


United States Army War College
Department of National Security and Strategy

National Security Policy and Strategy



Course Directive

AY16

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ACADEMIC YEAR 2016

NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY AND STRATEGY

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
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COURSE OVERVIEW

...The values of our founding inspire leaders in parliaments and new movements in public squares around the globe. And when a typhoon hits the Philippines, or schoolgirls are kidnapped in Nigeria, or masked men occupy a building in Ukraine, it is America that the world looks to for help. So the United States is and remains the one indispensable nation. That has been true for the century passed and it will be true for the century to come.

But the world is changing with accelerating speed. This presents opportunity, but also new dangers. We know all too well, after 9/11, just how technology and globalization has put power once reserved for states in the hands of individuals, raising the capacity of terrorists to do harm. Russia's aggression toward former Soviet states unnerves capitals in Europe, while China's economic rise and military reach worries its neighbors. From Brazil to India, rising middle classes compete with us, and governments seek a greater say in global forums. ...

It will be your generation's task to respond to this new world. The question we face, the question each of you will face, is not whether America will lead, but how we will lead -- not just to secure our peace and prosperity, but also extend peace and prosperity around the globe.

—President Barack H. Obama
Remarks by the President at the United States Military Academy
Commencement Ceremony - May 2014

1. General.

a. The *National Security Policy and Strategy* (NSPS) course is focused on national security policy and the strategies that put these policies into operation. It examines the elements that underpin national security policy and strategy, including the international and domestic environments, the American political system, national security policy and

strategy formulation, the instruments of national power, and the processes employed by the United States Government for integrating and synchronizing those instruments in the pursuit of national security objectives. The course also examines the role of the current national strategic documents to include the National Security Strategy (NSS), the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) (recently renamed the Defense Strategy Review by Congress), and the National Military Strategy (NMS), among others.

b. During NSPS, the Department of National Security and Strategy (DNSS) faculty's goal is to provide a positive adult learning environment through seminar discussions, readings, case studies, guest lectures, and question and answer periods. Throughout the course, the faculty will challenge students to evaluate complex national security issues that are often characterized by ambiguity and uncertainty using critical, creative, ethical, and systemic thought processes, as well as historical/contextual reflection and analysis.

c. The synthesis, analysis, evaluation and application of national security policy, and the military's role within the interagency decision-making process, conform to no prescribed doctrine. Strategic thinking requires creativity as well as discipline in grappling with the complex and dynamic matters of policy, strategy, and the use of national power to promote and protect national interests. National security strategists in the 21st Century must effectively operate in a complex, ambiguous and rapidly-changing environment. Strategists must be able to integrate the multiple dimensions of the global environment, as well as factors such as culture, international and domestic politics, economics, public policy, and technology. Upon completion of the NSPS course, students will be better able to analyze complex and ambiguous national security issues, providing a solid foundation for their prospective service at the strategic level.

2. [Purpose](#). The purpose of the NSPS course is to develop senior military and civilian leaders who understand the art and practice of policy and strategy formulation in achieving national security objectives in the current and emerging global environment.

3. [Objectives](#). The NSPS course objectives are:

a. Analyze the process of national security policy and strategy formulation and the major factors that influence this process.

b. Analyze and understand contemporary and emerging international security challenges and their impact on the national security agenda.

c. Synthesize key concepts, tools, and processes in the development of appropriate policy and strategy responses to national security challenges facing the United States in the 21st Century international security environment.

4. [Focus Questions](#). The course will assist in developing ways to think about important questions concerning national security policy and strategy to include:

a. How should national security be defined and what national interests flow from this definition of national security?

b. What is the relationship between policy and strategy?

c. What critical international, transnational, and regional security issues are of greatest interest and concern to the United States in the near-, mid- and long-terms? Why? What are U.S. policies towards these issues and how might such policies change? What U.S. strategies could be developed and implemented to deal with these issues?

d. What are the key factors in the contemporary international environment that shape U.S. national security policy and strategy? Which international actors and institutions have the greatest influence on this policy and strategy, and how/why do they exercise this influence?

e. How do U.S. domestic priorities influence national security policy and strategy?

f. What influence do bureaucratic politics, group dynamics, and the characteristics of individual decision-makers have on national security policy and strategy?

g. What are the relevant U.S. national security processes and how well do they serve the nation in the 21st Century?

h. Who are the key actors—whether individuals or institutions—in the national security community? What influence do they have on one another? How do they—individually and collectively—influence the formulation of policy and the development of supporting strategy? How do civilian and military roles differ?

i. What are the opportunities and constraints of the interagency process (as it has developed over the past 60 plus years) in the formulation of policy and development of strategy for today's national security requirements?

j. What are the instruments of U.S. national power? What are their relationships with one another? How might the United States wield its national power to meet the challenges and opportunities of the 21st Century?

k. In light of current circumstances, and projected forces and trends for the future, what national security priorities do you think should be reflected in national-level strategy documents (e.g., the National Security Strategy, Quadrennial Defense Review/Defense Strategy Review, and National Military Strategy)?

l. What are the key components in the formulation of strategy to successfully achieve national security policy objectives? What are the relationships among these components?

m. What types of national security policies and strategies will most effectively advance U.S. national interests over the next 10-20 years?

n. What lessons on the formulation and implementation of national security policy and strategy can be drawn from the study of major national security decisions in U.S. history?

5. [Scope](#). The national security professional must be as flexible, adaptable, and capable as the challenges our nation faces. During the *National Security Policy and Strategy* course, students should expect to do something that may appear at least paradoxical: ***to think clearly about ambiguous problems arising from complex circumstances.*** We will analyze and evaluate these problems (to the best extent possible) from the perspective of those occupying the highest national security positions in our government—both civilian and military. Despite the uncertainty of issues and circumstances, students will be expected to offer options/solutions even when no obvious correct answer seems to emerge. This is no small task; however, it can be rewarding when approached with a creative, critical, and informed outlook. What follows is a discussion of two key aspects of the course: the USAWC Strategy Formulation Framework, and the organization and flow of the course.

a. Strategy Formulation Framework.

(1) The “Strategy Formulation Framework” (Figure 1) offers one way to conceptualize the overall objectives of this course. This framework is examined in detail in [Appendix I](#) of this document. The central part of the framework depicts a logical approach to organizing our thoughts regarding strategy formulation. Policy flows from the path of U.S. historical development and the continuing political process. It is derived from our nation’s enduring beliefs, ethics, values, and previous choices. Policy provides broad guidance and articulates national interests in the context of the strategic environment. *National policy* provides the focus for strategy formulation. Strategy at the highest level of decision-making is often referred to as Grand Strategy, which may be defined *as the use of all instruments of national power in peace and war to support a strategic vision of America’s role in the world that will best achieve national objectives.* However, it is important to remember that all strategy is a calculation of ways and means directed towards the accomplishment of ends, balanced against a continuous assessment of risk.

Strategy Formulation Framework




Figure 1.

(2) Evolving from U.S. history and practice, strategy formulation begins with an understanding of the nation's values, purpose, and strategic culture. National values, based on the nation's enduring beliefs and ethics, significantly influence the identification of national interests. The strategist can then conduct an appraisal of the challenges and opportunities that affect these interests—as well as the nation's ability to promote and protect them. The core national interests of the United States generally revolve around the security of the United States, its citizens, and its allies; economic well-being; a stable international order; and the promotion of national values. However, the strategist must understand that these core interests, though enduring, may be

influenced by the history of the U.S., the current context of the times, the domestic mood, and the international security climate.

(3) A strategist will base an effective strategic appraisal on a realistic understanding of the international and domestic environments and an analysis of the many trends and forces operating in those environments (depicted in the boxes on the left and right sides of the framework diagram). Based on this appraisal, political leaders articulate a grand strategic vision of the nation's role in the world. Policymakers and strategists then translate this grand strategic vision into grand strategic objectives (ENDS). This vision also guides the choice of grand strategic concepts (WAYS; i.e., engagement, containment, or preeminence) based on a broad conception of national power (MEANS), resulting in broad national policy decisions. Key departmental and agency leaders continue the strategy formulation process at the national security level, focusing on a more detailed examination of national interests, considered by categories and intensities. As part of this process, the President determines overall national security policy objectives and approves a national security strategy for employing the instruments of national power – diplomacy, information, military, and economic (DIME) – to achieve national interests. Strategists then work to provide the President and other key policymakers with strategy options to serve the policy objectives.

(4) A key analysis for policymakers and strategists is a risk assessment to determine *feasibility* (Do we have the means to execute the strategy?), *acceptability* (Does the strategy accord with the preferences of key audiences? Is it legal? Ethical? Are costs likely to be borne?), and *suitability* (Will the strategy achieve or contribute usefully to the national policy objectives?). Additionally, this analysis helps identify and assess the possible second and third order effects involved in implementing the strategy (e.g., the impact of the strategy on another country, region, the economy; or the potential impact of resource constraints on strategy implementation). Ideally, such a process leads to the development of the National Security Strategy and derivative strategies such as the Quadrennial Defense Review/Defense Strategy Review and the National Military Strategy among others. At all levels, the strategy formulation process has the same four elements: *ways* and *means* in the service of *ends* accompanied by a thorough *risk* assessment. This process is designed to develop appropriate strategies to achieve specific policy goals in support of U.S. national interests.

(5) The Strategy Formulation Framework may imply that a rational, sequential or deliberative approach to policy and strategy formulation exists at the core of policymaking. However, the formulation of national security strategy is not always a smooth process: "means" and "ends" often may not match; various "ways" can interfere with, rather than complement, one another; and specific actions and outcomes may not conform exactly to initial intentions. An even more fundamental critique of this framework is to recognize that strategy formulation ***is not a linear process***. Comprehending the dynamic interaction of all of these steps is why the strategy-making environment often mirrors the 21st Century international security environment—it is complex and ambiguous.

(6) The dynamic and interactive nature of the national security strategy formulation process is difficult to depict graphically. The flanking boxes of Figure 1 represent the international and domestic environments within which the process occurs. These boxes suggest how a host of real world forces, external to the process, can influence it. The two-way arrows in the strategy formulation block show that while the framework appears sequential, every part really depends on every other part, and that strategy requires an on-going assessment of the relationships between ends, ways, and means. Finally, strategy development is not a solitary pursuit; multiple actors from both the international and domestic domains (Congress, the federal bureaucracy, interest groups, other nations, regional and international organizations, and non-state actors) influence the process. U.S. policy and strategy pronouncements and changes will cause strategy responses and adjustments by these actors that, in turn, influence subsequent U.S. actions. Thus, this process is always dynamic with a continual need to assess and reassess the execution of a strategy. A key task in this course will be to understand and appreciate one of the most complex national security processes of the U.S. government.

b. Course Organization. The NSPS course is organized into four Blocks:

(1) Block I: The National Security Environment and Decision-Making Models. NSPS is designed to broaden our strategic level conception and understanding of the U.S. position in the current global order through a survey of international and U.S. domestic national security and policy systems. Block I begins with an examination of the strategy formulation process and introduces the USAWC Strategy Formulation Framework, which serves as a construct for organizing our thoughts regarding policy and strategy formulation. Through an exploration of U.S. values we will examine the idea of “U.S. purpose” and how U.S. interests must follow and support this concept. We will explore the nature of the global strategic environment and then highlight the notion of grand strategy and how the United States is postured to maintain and promote its values and interests. Finally, we will explore the foundation and evolution of U.S. Cold War strategy as a means of synthesizing our understanding of the tensions between values and interests, as well as the notion of “grand strategy.”

(2) Block II: National Security Actors and Institutions. This block focuses on key actors and institutions that influence the U.S. national security decision-making process. These include the Presidency, the National Security Council system, Congress and interest groups. In this block, we will devote specific attention to the role of the U.S. military and the Department of Defense in the national security decision-making process, focusing on the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff. This block concludes with an experiential learning event focused on the decision by the Johnson Administration to escalate U.S. involvement in Vietnam.

(3) Block III: Instruments of Power. We will explore the fundamental nature, uses, and limitation of the instruments of U.S. national power (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic). We will develop a foundational appreciation of each instrument of power and examine how these elements complement, and at times, contradict one another.

Although intelligence is not generally considered an instrument of power, it informs the use of these instruments, so this block will also examine the national level U.S. intelligence community and its role in influencing policy and strategy. This block concludes with a case study focused on the George W. Bush Administration's decision to go to war in Iraq in 2003.

(4) [Block IV: Contemporary American Strategy](#). This block further examines U.S. purpose, interests, and values as articulated in the current *National Security Strategy* and supporting strategic documents and consequently America's position in the contemporary international order. We will focus on how the national security system employs foresight, develops policy, formulates strategy, allocates resources, gathers feedback, and assesses progress and outcomes. We will examine the role of DoD strategic documents in interpreting and expanding on the National Security Strategy and other presidential guidance, while also focusing on understanding potential strategic options. Finally, we will analyze and assess America's strategic position, potential options, and the need and role for continuous revitalization and reform of U.S. national security processes.

c. The NSPS course will conclude with a review of contemporary national security issues, and a discussion on the most appropriate grand strategy for the U.S. to deal with these issues and meet the challenges they raise. Our course capstone speaker will address future U.S. grand strategy and provide input for this discussion.

6. [Student Readings](#). Student readings will be annotated as follows:

a. "**Student Issue**"--Items received prior to the start of the academic year or distributed by the faculty during the year.

b. "**Blackboard**"--Copyright items provided digitally via Blackboard.

c. "**Library Reserve**"--Items placed on NSPS reserve in the library. (Please ask the librarians for assistance if you have any difficulty in locating a suggested reading).

d. "**Database**" -- Library provided databases: "ProQuest", "JSTOR", "Taylor and Francis", "EBSCOHOST", or others -- Resources available through accessing USAWC Library remote access. For link to the reading, see Appendix VIII and USAWC Library Staff for username and password.

e. "**Online**" -- Open source online resources available on the Internet. All internet-accessible required reading resources will have a hyperlinked web address to indicate that the material is an open source, online document.

7. [Curricular Relationships](#). NSPS will complement lessons contained in the USAWC *Introduction to Strategic Studies* (ISS), *Theory of War and Strategy* (TWS) and *Strategic Leadership* (SL) courses. In TWS we examine the theory of strategy and its historical application and evolution, which should enable the student to more profoundly

contemplate the theoretical underpinnings of contemporary U.S. strategies and challenges. The *Strategic Leadership* course laid the foundation for the NSPS course by providing the concepts and skills required of leaders within the strategic environment through an examination of responsible command, leadership, management practices, and group decision-making dynamics.

a. NSPS builds upon the lessons contained in SL by focusing on case studies of strategic decision-making and crisis management. This foundation should enable students to more insightfully examine the contemporary (and some future) strategic challenges in the global environment, followed by an examination and evaluation of the strategy formulation process, the elements of national power and statecraft wielded by the United States, and the processes for synchronizing and integrating those instruments. NSPS will facilitate the continued study and application of key strategic concepts and theories regarding the use of force covered in *Theory of War and Strategy*, as well as the integration of the military instrument of national power with the other instruments to include diplomatic, informational, and economic ones.

b. Additionally, the course will continue to build upon the roles and competencies of strategic leaders introduced in the *Strategic Leadership* course – especially critical, creative and systems thinking, ethical reasoning, and decision-making. Moreover, NSPS will provide the conceptual tools for work in the remaining three core courses, *Theater Strategy and Campaigning* (TSC), *Defense Management* (DM), and the *Regional Studies Program* (RSP) in which students study the various systems for strategic planning, providing the military capabilities in support of the national military strategy, and planning for global and theater military operations. NSPS will also provide a venue for discussion on the subject of the “means” behind U.S. policy and strategy by examining how America resources its wars, and the relationship of U.S. economic power to military power that provides a foundation for further examination of these issues in DM.

8. [Joint Professional Military Education \(JPME II\)](#). Joint Learning Areas are integrated into the resident core curriculum. NSPS provides the student with the foundation for understanding national security policy formulation, national and military strategy, and the national and international security environments. Specific Joint Learning Areas are listed in Section 5 of each lesson directive (see Appendix V for a complete list of JPME Learning Areas and Objectives). JPME Phase II Joint Learning Areas are taken from Appendix E to Enclosure E to Officer Professional Military Education Policy, CJSCI 1800.01E, current as of 29 May 2015.

COURSE REQUIREMENTS

In order to complete NSPS successfully, students will meet established standards in each of the two basic requirements listed below. Each requirement will be evaluated by the Faculty Instructor (FI) throughout the course.

1. Contribution: The essential requirement to achieve the overall objectives of NSPS is active participation in the seminar-learning environment. Through active participation, students contribute to the learning of others. Contribution includes interaction with guest speakers. Students are expected to contribute by accomplishing the required readings, research, and tasks listed in paragraph 3, Student Requirements, for each lesson or as assigned or modified by the Faculty Instructor. Active learning begins with thorough and thoughtful preparation. Contribution will comprise 40 percent of the overall NSPS grade.

2. Written Requirements:

a. Requirements. Each student will complete two written requirements, each worth 50 percent of the writing component grade. Refer to Appendix II for a detailed description of these requirements. The first of these will be a single page, single-spaced bulletized paper articulating and testing a strategy to implement a policy option selected from a list provided by the Faculty Instructor. The second paper will be a 6-8 page, double-spaced background paper on the same topic. The audience for both papers is a senior Department of Defense decision-maker. The goal of the first paper is to concisely encapsulate a recommended strategy for his/her decision; the goal of the second paper is to provide him/her more background information on the topic. These papers are intended to be submitted and graded together, and are meant to simulate the type of writing requirements often found within the national security policy and strategy enterprise.

b. Evaluation Standard. Written assignments will be evaluated based on *content*, *organization*, and *style*. The criteria for evaluating papers will be the student's demonstrated understanding of and ability to apply course concepts, to organize material logically, and to compose and express thoughts clearly and coherently through effective writing. Descriptions of the criteria for "Outstanding," "Exceeds Standards," "Meets Standards," "Needs Improvement," and "Fails to Meet Standards" are found in the *Communicative Arts Directive*. A paper evaluated as "Needs Improvement" or "Fails to Meet Standards" will be returned to the student for rework and resubmission. The grades for the two written requirements will be averaged and will comprise 60 percent of the overall NSPS grade.

October-November

Academic Planning Schedule AY16

<i>Sun</i>	<i>Mon</i>	<i>Tue</i>	<i>Wed</i>	<i>Thu</i>	<i>Fri</i>	<i>Sat</i>
			28 NSPS-1 Introduction to National Security: Key Concepts	29 NSPS-2 International Impacts on National Security Decision-Making	30 NSPS-3 Domestic Impacts on National Security Decision-Making	31
1	2 NSPS-4 National Security Decision-Making Models	3 NSPS-5 Case Study I: Containment and NSC-68 NTL: Cold War Economic Diplomacy	4 Reading, Writing & Research Day	5 NSPS-6 The Presidency and the NSC	6 NSPS-7 The Congress and Interest Groups	7
8	9 NSPS-8 The Role of the Military in National Security Decision-Making NTL: The Military and American Society	10 NSPS-9 Case Study II: Escalation in Vietnam	11 Veterans' Day Holiday	12 NSPS-10 Diplomacy and Information BH Lecture: The Military and the Civilian Government	13 NSPS-11 Intelligence	14
15	16 NSPS-12 Military Power NTL: China's Economic Rise	17 NSPS-13 Economics and Finance BH Lecture: The Global Economy	18 SRP Day	19 NSPS-14 Case Study III: Operation Iraqi Freedom NTL: The Iraq Surge	20 NSPS-15 Strategic Guidance and Posture	21
22	23 NSPS-16 Contemporary National Security Issues	24 NSPS-17 21 st Century American Grand Strategy BH Lecture: American Grand Strategy				

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BLOCK I:

THE NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION-MAKING ENVIRONMENT AND MODELS

No other society has asserted that the principles of ethical conduct apply to international conduct in the same way that they do to the individual—a notion that is the exact opposite of Richelieu’s *raison d’état*. America has maintained that the prevention of war is as much a legal as a diplomatic challenge, and that what it resists is not change as such but the method of change, especially the use of force.

A Bismarck or a Disraeli would have ridiculed the proposition that foreign policy is about method rather than substance; if indeed he had understood it. No nation has ever imposed the moral demands on itself that America has. And no country has so tormented itself over the gap between its moral values, which are by definition absolute, and the imperfection inherent in the concrete situations to which they must be applied.

—Henry Kissinger
Diplomacy

NSPS is designed to broaden our strategic level conception and understanding of the U.S. position in the current global order through a survey of international and U.S. domestic national security and policy systems. Block I begins with an examination of the strategy formulation process and introduces the USAWC Strategy Formulation Framework that serves as a construct for organizing our thoughts regarding policy and strategy formulation. The next lesson examines the global strategic environment and how this environment affects U.S. national security decision-making. Lesson 3 examines the domestic national security decision-making environment, exploring historical U.S. values, the idea of “U.S. purpose” and the effect these have on how the U.S. defines its interests and formulates policy and strategy. Lesson 4 advances models of national-security decision-making and lesson 5 gives us the opportunity to apply these models to the foundation and evolution of U.S. Cold War strategy as a means of synthesizing our understanding of the tensions between values and interests and the notion of “grand strategy.”

BLOCK I OBJECTIVES

- Understand the concept of national security, and the distinction between policy and strategy.
- Examine the USAWC’s Strategy Formulation Framework as a model for understanding how strategy is formulated.
- Understand the key international and domestic factors that impact the U.S. national security decision-making process.
- Understand the various models used to explain national security decision-making.

- Critically examine the implementation of NSC-68 and the strategy of Containment of the Soviet Union that it proposed.

