In the opening Blog comments for this month I stated that C2 in the modern battlefield needs to take on differing natures to meet emerging threats, influenced greatly by the speed of decision-making requirements. The operative terms referring to command structure in order to meet these emerging threats are that of “agility” and “adaptability”; combined together they represent the ability of the command to transform its structure to meet the current need or level of conflict intensity. These terms were introduced by Dr. Dave Alberts, who has been a leading expert in the field of future C2 requirements and the application of Net-Centric Warfare concepts and strategies. I would recommend reading “Understanding Command and Control” (Co-authored by Dr. Richard Hayes) as background to the discussion (CCRP Press, 2006).
The definition of agility in this context is “the measure of how quickly the organization can adapt to its new environment”; with adaptability being defined as “the capability to rearrange components to meet a different set of demands or exist in a different environment with different properties”. The requirements for operational preparation for theater and strategic commands span the full spectrum of conflict, from peace (domestic disaster relief to peace enforcement), to combat (counter-terrorism to strategic nuclear war). What mechanism does the “commander” have in his “kitbag” to use agility to be able to adapt to the current state of operations, somewhere on the spectrum of conflict? The requirement for this “mechanism” grows in significance when the potential for a cyberspace conflict is included in the mix of operational requirements.
It becomes apparent that the establishment of “intent” plays a large role in the success of the command in meeting the operational requirements. The sending, receiving and understanding of this intent becomes critical across the command. I would further argue that establishing designated C2 structures for different levels of operation across the spectrum of conflict would be an important item to consider, and should be a critical portion of the intent message. For example, the “battle staff” for a peacemaking operation would be different from a conventional conflict. A pre-arranged organizational doctrine could assist in the successful and “agile” transition to each C2 configuration.
The questions generated by this conversation revolve around what the correct command configuration would look like for different levels of conflict intensity. I would open up the discussion on what works with this Blog, as sharing successes in this area would potentially aid all organizations in conflict preparations.
Welcome to the Information as Power blog for the month of November 2009. This month we will be discussing the issue of Command and Control, and how contemporary US military organizations utilize Information technology to empower military and support operations. For ten years the theory of Network Centric Warfare and operations has been discussed and debated, this blog will look at how effective that theory is, how it is being adapted to current operations, and how it needs to transition to 21st century thought and technology to most effectively meet emerging requirements. First some thoughts:
The science and art of command and control has not kept pace with modern military thought, technology, or operations. The current state of command and control is rooted in the late 19th century Prussian command structures, in which the commander was the decision maker, the leader, and the motivator; there was a very distinctive chain of command, and decision making was conducted up the chain, with directives coming down the chain to make events happen. COL John Boyd, the author of the OODA loop (Observe, Orient, Decide and Act) utilized this command structure as information and intelligence moved up and down the chain of command. The “deciding” part of the loop was conducted by a commander after the observing and orienting was completed. This was effective for most operations utilizing typical “chain of command” logic and understanding. However, the parameters of military operations that this type of command structure was effective in have changed. Some contemporary leaders continue to attempt to fit this “square peg in a round hole” by continuing to operate with rigid command structures and decision chains. With the emergence of the age of information the requirements for agile structures, flexibility and speed of decision making, and the necessity of putting decision making at the appropriate level of command has risen to the forefront as necessary to move ahead in force structure, and in effective commanding.
The requirements for appropriate and successful commanding have changed in some very dynamic ways. In the not-that-distant past commanders did, in fact, command in the 19th century manner. They lead their organization – out front – and made each and every decision concerning operations, logistics, intelligence, and the way ahead. With the onset of information technology the current speed of battlefield decision making does not give those in “command” the luxury of time to make decisions. Battlefield effectiveness will now be created by empowering those individuals in the right location to make the decisions based on intelligence, situational awareness, and connectivity. Two pertinent issues in the cognitive domain of NetCentric Warfare theory are “sense-making”, and “decision making”, with the definitions of each of those events focusing on situational awareness and the correct decision location. With the speed of decision making requirements in an information engagement it becomes imperative that the sense-making organization or individual must be able to act on the event, without going through the rigmarole of explaining the details to the commander or pushing intelligence or time critical information up a chain of command for action to be taken. Information or Cyber engagements can happen and be decided in a matter of seconds or minutes, so the commander, in order to be effective must empower individuals to be decision makers (at the appropriate level), something like Gen Charles Krulak, USMC (r) called the “Strategic Corporal” which implied that the lowest level of personnel should be involved with making decisions based on current intelligence and situational awareness.
Instead of clutching to the concept of the commander being the only one who can be the decision maker, commanders must come to the realization that the most effective organizations in the information age will be those that empower the “edge”, provide and practice agility of command structure, and look ahead to future requirements . However that means that subordinates must understand their role in decision making, while the commander must empower these subordinates to make decisions.
Effective commanders in the information age will need to 1) establish the initial conditions (training and practice) 2) set the rules of engagement, 3) provide a continuously updated “intent”, 4) establish a priori requirements, 5) prepare for and practice agility in command structure to meet potential and emerging operational requirements. This is a major paradigm shift for the art and science of command, and needs to be embraced by those preparing for the position of command and those preparing future leaders. This will require visionary leaders who will unselfishly understand that success is accomplished by enabling lower level decisions, and by creating an environment for the success of those lower level decision makers by making available a “living” intent, (be that commanders intent, command intent, or strategic intent). In this way the commander is able to most successfully address the issues that he (or she) will be able to influence. In the area of cyber warfare commanders should not be in the immediate decision loop, except to establish policy, provide ROE, and look ahead to future requirements. Cyber conflicts will require the greatest flexibility and planning, and empowering of subordinates. Optimally those who gain situational awareness should also be empowered to act upon that awareness without the time consuming report to the “commander”. In order to accomplish this subordinates will need to “step up to the plate”, and senior leaders must do everything in their power to make the subordinates successful.
With this as background it would be good to have individuals weigh in on thoughts of this potential shift in command thought, what the major issues are concerning the development of agile organizations, and how military organizations can focus on “Unity of Effort” vice unity of command.
