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~~TOP SECRET~~ "BIGOT"

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
G-3 (Ops) Division

5 June, 1944

MEMORANDUM OF RECORD:

Pursuant to decision at the last Commanders' Meeting, the following assembled at 9:30 PM, 4 June, 1944:

General Dwight D. Eisenhower
General Sir Bernard Montgomery
Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay
Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder
Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory
Air Vice Marshal J. M. Robb
Rear Admiral G. E. Creasy
Lieutenant General W. B. Smith
Major General R. W. Strong
Major General F. W. de Guingand
Major General H. R. Bull

Group Captain Stagg, with Colonel Yates and Comdr. Flemming supporting him, gave the agreed weather forecast which was markedly improved. Stagg stated that the weather situation as described in recent meetings was most extraordinary and a mid-winter situation rather than normal to a June period. The forecast was that we could expect (although very heavily overcast at present) that tonight an improvement would set in and continue. Winds now blowing force 5 and 6 should moderate to 4 and 5 with 3 and 4 along the French coast, with cloud breaking to less than five tenths, with ceiling 2500 to 3000.

It is expected that Tuesday morning deterioration would set in again with winds 4 to 5, and increased cloud. Wednesday, Thursday and Friday uncertain with scattering clouds of all kinds; 4 to 5 winds with 3 to 4 on the other side; visibility probably good.

Discussion of the implications indicated considerable concern for the inability to conduct naval spotting in support of the assault with a cloud base probably down around 1000 feet. Although no swell is expected on the French coast, wind conditions were not desirable for the heavy towing and might well affect the build up. Weather was considered "chancey" from the bombing support angle and it was felt that enemy fighters would be favored with a probable high and with clear weather to the south of the Channel and cloud on this side. In spite of these difficulties, a tentative decision was taken by the Supreme Commander to continue D day as Y plus 5 and for Naval forces to continue to move but that he would require a confirmation at 4:00 AM, realizing that due to the position of Naval forces any change at that time would indicate the desirability of a 48 hour change.

The same Commanders re-assembled at 4:15 AM, 5 June, 1944. The weather forecasters presented a much more optimistic picture stating that Tuesday morning should be good and continue so until noon. Patches of cloud would be probably less than five tenths, cloud base around 2000 feet. Wednesday, Thursday and Friday better, with some periods quite likely of good cloud conditions. Winds of force 4 on the English coast and 3 on the French coast are to be expected through Friday and we might not get the disturbed condition previously expected. Cloud conditions should be good Tuesday till it warms up and clouds may then build up.

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A check up indicated Force U at sea at 4:00 AM and O moving out. All present agreed unquestionably with the decision and believed that the change was almost miraculous and far better than we had any reason to expect from the recent bad conditions.

At 9:00 AM, 5 June, Group Captain Stagg called me on the telephone to confirm the 4:00 AM forecast. He stated that there was no change to make except that they felt that the good period in the morning tomorrow would probably extend later and that in the period Wednesday to Friday no deterioration was now expected. He said because of the possible feeling of the Commanders that the decision reference Monday's postponement might not have been a sound one, under the circumstances, he called attention to the well established fact that the rain and cloud which was over here last night has been over the OVERLORD area with a ten tenths cloud last night continuing probably up to 9:00 AM, which presented a situation unacceptable to our air and airborne plans. Monday definitely would have been highly unsatisfactory.

Considering the vagaries of the weather, the serious implications of further delay of even 24 hours due to troops afloat for a long period and the good chances of being forced into a more undesirable situation, a decision was confirmed to go ahead with D day on Y plus 5.

H. R. BULL
Major General, G.S.C.
AC of S, G-3