LESSON 1: INTRODUCTION TO NATIONAL SECURITY: KEY CONCEPTS

Mode: Seminar

NSPS-1-S

1. Introduction.

a. In *Theory of War and Strategy* (TWS) we examined the nature of conflict and searched for the theories that have provided insight to, and understanding of, the history of conflict. This course takes our informed understanding of history, conflict, and strategy and examines how the U.S. national security policy and strategy processes handle strategic challenges and opportunities. We will examine the **environment** in which U.S. policy and strategy are formulated, the **actors** that play key roles in the policy and strategy formulation process, and the **instruments** that the U.S. uses to advance its national security policy and strategy objectives. We will also explore a set of models that attempt to explain how states make national security and foreign policy decisions, and we will study three historical cases through the lenses of these models. Finally, we will end the course with a survey of the strategic environment and a discussion of possible U.S. grand strategies to deal successfully with this environment.

b. In this lesson, we will begin by examining the concept of national security in the context of the modern international environment and the U.S. domestic environment. From the beginning of the Cold War to the present, the meaning and interpretation of national security and national interests has been debated and redefined continuously. Is national security something that can be defined and fully surveyed, or does this concept have a continuously changing and malleable nature? Should national security objectives be limited to defending the state against other states and non-state actors, or should issues such as migration, pandemic disease, and climate change also be included in how we approach the concept of national security? How we define national security will to a great extent influence how we define our national interests.

c. Our second task in this lesson is to explore the U.S. Army War College Strategy Formulation Framework ([Appendix I](#)) as a means of understanding the ways in which policy and strategy are constructed at the national level. A key part of this task will be to gain an understanding of the differences between policy and strategy, and the relationship between the two. In short, whereas policy usually consists of broad guidance concerning America's global role in pursuit of core national interests, strategy seeks to translate that guidance into achievable ends, and to lay out the ways and means used to achieve those objectives. If policy answers the question of "what" the U.S. seeks to do, strategy answers the question of "how" we will do it.

d. Like any conceptual framework, the U.S. Army War College Strategy Formulation Framework offers an abstract and simplified representation of a dynamic and complex

reality. The Framework seeks to reduce complexity by concentrating attention on the basic building blocks of strategy formulation, the strategic thought process, and the depiction of the strategy formulation process as a series of discrete steps. These steps consist of the identification of enduring national values; the identification of more focused national interests incorporating these values; a strategic appraisal process that leads to a grand strategy and policy objectives that support it; and finally, to the formulation of a specific strategy developed through the calculated application of ways and means designed to achieve a defined national objective, or end.

e. The entire process takes place within the context of a strategic environment, depicted schematically on the Framework as a series of variables derived from both the international and domestic arenas. Strategy is therefore depicted as comprehensive and holistic – dominated by conscious political purpose – hierarchical and subordinate to national command authority. However, it is also dynamic, contextual, and decisively affected by trends within the strategic environment over which policymakers may have little or no control. We will use the Strategy Formulation Framework as a tool for introducing basic concepts in strategic analysis and for encouraging critical thinking about the dynamics and demands of strategy formulation.

2. Learning Objectives.

- a. Understand the course organization and student requirements.
- b. Understand the concepts of national security and national security policy.
- c. Understand the key concepts of policy and strategy and analyze the relationship between them.
- d. Understand the U.S. Army War College Strategy Formulation Framework, to include the relationship among ends, ways and means, as well as the FAS-R test and international and domestic influences on policy and strategy formulation.

3. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks. None.

b. Required Readings.

(1) Amos A. Jordan et al., “National Security Policy: What It Is and How Americans Have Approached It,” in *American National Security*, 6th ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins U Press, 2009), 3-5. **[Blackboard]**

(2) Arnold Wolfers, “National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol,” *Political Science Quarterly* 67, no. 4 (December 1952): 481-93, accessed August 5, 2015, [JSTOR](#). (accessed 05 August 2015). **[Database]**

(3) Charles F. Hermann, "Defining National Security," in *American Defense Policy*, John F. Reichart, Steven R. Sturm, Ed (Johns Hopkins University Press; Baltimore MD, 1982) at: <http://www.voxprof.com/cfh/hermann-pubs/Hermann-Defining%20National%20Security.pdf> (accessed 29 July 2015). **[Online]**

(4) Alan G. Stolberg, "Crafting National Interests in the 21st Century," in *The U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues, Vol. II: National Security Policy and Strategy*, 5th ed., ed. J. Boone Bartholomees (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2012), 13-25 at: <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1110.pdf>. (accessed 29 July 2015). **[Online]**

(5) U.S. Army War College, Department of National Security and Strategy, Directive- National Security Policy and Strategy (U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA: 2015), 1-6 (with a focus on the "Strategy Formulation Framework," and Appendix I, "Guidelines for Strategy", 103-108, SKIM Appendix II, 109-15. **[Blackboard]**

c. Suggested Readings

(1) Alan G. Stolberg, "Making National Security Policy," in the *21st Century* in *The U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues, Vol. II: National Security Policy and Strategy*, 5th ed., ed. J. Boone Bartholomees (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2012), 41-62.

(2) Marybeth P. Ulrich, "American Values, Interests and Purpose: Perspectives on the Evolution of American Political and Strategic Culture," in *The U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues, Vol. II: National Security Policy and Strategy*, 5th ed., ed. J. Boone Bartholomees (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2012), 3-11.

4. Points to Consider.

a. What is national security? Does this concept have an enduring meaning or does the meaning adapt to environmental context?

b. Contrast the concept of national security with that of national security policy? What is policy, where does it come from, who determines and articulates policy?

c. What is the purpose of that USAWC Strategy Formulation Framework? How can this framework be used to help understand the policy/strategy process?

d. Why are these concepts important to senior military and government leaders and what roles do they play in policy and strategy formulation?

5. Relationship to Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) Phase II Learning Areas.

- a. JLA 1.a, b. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.
- b. JLA 2.c. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.
- c. JLA 3.a. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.
- d. JLA 4.a. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.
- e. JLA 5. a. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

6. Relationship to USAWC Institutional Learning Objective (ILO), Program Learning Objectives, (PLOs), Enduring and Special Themes.

a. ILO: Our graduates are intellectually prepared to preserve peace, deter aggression and, when necessary, achieve victory in war through studying and conferring on the great problems of national defense, military science, and responsible command.

b. PLOs: 1, 7, 9.

c. Enduring Themes: Strategic Leadership and the exercise of discretionary judgment, Relationship of Policy and Strategy (relationship between ends, ways, and means).

LESSON 2: INTERNATIONAL IMPACTS ON NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION-MAKING

Mode: Seminar

NSPS-2-S

1. Introduction.

a. United States security policy decision-making does not happen in a vacuum: it must reflect the dynamic domestic and international environments existing at the time. This lesson examines the left-hand side of our Strategy Formulation Framework -- the global environment and international actors. We will begin with a review of the prominent international relations (IR) theories – the realist, idealist, and constructivist schools – that offer alternative explanations for the actions of states operating in the international system. Next, we will consider the international system and analyze the competing types of world orders, how the current order came about, and whether we are in the process of moving to a new world order.

b. This lesson also examines the international structure in which the U.S. and all other states operate today, and how international actors and institutions impact the behavior of states. These external influences include political (alliances, balance of powers, government systems, and international institutions, etc.), economic (trade, financial markets, energy flows, etc.), social, and cultural factors (religion, migration and displacement, cultural priorities and perspectives, etc.). The international panoply of laws and customary practices, treaties and alliances, global and regional institutions, non-state actors and movements, NGOs, and multinational corporations also influence the actions of states.

c. The array of international factors impacting the actions of a state is dynamic and amorphous. How these features come together to influence decision-making in any given situation is unique to that situation. Yet national security decision-makers who discount or misunderstand important external factors do so at great peril to their nations. This lesson strives to raise awareness and challenge your strategic thinking with respect to the global system and actors that impact U.S. national security strategy.

2. Learning Objectives

a. Understand the major attributes of the contemporary international system and their impact on national security decision-making.

b. Analyze the actors, tools, and rules of international politics and understand the historical foundations of the current world order.

c. Understand the major international institutions and their impact on the international system.

d. Analyze how international institutions constrain or influence U.S. national security decisions.

3. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks. Be prepared to discuss the points to consider in Paragraph 4 below.

b. Required Readings.

(1) Glenn P. Hastedt, "The Global Context," in *American Foreign Policy*, 10th ed. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014), 29-54. **[Student Issue]**

(2) Joseph S. Nye, Jr., and David Welch, "Post -Cold War Conflict" and "Cooperation; Globalization and Interdependence," in *Understanding Global Conflict and Cooperation: An Introduction to Theory and History*, 8th ed. (New York: Pearson, 2011), 184-94 and 239-57. **[Student Issue]**

(3) Edward Alden, "With TPP and TTIP, United States and EU Reassert Control Over Rules of Global Trade," *World Politics Review*, Council on Foreign Relations, at: <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/13454/with-tpp-and-ttip-u-s-and-eu-reassert-control-over-rules-of-global-trade>. (accessed 29 July 2015). **[Online]**

(4) Stewart Patrick, "Present at the Creation, Beijing-Style," *The Internationalist*, Council on Foreign Relations <http://blogs.cfr.org/patrick/2015/03/20/present-at-the-creation-beijing-style/>. (accessed 5 August 2015). **[Online]**

c. Suggested Readings.

(1) Tyler S. Moselle, "The Concept of World Order," *Carr Center for Human Rights Policy*, Harvard Kennedy School, at: [\[http://www.hks.harvard.edu/cchrp/research/ConceptOfWorldOrder_Moselle.pdf\]](http://www.hks.harvard.edu/cchrp/research/ConceptOfWorldOrder_Moselle.pdf) (accessed 29 July 2015).

(2) George E. Teague, "The International Political System," (The United States Naval War College, March 2002; revised, edited and updated by Nick Gvosdev in March 2010 and Hayat Alvi in June 2013), 1-20.

(3) Eric A. Posner, "Sorry, America, the New World Order is Dead," *Foreign*

Policy.com, (06 May 2014) at:

[http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/05/06/sorry_america_the_new_world_order_is_dead_russia_ukraine] (accessed 5 August 2015).

(4) Deborah L. Hanagan, "International Order," in *The U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues, Vol. II : National Security Policy and Strategy*, 5th ed., ed. J. Boone Bartholomees (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2012) at: [<http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdf/files/pub1005.pdf>] (accessed 5 August 2015).

(5) G. John Ikenberry, "Varieties of Order: Balance of Power, Hegemonic, and Constitutional," in *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001) 21-30.

(6) Henry A. Kissinger, "Power Shifts," *Survival* 52, no. 6 (December 2010-January 2011) 205-212.

(7) Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996).

(8) The Charter of the United Nations. Read Chapters I, II, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, and XV. [<http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/>] (accessed 5 August 2015).

(9) Luisa Blanchfield, "United Nations Reform: U.S. Policy and International Perspectives," *Congressional Research Service Report for Congress*, December 21, 2011, read Summary and 1-25. [<http://www.fas.org/sqp/crs/row/RL33848.pdf>] (accessed 5 August 2015).

(10) COL Deborah Hanagan, "Bretton Woods and Economic Order" (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, July 2013).

(11) Jorge G. Castaneda, "Not Ready for Prime Time: Why Including Emerging Powers at the Helm Would Hurt Global Governance," *Foreign Affairs* 89, no. 5 (September-October 2010):109-122 in [[ProQuest](#)] (accessed 19 June 2015).

(12) Robert Zoellick, "The Currency of Power," *Foreign Policy* 196 (November 2012), 67-73, 78 in [[ProQuest](#)] (accessed 19 June 2015).

(13) Ilan Bremmer and Nouriel Roubini, "A G-Zero World: The New Economic Club Will Produce Conflict, Not Cooperation," *Foreign Affairs*, 90, no. 2 (March/April 2011), 2-7 in [<http://usawc.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2011-01-31/g-zero-world>] (accessed 7 August 2015).

4. Points to Consider.

a. What is the structure and nature of the contemporary world order? Did it change after the end of the Cold War? Is it changing now? What type of world order do we want? How do we use power to achieve it?

b. Does world order change only through major war or can other dramatic international events change it? What is driving change in the current world order?

c. Is the United States still the leader and driving force in the contemporary world order? If not, who is and what are the implications for U.S. policy and the ability of the United States to achieve its national objectives?

d. Can the United States advance its national interests through international organizations such as the UN and NATO, or should it rely more on unilateral actions? Why and under what circumstances should it act multilaterally or unilaterally?

e. Is the UN an outdated and ineffective mechanism for promoting or assuring security in the 21st century? What about NATO and other regional security organizations that support and complement the UN? Are regional organizations more useful and effective for ensuring political order, peace, and security than the UN? Can they wield any power if the United States does not want them to do so?

f. How interconnected and interdependent are states in the current international economic order? Do we need a governance structure for the global economy or can matters be left up to the self-regulating market? Can states independently solve their financial and economic problems?

g. Assess the range of international organizations around the world. Why are the multilateral efforts of states to advance their economic, political, and security interests so different? Why is Europe so “institutionalized” while Asia is not?

h. The Pacific Rim, as a region, could be characterized as unipolar (U.S. at the top with a rising China challenging its pre-eminence), as bipolar (U.S. and China the dominant states with all the other states in the region aligned with one or the other bilaterally), and/or as multipolar (with U.S., China, Russia, Japan and Australia as the main actors). Why is this region so complex and how can concepts related to world order be applied to describe the region?

i. Do recent Chinese actions (such as efforts to establish the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), military expansion, confrontational policy in South China Sea, bilateral treaties with neighbors) indicate a challenge to the established world order? How should the U.S. respond?

5. Relationship to Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) Phase II Learning Areas.

a. JLA 1.a, b, c. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

b. JLA 2.c. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

c. JLA 3.a, d. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

d. JLA 5.a, b. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

6. Relationship to USAWC Institutional Learning Objective (ILO), Program Learning Objective (PLOs), Enduring and Special Themes.

a. ILO: Our graduates are intellectually prepared to preserve peace, deter aggression and, when necessary, achieve victory in war through studying and conferring on the great problems of national defense, military science, and responsible command.

b. PLOs: 1, 2, 7, 9.

c. Enduring Themes: Strategic Leadership and the exercise of discretionary judgment Relationship of Policy and Strategy (Relationship Between Ends, Ways, and Means).

LESSON 3: DOMESTIC IMPACTS ON NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION-MAKING

Mode: Seminar

NSPS-3-S

1. Introduction.

a. In the U.S. tradition, strategy formulation begins with an understanding of the nation's values, purpose, and strategic culture. National values, based on the nation's enduring beliefs and ethics, significantly influence the identification of national interests. The strategist can then conduct an appraisal of the challenges and opportunities that affect these interests – as well as the nation's ability to promote and protect them. The core national interests of the United States generally revolve around the security of the United States, its citizens and its allies; economic well-being; a stable international order; and the promotion of national values.

b. In this lesson we will explore the legacy of America's founding, not only as the source of its enduring values and interests, but also as the origins of its unique, national style. The major strands of American foreign policy and the tension between isolationism and internationalism will be traced through American history. In addition, the concepts related to distinct patterns of American thought and action, as well as the idea that there are policy consequences of US national security decision-making culture, will be discussed. Where the previous lesson explored the international influences on U.S. national security decision-making, this lesson focuses on those domestic factors – many grounded in America's ideas about its values and purpose in the world – that also influence the U.S. national security decision-making process.

Values

...the Revolution ... is the most important event in American history, bar none. Not only did the Revolution legally create the United States, but it infused into our culture all of our highest aspirations and noblest values. Our beliefs in liberty, equality, constitutionalism, and the well-being of ordinary people came out of the Revolutionary era. So too did our idea that we Americans are a special people with a special destiny to lead the world toward liberty and democracy. The Revolution, in short gave birth to whatever sense of nationhood and national purpose we Americans have had.

-- Gordon Wood
The Idea of America

The foremost historian of the American revolutionary era, Gordon Wood, argues that America, at its founding was, and remains, fundamentally an idea. In an era when monarchical rule was universal and the concepts of popular sovereignty and individual liberty only notional, the founders' advancement of these values through an ideological movement was truly revolutionary. The enshrinement of the principles and processes of self-rule in a written Constitution, which laid out the parameters of political debate and political participation, institutionalized these previously aspirational democratic values.

The founders understood that the key to sustaining the American idea was to balance the imperatives of liberty and security in the American political system's institutional design. The realization that the weak confederation established in the course of the Revolutionary War did not adequately secure fundamental American interests, such as securing the state from internal and external threats, while also protecting individual liberty, was the primary driver for the convening of the Constitutional Convention in 1787.

Interests

Allusion to the national interests are sentimentally attractive because they reaffirm the presumption that the expenditures and exertions that result from strategic decisions are made for worthy purposes. Even in nondemocratic regimes, creating the sense that worthwhile ends are being served is often vital to the mobilization of the national effort.

– James F. Miskel
Naval War College Review, Autumn 2002

National values are lived out against the backdrop of national interests. The United States' abandonment of the Articles of Confederation in favor of a new Constitution is an example of a "rebalancing" of national values and interests to ensure that state and federal power were sufficient to secure liberty. The Kohn reading analyzes the Constitution's design as a national security document featuring "tightly won compromises" crafted with the common aim of separating, sharing, and checking power. Embedded in the overall design was the founders' plan for checking the growth of military power in the new nation through the establishment of civilian control. Thus, the enduring theme of civil-military relations is relevant as we explore the founders' ordering of civil-military relations in the Constitution.

American National Style

The Hastedt reading introduces the ongoing influence of George Washington, John Adams, Alexander Hamilton, Andrew Jackson, Theodore Roosevelt, and Woodrow Wilson in American national security decision-making. A "school" of American foreign policy can be traced to each. The echoes of Washington and Adams can be heard in the arguments of present-day isolationists. Hamilton's emphasis on promoting economic strength is resonant in Presidents Clinton and Obama's focus on free trade agreements. Jackson's populism and self-reliance style appeals to the Tea Party

movement influencing American politics today. Understanding American foreign policy requires familiarity with these competing strains of thought that have characterized American national style throughout history.

2. Learning Objectives.

a. Analyze the values and purpose of the United States as reflected in the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution.

b. Analyze the concept of interests and the role of national values and interests in formulating policy and strategy.

c. Understand the role that the history of the United States plays in determining its values and interests and influencing its national security decision-making style and substance.

3. Student Requirements.

a. Required Readings.

(1) Glenn P. Hastedt, "The American National Style," in *American Foreign Policy*, 10th ed. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014), 55-76. **[Student Issue]**

(2) Marybeth P. Ulrich, "American Values, Interests and Purpose: Perspectives on the Evolution of American Political and Strategic Culture," in *The U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues, Vol. II: National Security Policy and Strategy*, 5th ed. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2012), 3-11 at: <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdf/PUB11110.pdf> (accessed 4 June 2015). **[Online]**

(3) *The Constitution of the United States* at: http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/constitution_transcript.html Many other interesting links are available at this National Archives site (accessed 5 August 2015). Read Articles 1 & 2. **[Online]**

(4) Richard Kohn, *The Constitution and National Security: The Intent of the Framers, in the United States Military under the Constitution of the United States*, (New York: New York Press, 1991), 1-27. **[Blackboard]**

b. Suggested Readings.

(1) Gordon S. Wood, *The Idea of America: Reflections on the Birth of the United States* (Penguin Press, 2011).

(2) Book TV: Gordon Wood, "The Idea of America," July 11, 2011, *YouTube*, streaming video, 10:05, [youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=...) (accessed 5 August 2015).

(3) The *Economist*, “What Would America Fight For?” 3 May 2014; <http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21601508-nagging-doubt-eating-away-world-orderand-superpower-largely-ignoring-it-what> (accessed 5 August 2015).

4. Points to Consider.

- a. How are American values related to national purpose?
- b. How can national interests be defined and distinguished?
- c. How does the founders’ ordering of civil-military relations reflect the interplay of U.S. national values and interests?
- d. How is the tension between American values and interests reflected in its “national style”?

5. Relationship to Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) Phase II Learning Areas.

- a. JLA 1.a, b, c. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.
- b. JLA 2.c. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.
- c. JLA 3.a. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.
- d. JLA 5.b, g. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

6. Relationship to USAWC Institutional Learning Objective (ILO), Program Learning Objective (PLOs), Enduring and Special Themes.

a. ILO: Our graduates are intellectually prepared to preserve peace, deter aggression and, when necessary, achieve victory in war through studying and conferring on the great problems of national defense, military science, and responsible command.

b. PLOs: 1, 4, 7, 9.

c. Enduring Themes: Strategic Leadership and the exercise of discretionary judgment, History as a vehicle for understanding strategic alternatives and choices.

