)

Information and Communications Assistance

Strategically targeted information and communications assistance to other nations can contribute significantly to achieving US objectives. It should be recognized as an integral part of US international information activities. A study should be undertaken by the Senior Interagency Group on International Communications and Information Policy to define the role and contributions of the various agencies involved and to develop a long-term strategy in this area. ~~(S)~~

International Information Policy in Peace and War

In view of the importance of psychological factors in maintaining the confidence of allied governments and in deterring military action against US national interests, and in order to be prepared for the immediate and effective use of psychological operations (PSYOP) in crisis and wartime, it is vital that the Armed Forces maintain a strong and active international information capability. Revitalization and full integration of PSYOP in military operations and planning should be a high priority of the Department of Defense. In order to employ PSYOP effectively and economically, a set of national guidelines and a funded program will be established and roles and relationships of the agencies that are involved will be defined. The Department of Defense is directed, with appropriate interagency coordination and in accordance with national law and policy, to participate in overt PSYOP programs in peacetime. The SPG should take the lead in developing coordinated interagency plans, including the utilization of DOD capabilities, for international information activities in support of national security objectives. ~~(S)~~

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Crisis and wartime conditions impose special requirements on US international information activities. In wartime or during crises (which may be defined as periods of acute tension involving a threat to the lives of American citizens, or the imminence of war between the US and other nations), US international information elements should be ready to initiate special procedures to ensure policy consistency, timely response and rapid feedback from the intended audience. Appropriate agencies should review and, as necessary, develop procedures for their operations during crises. (S)

International Information: Functional Requirements

Research on public opinion, media reaction, and cultural factors needs to be substantially improved and more fully coordinated and applied to US information activities. The proposed Foreign Opinion Research Advisory Group (FORA) is hereby approved, and agencies should seek funding for it as required. (U)

There is an urgent requirement for more extensive and sophisticated training of USG personnel in the international information environment, and in substantive and technical requirements of effective international and intercultural communication. Agencies should review their existing training programs and augment them as necessary. In the area of career development, a special effort should be made by all agencies to develop career tracks which encourage qualified individuals to remain in the field of international information. (U)

The lack of adequate resources devoted to international information remains a problem of fundamental importance. All Executive departments with significant activities in the international or national security areas should comprehensively review their participation in and support of US international information activities, with a view both to increasing resources devoted to this area within current allocations and establishing clear requirements for future budgetary submissions. (U)

There is a need to enhance the role of international information considerations in the national security policy process. Wherever appropriate, major national security policy studies and decision documents should include an assessment of the impact of policy options or decisions on foreign opinion and on the international information environment generally. (U)

In order to generate the public consensus that is essential to support of a vigorous international information effort, agencies will review current mission statements and other existing policy declarations and revise them as necessary to reflect the guidance provided by this directive and the accompanying study. Other activities in support of this

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objective should be pursued by the involved agencies on a coordinated basis. (U)

Ronald Reagan

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