Welcome to the Information as Power blog for the month of November 2009.  This month we will be discussing the issue of Command and Control, and how contemporary US military organizations utilize Information technology to empower military and support operations.  For ten years the theory of Network Centric Warfare and operations has been discussed and debated, this blog will look at how effective that theory is, how it is being adapted to current operations, and how it needs to transition to 21^st century thought and technology to most effectively meet emerging requirements.  First some thoughts:

The science and art of command and control has not kept pace with modern military thought, technology, or operations.  The current state of command and control is rooted in the late 19^th century Prussian command structures, in which the commander was the decision maker, the leader, and the motivator; there was a very distinctive chain of command, and decision making was conducted up the chain, with directives coming down the chain to make events happen.  COL John Boyd, the author of the OODA loop (Observe, Orient, Decide and Act) utilized this command structure as information and intelligence moved up and down the chain of command.  The “deciding” part of the loop was conducted by a commander after the observing and orienting was completed.  This was effective for most operations utilizing typical “chain of command” logic and understanding.  However, the parameters of military operations that this type of command structure was effective in have changed.  Some contemporary leaders continue to attempt to fit this “square peg in a round hole” by continuing to operate with rigid command structures and decision chains.  With the emergence of the age of information the requirements for agile structures, flexibility and speed of decision making, and the necessity of putting decision making at the appropriate level of command has risen to the forefront as necessary to move ahead in force structure, and in effective commanding.

The requirements for appropriate and successful commanding have changed in some very dynamic ways.  In the not-that-distant past commanders did, in fact, command in the 19^th century manner.  They lead their organization – out front – and made each and every decision concerning operations, logistics, intelligence, and the way ahead.  With the onset of information technology the current speed of battlefield decision making does not give those in “command” the luxury of time to make decisions. Battlefield effectiveness will now be created by empowering those individuals in the right location to make the decisions based on intelligence, situational awareness, and connectivity.  Two pertinent issues in the cognitive domain of NetCentric Warfare theory are “sense-making”, and “decision making”, with the definitions of each of those events focusing on situational awareness and the correct decision location.  With the speed of decision making requirements in an information engagement it becomes imperative that the sense-making organization or individual must be able to act on the event, without going through the rigmarole of explaining the details to the commander or pushing intelligence or time critical information up a chain of command for action to be taken.  Information or Cyber engagements can happen and be decided in a matter of seconds or minutes, so the commander, in order to be effective must empower individuals to be decision makers (at the appropriate level), something like Gen Charles Krulak, USMC (r) called the “Strategic Corporal” which implied that the lowest level of personnel should be involved with making decisions based on current intelligence and situational awareness. 

Instead of clutching to the concept of the commander being the only one who can be the decision maker, commanders must come to the realization that the most effective organizations in the information age will be those that empower the “edge”, provide and practice agility of command structure, and look ahead to future requirements . However that means that subordinates must understand their role in decision making, while the commander must empower these subordinates to make decisions.

Effective commanders in the information age will need to 1) establish the initial conditions (training and practice) 2) set the rules of engagement, 3) provide a continuously updated “intent”, 4) establish a priori requirements, 5) prepare for and practice agility in command structure to meet potential and emerging operational requirements.  This is a major paradigm shift for the art and science of command, and needs to be embraced by those preparing for the position of command and those preparing future leaders.  This will require visionary leaders who will unselfishly understand that success is accomplished by enabling lower level decisions, and by creating an environment for the success of those lower level decision makers by making available a “living”  intent, (be that commanders intent, command intent, or strategic intent).  In this way the commander is able to most successfully address the issues that he (or she) will be able to influence.  In the area of cyber warfare commanders should not be in the immediate decision loop, except to establish policy, provide ROE, and look ahead to future requirements.  Cyber conflicts will require the greatest flexibility and planning, and empowering of subordinates.  Optimally those who gain situational awareness should also be empowered to act upon that awareness without the time consuming report to the “commander”.  In order to accomplish this subordinates will need to “step up to the plate”, and senior leaders must do everything in their power to make the subordinates successful.

With this as background it would be good to have individuals weigh in on thoughts of this potential shift in command thought, what the major issues are concerning the development of agile organizations, and how military organizations can focus on “Unity of Effort” vice unity of command.