LESSON 4: NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION-MAKING MODELS

Mode: Seminar

NSPS-4-S

“All models are wrong, but some are useful”.
- George Box, Statistician

1. Introduction.

a. Crafting foreign and security policy at the national level is a practical undertaking. Though we still occasionally cite the hopeful phrase of Republican Senator Arthur Vandenberg, made in 1947, that, “politics stop at the water’s edge,” it is most often a contested process where the competitive interplay of personalities, institutions, and priorities are critical variables. Policymaking is not a textbook exercise. It is a robust and multifaceted political process that often produces unpredictable outcomes.

b. In the American context, the policymaking process unfolds within a formalized structure, but with many informal variables in play. The process is designed to have policy and feedback flow smoothly between top and bottom, with ample time for analysis and reflection. American governance is not always conducive to rapid response to national needs or maximizing efficiency. Rather, priority is placed upon sustaining stability and continuity. Changes of direction are usually incremental, consisting of modest adjustments to the status quo.

c. However, on occasion a crisis will emerge where vital interests are perceived to be at stake, where there is an imminent threat of armed conflict, and policy makers find themselves under severe time constraints. In such cases, the national security policy painstakingly forged by various stakeholders may require reexamination and recalibration, or may even be discarded or ignored. In times of crisis, the government can ill afford hesitance or paralysis. The conduct of business will normally be driven from the top down, often at the highest level, with fewer actors involved. Crisis decision-making is streamlined; nonetheless, the complex dynamics that affect all foreign and security policy decision-making still apply.

d. We will use David Patrick Houghton’s *The Decision Point* as our core reading for this lesson. Houghton focuses on both theoretical and case-based analyses to examine how real U.S. foreign policy decision-makers make decisions. The assigned readings will give us some perspectives through which to analyze and understand the ways in which high-level decision-making may be shaped and why it often falls short of “pure rationality,” or apparent optimal effectiveness. Houghton has refreshed and updated the classic decision-making models developed by Graham Allison in *Essence of Decision* (see recommended readings). The assigned readings and classroom discussion are

designed to provide us with four comparative analytic models with which to contrast and understand foreign policy decision-making, and to inform their interaction and potential participation in the same.

e. As George Box implies in the quote at the beginning of this lesson, no model can fully and accurately portray the complex interplay of variables involved in any real-world national-security decision process. Nevertheless, decision-making models of the type advanced by Houghton are useful in that they provide a simplified representation of a complex process, and alert us to factors that may play important roles in shaping decisions. An understanding of the decision-making frameworks discussed in Houghton's work (and those to which you were exposed in the Strategic Leadership course) should allow us to better understand why American policymakers made the decisions they did in our upcoming case studies examining NSC-68/Containment, the decision to escalate the war in Vietnam, and the decision to go to war in Iraq in 2003.

2. Learning Objectives

a. Comprehend the rational actor model as well as the roles of bureaucratic, sociological, and psychological factors in the policy process through understanding Houghton's four models of decision making.

b. Assess the value of these models in policy and strategy formulation and implementation.

c. Evaluate the differences between formal or institutionalized policy and strategy development processes and crisis decision making.

3. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks. Be prepared to discuss the points to consider in Paragraph 4 below.

b. Required Readings.

David P. Houghton, *The Decision Point* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 3-84. **[Student Issue]**

(1) 3-18, "Introduction"

(2) 23-42, "Homo Bureaucraticus"

(3) 43-61, "Homo Sociologicus"

(4) 62-84, "Homo Psychologicus"

c. Suggested Readings.

(1) Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 2nd ed. (New York: Longman, 1999).

(2) Alex Mintz, "How Do Leaders Make Decisions? A Poliheuristic Perspective," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48, no. 1 (Feb 2004): 1, [[JSTOR](#)] (accessed 5 August 2015).

4. Points to Consider.

a. What are the most important assumptions of the Homo Economicus (or Rational Actor) Model? What are its primary advantages and disadvantages in explaining policy outcomes?

b. What are the primary differences between the Homo Bureaucraticus and Homo Economicus Models? What are the most important factors in government decision-making from the Homo Bureaucraticus Model?

c. What are the key variables affecting policy outcomes that are highlighted by the Homo Sociologicus Model?

d. How do the five basic assumptions of the Homo Psychologicus Model inform our interpretation and understanding of the other decision making models?

e. What are the key differences between crisis decision-making and formal deliberate decision-making as they relate to strategy, if any?

5. Relationship to Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) Phase II Learning Areas.

a. JLA 1.a, b, c. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

b. JLA 2.c, e. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

c. JLA 3.a. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

d. JLA 4a. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

e. JLA 5a, b, d. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

6. Relationship to USAWC Institutional Learning Objective (ILOs), Program Learning Objectives (PLOs), Enduring and Special Themes.

a. ILO: Our graduates are intellectually prepared to preserve peace, deter aggression and, when necessary, achieve victory in war through studying and conferring on the great problems of national defense, military science, and responsible command.

b. PLOs: 1, 7, 9.

c. Enduring Themes: Strategic Leadership and the exercise of discretionary judgment. Relationship of Policy and Strategy (relationship between ends, ways, and means). Instruments of national power and potential contributions to national security. Civil-military relations. Instruments of war and national security. History as a vehicle for understanding strategic alternatives and choices.

LESSON 5: CASE STUDY I - CONTAINMENT AND NSC 68

Mode: Seminar

NSPS-5-S

[Strategy] is about getting more out of a situation than the starting balance of power would suggest. It is the art of creating power.

—Lawrence Freedman
2013

The main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies.... The United States has it in its power to increase enormously the strains under which Soviet policy must operate... and in this way to promote tendencies which must eventually find their outlet in either the break-up or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power.

—George F. Kennan
1947

1. Introduction

a. As you do your reading this year, you will discover that in the national security literature, many definitions exist of the terms “strategy” and “grand strategy.” While they once referred principally to the realm of warfighting, they are now used rather more widely to include domestic policy and even business practice. This lesson examines strategy and grand strategy in the context of U.S. national security, and uses a case study – the development of NSC-68 in 1950 – as a vehicle for understanding the US response to a pressing national security problem: the threat posed by the Soviet Union and the expansion of communist ideology. The utilization of a case study rests on the premise that a willingness to ask probing questions about the past can hone and sharpen our ability to ask targeted and incisive questions about the present. By examining strategic choices made in the past we can analyze decision-makers’ perceptions of the external environment and threats to U.S. interests. We can evaluate their assessments of the enemy (including his likely behavior in response to U.S. actions), and we can examine the way they sought to create a calculated relationship between ends, ways, and means.

b. Any actor on the international stage has a set of interests it will defend and advance through the utilization of its power and influence. In most cases, states are willing to expend resources (economic, material, and human) to protect and further their national interests. (Non-state actors also have identifiable interests; they seek to defend

and advance those interests through whatever means of power and influence they have available to them). Understanding an actor's behavior in the international system means understanding the interests and aspirations that emerge from its history, geography, socio-political structure, and technological development. But it is also important to understand that political actors (including both state and non-state actors) are not unitary actors; they are instead comprised of individuals and sub-groups that do not always see eye-to-eye, or pull together towards the same ends. And it is also important to understand that domestic political interests frequently will shape (or drive, or hold hostage) international interests.

c. Threats to U.S. national security have surely changed since the nation rose to great power status in the early part of the 20th century, and the mechanisms for coping with these threats have changed as well. In large part due to the influence of NSC-68, a preponderance of U.S. government resources for U.S. national security is allocated to the Pentagon and the vast security architecture of the U.S. military. This makes it imperative that senior military officers become fully educated not only about the complex tasks of their own profession, but also about the way in which U.S. decision-makers (including senior political leaders and interagency leaders) think about U.S. national security and the most central questions of grand strategy – questions that, above all, involve making hard choices about how to use finite resources.

d. U.S. national interests are debated in a diverse, dynamic domestic environment, and grand strategy is crafted and implemented in that same environment. Interest groups jockey for position; think tanks and policy shops try to shape discussions and formulate policy suggestions of their own; legislators heed the desires of their constituents (however shortsighted they sometimes may be); and the media attends to what is timely and compelling at any given moment. Under these circumstances, there is no simple path between interest and policy, or between purpose and action. Any administration elected to power will have campaigned on its own national security/foreign policy platform, and will have tried to define and articulate a coherent vision in those realms. Once elected, members of an administration will use the means at their disposal to shape the ends and outcomes they desire. But they will be buffeted, constantly, by the surprises and frictions of an unpredictable world, and by the exigencies of domestic politics. Crises will arise and unexpected events will occur. While some of these will be fairly small, others will be seismic in their scope and consequences (e.g. the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, or the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989).

e. The first part of this lesson is intended to help you think about strategy and grand strategy in general, and to help you understand the many difficulties that stand in the way of implementing it successfully. These difficulties can be – and usually are – daunting; therefore, practitioners of strategy and grand strategy must be diligent, determined, and indefatigable in addition to being aggressively analytical, honest, and communicative. In the 21st century, the US has a very large infrastructure and bureaucracy dedicated to the problems of national security and international affairs.

These organizations must be willing and able to work together to pull in the same direction for grand strategy to have any hope of success.

f. The heart of this lesson will consist of an examination of the security environment of the late 1940s, and the crafting of NSC-68 (National Security Council Paper #68), which became the basic blueprint for the waging of the Cold War. We will read an essay examining the birth of NSC-68 (the conditions that shaped it, and the way that it came to life), and we will read and analyze the text of NSC-68 itself. We will examine NSC-68 as an example of strategy formulation, and we will evaluate its strengths and its flaws.

g. From 1947 to 1950, a series of crises had prompted a review of American policy toward its former World War II ally, the Soviet Union. Despite the unconditional surrender of Germany, the post-WWII political settlement in Europe had been difficult due to emerging differences between the Soviet Union and its wartime allies. Tensions began to come to the surface by the end of WWII, and, from the perspective of the U.S., events continued to take an unfortunate turn. The Czech coup and the Berlin Blockade in 1948 were followed in 1949 by the fall of China to Mao's communist forces, as well as the explosion of a Soviet atomic bomb. These events directly threatened U.S. global interests, and strained the relationship between democratic states, relying on free market systems, and communist states, relying on state-controlled economies.

h. Between 1945 and 1950, U.S. policymakers had faced an era of tremendous transition and turmoil. They not only had to adjust American policy to fit the nation's new role in the world (and the new threats it faced), but they also had to build the organizations and bureaucratic institutions suited to protecting and advancing the nation's interests. Although the United States had momentarily enjoyed an atomic monopoly, conventional Soviet land power cast a long shadow over the Eurasian continent. But the heart of the U.S.-Soviet conflict was over political ideology. It was not clear how communism and liberal democracy would co-exist, especially since both tended toward universalism. In 1949, Paul Nitze was the head of the Policy Planning Staff at the State Department. Building on the work of noted Soviet expert George Kennan, he advocated the "containment" of Soviet influence around the world. But Nitze went further than Kennan by calling for an assertive version of containment that would rest heavily upon an expanded U.S. military—well-armed with both conventional and atomic weapons.

i. Your task in this lesson is to understand the way that Nitze perceived the threat to U.S. interests, articulated a strategy in writing, and then helped it to gain traction in key decision-making circles in Washington. The NSC-68 document, which was written principally by Nitze, is clear and forthright. This makes it a fitting subject for examination and analysis. But to do this you must read attentively and critically. Above all, ask yourselves: How does Nitze perceive the Soviet threat? Why does he find it so dangerous? What U.S. interests are involved? What is his assessment of the stakes? What are his proposed solutions, and how do these call upon resources possessed by the United States? How does he align ends, ways, and means? How does he prioritize resources?

2. Learning Objectives. (Some may need to wait until tomorrow's lesson)

a. Evaluate how decision-makers define and articulate the appropriate “ends” for American grand strategy. Assess the “ways and means” the United States can use to protect and advance its national interests.

b. Analyze how a political actor's history and culture will shape its behavior in the international arena? Understand and evaluate the very real challenges inherent in both crafting and implementing a grand strategy over time. How do domestic politics, organizational behavior and outside interest groups shape grand strategy?

c. Understand the circumstances in which NSC-68 was born.

d. While it highlighted the importance of political and economic tools, NSC-68 also gave high priority to military elements of power for coping with the Soviet threat. Do you feel Nitze got the balance right? What leverage did Nitze feel economic, political, and military elements would bring to the table? How did he envision U.S. policymakers using that leverage?

3. Student Requirements.

a. Required Readings.

(1) Tami Davis Biddle, *Strategy and Grand Strategy: What Students and Practitioners Need to Know* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2015): 1-20, 41-63. **[Blackboard]**

(2) Ernest May's “Introduction,” in May ed. *American Cold War Strategy: Interpreting NSC 68* (Boston: Bedford Books, 1993), 1-17. **[Blackboard]**

(3) The Executive Secretary, “NSC-68: A Report to the National Security Council,” *Naval War College Review* 27, no. 6 (May-June 1975): 51-108 at: [\[NavalWarCollege\]](#) (accessed 5 August 2015). **[Online]**

b. Suggested Readings.

(1) Michael Howard, “The Forgotten Dimensions of Strategy,” in *The Causes of Wars* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983), 101-09.

(2) Richard K. Betts, “Is Strategy an Illusion?” *International Security* 25, no. 2 (Fall 2000): 5-50 in (accessed June 14, 2013).

(3) Paul Kennedy, *Grand Strategies in War and Peace* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991).

(4) John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982).

(5) John Lewis Gaddis and Paul Nitze, "NSC 68 and the Soviet Threat Reconsidered," *International Security* 4, no. 4 (Spring 1980): 164-176 in [\[JSTOR\]](#).

(6) Samuel Williamson, "Sounding the Tocsin: NSC 68 and the Soviet Threat," *International Security* (1979), 116-58.

4. Points to Consider.

a. Is "grand strategy" an enterprise for great powers, or do all states (regardless of size and resource base) need a grand strategy?

a. Do you think that the rapid sequence of disturbing events (from the U.S. perspective) in 1948 and 1949 contributed to the tone and language found in NSC-68? Do sequences of events shape the outlook of policymakers more forcefully than single events do?

b. Nitze describes the fundamental question of national security as follows: "How do we get from where we are to where we want to be without being struck by disaster along the way?" At the time of NSC-68, he clearly saw the Soviet political, economic, and military structures aimed at world domination. What shaped his interpretation? What evidence does he assert to support his contention? Nitze also believed that the Soviet Union posed a direct threat to the very existence of the United States as a free and democratic nation? Why did he believe this? How accurate was his perception--and how accurate *could it have been* in 1949-1950?

5. Relationship to Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) Phase II Learning Areas.

a. JLA 1.a, b, c. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

b. JLA 2.c, e. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

c. JLA 3.a. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

d. JLA 4 a. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

e. JLA 5a, b. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

6. Relationship to USAWC Institutional Learning Objective (ILO), Program Learning Objectives (PLOs), Enduring and Special Themes.

a. ILO: Our graduates are intellectually prepared to preserve peace, deter aggression and, when necessary, achieve victory in war through studying and

conferring on the great problems of national defense, military science, and responsible command.

b. PLOs: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9.

c. Enduring Themes: Relationship of Policy and Strategy (relationship between ends, ways, and means) Instruments of national power and potential contributions to national security Civil-military relations History as a vehicle for understanding strategic alternatives and choices.

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BLOCK II:

THE NATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT – ACTORS AND INSTITUTIONS

The international system of the twenty-first century will be marked by a seeming contradiction: on the one hand, fragmentation; on the other, growing globalization. On the level of the relations among states, the new order will be more like the European state system of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries than the rigid patterns of the Cold War. It will contain at least six major powers—the United States, Europe, China, Japan, Russia, and probably India—as well as a multiplicity of medium-sized and smaller countries. At the same time, international relations have become truly global for the first time. Communications are instantaneous; the world economy operates on all continents simultaneously. A whole set of issues has surfaced that can only be dealt with on a worldwide basis, such as nuclear proliferation, the environment, the populations explosion, and economic interdependence.

—Henry Kissinger
Diplomacy, 1994

This block focuses on the key actors in the U.S. national security enterprise. These include the President, the National Security Advisor and members of the National Security Council, and the U.S. Congress. We also dedicate a lesson in this block to the role of the military in the policy process, focusing on the Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). Finally, we examine the nature of policy decision-making and use a case study on the escalation of the Vietnam War to synthesize the lessons from this block of instruction.

BLOCK II OBJECTIVES

- Understand the role of the executive and legislative branches in the national security decision-making process.
- Understand the impact of Presidential leadership style on the national security decision-making process.
- Understand the role of interest groups in influencing the national security decision-making process.
- Understand the role of the uniformed military and the civilian leadership of the Department of Defense in the national security decision-making process.
- Critically examine the decision to escalate U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War in 1965.

LESSON 6: THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM—THE PRESIDENCY AND THE NSC

Mode: Seminar

NSPS-6-S

1. Introduction.

a. In this lesson, we will examine the role of the President, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (APNSA or more commonly known as the National Security Advisor), and the National Security Council, in the policymaking process. The U.S. Constitution enumerates six formal roles and powers for the President that grants him significant, but not complete authority in foreign affairs. Further, given the vastness of the federal bureaucracy, a president cannot administer these organizations directly, but rather can call upon their expertise and resources to assist him in the formulation and implementation of policy.

b. This expertise resides in his personal staff (the National Security Council staff) under the direction of the National Security Advisor, but also with the National Security Council (NSC) and the departments and agencies that the members of the Council represent. By law, the function of the NSC is to “advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and the other departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security.” The Council’s statutory membership consists of the President, the Vice President, and the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Energy. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the statutory military advisor to the Council, and the Director of National Intelligence is the intelligence advisor.

c. Another aspect of this lesson is to examine the role of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (NSA). The National Security Advisor is not a statutory member of the NSC, but is traditionally responsible for determining the policy agenda in consultation with the other regular members of the NSC, ensuring necessary papers are prepared, recording NSC deliberations, and disseminating presidential decisions. However, the authorities and responsibilities of the NSA, as well as other members of the President’s national security team have often varied significantly from one administration to another. Thus, the functions that the advisor performs (usually categorized in the scholarly literature as administrator, coordinator, counselor, or agent) are ultimately the President’s decision.

d. We will begin this lesson by examining the history of the interagency process used to formulate and implement national security policy. We will then specifically

examine the role of the President and the National Security Council in that process and in particular, the national security system structure the Obama administration is using. Lastly, we will use a historical vignette, the 2006 Iraq strategy review, to study how the national security advisor can influence the decision-making process and equally important, how the relationship between the advisor and the President is fundamental to agenda-setting and the examination of policy options.

2. Learning Objectives.

a. Understand the roles of the various participants in the national security policymaking process, especially the President, the national security advisor, and the NSC.

b. Analyze how presidential managerial style and personality influence the formulation and implementation of national security policy, and evaluate how presidents use a variety of skills to accomplish their national security policy objectives successfully.

c. Analyze the national security policymaking system's effectiveness in helping the President formulate and implement national security policy by assessing the influence that the national security advisor and the National Security Council have in managing the system for this purpose.

3. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks.

(1) Be prepared to discuss the readings in conjunction with the learning objectives and the points to consider.

(2) Be prepared to discuss the difficulties inherent in a policymaking process that is complex, fragmented, and reliant on a variety of skills, expertise, agendas and influences.

b. Required Readings.

(1) Glenn P. Hastedt, "*Presidency*," in *American Foreign Policy: Past*, 10th ed. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014), 175-97. **[Student Issue]**

(2) President Barack Obama, Presidential Policy Directive-1, "Organization of the National Security Council System," Washington, DC: The White House, February 13, 2009 at: <http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=34560> (accessed 29 July 2015)

[Online]

(3) Alan G. Whittaker et al., *The National Security Policy Process: The National Security Council and Interagency System* (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 2011), 5-11. **[Blackboard]**

(4) Colin Dueck, "The Role of the National Security Advisor and the 2006 Iraq Strategy Review," *Orbis* 58, no. 1 (Winter 2014): 15-38 at: <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/00304387> (accessed 5 August 2015).

[Online]

c. Suggested Readings.

(1) Ernest R. May, ed., *The Ultimate Decision: The President as Commander in Chief* (New York: G. Braziller, 1960).

(2) Alexander L. George, *Presidential Decision-making in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1980).

(3) Gary Hess, *Presidential Decisions for War: Korea, Vietnam, the Persian Gulf and Iraq* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009).

(4) Elizabeth N. Saunders, *Leaders at War: How Presidents Shape Military Interventions* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011).

(5) Joseph G. Dawson, *Commanders-in-Chief: Presidential Leadership in Modern Wars* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1993).

(6) Sam C. Sarkesian, John Allen Williams, and Stephen J. Cimbala, *U.S. National Security: Policymakers, Processes and Politics*. Boulder, (CO: Lynne Rienner, 2008).

(7) Theodore C. Sorensen, *Decision-making in the White House: The Olive Branch or The Arrows* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963).

4. Points to Consider.

a. What events prompted the creation of the National Security Council? How has this advisory system changed since the enactment of the National Security Act of 1947? Why has the advisory system changed?

b. How do presidential leadership style and presidential personality influence the policymaking process? How do these two factors affect the president's advisory system for national security decision-making?

c. President Dwight Eisenhower once remarked, "Organization cannot of course make a successful leader out of dunce, any more than it should make a decision for its chief. But it is effective in minimizing the chances of failure and insuring that the right hand does, indeed, know what the left hand is doing." In your estimation, how much credit should be given to a well-organized advisory system in helping the President make prudent decisions on national security issues?

d. What are the domestic and international ramifications when the President uses the various strategies Hastedt mentions to sidestep the limitations that the U.S. Constitution places on his office?

5. Relationship to Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) Phase II Learning Areas.

a. JLA 1.a, b, d. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

b. JLA 2.a. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

c. JLA 3.a. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

e. JLA 5a, b, c, d, g. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

6. Relationship to USAWC Institutional Learning Objective (ILO), Program Learning Objectives (PLOs), Enduring and Special Themes.

a. ILO: Our graduates are intellectually prepared to preserve peace, deter aggression and, when necessary, achieve victory in war through studying and conferring on the great problems of national defense, military science, and responsible command.

b. PLOs: 1, 7, 8, 9.

c. Enduring Themes: Strategic leadership and the exercise of discretionary judgment; Relationship of policy and strategy; Instruments of national power and potential contributions to national security; Civil-military relations; Instruments of war and national security; History as a vehicle for understanding strategic alternatives and choices

LESSON 7: THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM II: CONGRESS AND INTEREST GROUPS

Mode: Seminar

NSPS-7-S

1. Introduction.

a. The framers of the U.S. Constitution designed a government based on a system of shared and separate powers across the institutions they created. Their grants of power over foreign policy to two separate branches, the executive and the legislative, led the political scientist Edward S. Corwin, in his book *The President, Office and Powers*, to describe the result as an “invitation to struggle for the privilege of directing American foreign policy.”

b. Consequently, the process for the making of foreign and defense policies (that is, national security policy) requires both coordination and cooperation to achieve anything of real significance in national security affairs. It behooves national security professionals therefore, to understand how the aforementioned unique institutional arrangement influences the formulation and execution of these policies. In essence, senior military leaders and civilian officials, as participants in the U.S. political system, soon discover that they are accountable to two masters for policymaking and implementation: the President and the Congress. In this lesson, we will examine the interaction between the Congress and the executive branch on foreign policy and defense issues.

c. In doing so, we will explore how formal powers contribute to, and limit, the influence wielded by the Congress (and the President as well) in any specific policymaking scenario. Presidents draw upon their constitutional authority to carry out their roles as commander-in-chief and chief administrator of the federal bureaucracy. The president’s effectiveness depends largely on “strategic competence,” that is, the appropriate mastery of policy substance, process, and promotion. Gaining these competencies enables the president to exploit the institutional competencies of the executive branch. Congress, in turn, has countervailing powers to shape the development and implementation phases of policymaking. Further, the informal powers of each branch, if astutely employed, can significantly enhance the influence of either institution, a point worth weighing. To maximize the likelihood of successful policy development, Congress must participate in the process in ways that leverage its unique institutional competencies.

d. Lastly, we will examine how various interest groups, through their lobbyists, influence national security policymaking, especially with respect to the Congress. Experts estimate that there are more than 10,000 interest groups attempting to

influence U.S. government policy, and a substantial number of them focus on national security issues such as arms control, military procurement, trade, and diplomatic relations. As an example, the role of policy institutes or think tanks, often categorized as public-interest groups, has evolved over time, becoming increasingly relevant during the Cold War era and even important today. In their purest form, a think tank is intended to provide unbiased, neutral, expert advice on a wide array of policy issues. However, today's think tanks are often affiliated with a particular political philosophy, interest group goal, or specific issue. It is important not to underestimate the degree of influence that these actors have in the national security policymaking process, and how they have become increasingly integrated into that process.

2. Learning Objectives.

a. Understand how the constitutional powers of the Congress affect U.S. foreign policymaking, and recognize the political dynamic that exists between the Congress and the President in this policy area.

b. Comprehend the role that interest groups have in shaping national security policy; understand how these actors are organized, and with whom they work at the national level to achieve their aims.

c. Analyze how the Senate and House Armed Services Committees can influence U.S. national defense through oversight, the defense budget, and the development of policy initiatives.

3. Student Requirements.

a. Task. Be prepared to discuss the readings in conjunction with the learning objectives and the points to consider.

b. Required Readings.

(1) Pat Towell, "Congress and Defense," in *Congress and the Politics of National Security*, David P. Auerswald and Colton C. Campbell, eds. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 71-99. **[Blackboard]**

(2) Glenn P. Hastedt, "Society" and "Congress," in *American Foreign Policy: Past, Present, and Future*, 10th ed. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014), 122-29, 143-71. **[Student Issue]**

(3) James Kitfield, "Defense Hawks Take Flight," *The National Interest* 132 (July/August 2014): 49-55 at <http://search.proquest.com/docview/1543483175> (accessed August 7, 2015). **[Online]**

c. Suggested Readings.

(1) Kay King, *Congress and National Security*. Council Special Report No. 58. (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2010).

(2) James M. Lindsay, *Congress and the Politics of U.S. Foreign Policy*. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994).

(3) Walter J. Oleszek, *Congressional Procedures and the Policy Process*, 7th ed. (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2007).

(4) Ralph G. Carter and James M. Schott, "Understanding Congressional Foreign Policy Innovators: Mapping Entrepreneurs and Their Strategies," *Social Science Journal*, 47, no. 2 (Jun 2010): 418-38.

(5) Lee H. Hamilton, *A Creative Tension: The Foreign Policy Roles of the President and Congress*. (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2002).

(6) Keith M. Wilkinson, "One Natio Indivisible?: Ethnic Interest Groups and U.S. Foreign Policy." (Maxwell Air Force Base: Air University, Air War College, 1999).

(7) Randall B. Ripley and James M. Lindsay, eds., *Congress Resurgent: Foreign and Defense Policy on Capitol Hill*. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1993).

(8) James G. McGann, "Think Tanks and the Transnationalization of Foreign Policy," *Foreign Policy Research Institute*, E-Notes, December 16, 2002).

(9) Rebecca K. C. Hersman, *Friends and Foes: How Congress and the President Really Make Foreign Policy*. (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000). Chapter 2, "Individual Power and Issue Leaders," 10-33, and Chapter 3, "Institutional Overlap and Issue Clusters," 34-52.

(10) Stanley R. Sloan, Mary Locke, and Casimir A. Yost, *The Foreign Policy Struggle: Congress and the President in the 1990s and Beyond*. Washington, DC: Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, 2000.

(11) Norman A. Swazo, "The Duty of Congress to Check the President's Prerogative in National Security Policy," *International Journal on World Peace*, 21, no. 4 (Dec. 2004), 21-62.

(12) James M. Lindsay, "Deference and Defiance: The Shifting Rhythms of Executive-Legislative Relations in Foreign Policy," *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, 33, no. 3 (Sep 2003), 530-46.

4. Points to Consider.

- a. How do interest groups influence foreign policy formulation and implementation?

b. How does the Congress employ its constitutional powers to participate in the foreign policymaking process?

c. What policy initiatives can the Armed Services Committees undertake and what sources of information (internal and external) can they use to carry out their constitutional responsibilities effectively?

d. How can internal political party undercurrents influence the formulation of national security policies and their execution?

5. Relationship to Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) Phase II Learning Areas.

a. JLA 1.a, b. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

b. JLA 2.a. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

c. JLA 4.a. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

d. JLA 5a, b. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

6. Relationship to USAWC Institutional Learning Objective (ILO), Program Learning Objectives (PLOs), Enduring and Special Themes.

a. ILO: Our graduates are intellectually prepared to preserve peace, deter aggression and, when necessary, achieve victory in war through studying and conferring on the great problems of national defense, military science, and responsible command.

b. PLOs: 1, 7, 9

c. Enduring Themes: Relationship of Policy and Strategy (relationship between ends, ways, and means) Instruments of national power and potential contributions to national security Civil-military relations History as a vehicle for understanding strategic alternatives and choices.

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LESSON 8: THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION- MAKING

Mode: Seminar

NSPS-8-S

1. Introduction.

a. Policymaking is different than strategy making. Policy is a political goal, regardless of the sphere of politics or any organizational setting. It is *what* outcome is to be achieved. Policy in the national security arena, we might say, is Policy with a capital “P.” Policy as used by executives and managers in every organization is policy with a small “p.” In either case, policy is a control or forcing mechanism—a form of organizational power—that either constrains or advances behaviors towards a political end. Strategy, on the other hand, is *how* the policy is to be achieved. In this lesson, we look at the policymaking process from the perspective of the military involvement in that Policy process, Policy with a capital “P.”

b. Understanding the players and roles acting in the national security decision-making process opens up a different world than we have experienced in the operational and tactical realms. The stage is usually Washington, D.C. and not the combatant command headquarters or the battlefield. The players are predominately civilians—at the senior levels, the civilians are either elected, appointed by elected civilians, or have been appointed by civilians who themselves have been appointed by elected civilians— and not the uniformed technicians and specialists typically within the enlisted ranks of service men and woman supervised and led by mid-grade officers. The rules these players follow are generally founded upon a constitutionally mandated and inspired framework of checks and balances, rather than doctrine, directives, and instructions aligning policy quite narrowly with implementation. When it comes right down to it, this national security context is, in a word, antithetical to the military concept of unity of command.

c. The question, then, is, how does the military mindset operate within an environment absent of unity of command? This lesson covers two elements to answer this question. First, we cover the roles that various defense-related actors play in the national security decision-making space. Second, and more important, the contexts in which these players act out their roles provides evidence to better understand the nature of the roles they do play. By looking at the way they operate within their social and organizational context, we can gain better insight into this very different context that defense-related actors play in Washington, D.C. than on the battlefield.

d. The roles people play is an organizational concept familiar to the defense establishment. The military is an example, par excellence, of an organization that defines everyone’s role, that is, the function they serve is well documented and, along with rank,

is the currency of interaction between members. The function each military member serves is typically well-positioned, in theory, to support a series of interconnected and embedded objectives to a broader, higher-level military-related outcome. When we understand a person's role, we understand their function, and their maneuver space within a relatively shared understanding of what to expect at the next turn.

e. But in the national security interagency arena, the roles played by defense-related actors do not at all signify a shared understanding of what to expect. In the absence of unity of command, understanding the military's role in this arena is a challenge. The operational and tactical elements of the military provide little or no foundation for interpreting the significance or challenges of these roles played in the interagency. As a foundational start, nevertheless, this lesson will describe the roles played by defense-related and non-defense-related actors, but it will then provide insight into the contexts these actors operate.

f. Context can be described in a variety of views. We can look at context from a strategic, operational, and tactical lens. In this lesson, we focus on the strategic level, and it begins with an understanding of the fundamental aspects of the relationship between military and political actors. Key contextual elements are how actors physically (or even virtually) interact in meetings, and what form of communication is used to inform and coordinate with each other. While hierarchical structures are the norm for bureaucratic organizations, the existence of informal systems becomes highly important in getting work done. Instead of authority, persuasion can become a key success factor.

g. In the end, understanding the nuances, inherent strengths, and limitations of each player is critical to understanding the landscape and challenges in how military and civilian actors can synergistically work together. This lesson continues our exploration of the instruments of power in relation to the development of policy where, in our system, military leaders advise and civilian leaders decide.

2. Learning Objectives.

a. Understand the roles of the Secretary of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Joint Staff in the U.S. Government interagency processes.

b. Understand the social and organizational contexts in which these military actors operate within a political/civilian interagency policymaking process.

3. Student Requirement.

a. Task. Be prepared to discuss the readings in conjunction with the learning objectives and the points to consider.

b. Required Readings.

(1) Marybeth P. Ulrich, "A Primer on Civil-Military Relations for Senior Leaders," in *The U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues*, Vol. II: National Security Policy and Strategy, 5th ed. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2008), 306-314. **[Blackboard]**

(2) Alan G. Whittaker, et al., "The National Security Policy process: The National Security Council and the Interagency System," *Research Report Annual Update* (Washington D.C.: The National Defense University, August 2011), 48-53 **[Blackboard]**

(3) Amos A. Jordan, et al., "The Role of the Military in the Policy Process," in *American National Security*, 6th ed., ed. Amos A. Jordan, William J. Taylor, Michael J. Meese and Suzanne C. Nielsen (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009), 171-89. **[Blackboard]**

(4) Stephen M. Saideman, "More than Advice? The Joint Staff and American Foreign Policy," in *Inside Defense, Understanding the U.S. Military in the 21st Century*, ed. Derek S. Reveron and Judith Hicks Stiehm (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008), 31-39. **[Blackboard]**

(5) James Schlesinger, "The Office of the Secretary of Defense," in *Reorganizing America's Defense: Leadership in War and Peace*, ed. Robert J. Art, Vincent Davis, and Samuel Huntington (Washington, DC: Pergamon-Brassey, 2009), 255-268. **[Blackboard]**

(6) Glenn P. Hastedt, "The Bureaucracy" in *American Foreign Policy: Past, Present, and Future*, 10th edition (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014), 201-230 (Read only 211-216). **[Student Issue]**

c. Suggested Readings.

(1) Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint History Office, The Chairmanship of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Role of the Chairman (Washington, DC: Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1995) at: <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/doctrine/history/jcspart1.pdf>

Scan pages 3-38. Note: A brief history of the development of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from World War II to the Chairmanship of John Shalishkashvili, containing a large number of photos of the chairmen and the "tank" and 9-10 pages of text.

(2) Samuel P. Huntington, "The Political Roles of the Joint Chiefs," in *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press), 374-387.

(3) Frank L. Jones, "U.S. Defense Policymaking: A 21st-Century Perspective," in *Handbook of Defense Politics: International and Comparative Perspectives*, ed. Isaiah Wilson III and James J. F. Forest (New York, NY: Routledge 2008).

(4) Rupert Smith, *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World*, (New York, NY: Vintage, 2008).

(5) Peter J. Roman and David W. Tarr, "The Joint Chiefs of Staff: From Service Parochialism To Jointness," *Political Science Quarterly* (Spring 1998): 91-111 in [\[ProQuest\]](#) (accessed 15 June 2015).

(6) Christopher Paul, "The U.S. Military Intervention Decision-Making Process: Who Participates, and How," *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* 32, no. 1 (Summer 2004), 19-43.

(7) Colin Gray, "Politics and War" in *Modern Strategy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 58-64.

(8) Markel Wade, "The Limits of American Generalship: The Jcs's Strategic Advice in Early Cold War Crises," *Parameters* 38, no. 1 (Spring 2008): 16-29, [\[ProQuest\]](#) (accessed 5 August 2015).

4. Points to Consider.

a. How would you characterize and describe the relationships between OSD, the Joint Staff, the Interagency, and the Combatant Commands? How does each interact with the other, with the President, the interagency process, and Congress? What is the role of each in policy development, advice, and policy implementation?

b. What social, organizational, and structural impediments exist that make it a challenge to structure the advice we give our political leadership when it comes to the use of the military instrument of power?

5. Relationship to Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) Phase II Learning Areas.

a. JLA 1.a, b. e. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

b. JLA 2.c. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

c. JLA 3.a. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

d. JLA 4.a. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

e. JLA 5.a, b, d, f, g. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

6. Relationship to USAWC Institutional Learning Objective (ILO), Program Learning Objectives (PLOs), Enduring and Special Themes.

a. ILO: Our graduates are intellectually prepared to preserve peace, deter

aggression and, when necessary, achieve victory in war through studying and conferring on the great problems of national defense, military science, and responsible command.

b. PLOs: 1, 7, 9.

c. Enduring Themes: Evaluate Army/landpower and its scope in addressing national security policy aims. Analyze the diversity of landpower requirements over time (hence requirement for flexibility). Strategic Leadership and the exercise of discretionary judgment Relationship of Policy and Strategy (relationship between ends, ways, and means) Civil-military relations.

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LESSON 9: CASE STUDY II – U.S. ESCALATION IN VIETNAM

Mode: Seminar

NSPS-9-S

You have a row of dominoes set up; you knock over the first one, and what will happen to the last one is that it will go over very quickly. —President Dwight D. Eisenhower speaking at a press conference on April 7, 1954.

"I am not going to lose Vietnam. I am not going to be the president who saw Southeast Asia go the way China went." —Newly inaugurated President Lyndon Johnson at a White House meeting on November 24, 1963 responding to U.S. ambassador to South Vietnam Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. telling him that Vietnam "would go under any day if we don't do something."

"We are not about to send American boys nine or ten thousand miles away from home to do what Asian boys ought to be doing for themselves." —President Lyndon Johnson in a speech at Akron University on October 21, 1964, two weeks before the presidential election.

"We do this [escalating U.S. military involvement in Vietnam] in order to slow down aggression. We do this to increase the confidence of the brave people of South Vietnam who have bravely born this brutal battle for so many years with so many casualties. And we do this to convince the leaders of North Vietnam—and all who seek to share their conquest—of a simple fact: We will not be defeated. We will not grow tired. We will not withdraw either openly or under the cloak of a meaningless agreement."—President Lyndon Johnson, speaking to the nation on April 7, 1965 explaining his decision to send U.S. combat troops to Vietnam.

1. Introduction.

a. By the summer of 1965, the worsening situation in South Vietnam resulted in a concerted attempt by the Johnson Administration to assess the situation and develop a strategy to deal with it. Neither the increase in U.S. troop levels from 16,000 in August 1964, to some 71,000 less than a year later, nor the commencement of a bombing campaign against North Vietnam appeared to have any real effect. Instead, instability in the South Vietnamese government, the rapid deterioration of the South Vietnamese military, and significant and sustained Viet Cong territorial gains made it clear that unless something changed, the prospect of a communist victory in Vietnam was a distinct possibility.

b. In June and July of 1965, a series of high-level meetings in Washington and Saigon resulted in a decision to escalate U.S. involvement in the conflict – a decision

that is one of the most thoroughly analyzed foreign policy events in American history. In this lesson, we too will analyze this decision through an exercise designed to place each student in the role of one of its key participants. Your task will be to familiarize yourself with the historical context of the situation through the assigned readings and background materials, and – as a group – come up with a recommendation to the President.

c. As the background reading and the exercise material – much of which consists of declassified documents used in the actual decision-making process – make clear, U.S. officials struggling with this question had to balance a number of competing and sometimes contradictory imperatives. Among these were preventing communist domination of Southeast Asia; establishing a stable, self-sustaining, non-communist government in South Vietnam; demonstrating a U.S. capability to counter wars of national liberation and sustaining the reputation of the United States as a reliable partner, especially among key allies in the region; avoiding a war with China in Asia; deterring the Soviet Union from using the U.S. engagement in Asia as an opportunity to destabilize Europe; and sustaining public support for the U.S. war effort.

2. Learning Objectives.

a. Evaluate how decision-makers defined and articulated the appropriate “ends” for American strategy in Vietnam. Assess the “ways and means” that the United States used to achieve these ends.

b. Analyze how U.S. history and culture shaped the decision to escalate American involvement in Vietnam.

c. Understand the roles that organizational behavior, group dynamics and the individual characteristics of decision-makers played in shaping the outcome in the debate over whether to escalate U.S. involvement in Vietnam.

d. Understand the roles played by internal/domestic and external/international factors in shaping the outcome in the debate over whether to escalate U.S. involvement in Vietnam.

3. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks. Assume the role (assigned by your Faculty Instructor) of one of the participants in the decision over whether to escalate U.S. involvement in Vietnam.

b. Required Readings.

(1) David P. Houghton, “An Agonizing Decision: Escalating the Vietnam War,” in *The Decision Point: Six Cases in U.S. Foreign Policy Decision Making*, (New York: Oxford University Press 2013), 149-63. **[Student Issue]**

(2) Gary R. Hess, *Presidential Decisions for War: Korea, Vietnam, the Persian* (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2009), 76-106. **[Student Issue]**

(3) 1965: The Decision to Escalate the Vietnam War: Background Information for the Exercise”, Merrill Center for Strategic Studies, Johns Hopkins University, 1-7. **[Blackboard]**

(4) Escalating the War in Vietnam: A Simulation of the July 1965 Deliberations, Merrill Center for Strategic Studies, Johns Hopkins University, 3-26. **[Blackboard]**

(5) Biographies of Participants: read only the biography for the official whose role you have been designated to play for the exercise. **[Blackboard]**

c. Suggested Readings.

(1) George McTurnan Kahin, *Intervention: How America Became Involved in Vietnam* (New York: Knopf, 1986).

(2) Frederik Logevall, *Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of War in Vietnam.* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999).

(3) H.R. McMaster, *Dereliction of Duty.* (New York: HarperCollins 1997); Robert S. McNamara, *In Retrospect.* (New York: Times Books, 1995).

(4) Robert S. McNamara, *In Retrospect.* (New York: Times Books), 1995.

4. Points to Consider.

a. What other options were available to U.S. policymakers in July 1965 and why weren't these selected?

b. Was the decision to escalate fated to end in defeat or did decisions taken subsequently doom what might have otherwise been a successful strategy?

c. Was there conflict between the civilian and military members of the group concerning issues of "military expertise"? Did (or might) the members of the JCS have difficulty giving military advice to the president that might conflict with the assessment of their boss (the SecDef)?

d. Were there other officials or organizations (civilian or military) that should have been represented in this decision?

5. Relationship to Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) Phase II Learning Areas

a. JLA 1.a, b, c, d. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

b. JLA 2 b, c, e. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

- c. JLA 3.a, c. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.
- d. JLA 4.a. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.
- e. JLA 5. a, b, d, d, g. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

6. Relationship to USAWC Institutional Learning Objective (ILO), Program Learning Objectives, (PLOs), Enduring and Special Themes.

a. ILO: Our graduates are intellectually prepared to preserve peace, deter aggression and, when necessary, achieve victory in war through studying and conferring on the great problems of national defense, military science, and responsible command.

b. PLOs: 1, 7, 9.

c. Enduring Themes: Evaluate Army/landpower and its scope in addressing national security policy aims. Analyze the diversity of landpower requirements over time (hence requirement for flexibility). Strategic Leadership and the exercise of discretionary judgment. Relationship of Policy and Strategy (relationship between ends, ways, and means). Civil-military relations. Instruments of war and national security. History as a vehicle for understanding strategic alternatives and choices.

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BLOCK III:

U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY – INSTRUMENTS OF POWER

The various agencies that propose and execute policy interact to choose among policy alternatives that the executive branch will implement or, if necessary, submit to the legislative branch for its approval. Generally, administrations have sought to involve Congress in foreign policy matters as little as possible. Presidents and their advisers often come to think of foreign and security policy as their own preserves, matters that they should be allowed to handle with minimum interference, especially when sensitive or classified information is involved. At times in U.S. history, Congress acceded to this attitude, but in recent decades that has clearly been less the case. When presidents ignore Congress, fail to consult it adequately (as defined by Congress), or engage in foreign policy misdeeds or misguided policies, the battle is joined.

—Donald M. Snow/Eugene Brown
Puzzle Palaces and Foggy Bottom, 147-148

In this block we will explore the fundamental nature, uses, and limitations of the instruments of U.S. national power (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic). We will develop a foundational appreciation of each instrument of power and examine how these instruments complement, and at times, contradict one another. We will also study the national level intelligence community in this block. Although intelligence is not generally considered an instrument of national power, it is a key enabler of those instruments. We end this block of the course with a case study examining the decision to go to war in Iraq in 2003. Whereas the first case study (Containment and NSC-68) examined a strategy designed to achieve U.S. national objectives while avoiding global war with the Soviet Union, and the second case study (Vietnam) examined the decision to escalate U.S. involvement in an ongoing war, this case study examines a case of pre-emptive war.

BLOCK III OBJECTIVES

- Understand and evaluate the instruments of national power and intelligence as “means” of promoting and protecting national interests.
- Critically examine the U.S. decision to go to war in Iraq in 2003.

LESSON 10: DIPLOMACY AND INFORMATION

Mode: Seminar

NSPS-10-S

1. Introduction.

a. This lesson will explore how diplomacy and information are used as instruments of national power. In most cases, diplomacy, foreign assistance, other economic tools, and information are used in conjunction with military capabilities in order to achieve the political objectives defined by the national leadership. Students will discuss how diplomatic power – i.e., the power to persuade other countries, most often without the threat of force, to do things they would otherwise not do – is amassed, maintained and used. Students will also examine the Information instrument at the policy level.

b. Among other aspects, seminar discussion will focus on how diplomatic and military power can be used in concert, and how information works with both of these instruments. Students will have seen multiple examples of these connections in Theory of War and Strategy (TWS), particularly with respect to the Peloponnesian War. The second reading, from Chas Freeman's book, *Arts of Power*, focuses largely on the instrument of diplomacy. What are the tools available? How are they best employed in pursuit of foreign policy goals and objectives?

c. Over the past decade-plus of war and international crises, a clearer understanding of the ever-closer relationship among the instruments of national power (diplomacy, information, military and economic) has emerged. The important features of a successful and well-integrated political-military strategy are: a disciplined pursuit of clear, achievable and important political goals; and the application of military force to achieve well-defined objectives directly and clearly linked to the overall political goals. Students will see how diplomacy and information – if integrated with the other instruments of national power and subordinated to the task of achieving the nation's goals – can provide results that might not be achievable if the options were to be pursued separately.

d. The lesson will next examine the role of public diplomacy. Public diplomacy overlaps two "instruments of power:" diplomacy and information. Edmund Gullion, Dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy in 1965, defined public diplomacy thusly:

Public diplomacy...deals with the influence of public attitudes on the formation and execution of foreign policies. It encompasses dimensions of international relations beyond traditional diplomacy; the cultivation by governments of public opinion in other countries; the interaction of private

groups and interests in one country with another; the reporting of foreign affairs and its impact on policy; communication between those whose job is communication, as diplomats and foreign correspondents; and the process of intercultural communications.

e. The Nye article expands on this theme. While there are professionals who manage and conduct public diplomacy for the USG, it is a fact that every U.S. diplomat – career or appointed, Foreign Service or other – is deeply involved in “PD” at every turn of implementation of a diplomatic strategy.

f. We will discuss cyberspace’s role in the Information instrument. The *2015 National Security Strategy* – itself an example of the use of the Information instrument, given the document’s function as a message for both domestic and international consumption – mentions digital technology, the Internet, and cyberspace in various guises thirteen times throughout, including twice in the President’s cover letter. U.S. foreign policy on cyberspace was recently described by the Department of State’s Coordinator for Cyber Issues as a *still nascent policy space*, though he added that *Cyber issues have become central topics of discussion in virtually every international venue, and cyber diplomacy is increasingly viewed by governments as a foreign policy imperative*. His remarks came in testimony in May 2015 before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s Subcommittee on East Asia, the Pacific and International Cybersecurity Policy, this last element of the Subcommittee’s responsibilities having been recently added in recognition of cyber’s importance. U.S. foreign policy engagement focuses on cyberspace in three principal areas:

- Cybersecurity, where the U.S. promotes the broad collection of tools, policies, best practices, and actions that can be used to protect organizations’ and users’ assets in cyberspace and better ensure that the intended availability, integrity, and confidentiality of online data and services are unaffected by malicious threats;
- Internet freedom – the U.S. seeks to preserve and expand the Internet as an open, global space for freedom of expression, for organizing and interaction, and for commerce, across the whole range of human interests and endeavors; and
- Internet governance, for which the U.S. position is that when decisions are made about the future of the Internet, all stakeholders – the private sector, civil society, academics, the technical community, and governments – should have a seat at the table.

g. The Department of State uses a whole-of-government approach to pursue these policies and the associated goals through bilateral and multilateral engagement, working to build norms for the Internet and for cyber generally. The Farrell article discusses the need for, and challenges to, achieving such norms. The 2012 speech by former Department of State Legal Advisor Harold Hongju Koh, presented to a USCYBERCOM gathering, broke ground by stating unequivocally that existing international law, including humanitarian law, applies fully in cyberspace.

h. Finally, the issue of cyber sovereignty has highlighted more of the most significant challenges to achieving consensus on Internet norms. The Internet may not recognize national borders, but states have concerns about its use within their borders and some are increasingly implementing policies to establish control over the Internet's content and access within their countries. Among the strongest proponents of establishing strong norms for national governments' authority over the Internet, or even negotiating a new international convention to codify such norms, are China and Russia.

2. Learning Objectives.

a. Comprehend the unique nature of diplomacy as a means of amassing, preserving and exercising national power.

b. Understand how diplomacy works with the various elements of national power in order to reach the political goals defined by the leadership

c. Examine how public diplomacy furthers U.S. foreign policy goals, and the emerging foreign policy issues of cyberspace.

3. Student Requirements.

a. Task. Study the readings; be prepared to discuss the "Points to Consider" in Section 4 below.

b. Required Readings.

(1) Glenn P. Hastedt, "The State Department" (204-211) skip the "Historical Lesson" on 204-211) and "Diplomacy" (260-283) in *American Foreign Policy*, 10th ed. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014). **[Student Issue]**

(2) Charles W. Freeman Jr., "Diplomatic Strategy and Tactics," "Diplomatic Maneuver," "Diplomatic Negotiation," "Relations Between States" and "The Use of Diplomats." *Arts of Power: Statecraft and Diplomacy* (U.S. Institute of Peace Press; Washington, DC, 1997) 71-104. **[Student Issue]**

(3) Joseph S. Nye Jr., "Theorizing Public Diplomacy: Public Diplomacy and Soft Power," *The Annals of The American Academy of Political and Social Science* (March 2008,at: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/lncui2api/api/version1/getDocCui?oc=00240&hnsd=f&hgn=t&lni=4S2N-3HM0-00CV-J0N8&hns=t&perma=true&hv=t&hl=t&csi=165641&secondRedirectIndicator=true> (accessed 22 October 2015). **[Online]**

(4) Henry Farrell, "Promoting Norms for Cyberspace," *Council on Foreign Relations*, April 2015 <http://www.cfr.org/cybersecurity/promoting-norms-cyberspace/p36358> (accessed 4 June 2015). **[Online]**

(5) Harold Hongju Koh, "International Law in Cyberspace," U.S. Department of State, September 18, 2012 <http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/197924.htm> (accessed 4 June 2015). [Online]

c. Suggested Readings:

(1) G.R. Berridge, *Diplomacy: Theory and Practice* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).

(2) Shawn Dorman, eds., *Inside a U.S. Embassy: Diplomacy at Work* (Washington, DC: Foreign Service Books, American Foreign Service Association, 2011).

(3) Keith Hamilton and Richard Langhorne, *The Practice of Diplomacy: Its Evolution, Theory and Administration* (New York: Routledge, 2011).

(4) Henry Bertram Hill, trans, *The Political Testament of Cardinal Richelieu* (Madison, WI: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1961).

(5) Henry A. Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994).

(6) Paul Gordon Lauren, Gordon A. Craig, Alexander L. George, *Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Challenges of Our Time* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014).

(7) Sir Harold Nicolson, *Diplomacy* (Washington, DC: Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, 1988).

(8) Joseph M. Siracusa, *Diplomacy: A Very Short Introduction* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010).

(9) U.S. Department of State, *Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, 2015*, "Executive Summary," 7-15 <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/241429.pdf> (accessed June 25, 2015).

(10) A.F. Whyte, trans., *On the Manner of Negotiating with Princes, by Monsieur de Callières* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1963).

Information

(1) Nicholas J. Cull, *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency: American Propaganda and Public Diplomacy, 1945-1989* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

(2) Nicholas J. Cull, *The Decline and Fall of the United States Information Agency: American Public Diplomacy, 1989-2001* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).

(3) Justin Hart, *Empire of Ideas: The Origins of Public Diplomacy and the Transformation of U.S. Foreign Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013).

(4) Melissa Hathaway, "Connected Choices: How the Internet is Challenging Sovereign Decisions," *American Foreign Policy Interests*, Volume 36, Issue 5, 2014 <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10803920.2014.969178#.VXCJ9U377cs> (accessed 4 June 2015).

(5) Henry A. Kissinger, *World Order* (New York: Penguin Press, 2014); "Technology, Equilibrium, and Human Consciousness," 330-360.

(6) Jonathan Masters, *What is Internet Governance?*, Council on Foreign Relations, November 2014, <http://www.cfr.org/internet-policy/internet-governance/p32843> (accessed 4 June 2015).

(7) Jan Melissen, ed., *The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).

(8) Christopher M.E. Painter, Coordinator for Cyber Issues, U.S. Department of State, *Cybersecurity: Setting the Rules for Responsible Global Behavior* (Testimony Before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on East Asia, the Pacific, and International Cybersecurity Policy, May 14, 2015) http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/051415_Painter_Testimony.pdf (accessed 4 June 2015).

(9) U.S. Department of Defense, *The DOD Cyber Strategy*, April 2015, "Introduction" and "Strategic Context," 1-12, http://www.defense.gov/home/features/2015/0415_cyber-strategy/Final_2015_DoD_CYBER_STRATEGY_for_web.pdf (accessed 4 June 2015).

4. Points to Consider:

a. What is diplomatic power? How do you get countries to do things they wouldn't otherwise do without compelling them?

b. How can diplomacy and military power be used to achieve effects without resorting to force?

c. What role does "public diplomacy" play with regard to achieving national interests?

d. What are the ends-way-means and associated risks for the U.S. in the emerging policy arena of cyberspace?

5. Relationship to Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) Phase II Learning Areas:

- a. JLA 1.a, b. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.
- b. JLA 2 c. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.
- c. JLA 3.a, c, d. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.
- d. JLA 4.a. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.
- e. JLA 5. a, b. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

6 Relationship to USAWC Institutional Learning Objective (ILO), Program Learning Objectives (PLOs), Enduring and Special Themes.

a. ILO: Our graduates are intellectually prepared to preserve peace, deter aggression and, when necessary, achieve victory in war through studying and conferring on the great problems of national defense, military science, and responsible command.

b. PLOs: 1, 7, 9.

c. Enduring Themes: Relationship of Policy and Strategy (relationship between ends, ways, and means) Instruments of national power and potential contributions to national security, History as a vehicle for understanding strategic alternatives and choices.

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LESSON 11: INTELLIGENCE

Mode: Seminar

NSPS-11-S

1. Introduction.

a. We pause momentarily in this lesson from the thrust of Block III, Instruments of National Power, by considering the question of whether intelligence—as a strategic tool—is an enabling function that supports decision makers of instruments, or whether intelligence is itself an instrument of power. We argue it is an enabling function though since for a time since 9/11 it has often been called an instrument. So, what is intelligence?

b. Intelligence is a function, according to sociologist Wilensky (1967) who wrote the seminal work on how knowledge shapes policy that includes the gathering processing, interpreting, and communicating of specific information needed in the policymaker's decision-making process. Intelligence is a universal function used in government, industry and non-profit organizations. Here, in this lesson, we focus on intelligence from a theoretical vantage point to delve deeper into its enabling function, as it is applied to national security, operated within specialized organizational entities to help policymakers navigate the international uncertainties as well as to be successful during the fog of war.

c. First, we provide a quick overview of how the word intelligence is used on a day-to-day basis. Former career intelligence officer and now academician, Lowenthal (2012) defines intelligence in terms of three dimensions: as a process, a product, and a practice.

d. Intelligence—as process—derives from senior leaders (policy makers, commanders) identifying intelligence requirements and assigning them priorities for action. Based on that guidance, intelligence collection managers, working with analysis and collection experts, determine the best sources or methods for collecting the intelligence and then task intelligence organizations accordingly. The process also includes continuing review and evaluation of reports and finished products for suitability and value. This is the nominal view, but in reality, the human dimension of the interaction between policymaker and intelligence officer adds many nuances to this process. The focus of our lesson will be on process-related issues relevant to the intersection of intelligence producers and policymaker consumers.

e. Intelligence—as product—may be classified analysis based on classified reporting, but being classified is not the determinant. Information becomes *intelligence* as a result of the analytic process that considers raw reports in context of reports from other sources and methods of collection, combined with the informed judgment of the

analyst. In many cases the product is classified if the raw reports were collected through classified means, but increasingly, open and unclassified sources provide high value reports for analysts' use in their assessments.

f. Intelligence—as practice—is among the most popular areas of discussion. This primarily includes the collection and analysis of information—whether from classified sources or not—but also includes a very specialized governmental function called covert action. Covert action, such as paramilitary activity to kill, capture or sabotage, is a very different phenomenon than that of the collection and analysis of information. For one, covert action occurs after a policy decision has been made whereas virtually all of the intelligence community resources are dedicated to collecting and analyzing information to be used prior to a policymaker making a decision, and, for another, the post-decisional covert action requires the approval of the policymaker, in this case, the president. Here, in this lesson, the underlying focus is the practice of intelligence from the point of view of policymaker's use of information in the support to policymaker decisions.

g. Second, we use this lesson to provide an inside view of the intelligence process from two theoretical perspectives: (1) the epistemological dilemmas—i.e., how knowledge is created—that intelligence professionals face in knowing what and how to focus their talent in order to serve the needs of policymakers (decision makers, combatant commanders, etc.); and (2) the ontological dilemmas—e.g., what knowledge means—for intelligence professionals to serve the needs of policymakers, and how the products of intelligence by intelligence officers and use of intelligence by policymakers are shaped by the interaction between these two world views: intelligence and policymaking.

h. From the intellectual perspective, intelligence professionals face two fundamental epistemological dilemmas. They have to figure out how to synthesize knowledge across many specialized boundaries since the kinds of problems decision makers face in the world today do not neatly fit into any specialized knowledge domains or organizational boundaries. They also have to come to terms with their value proposition: what is the value-added that intelligence provides the policymaker, especially relevant in an information age where information is ubiquitous, and determine what kind of knowledge is of value? Here, we are not talking about domain specific knowledge as the dilemma but, rather, the whether knowledge should be used to help policymakers face the present, or the leading edge of the future, and, if the latter, what that means for knowledge creation. It is not an either / or proposition; it is a matter of balance.

j. From a psychological and social perspective, intelligence professionals face two ontological dilemmas. The first is the recognition of the fundamental difference between intelligence—which one may consider a “fact”—versus beliefs and ideas of the policymaker. Even “facts” are not really absolute, so understanding the dynamics within the sociology of intelligence becomes important, especially when policymakers live in the world of beliefs and ideas, not of facts. The second is the set of specific conflicting dynamics between these two worlds—of facts, and of beliefs and ideas—that make not only the transmission or communication of knowledge a challenge, but may also portend an effect on the creation itself of intelligence “facts.”

2. Learning Objectives.

a. Analyze the internal challenges intelligence organizations have in creating actionable knowledge about complex problems.

b. Analyze the external challenges—the differences between the fact-based world of intelligence officers and the belief- and idea-based world of policymakers—of the effects that the collision of these different worlds have on informing policymakers.

3. Student Requirements.

a. Required Readings:

(1) David Kahn, “The Rise of Intelligence”, *Foreign Affairs*, 85, no. 5 (2006): 125-134. in [\[Ebscohost\]](#) (accessed 4 June 2015). **[Online]**

(2) John McLaughlin, “New Challenges and Priorities for Analysis,” *Defense Intelligence Journal* 6, no. 2, (1997): 11-21. **[Blackboard]**

(3) Thomasingar, “Using Intelligence to Anticipate Opportunities and Shape the Future,” in *Reducing Uncertainty: Intelligence and National Security*,” (2011), 52-66 at: [\[http://iis-db.stanford.edu/evnts/5859/lecture_text.pdf\]](http://iis-db.stanford.edu/evnts/5859/lecture_text.pdf) (accessed 5 August 2015). **[Online]**

(4) Thomas Hughes, “The Fate of Facts in the World of Men,” Paper presented at the American Society of International Law Annual Meeting, 63, Perspectives for International Legal Development, 233-245 (1969). **[Blackboard]**

(5) Robert Jervis, “Why Intelligence and Policymakers Clash?” *Political Science Quarterly* 125, no. 2 (Summer 2010): 185-204 in [\[Ebscohost\]](#) (accessed 3 November 2015). **[Online]**

b. Suggested Readings:

(1) Richard Immerman, “Intelligence and Strategy: Historicizing Psychology, Policy, and Politics,” *Diplomatic History* 32, no. 1 (January 2008): 1-23.

(2) Mark M. Lowenthal, *Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy*, 5th ed. (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2012).

(3) Nate Jones, “The 1983 War Scare: The ‘Last Paroxysm’ of the Cold War, Parts I, II, and III” (Washington, DC: National Security Archive, May 16, 2013), at: [\[http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB426/\]](http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB426/)

(4) Richard A. Best, Jr, “What the Intelligence Community Got Right About Iraq,” *Intelligence and National Security* 23, no 3 (June 2008): 289-302.

(5) Paul R. Pillar, "Intelligence, Policy, and the War in Iraq." *Foreign Affairs* 85, no. 2, (March/April 2006):15-27.

(6) Paul R. Pillar, "Think Again: Intelligence," *Foreign Policy* 191 (January/February 2012).

(7) Christopher M. Blanchard, *Al Qaeda: Statements and Evolving Ideology* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Updated July 9, 2007), 1-18.

(8) Thomas H. Kean, et al, *9/11 Commission Report*, 374-380 at: [<http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf>].

(9) Harold L. Wilensky, *Organizational Intelligence: Knowledge and Policy in Government and Industry* (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1967).

4. Points to Consider.

a. What prompts a nation's emphasis and organizational development in intelligence; what prompts its lack of emphasis?

b. What are the trade-offs between current and strategic intelligence from an organizational resource perspective; is there a preference by the policymaker, and, if so, why?

c. What is the difference between predictive analysis and opportunity analysis, and how can the intelligence officer navigate his/her relationship with the policymaker in providing opportunity analysis without crossing into the policymaking domain?

d. Intelligence officers assume that the facts they provide stand alone as facts devoid of overlaying a priori viewpoints; how does the policymaker see these facts, and why?

e. Intelligence officers and policymakers are different at a fundamentally psychological and political level, which contribute to their existential conflict; what are some fundamental dynamics that contribute to differences in how these two actors see the world?

f. Is intelligence an enabling function to instruments of power or is intelligence itself an instrument, and why?

5. Relationship to Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) Phase II Learning Areas.

a. JLA 1.a, b d. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

b. JLA 2 c. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

c. JLA 3.a, c. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

d. JLA 4.a, c. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

e. JLA 5. a, b. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

6. Relationship to USAWC Institutional Learning Objective (ILO), Program Learning Objectives (PLOs), Enduring Themes and Special Themes:

a. ILO: Our graduates are intellectually prepared to preserve peace, deter aggression and, when necessary, achieve victory in war through studying and conferring on the great problems of national defense, military science, and responsible command.

b. PLOs: 1, 7, 9.

c. Enduring Themes: Instruments of National Power, Civil-Military Relations.

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LESSON 12: MILITARY POWER

Mode: Seminar

NSPS-12-S

1. Introduction.

a. This lesson continues the Block III dialogue on U.S. National Security – Instruments of Power, by exploring the military instrument of power. In the preceding lessons, students explored diplomacy and information instruments of national power. In Lesson 12, students will focus on the military instrument of power while synthesizing their newly gained knowledge of the Diplomatic and Information instruments of national power into the dialogue.

b. Carl von Clausewitz’s recognition that war is an instrument of policy, where the grammar of war is governed by the logic of policy, led him to espouse the need to understand and resolve the tensions that exist between the purely military and political (policy) viewpoints at the strategic level. This demands that a general grasp of military affairs is vital for those in charge of policy, for, “Only if statesmen look to certain military moves and actions to produce effects that are foreign to their nature do political decisions influence operations for the worse” (*On War*, 605 - 608). However, in the 21st Century there is a growing idea that military power is less effective at achieving strategic objectives, that there is, as posited by General Rupert Smith in *The Utility of Force*, a “deep and abiding confusion between *deploying* a force and *employing* force.” (*Utility of Force*, 6).

c. Perhaps this is the case. But, if the situation is, to paraphrase Carl von Clausewitz, one where every age has a *form* of warfare unique unto itself (*On War*, 593-594), then it may stand to reason that what is perceived as military power, or what means make up the military instrument of power, may also be unique to that age as well. This may simply mean that intellectually we’ve failed to keep up with the changes. Could this then, be the reason that military power is perceived to have lost its effectiveness? Or is it a deeper issue; one rooted in the relationship of policy and strategy alluded to by Clausewitz with his commentary on means and actions (*On War*, 608)? Answering these questions demands we look at and review several different facets about the military instrument of power and its use.

d. First is the need to review and discuss exactly what military power *is* and, more importantly, what can it *accomplish* in the 21st Century in terms of strategic effect? This is a complicated issue. However, if strategy remains the balanced application of ends, ways, and means for the achievement of an actor’s interests, then the decisions we make on how, or even whether, to combine and sequence our ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ power (means), has a direct relationship on whether we achieve the effect we are looking for.

e. Second, the decision to use the Military instrument of national power requires policy makers to understand the capabilities of military power to solve the strategic problems they are addressing. This requires that they understand the costs, effects, and limits to the use of military of force. Military power complements, supports, and often enables other instruments of national power. When the use of military power is at its apex, the other instruments of national power are still at work. In the ebb and flow of statecraft, every military problem ultimately involves the use of diplomacy to achieve lasting peace, but not every diplomatic problem involves the use of force. In almost all cases, peace is ultimately achieved through negotiation and compromise. When military power is in a supporting role, it defends, deters, reassures, and prepares to compel the nation's potential adversaries to achieve desired national objectives and interests.

f. Third, strategy is founded in what is to be accomplished and why it is to be accomplished in the face of a complex and ambiguous environment. Thus, policy and strategy must be made with an understanding of the current environment, potential future environment, and its influence on core interests in order to best determine what *means* are best suited to achieve the desired strategic effect. Issues of interventions, mass atrocities, and operations other than war create situations where traditional forms of military power may or may not be able to fully resolve the strategic-level issues at hand. However, understanding the limitations and strengths of the Military instrument of power in relation to the effects it can produce in a given context goes a long way toward understanding risk and being able to develop a military endstate that can be effectively integrated with the use of the other national instruments of power to achieve the overall desired strategic endstate. The on-going operation against ISIS in Iraq and Syria, and Saudi Arabia's operations in Yemen, both provide examples of this dynamic in action.

g. In the end, strategy and policy is about the use of national power to achieve desired outcomes. Understanding the nuances, inherent strengths, constraints, and limitations of each instrument is critical to understanding how they can work together in an integrated manner, as well as opens the door to creatively applying 'old' means in new ways to achieve a desired strategic effect. This lesson continues our exploration of the instruments of national power in relation to the development of strategy and policy where, in our system, military leaders advise, plan, and execute, while civilian leaders decide and make policy.

2. Learning Objectives.

a. Analyze the forms, potential uses, and limitations of the Military instrument of power in the 21st Century strategic environment.

b. Analyze how military power can be combined with other instruments of national power to achieve national security objectives.

c. Analyze and evaluate the use of the Military instrument of power in operations other than war.

3. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks.

(1) Examine the Military instrument of national power in U.S. policy and strategy and its potential contributions to national security.

(2) Analyze the fundamental nature, capabilities, and limitations of the use of the Military instrument of power.

b. Required Readings.

(1) Glenn P. Hastedt, "Military Instruments: Small Wars" and "Military Instruments: Big Wars" in *American Foreign Policy*, 10th ed. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014), 316-366. **[Student Issue]**

(2) Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Military Power," in *The Future of Power* (New York: Public Affairs, 2011), 25-49 (25-26, 39-49). **[Student Issue]**

(3) Chas. W. Freeman, Jr., "The Use of Force," in *Arts of Power: Statecraft and Diplomacy* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1997), 61-68. **[Student Issue]**

(4) Jim Garamone, "Dempsey Discusses Use of Military Instrument of Power", DoD News, Defense Media Activity, July 2014, at: [\[http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=122596\]](http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=122596) (accessed 5 June 2015). **[Online]**

c. Suggested Readings.

(1) Colin S. Gray, "Hard and Soft Power: The Utility of Military Force as an Instrument of Policy in the 21st Century", Strategic Studies Institute (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College 2011), summary and 47-53.

(2) Barry Posen, *Restraint: A New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy*, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014), 69-134.

(3) Robert J. Art, "To What Ends Military Power?" in *American Defense Policy*, ed. Paul J. Bolt, Damon V. Coletta, and Collins G. Shackelford, Jr. (Baltimore, MD: The John Hopkins University Press), 242-247.

4. Points to Consider.

a. What is military power in the 21st Century? What can it accomplish/how does it achieve strategic effect? What forms can it take in the 21st Century?

b. In the 21st Century strategic environment, does the Military instrument of power have less utility as an instrument of national power than in the past? Why or why not?

c. Is the use of the Military instrument of power always considered to be the use of “hard power” or can it be considered “soft power” as well?

d. What are the limitations, if any, of the use of the Military instrument of power?

e. How does the use of the military force support or enable the other instruments of national power?

5. Relationship to Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) Phase II Learning Areas.

a. JLA 1.a, b. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

b. JLA 2 c. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

c. JLA 3.a, c. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

d. JLA 4.a.c. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

e. JLA 5. a, b, d. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

6. Relationship to USAWC Institutional Learning Objective (ILO), Program Learning Objectives, (PLOs), Enduring and Special Themes.

a. ILO: Our graduates are intellectually prepared to preserve peace, deter aggression and, when necessary, achieve victory in war through studying and conferring on the great problems of national defense, military science, and responsible command.

b. PLOs: 1, 3, 4, 5, 7, 9.

c. Enduring Themes: Evaluate Army/landpower and its scope in addressing national security policy aims. Analyze the diversity of landpower requirements over time (hence requirement for flexibility). Instruments of national power and potential contributions to national security. Civil-military relations.

LESSON 13: ECONOMICS AND FINANCE

Mode: Lecture/Seminar

NSPS-13-L/S

1. Introduction.

a. This lesson explores the concept of economic power and the role economics and finance play in determining a nation's capability to project power and protect its national interests abroad. Samuel Huntington wrote in 1993 that economics becomes increasingly important in "determining the primacy or subordination of states," as military conflicts between *major* states become less likely. Economic strength allows a nation to support a military capability and enhances its "soft" power tools of persuasion, influence, assistance, peacekeeping, and stability operations.

b. For example, China has made both economic and political gains in sub-Saharan Africa through soft power. We will look at economics as an instrument of national power and statecraft for the U.S. Government, and the economic and financial constraints inherent in achieving national security goals. We will also examine the "means" of war fighting through the lens of our nation's economic strength.

c. Specifically, we will examine how states can use economic and financial statecraft to achieve national policy objectives and national security interests. Political scientist David A. Baldwin, in his 1985 book *Economic Statecraft*, differentiated between economic power manifested in normal economic activity between states, and those economic means used to accomplish a state's political goals. In other words, it is the use of such concepts as Foreign and International Economic Policy, Economic Diplomacy, Economic Leverage, Economic Sanctions, Economic Coercion, and Economic Warfare, that allow you to persuade an opponent or competitor to do what you want.

d. Some forms of economic and financial statecraft may be negative (i.e., embargos, boycotts, tariff increases, withdrawals of Most Favored Nation (MFN) or Normal Trade Relations (NTR) status, blacklists, quotas on exports or imports, license denials, dumping, preclusive buying, freezing assets, controls on exports or imports, aid suspensions, expropriations, taxation, withholding dues to international organizations, or threats of any of the above). Other forms of economic and financial statecraft may be positive (favorable tariff discrimination, granting MFN/NTR status, direct purchases, export or import subsidies, granting licenses, providing aid, investment guarantees, encouragement of private capital exports or imports, favorable tax measures, concessional prices/financing for oil and gas imports, or promises of any of the above). NTR is the term legislated by the U.S. Congress in the late 1990's to more accurately describe the trade status of countries previously granted MFN status. MFN status, as

defined by the 1994 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, denotes the reciprocal extension of the highest level of concessions, privileges, or immunities granted by a country.

e. In the end, economic and financial levers are useful, but may often be imprecise (time-wise and effect-wise) tools for achieving foreign policy and strategy goals. Trade sanctions are often the weapons of choice, but they may have limited or short-term impact, and only under specific conditions.

f. Economic tools may also have unintended second- and third-order effects, such as with the OPEC ban on oil exports to the West after the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. This ban led to a global economic downturn, energy conservation, the development of alternative sources of energy, and the loss of markets for the Arab members of OPEC. Foreign assistance, free trade agreements, and other forms of preferential market access have been effective implementations of persuasion, but generally only over the long-term, and in difficult ways to measure.

g. Finally, we will examine the foundational role that economic factors have in the ongoing challenges between the U.S. and other major powers. Understanding how economic drivers have influenced the decision space for these countries in their approach to regional and global international relations provides a sound basis for exploring potential U.S. policy choices and opportunities.

2. Learning Objectives

a. Comprehend the economic element of power and the role of economic and financial instruments of statecraft.

b. Analyze the importance and consequences of America's relative economic power as they relate to the global balance of power.

c. Analyze the United States' use of economic power as a "way" of promoting and protecting its national interests and as a "means" to support U.S. national security interests.

3. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks.

(1) Complete the required readings.

(2) Be prepared to discuss the relationship between economics and national security.

b. Required Readings.

(1) Glenn P. Hastedt, "Economic Instruments" in *American Foreign Policy: Past, Present and Future*, (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014), 287-312.

[Student Issue]

(2) Michael Mastanduno, "Economic Statecraft," in *Foreign Policy*, ed. Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield, and Tim Dunne (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2012), 204-21.

[Blackboard]

(3) Mark Duckenfield, "Fiscal Fetters: The Economic Imperatives of National Security in a Time of Austerity," *Strategic Studies Quarterly* 6, no. 2 (Air University; Maxwell AFB, AL 2012) at: [<http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2012/summer/summer12.pdf>] (accessed 22 May 2015).

[Online]

c. Suggested Readings:

(1) Clayton K.S. Chun, "Economics: A Key Element of National Power," in *U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues, Vol. I: Theory of War and Strategy*, 3rd ed., ed. J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr. (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2012), 249-260 at: [<http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=870>] (accessed 15 June 2015).

(2) Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *The Future of Power* (Public Affairs; New York, 2011), 51-80.

(3) Joseph S. Nye Jr., and David A. Welch, *Understanding Global Conflict and Cooperation: An Introduction to Theory and History* (Pearson Education Inc.; Boston MA, 2011).

(4) Diane B. Kunz, "When Money counts and doesn't: Economic Power and Diplomatic Objectives," *Diplomatic History* 18, Issue 4 (October 1994): 451-462. Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Lecture given at Atlanta, 16 April 1994.

(5) Stephen Blank, ed., *Politics and the Economics of Putin's Russia* (United States Army War College Press; Carlisle, PA 2012).

(6) David L. Asher, Victor D. Comras and Patrick M. Cronin, *Pressure: Economic Statecraft and U.S. National Security* (Washington, DC: Center for New American Security, January 2011), 5-12 at: [http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_Pressure_AsherComrasCronin_1.pdf] (accessed 15 June 2015).

(7) Benn Steil and Robert R. Litan, "What is Financial Statecraft?", and "Finance and the 'War on Terror'," in *Financial Statecraft: The Role of Financial Markets in American Foreign Policy*, Council on Foreign Relations/Brookings Institution Book (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), 1-5, 31-47.

(8) David L. Asher, "Pressuring Kim Jong Il: The North Korean Illicit Activities Initiative, 2001-2006", in *Pressure: Coercive Economic Statecraft and U.S. National Security* (Washington, DC: Center for New American Security January 2011), 25-52 at: [http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_Pressure_AsherComrasCronin_1.pdf] (accessed 15 June 2015).

(9) Victor D. Comras, "Pressuring Milosevic: Financial Pressure against Serbia and Montenegro, 1992-1995", in *Pressure: Coercive Economic Statecraft and U.S. National Security* (Washington, DC: Center for New American Security, January 2011), 53-78 at: [http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_Pressure_AsherComrasCronin_1.pdf] (accessed 15 June 2015).

(10) David L. Asher, "Pressuring Saddam, 1991-2003 – A Failure to Recognize Success", in *Pressure: Coercive Economic Statecraft and U.S. National Security* (Washington, DC: Center for New American Security January 2011), 79-80 at: [http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_Pressure_AsherComrasCronin_1.pdf] (accessed 15 June 2015).

4. Points to Consider.

a. What are the tools of economic statecraft, and how and when should these tools be employed? How are they used in conjunction with the other elements of power?

b. How effective are the tools of economic statecraft, what are some of the limitations of these tools?

c. Has the economic balance of power shifted toward or away from the United States during the last two decades? Who now holds a predominant role economically?

d. What is the relationship between the current international economic order and the economic power of the United States?

5. Relationship to Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) Phase II Learning Areas

a. JLA 1. B. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

b. JLA 2 c. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

c. JLA 3.a, d. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

d. JLA 4.a. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

e. JLA 5. a, b. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

6. Relationship to USAWC Institutional Learning Objective (ILO), Enduring and Special Themes.

a. ILO: Our graduates are intellectually prepared to preserve peace, deter aggression and, when necessary, achieve victory in war through studying and conferring on the great problems of national defense, military science, and responsible command.

b. PLOs: 1, 7, 9.

c. Enduring Themes: Evaluate Army/landpower and its scope in addressing national security policy aims. Analyze the diversity of landpower requirements over time (hence requirement for flexibility). Strategic Leadership and the exercise of discretionary judgment. Relationship of Policy and Strategy (relationship between ends, ways, and means). Instruments of national power and potential contributions to national security. Instruments of war and national security.

LESSON 14: CASE STUDY III - THE 2003 INVASION OF IRAQ

Mode: Seminar

NSPS-14-S

One of the greatest of the president's powers is his control, which is very absolute, of the foreign relations of the nation. The initiative in foreign affairs, which the president possesses without any restriction whatever, is virtually the power to control them absolutely.

– Woodrow Wilson, 1908

1. Introduction.

a. A government's most momentous decision is to take its people to war. Although the Constitution grants Congress the authority to formally declare war, in practice the President is usually at the center of any movement toward this end. The Constitution confers upon the President great power to define and implement U.S. foreign policy. The President arrays American objectives, and has a wide range of means at his disposal to exert pressure within the international system – foremost among the instruments of power being that of military force.

b. Beyond formal powers, he enjoys the authority of the “bully pulpit” – the unique capacity inherent in the presidency to speak directly as the nation's leader to the American public, which naturally rallies around presidential leadership in times of crisis. Enhancing that bond with the public is a president's capacity to cast his objectives in terms of the ideals that Americans associate with their role in the world.

c. The power of a president, however, has its limits. Congress, interest groups, the press, and other media respond to initiatives, so that every step toward involvement in a war risks domestic criticism. In addition to being cautious not to lead where the American public will not follow, a president must also weigh the potential approval – or backlash – of the international community.

d. During and immediately following the Cold War, Presidents Truman, Johnson, and George H. W. Bush each believed that aggressive actions taken by rival nation states presented viable threats to U.S. national security, necessitating the use of military force. Their decisions took Americans to war against North Korea, North Vietnam, and Iraq, respectively.

e. In the new millennium, President George W. Bush led Americans into a war very different in rationale and objectives. The military action against Iraq, launched in March 2003, was intended to eliminate Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) *before* Iraq

could take verifiable action to arm terrorist groups or intimidate its neighbors, which necessitated ending the regime of Saddam Hussein. In its place – theoretically – a democratic Iraq would emerge – becoming a model for political change throughout the Middle East. President Bush’s decision to force a regime change in Iraq marked a departure point for American foreign policy. While Congress readily supported his decision to attack Iraq, that support reflected a momentary public consensus that the war was just and vital to American security. Earlier presidential decisions to use force in Korea, Vietnam, and the Persian Gulf responded to the use of force by perceived enemies. But for Iraq in March 2003, the president appeared to espouse a new doctrine of ‘preventive war.’

f. This case highlights several issues discussed to this point in NSPS, including the creation and implementation of policy and strategy, the role of values and interests, the structure of the global strategic environment, and just war and IR theory concepts. It illustrates the role of Congress and domestic opinion, as well as the war-making powers of the Executive branch. Perhaps most importantly, the Iraq War highlights the politics and personal interaction between the President and the major players within the National Security Council. The Bush Administration made assumptions, considered available ways and means, and took risks in order to achieve goals that they considered essential to U.S. national interests. Whether those goals were justified and achievable with the means and ways chosen is debatable, and should be closely considered within seminar dialogue.

2. Learning Objectives.

- a. Examine the organizational, personal, domestic, and international factors of a presidential decision to go to war.
- b. Assess the role of the DIME in dealing with such a crisis.
- c. Assess the value of decision-making models to policy and strategy formulation and implementation.
- d. Evaluate the differences between institutionalized policy, strategy development processes, and crisis decision-making.

3. Student Requirements.

- a. Task. Complete assigned readings as assigned by the FI and be prepared to discuss the readings in conjunction with the learning objectives and the points to consider.
- b. Required Readings.

(1) Gary R. Hess, Chapter 7 “George W. Bush and the Second Crisis with Iraq,” in Hess, *Presidential Decisions for War: Korea, Vietnam, the Persian Gulf, and Iraq*, 2nd ed. (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009), 221-48. **[Student Issue]**

(2) David Patrick Houghton, Chapter 10, “Into Iraq: A War of Choice,” in Houghton, *The Decision Point, Six Cases in U.S. Foreign Policy Decision Making* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 218-247. **[Student Issue]**

c. Recommended Viewing.

Michael Kirk, “Bush’s War,” Part 1, *PBS Frontline* (March 24, 2008)
<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/bushswar/view/> (accessed 15 May 2015).

d. Suggested Readings.

(1) Andrew J. Polsky, “The Perils of Optimism: George W. Bush,” in *Elusive Victories: The American Presidency at War*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 273-325.

(2) David Rothkopf, Chapter 12, “A Thumb on the Scales: Tipping the Balance in the Battle Between the Traditionalists and the Transformationalists,” in *Running the World: The Inside Story of the National Security Council and the Architects of American Power* (New York: Public Affairs, 2005), 389-447.

(3) Joseph J. Collins, “Choosing War: The Decision to Invade Iraq and Its Aftermath,” (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, April 2008).

(4) Bob Woodward, *Bush at War* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2002).

(5) Bob Woodward, *Plan of Attack* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004).

4. Points to Consider.

a. What is the “history” of Iraq and the United States in the Persian Gulf region? How did 9/11 change the calculus for that relationship?

b. What is the broader context – is this a “unique” moment in modern history, understood by some, misunderstood by others?

c. How are realist and liberal lenses regarding foreign policy reflected in the actions of the Bush ‘43 Administration? What other theories and concepts from SL, TWS, and thus far in NSPS are at play? What role did personality play in the post-9/11 decision to invade Iraq?

d. What are the key aspects of decision-making as it relates to strategy? How do various decision-making models help illuminate the Bush ‘43 administration’s decision

for war? What role did assumptions play in the decision to invade? What about risk assessment?

e. How strong (or weak) was the case for war? Was there solid consensus among Bush's advisors for war? What alternatives fell by the wayside – why? Was this a “just” war?

f. How did Bush '43 manage civil-military relations? International relations with friends/allies/enemies?

g. How fully and effectively did Bush adhere to the constitutional process in building congressional and popular support for war?

i. How strong was the Bush Administration's “Coalition of the Willing?” What was the effect of not gaining UN support for military action? Why did the Bush Administration feel the timing was right for an invasion of Iraq?

5. Relationship to Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) Phase II Learning Areas.

a. JLA 1. a, b, c, e. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

b. JLA 2 c, e, f. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

c. JLA 3.a, c, d. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

d. JLA 4.a. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

e. JLA 5. a, b, f, g. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

6. Relationship to USAWC Institutional Learning Objective (ILO), Program Learning Objectives (PLOs), Enduring and Special Themes.

a. ILO: Our graduates are intellectually prepared to preserve peace, deter aggression and, when necessary, achieve victory in war through studying and conferring on the great problems of national defense, military science, and responsible command.

b. PLOs: 1, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9.

c. Enduring Themes: Evaluate Army/landpower and its scope in addressing national security policy aims. Analyze the diversity of landpower requirements over time (hence requirement for flexibility). Relationship of Policy and Strategy (relationship between ends, ways, and means). History as a vehicle for understanding strategic alternatives and choices. Special Themes: Educating and Developing Adaptive Senior Leaders for a Complex World.

BLOCK IV:

CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN STRATEGY

All States have a grand strategy, whether they know it or not. That is inevitable because grand strategy is simply the level at which knowledge and persuasion, or in modern terms intelligence and diplomacy, interact with military strength to determine outcomes in a world of other states, with their own “grand strategies.”

—Edward Luttwak

The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire, p. 409

This block further examines U.S. purpose, interests, and values as articulated in the current *National Security Strategy*, and consequently America’s position in the contemporary international order. We will focus on how the national security system employs foresight, develops policy, formulates strategy, allocates resources, gathers feedback, and assesses progress and outcomes. We will examine the role of DoD strategic documents in interpreting and expanding on the National Security Strategy and other presidential guidance, while also focusing on understanding potential strategic options. Finally, we analyze and assess America’s strategic position, potential options and the need and role for continuous revitalization and reform of U.S. national security processes.

BLOCK IV OBJECTIVES

- Evaluate the role of DoD strategy documents in U.S. policy and strategy formulation.
- Examine the President’s strategic vision and guidance.
- Evaluate America’s grand strategy and purpose in the contemporary security environment.

LESSON 15: NATIONAL STRATEGIC GUIDANCE: NSS, QDR (DSR), NMS

Mode: Seminar

NSPS-15-S

“This morning, President Obama released his 2015 National Security Strategy. Fundamentally, it’s a strategy to strengthen the foundations of America’s power—political, economic, and military—and to sustain American leadership in this new century so that we can surmount the challenges of today and capture the opportunities of tomorrow.”

Susan Rice

1. Introduction.

a. To paraphrase Colin Gray, Mackubin Owens, and Rich Yarger, strategy is the product of a dialogue between policy, national power, and the international environment with the intent to cause specific effects in the environment by advancing favorable, and precluding or inhibiting unfavorable, outcomes (Owens, 3; Yarger, 17). In simple terms, strategy is about positively shaping the environment in ways that protect or advance the national interest relative to other actors in the international system with the knowledge that complete control of the environment is impossible (Yarger, 1, 23).

b. In this lesson students will study U.S. national strategic guidance by first examining President Obama’s National Security Strategy (NSS) released in February 2015. Next, students will examine the two supporting strategic documents produced by the Department of Defense: the 2014 *Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)* and the National Military Strategy (NMS). Like all cabinet level agencies, DoD plays its own unique role in supporting and implementing the NSS. Previously by law, every four years the Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) was responsible for the drafting and implementation of the *Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)*; however, in the Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015, the Congress, in section 1072 of the Act, “Reform of Quadrennial Defense Review”, amended Title 10 U.S. Code to read **Defense Strategy Review** rather than QDR. Essentially this amounts to a change in naming conventions. The Joint Staff is responsible for the drafting of the *National Military Strategy (NMS)*. These strategic documents are linked and intended to help implement the nation’s overall strategic aim and goals articulated in the NSS and serve to communicate America’s strategic posture to the world as it relates to our potential uses of American military power.

c. Previous lessons in NSPS have also revealed the complexity of strategy and policy formulation in an uncertain world. There has been extensive and spirited discussion among practitioners and scholars in the past few years regarding the future of American grand strategy. Some have argued that the United States is incapable of

formulating such an articulation of national goals because of the lack of a foreign policy consensus. Others contend that the dynamic nature of the strategic environment calls for new thinking about American national security objectives in view of a changing world order, perhaps the end of the liberal order established in the aftermath of World War II. Given that strategy and policy are subordinate to the nature of the strategic environment, change is inevitable. Thus, the formulation of strategy and policy cannot be fixed, but must be an interactive and iterative process if a state is to successfully adapt to changing geopolitical realities (Owens, 3). Issues such as Russian aggression against Ukraine, rising tensions in the South China Sea or the rise of ISIL all create tensions or unleash new dynamics that have to be taken into account. The “monitor for success, failure or modification” block of the strategy formulation model represents this process of adaptation in relation to the environment. In terms of documents and process, these modifications can come about and/or be communicated through directed reviews or major policy addresses by the civilian leadership.

e. Given these circumstances, one might rightfully ask, “What is America’s grand strategy today; how is strategy currently crafted and implemented; what is my role as a national security professional in the process?” This lesson seeks to provide a basis for answering these questions by examining the principal documents that are meant to articulate American grand strategy, the complex ways that these documents are developed and their meaning for the achievement of U.S. national security objectives in the contemporary world.

2. Learning Objectives.

a. Understand the role and vision of the National Security Strategy in relation to the military instrument of power.

b. Understand the role and vision of DoD strategy documents in U.S. policy and strategy formulation—the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and the National Military Strategy (NMS).

c. Understand the Obama administration’s formal and informal strategic guidance, and evaluate their role and implications in relation to U.S. national security interests.

d. Evaluate U.S. national security strategy documents through the lens of the U.S. Army War College Strategy Formulation Framework.

e. Synthesize key concepts, tools and processes in the development of appropriate policy and strategy responses to national security challenges facing the United States in the 21st Century international security environment.

3. Student Requirement.

a. Tasks. Be prepared to discuss the readings in conjunction with the learning objectives and the points to consider.

b. Required Readings.

(1) Barack Obama, National Security Strategy (Washington, D.C.: Whitehouse, February 2015), 1-14, scan remainder, at: [\[https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy.pdf\]](https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy.pdf) (accessed June 9, 2015) **[Online]**

(2) Susan Rice, "Remarks by National Security Advisor Susan Rice on the 2015 National Security Strategy", (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Press Secretary, February 2015), 1-5 (5 pages) at: [\[https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/02/06/remarks-national-security-advisor-susan-rice-2015-national-security-strategy\]](https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/02/06/remarks-national-security-advisor-susan-rice-2015-national-security-strategy) (accessed 9 June 2015) **[Online]**

(3) U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review 2014 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, March 2014), Read cover letter and Executive Summary (III-XV); scan remainder, at: http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2014_Quadrennial_Defense_Review.pdf. (accessed June, 9 2015) Note 1. The 2015 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) essentially renaming the QDR the Defense Strategy Review. The DSR will be published every four years, "in a year following a year divisible by four", and will contain the same information as the QDR. **[Online]**

(4) U.S. Congress, *Carl Levin and Howard P. "Buck" McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Congress, December 2014), Read sec. 1072 pages 226-231. (6 pages) at: [\[http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-113HPRT92738/pdf/CPRT-113HPRT92738.pdf\]](http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-113HPRT92738/pdf/CPRT-113HPRT92738.pdf) (accessed 9 June 2015). **[Online]**

(5) U.S. Department of Defense, *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for the 21st Century* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, January 2012), 1-8 (8 pages) at: [\[http://www.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf\]](http://www.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf) (accessed June 9, 2015). **[Online]**

(6) Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *The National Military Strategy of the United States of America*, (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2015), at: http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Publications/2015_National_Military_Strategy.pdf (accessed 4 August 2015). **[Online]**

(7) Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *18th Chairman's 2nd Term Strategic Direction to the Joint Force* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense) 1-4, at: [\[http://www.jcs.mil/portals/36/Documents/CJCS_2nd_Term_Strategic_Direction.pdf\]](http://www.jcs.mil/portals/36/Documents/CJCS_2nd_Term_Strategic_Direction.pdf) (accessed 4 August 2015). **[Online]**

c. Suggested Readings.

(1) Rich Yarger, *Strategic Theory for the 21st Century: The Little Book on Big Strategy* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2006) at [<http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/Pubs/display.cfm?pubid=641>] (accessed April 14, 2015).

(2) Al Stolberg, *How Nation-States Craft National Security Documents* (Carlisle PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, October 2012), at: [<http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdf/PUB1128.pdf>] (accessed May 24, 2015).

(3) John Lewis Gaddis, "The Twenty First Century," in *Surprise, Security and the American Experience* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), 69-113.

(4) Catherine Dale, *National Security Strategy: Legislative Mandates. Execution to Date, and Considerations for Congress* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, August 6, 2013), 2-8; 16-18; 20-26.

(5) Colin Gray, "Politics and War" in *Modern Strategy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 58-64.

(6) Aaron L. Friedberg, "The Making of American National Strategy, 1948-1988," *The National Interest* 11 (Spring 1988): 65-75.

(7) Barry Posen, "Stability and Change in U.S. Grand Strategy," *Orbis* 51, no. 4 (Fall 2007): 561-567.

4. Points to Consider.

a. Do all nations have some form of grand strategy guiding their foreign policy and national security decisions, whether or not that strategy is clearly articulated? What purpose is served by clearly articulating a vision of a nation's role in the world and the grand strategy to achieve that vision?

b. Based on National Security Advisor Susan Rice's remarks, what are the changes in President Obama's National Security Strategy? What has remained the same? Have any new challenges or threats been identified? Does it use a "whole of government approach"? How are the DIME instruments of power integrated into the 2015 NSS?

c. During the G7 summit of world leaders held in Germany in June 2015, President Obama acknowledged that "we don't yet have a complete strategy [to defeat ISIS], because it requires commitments on the part of the Iraqis as well." In addition Congress has refused to act on the President's request for authorization for the use of military force (AUMF) against ISIL until he provides a strategy for defeating ISIL. How do the President and the DoD synchronize/nest a strategy on ISIL with existing strategy

documents? Is there a need for a separate strategy on ISIL? How would one integrate and harmonize all of the instruments of the DIME into a strategy to defeat ISIL?

d. What types of national security policies and strategies will most effectively advance U.S. national interests over the next 10-20 years?

e. How well do the NSS, Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG), QDR, and NMS accurately assess the national defense requirements of the United States? How well synchronized are the enduring national interests and national strategic objectives within these documents? Do the objectives laid out in these documents address the strategic environment adequately?

f. Are there sufficient means available to meet the strategic objectives of the NSS, QDR, DSG, and the NMS given worldwide demands on DoD assets? Are strategic and military risk evaluated sufficiently?

g. Based the legal requirements of the 2015 NDAA, the DoD will conduct the next Defense Strategy Review process in 2017 and release it in 2018. Unless President Obama publishes another NSS before he leaves office, the DoD will conduct the Defense Strategy Review based on a two-year old strategy, which will be three-years old by the time the DSR is released. Does this present a dilemma for DoD strategist? What are some other sources of policy that they can use inform the 2017 DSR process, if the new President does not publish a NSS early enough in 2017 to influence the DSR?

h. What challenges does the U.S. Defense Establishment face in the next 20 years? Is the current Defense Strategy Formulation Process sufficient to identify and prepare for these challenges? What changes – if any – are required in U.S. defense strategy, policy and capabilities to cope with the strategic challenges of 2030? Are the strategic objectives in the NDS, DSG and the objectives in the NMS properly synchronized to promote U.S. interests?

5. Relationship to Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) Phase II Learning Areas.

a. JLA 1. b, d. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

b. JLA 2 b, c. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

c. JLA 3.a, c, d. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

d. JLA 4.a. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

e. JLA 5. a, b. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

6. Relationship to USAWC Institutional Learning Objective (ILO), Program Learning Objectives (PLOs), Enduring and Special Themes.

a. ILO: Our graduates are intellectually prepared to preserve peace, deter aggression and, when necessary, achieve victory in war through studying and conferring on the great problems of national defense, military science, and responsible command.

b. PLOs:1, 7, 8, 9.

c. Enduring Themes: Evaluate Army/landpower and its scope in addressing national security policy aims. Analyze the diversity of landpower requirements over time (hence requirement for flexibility).

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LESSON 16: CONTEMPORARY NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES

Mode: Seminar

NSPS-S-16

1. Introduction.

a. This lesson serves as an opportunity to consider the myriad of current international security issues facing those charged with informing or acting in the national decision-making process. The NSPS course focuses on the students' ability to understand and apply the strategy formulation process to review and recommend modifications to U.S. policy. This lesson challenges the students to draw on important course concepts and theory, along with the Strategy Formulation Framework, by addressing potential national security issues of major importance to the United States.

b. For this lesson students will read about various regional and international issues, including the Russian resurgence, the rise of China, ISIS/ISIL, and the conflict in Yemen. In seminar they will be tasked to review existing U.S. policy and strategy regarding these complex problems that are likely to confront national security professionals now and in the near future. Students will be required to synthesize course material in developing their responses to the identified issues.

c. During the seminar, students will engage in a thorough discussion of the issues, and outline potential U.S. policy and strategy considerations.

2. Learning Objectives.

a. Comprehend the complexity of preparing for the emerging global security environment in the first quarter of the 21st century and the exercise of U.S. diplomatic, informational, military, and economic power.

b. Apply key course concepts to understand and assess a given national security issue/threat.

c. Synthesize and apply multiple aspects of the relationship between, and the relative importance of, the diplomatic, information, military, and economic instruments of statecraft, with the goal of coordinating them towards a common end.

d. Apply the Strategy Formulation Framework to develop approaches for addressing a given national security issue in the form of a policy review.

3. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks.

(1) Critically examine contemporary international security issues in the context of U.S. interests.

(2) Explain and discuss U.S. interests in dealing with the security issues and consider them in the context of the DIME to comprehend how integrated options might facilitate resolution.

b. Required Readings.

(1) Robert Work, "The Third U.S. Offset Strategy and its Implications for Partners and Allies," January 28, 2015, 1-9, at: <http://www.defense.gov/Speeches/Speech.aspx?SpeechID=1909> (accessed 12 May 2015). **[Online]**

(2) Michael V. Hayden, "Understanding the New Global Disorder: Three Tectonics," November 19, 2014, 1-8, at: <http://www.fpri.org/articles/2014/12/understanding-new-global-disorder-three-tectonics>: (accessed 12 May 2015). **[Online]**

(3) Graham Allison and Dimitri K. Simes, "Russia and America: Stumbling to War," April 20, 2015, 1-6, at: <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/russia-america-stumbling-war-12662?page=8> (accessed 12 May 2015). **[Online]**

(4) Graeme Wood, "What ISIS Really Wants," March 2015, 1-40, at: <http://www.theatlantic.com/features/archive/2015/02/what-isis-really-wants/384980/> (accessed 12 May 2015). **[Online]**

(5) Zachary Laub, "Yemen in Crisis," April 29, 2015, 1-7, at: <http://www.cfr.org/yemen/yemen-crisis/p36488>. (accessed 12 May 2015). **[Online]**

(6) Jack Jenkins, "What The Atlantic Left Out About ISIS According to Their Own Expert," February 20, 2015, 1-9, at: http://thinkprogress.org/world/2015/02/20/3625446/atlantic-left-isis-conversation-bernard-haykel/?utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=tptop3 (accessed 12 May 2015). **[Online]**

4. Points to Consider.

a. Do the current national policies create an adequate framework for strategy formulation and development for the issues under consideration?

b. What are the potential regional and global threats, challenges, and opportunities presented by the contemporary strategic issues? How could the various instruments of national power be used to achieve U.S. policy objectives and protect America's national

security interests? How might these be used to further protect those interests and objectives of allies, partners and other regional players?

c. What U.S. statutes and Congressional mandates must the Executive Branch take into consideration as part of the policy formulation process? What potential effects does your recommended policy or strategy have on the U.S. domestic environment? Does your policy require changes to these statutes/mandates?

d. What possible second- or third-order consequences might be involved in any U.S. policy response to the contemporary strategic issues considered?

5. Relationship to Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) Phase II Learning Areas.

a. JLA 1. A, b, e. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

b. JLA 2 b, c. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

c. JLA 3.a, d. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

d. JLA 4.a. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

e. JLA 5. a, b. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

6. Relationship to USAWC Institutional Learning Objective (ILO), Program Learning Objectives, (PLOs), Enduring and Special Themes.

a. ILO: Our graduates are intellectually prepared to preserve peace, deter aggression and, when necessary, achieve victory in war through studying and conferring on the great problems of national defense, military science, and responsible command.

b. PLOs: 1, 4, 7, 8, 9.

c. Enduring Themes: Evaluate Army/landpower and its scope in addressing national security policy aims. Analyze the diversity of landpower requirements over time (hence requirement for flexibility).

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LESSON 17: 21st CENTURY AMERICAN GRAND STRATEGY

Mode: Lecture/Seminar

NSPS-17-L/S

1. Introduction.

In this lesson, we will examine U.S. grand strategy with a focus on the near future – the next 10-15 years. We will start by examining criticisms and recommendations for current U.S. “grand strategy.” Of course, it is first necessary to define what we mean by “grand strategy.” While there are multiple definitions, most of them share several key tenets. Three of the more well-known definitions of grand strategy are below:

- B.H. Liddell Hart – strategy is about winning the war; grand strategy takes the longer view, it is about winning the peace.
- Edwin M. Earle – grand strategy so integrates the resources of a nation that war is either unnecessary or is undertaken with the maximum chance of victory.
- Walter A. McDougall – an equation of ends and means so sturdy that it triumphs despite serial setbacks at the level of strategy, operations or campaigns.

a. The shared tenets of these definitions of grand strategy are that it implies a whole-of-government approach; and that it takes the longer and broader view, rather than being focused on a specific issue or region. Of course, the basic question is “does the U.S. have a grand strategy”, or is the U.S. simply reacting to one crisis after another? We will examine the proposed approaches to grand strategy from several noted authors in the foreign policy/international relations field. These authors have diverse opinions about what priorities should drive grand strategy, and what “ways” might be most effective. Apply what you have learned in both NSPS and TWS to determine which alternatives are more or less likely to preserve U.S. security and advance U.S. national interests.

b. For this final lesson of NSPS students are asked to prepare an outline of forward thinking U.S. grand strategy. What should U.S. grand strategy for the next decade be based on? What are your own beliefs about the position the U.S. should maintain in the world? What should national interests be, and how should the U.S. pursue those objectives? This grand strategy should reflect serious consideration of the array of international and domestic security challenges facing the United States, to include declining economic power.

c. In broad terms, what major changes would your strategy require in resourcing, military force structure, basing and employment, involvement in international organizations, etc.? Be prepared to discuss the feasibility (Can America afford it?), acceptability (Will Americans find it acceptable? What about key allies? Who will oppose

your choices, and why?), and suitability (Will they work? Are there second- and third-order effects?) of your choices.

2. Learning Objectives.

a. Evaluate America's objectives in the emerging international environment and the challenges and opportunities that will shape American grand strategy.

b. Evaluate alternative grand strategies and identify or develop one that will best posture the United States to advance its national interests over the next decade.

c. Identify and evaluate the resource implications of competing American grand strategic options.

3. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks.

(1) Critically examine the alternative grand strategies presented in the readings and identify the IR theories that underlie each alternative.

(2) Be prepared to discuss and explain the grand strategy you selected or developed, to include why you believe it is best suited to advancing U.S. interests in the emerging strategic environment.

b. Required Readings.

(1) Glenn P. Hastedt, "Alternative Futures" in *American Foreign Policy: Past, Present and Future*, (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014), 367-79.

[Student Issue]

(2) Hal Brands, "Breaking Down Obama's Grand Strategy", *The National Interest*, June 23, 2014, online resource at: <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/breaking-down-obamas-grand-strategy-10719> (accessed 1 June 2015).

[Online]

(3) Paul D. Miller, "Five Pillars of American Grand Strategy" *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy* 54, no. 5 (2012): 7-44 in [\[TaylorandFrancis\]](#) (accessed 4 August 2015).

[Database]

c. Suggested Readings.

(1) Anne-Marie Brady, "Chinese Foreign Policy: A New Era Dawns", *The Diplomat* <http://thediplomat.com/2014/03/chinese-foreign-policy-a-new-era-dawns/> (accessed 4 August 2015).

(2) Peter Harris, "Back to Balancing? Ukraine, the Status Quo, and American Grand Strategy in 2014," *The National Interest* (19 May 2014) at: <http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/back-balancing-ukraine-the-status-quo-american-grand-10487> (accessed 4 August 2015).

(3) Charles Kupchan, "Grand Strategy: The Four Pillars of the Future," *Democracy* 23 (Winter 2012): 9-18 in [ProQuest] (accessed 4 August 2015).

(4) Robert D. Kaplan & Stephen S. Kaplan, "America Primed," *The National Interest* 112 (March/April 2011): 42-54 in [ProQuest] (accessed 4 August 2015).

(5) Joseph Nye, "The Future of American Power: Dominance and Decline in Perspective," *Foreign Affairs* (November/December 2010): 2-12 in [ProQuest] (accessed 4 August 2015).

(6) Brent Scowcroft, "The World in Transformation," *The National Interest* 119 (May/June 2012): 7-9 in [ProQuest] (accessed 4 August 2015).

4. Points to Consider.

a. Should the quest to maintain American primacy, of itself, be a driving force behind U.S. behavior in the world? Can you envision ways in which a determined quest for ongoing primacy might be detrimental to long-term U.S. interests?

b. If not maintenance of American primacy, what should be the central tenet of an American grand strategy? Is it possible to develop a grand strategy that promotes U.S. interests while also promoting the interests of key allies and potential adversaries?

c. What are the risks inherent in various grand strategy options? How might allies and potential adversaries react to changes in American behavior resulting from a shift in grand strategy?

5. Relationship to Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) Phase II Learning Areas

a. JLA 1. A, b, d. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

b. JLA 2 b, c, e, f. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

c. JLA 3.a. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

d. JLA 4.a. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

e. JLA 5. a, b. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

6. Relationship to USAWC Institutional Learning Objective (ILO), Program Learning Objective (PLOs), Enduring and Special Themes.

a. ILO: Our graduates are intellectually prepared to preserve peace, deter aggression and, when necessary, achieve victory in war through studying and conferring on the great problems of national defense, military science, and responsible command.

b. PLOs: 1, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9.


c. Enduring Themes: Evaluate Army/landpower and its scope in addressing national security policy aims. Analyze the diversity of landpower requirements over time (hence requirement for flexibility). Strategic Leadership and the exercise of discretionary judgment. Relationship of Policy and Strategy (relationship between ends, ways, and means). Instruments of national power and potential contributions to national security. Civil-military relations. Instruments of war and national security. History as a vehicle for understanding strategic alternatives and choices.

APPENDIX I

GUIDELINES FOR STRATEGY FORMULATION

1. General. Strategy is an art. It is also somewhat scientific, in that it follows certain patterns which require a common understanding of terminology, adherence to certain principles, and disciplined, albeit creative, thought processes. Remember that these strategy formulation guidelines are not formulas. Strategy will be developed in keeping with the particular features of the time, place and personalities involved. Nevertheless, these guidelines offer an approach to address the complexity of strategy, and are intended for strategists attempting to achieve the coherence, continuity, and consensus that policymakers seek in designing, developing and executing national security and military strategies.

Figure 1.



2. National Purpose. This is the starting point for the entire process. Enduring values and beliefs embodied in the national purpose represent the legal, philosophical and moral basis for continuation of the American system. From the nation's purpose - as well as an understanding of the nation's domestic and global needs—the United States derives its enduring core national interests. The strategist should return to these considerations in terms of risk assessment at every derivative level of strategy formulation.

3. National Interests. There are four generally agreed upon core U.S. national interests: physical security—defined as protection against attack on the territory and people of the United States in order to ensure survival with fundamental values and institutions intact; promotion of values; stable international order; and economic prosperity. These have changed little during the course of U.S. history with the Preamble to our Constitution declaring that its purpose was to “provide for the common defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity.”

4. Strategic Vision: At the grand strategic level, the ways and means to achieve U.S. core national interests are based on the national leadership's strategic vision of what America's role in the world should be to safeguard these national interests. All administrations focus on national interests, but the administration perspective is shaped by assessments of threats and opportunities by senior advisors, personal beliefs of the President, and the decision making process and culture established by the President. Through these aspects and the unique circumstances of each administration, presidents establish different strategic visions of America's role in the world, often causing them to emphasize certain national interests over others. Grand strategy is rarely articulated as a cohesive, structured, and concise document or set of ideas such as in NSC-68. Thus strategic vision may serve as a more graspable concept that incorporates the myriad of ways in which an administration communicates its perception of the world and the future path of a nation.

a. From the founding of the American republic to the present day, national leaders and the populace have embraced a variety of views on how best to attain U.S. national interests. These views have ranged from isolationism, that is, a non-interventionist stance, to global engagement.

b. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, for example, led the nation in a time of global economic depression followed by a massive world war during which he moved the American grand strategic vision from non-intervention in European affairs to active global engagement with numerous nation-states to defeat Nazi Germany. Within five years of the end of the Second World War, President Harry Truman articulated a grand strategic vision of global engagement with the focus on containing an expansionist Soviet Union that the United States feared would dominate Eurasia. To meet that challenge, the Truman administration made substantial investments in U.S. military power. The grand strategy of containment dominated U.S. strategic thinking until the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. Today the United States maintains a strong commitment to global engagement, albeit with shifts in the application of ways and

means, that is subject to tensions created by competing interests in sustaining continuity in favorable aspects of the international order while at the same time pursuing beneficial changes to that order.

5. National Policy. Based on grand strategic decisions, the United States political leadership provides national policy in the form of broad guidance concerning America's global role in pursuit of core national interests. These published and public policies are only the start point for strategy formulation at the national level. National policy is conveyed in many iterative and cumulative forms ranging from formal national security directives and pronouncements in presidential and cabinet-level speeches to presidential replies to press queries and cabinet-level appearances on current affairs television shows. An astute and informed participant in U.S. policy and strategy must work constantly to understand, interpret, and align his agency or institution with overarching policy.

6. Strategy Formulation Process.

a. General:

(1) Inherent in this more detailed strategy process is an appropriate degree of analysis designed to illuminate alternatives in the face of recognized uncertainties. A general outline for this phase of the strategy process follows:

- (a) Identify and determine U.S. interests.
- (b) Determine level of intensity for each interest.
- (c) Evaluate the issues, trends, and challenges (threats and opportunities) in regard to interests.
- (d) Identify policy objectives (ends).
- (e) Consider alternative concepts (ways) that use resources (means) to achieve objectives.
- (f) Determine the feasibility, acceptability and suitability of the strategic options.
- (g) Conduct a risk assessment.
- (h) Present strategy recommendations.

(2) The analysis must be more than a listing of challenges. To be useful, it must examine and explain which and in what ways U.S. interests are affected. The analysis should seek to identify opportunities and threats to U.S. interests. As a consequence, the strategic analysis may not only be influenced by current national policy, but may help identify recommendations for policy makers to consider for changes to existing

policies or for the creation of new policies. The analysis should address most (if not all) of the following questions:

- (a) What is the current U.S. policy or precedent?
- (b) Who are the critical actors?
- (c) What are their interests and/or policies?
- (d) With whom does the United States have convergence or divergence of interest/policy?
- (e) What are the other feasible options to employ U.S. power to implement the strategy options under consideration?
- (f) How will the strategy be sustained?

(3) The strategy formulation guidelines delineated above can apply equally to all formal national security documents (i.e., National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, National Military Strategy, theater military strategy, etc.). The strategist must be able to develop strategies employing all of the elements of power. Students at the USAWC will develop and practice these skills in NSPS, elective courses, and the National Security Staff Rides. Remember, the formulation of strategy at any level employs the strategic thought process based on the balancing of Ends, Ways, and Means.

b. National Interests. During the strategy formulation process, the strategist moves beyond the core grand strategic interests to more specific national security interests derived from those core interests in accordance with national policy. These national security interests provide more detail to the nation's needs and aspirations, in terms of the relationship between the foreign and domestic aspects of national security, and are thus the start point for defining policy objectives for national security related strategies.

(1) As a rule of thumb, interests are stated as fundamental concerns of the nation, and written as desirable conditions without verbs, action modifiers, or intended actions. For example, U.S. national interests might be stated as:

- (a) Access to raw materials – (not “Protect sources of raw materials”).
- (b) Unrestricted passage through international waters – (not “Secure sea lines of communications”).

(2) Intensity of interests: Determining the level of intensity helps to determine priority of interests, recognizing that without prioritization, there is the potential for unlimited derivative objectives and the consequent mismatch of those policy objectives

(ends) with resources (means). The four degrees of intensity are determined by answering the question: What happens if the interest is not realized?

(a) Survival/Existential: if not attained, will have catastrophic results for the nation

(b) Vital: if unfulfilled, will have immediate consequences for national interests.

(c) Important: if unfulfilled, will result in damage that will eventually affect national interests.

(d) Peripheral: if unfulfilled, will result in damage that is unlikely to affect national interests.

c. Ends-Ways-Means:

(1) Objectives are derived from national policy and from a detailed consideration of United States national interests by category and intensity against the backdrop of issues, trends and challenges (threats and opportunities) that affect those interests. Based on these objectives, strategists then consider alternative concepts and courses of action for the use of the national elements of power. Note the primacy of the objectives—strategy should be ends-driven, not resource-driven, in order to ensure maximum opportunity to achieve the objectives.

(2) Identifying and defining the policy objective (end), therefore, is a critical first step in the strategy formulation process. Understanding the objective is critical to formulating strategy.

(3) Once the policy objective is identified, strategists consider the range of resources (means) available, and then examine potential ways to employ these resources in pursuit of the objectives. While strategy should remain ends-focused, ways are necessarily resource-constrained. (For example: Unless a state has nuclear weapons, the concept of nuclear deterrence cannot be adopted in developing its security strategy, that is, there is no “mutually assured destruction.” Therefore, the state must find alternative ways to enhance security or deter attack by a nuclear-capable adversary.)

d. Feasibility, Suitability, and Acceptability (FAS): Once potential strategy options are identified, each option must be examined to determine *feasibility* (Do we have the means to execute the ways?), *acceptability* (Does it have necessary constituent support? Is it legal? Ethical? Worth the cost?) and *suitability* (Will it achieve the objectives?). This evaluation process, often described as a “FAS test,” enables the strategist to evaluate the likelihood of success for each option and to select that strategy deemed most likely to attain the objectives with available means and in an acceptable

way. Before a final strategy is recommended or adopted, however, each option must also be subjected to a risk assessment.

e. Risk Assessment: Strategies at any level often lack resources or the ability to employ resources in a manner sufficient for complete assurance of success. As a result, a final and essential test is to assess the risk to attainment of policy objectives, as well as the risk of second- and third-order effects that implementation of the strategy could have (i.e., effects on the economy, relationships with allies, etc.). Eliminating all risk is rarely within reach. Being able to articulate its character and extent is the first step in reducing its impact.

f. Continuous Assessment (Monitor for Success, Failure or Modification). The final step in the strategy formulation process is one of continuous assessment to monitor or review the strategy as it is being implemented. Continuous assessment should be a formalized, recurring process during the life of the strategy that evaluates the strategy's effectiveness in attaining policy objectives. The strategic environment is dynamic and continuous change is inherent. Strategies that are successful may present new opportunities or require a new strategy to account for the conditions of success. Strategies that are failing beg for replacement. In addition, unforeseen changes in the strategic environment may occur that justify modification of some aspects of an existing strategy, but are not significant enough to invalidate the greater whole of the strategy. Lastly, national interests and policy can also change over time and as a result new strategies or modification(s) to existing strategies may be appropriate. Ideally, properly formulated strategy is constructed with inherent flexibility and adaptability in its statements of ways and means to serve particular ends. Continuous changes beyond requirements of success, failure and changed conditions, beyond the control of the formulators of the strategy, may be indicators of poor strategic thinking or a flawed strategy formulation process. Nonetheless, both the strategic environment and the strategy are continuously assessed to ensure strategy supports the directing policy and interests appropriately.

APPENDIX II

COURSE WRITING REQUIREMENTS and GUIDELINES

1. General. During the NSPS course, each student will complete two written requirements consisting of a short decision paper detailing a proposed strategy and a longer paper intended to provide background information on the issue and the reason for the decision recommended. Specific requirements follow.

2. Decision Paper.

a. Purpose. The primary purpose of the papers is to further your ability to think critically and analytically about national security policy. To accomplish this goal you will have to synthesize and apply material learned throughout the course. Because synthesizing and articulating policy in a short amount of time or space is a key leader skill, a secondary purpose of both papers is to improve your ability to prepare succinct written products that provide a relevant depth of analysis and a sound recommendation.

b. Requirement. A decision paper provides a very brief yet comprehensive analysis of an issue, explains to the decision-maker the impact of the decision he or she is being asked to make, and provides a recommendation. This requirement will test your ability to synthesize large amounts of information into a brief paper designed to allow a senior leader to make an important decision in an environment where time is at a premium and an exhaustive review of the issue's background is often not possible. The paper must be concise, framing the issue and possible options available. Concise background analysis must directly relate to the decision, and may include a history of the problem as it relates to the decision (why the decision must be made now and what decisions or events led us to have to make this policy decision).

c. The decision paper will be one page, single-spaced, using one inch margins. Font should be Arial 11 pitch.

(1) Issue. A brief statement of the policy that requires a strategy for implementation.

(2) Background. A concise overview of relevant information to allow a decision-maker to understand the issue and make an informed decision. This section should include:

a. Strategies considered to implement this policy, using the ends-ways-means construct.

b. Historical or other information relevant to the decision.

c. Impact, or why the issue is important and the decision must be made now.

(3) Recommendation.

a. Begin with a brief statement of the recommended strategy and supporting rationale.

b. Compare the recommended strategy with those not recommended.

c. Test the recommended strategy using the FAS-R test (save the testing of the strategies not recommended for the longer background paper).

NOTE: This section should not include any new information or decision criteria not already included in your previous analysis.

3. Background Paper. This paper will conduct a more detailed analysis of the policy decision assigned by each Seminar's FI and more comprehensively describe, compare and test the various strategies considered to implement it. In addition, this paper allows space for detailed historical background on the policy decision under consideration. As opposed to the decision paper, which is designed to be written in a spare, economical style, with as few words as possible used to express points or concepts, this paper is more academic in style, and more detail is appropriate. The background paper is usually written first, and then the decision paper condenses the key points and recommendations of the background paper into a format and style that allows a senior policy-maker to make an informed decision in a time-constrained environment.

a. Purpose. The purpose of this paper is to provide the decision-maker more detailed, comprehensive analysis of and background on the issue under consideration, in the event he or she feels this level of detail is required in order to make a decision.

b. Requirement. The core of this requirement consists of 6-8 pages per the provided format. **The paper must articulate the policy objective and executive decision. The paper must outline possible strategic options available for consideration. Background analysis must directly relate to the strategic options.**

c. Format. **The paper will have 6-8 double spaced pages, using one-inch margins. Font should be Arial 11 pitch.** While the focus of the paper is on content, **each background paper must adhere to a general format** and contain certain essential elements:

(1) Policy Decision and Objective(s): An articulation of the policy decision that requires a strategy. A description of the policy objective and end-states defined in the Policy Decision.

(2) Background (National Interests): A statement of the national interests affected by the policy decision and strategy implementation.

(3) Strategy Options.

a. Describe, in a few paragraphs, strategies considered for the proposed policy option to achieve the stated policy objective. In short, what are the strategies the U.S. could select to implement the policy option? For each strategy discussed, tie together the objectives/ends with the ways and means needed to achieve the objective. The strategy should take into consideration all elements of national power, as well as key domestic and global forces and trends, as detailed in the Strategy Formulation Framework (there is no requirement to discuss all of these; instead, discuss only those that play key roles in the strategies under consideration).

b. The strategy should describe how the elements of national power complement each other, whether and how they might operate together, or how they might comprehensively support the strategy. You also should identify if any conflict exists between the elements of power. Does the strategy rely primarily on only one of the elements of power (military, or economic, or diplomatic, etc.)? If so, why? Does this increase risk?

(4) Analysis and Comparison of Strategy Options: Evaluate each proposed strategy option in terms of feasibility, acceptability, suitability, and risk. Address second- or third-order consequences of the strategy. What is the desired response? What is the anticipated response? What critical indicators might require a revision of the proposed strategy? What actions can mitigate risk?

(5) Recommendation: Briefly restate the strategy recommended to implement the policy option given, and explain why you chose it. What are its advantages - in terms of the integration of instruments of national power, and in terms of the FAS-R test – over those strategies not chosen?

4. Evaluation. Both papers will be evaluated based on *content, organization, and style*, IAW the *Communicative Arts Program Directive*, with emphasis on content. The criteria for evaluating the papers will address the student's demonstrated ability to understand and apply course concepts, to organize material logically, to express thoughts using standard written English expected of educated senior officers and officials. Descriptions of the criteria for "Outstanding," "Exceeds Standards," "Meets Standards," "Needs Improvement," and "Fails to Meet Standards" are found in the *Communicative Arts Directive*. A paper evaluated as "Needs Improvement" or "Fails to Meet Standards" will be returned for rework and resubmission. Each paper will comprise 50 percent of the written component of the NSPS grade and the written component will comprise 60 percent of the overall NSPS grade.

5. Due Dates. Both papers are due to DNSS Faculty Instructors no later than close of business on Monday, 23 November 2015.

6. Sample Paper formats: Format examples are included below. NOTE: Organizations and agencies within the U.S. government policy process use various formats for papers designed to frame decisions for its strategic leaders. The sample policy paper represented here is not intended to reflect the required format of any particular agency

of government. However, for purposes of synthesizing course content, the example provided is similar to papers that might be used within the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

DECISION PAPER

TO: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THRU: UNDERSECRETARY OF DEFENSE (POLICY)
FROM: ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS)

Date XX XXX XX

SUBJECT: (Hypothetical Example). Strategy for Military Assistance to Ukraine

1. **ISSUE:** The President has approved in principle a package of military assistance to Ukraine to allow it to combat Russian-backed separatists in the east of the country. A National Security Council meeting has been scheduled for XX XXX XX to decide the form this assistance will take.

2. **BACKGROUND:** The ongoing separatist conflict in eastern Ukraine has recently expanded, with the cease-fire breaking down and Russian-backed separatists driving on the key port city of Mariupol. The President has authorized an immediate expansion of the U.S. military training mission to Ukraine and has requested options for provision of military equipment to Ukraine. ASD/ISA proposes the following strategy options, each of which has the proposed end state of halting further separatist military advances and stabilizing the conflict to allow the pursuit of a negotiated political settlement.

- a. Expand the ongoing military training mission but do not provide equipment.
- b. Provide defensive weapons only. Defensive weapons are defined here as individual protective equipment, anti-aircraft and anti-armor weapons and counter-artillery radars.
- c. Provide significant military equipment to Ukraine, to include all of the items listed above as well as night vision and communications equipment and armored vehicles.

A decision is requested by XX XXX XX in order to allow ASD/ISA to prepare for the NSC meeting on this issue, scheduled for XX XXX XX.

3. **RECOMMENDATION:** ASD/ISA recommends you select strategy X listed above.
- a. Discuss the suitability of the strategy proposed by explaining how it supports the ends of the policy.
 - b. Briefly discuss the proposed strategy's acceptability to key audiences (Congress, regional allies and partners, the American people, etc.).
 - c. Briefly discuss the feasibility of the strategy by detailing the means required to implement it.
 - d. Discuss and risk inherent in the strategy and how this will be mitigated (or whether the risk can be accepted).

BACKGROUND PAPER

TO: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Date XX XXX XX

THRU: UNDERSECRETARY OF DEFENSE (POLICY)

FROM: ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

(INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS)

SUBJECT: **(Hypothetical Example)**. Strategy for Military Assistance to Ukraine

1. POLICY DECISION AND OBJECTIVES: On XX XXX XX the President approved in principle a package of military assistance to Ukraine to allow it to combat Russian-backed separatists in the east of the country. A National Security Council meeting has been scheduled for XX XXX XX to decide the form this assistance will take. The stated objectives of this policy are XX, XX, and XX. Given the advance of separatist forces on the key port city of Mariupol, the President wants the expanded package of assistance to begin arriving as soon as possible to provide a visible sign of support to the Ukrainian government.

2. BACKGROUND / NATIONAL INTERESTS: A statement of the national interests this strategy will pursue, protect, or advance.

3. STRATEGY OPTIONS: A statement of each strategy option, followed by an articulation of the ends, ways, and means inherent in each. Discuss how each strategy option will advance U.S. interests and support the policy decision. Discuss how each strategy proposed would integrate the instruments of national power (DIME), or whether it relies mostly or wholly on a single instrument.

4. ANALYSIS AND COMPARISON OF STRATEGY OPTIONS: Compare each strategy option in terms of its feasibility, acceptability, suitability and risk. When discussing acceptability, ensure to address the strategy option's acceptability to all key audiences (Congress, other executive branch departments and agencies, the media, the American people/interest groups, key allies and partners, others?). Discuss how risk can be mitigated or whether it can be accepted. Discuss the potential reactions of any adversaries to each strategy option, and the potential second and third order effects of each strategy option. Discuss what the indicators might be that the strategy option is in need of revision once it has been implemented.

5. RECOMMENDATION: Recommend one of the strategy options and explain why it best achieves the stated ends of the policy it is meant to implement. Review the ways and means to be used in the strategy and the instruments of national power to be employed, as well as its advantages over the strategy options not chosen in terms of the FAS-R test and the risk inherent in it.

APPENDIX III

NSPS STUDENT CRITIQUE

1. Analyses of student views of the USAWC courses are an extremely important input to the curriculum planning process. The course evaluation consists of a computer-assisted questionnaire. You can access the computerized survey system through the Student drop down menu on the USAWC Homepage.
2. You will be contacted via email once the computer survey is available, and you will be notified of the desired completion date at that time. Questions on the survey should be directed to the Director of Curriculum Evaluation, 245-3365.
3. The stated objectives of “National Security Policy and Strategy” are on page 2 of the Course Directive. For your convenience, they are listed below. Please review them prior to completing the course evaluation survey.
 - a. Examine the essential elements and processes in the formulation of national security strategy and policy, the art and practice of policy and strategy formulation in achieving national security objectives.
 - b. Examine contemporary and emerging international security challenges and their impact on the national security agenda, the current and emerging global environment.
 - c. Synthesize key concepts, tools, and processes in the development of appropriate policy and strategy responses to national security challenges facing the United States in the 21st Century international security environment.

APPENDIX IV

MISSION

The United States Army War College educates and develops leaders for service at the strategic level while advancing knowledge in the global application of Landpower.

AY16 PROGRAM LEARNING OBJECTIVES (PLOs)

To accomplish its mission, the USAWC presents a curriculum designed to produce graduates who can:

PLO 1: Think critically and creatively in applying joint warfighting principles at the strategic level.

PLO 2: Communicate clearly, persuasively, and courageously.

PLO 3: Anticipate and adapt to surprise and uncertainty.

PLO 4: Recognize change and lead transitions.

PLO 5: Make ethical decisions and promote military cultures that reflect the values and traditions of the Profession of Arms.

PLO 6: Operate on intent through trust, empowerment, and understanding (Mission Command).

PLO 7: Assess the strategic security environment and the contributions of all instruments of national power.

PLO 8: Apply theories of war and strategy to national security challenges.

PLO 9: Assess the processes and relationships of the Department of defense, as well as those of interagency, intergovernmental, multinational, and non-governmental organizations.

PLO 10: Appreciate the utility of, and creatively employ, Landpower in joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational operations.

APPENDIX V

JOINT SENIOR SERVICE COLLEGE LEVEL LEARNING AREAS AND OBJECTIVES (JPME Phase II)

1. Overview. Service SLCs focus on the development and application of military power in support of national objectives in a joint, interagency, intergovernmental, multinational environment.

2. Mission. Although each Service SLC mission is unique, a fundamental objective of each is to prepare future military and civilian leaders for high-level policy and command and staff responsibilities requiring joint and Service operational expertise and warfighting skills by educating them in the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic dimensions of the strategic security environment and the effect of those dimensions on strategy formulation, implementation, and campaigning. SLC subject matter is inherently joint; JPME at this level focuses on the immersion of students in a joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational environment and completes educational requirements for JQO nomination.

3. Learning Area 1 - National Strategies.

a. Apply key strategic concepts, critical thinking and analytical frameworks to formulate and execute strategy.

b. Analyze the integration of all instruments of national power in complex, dynamic and ambiguous environments to attain objectives at the national and theater-strategic levels.

c. Evaluate historical and/or contemporary security environments and applications of strategies across the range of military operations.

d. Apply strategic security policies, strategies and guidance used in developing plans across the range of military operations and domains to support national objectives.

e. Evaluate how the capabilities and limitations of the U.S. Force structure affect the development and implementation of security, defense and military strategies.

4. Learning Area 2 - Joint Warfare, Theater Strategy and Campaigning for Traditional and Irregular Warfare in a Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental and Multinational Environment.

a. Evaluate the principles of joint operations, joint military doctrine, joint functions (command and control, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection and sustainment), and emerging concepts across the range of military operations.

b. Evaluate how theater strategies, campaigns and major operations achieve national strategic goals across the range of military operations.

c. Apply an analytical framework that addresses the factors politics, geography, society, culture and religion play in shaping the desired outcomes of policies, strategies and campaigns.

d. Analyze the role of OCS in supporting Service capabilities and joint functions to meet strategic objectives considering the effects contracting and contracted support have on the operational environment.

e. Evaluate how strategic level plans anticipate and respond to surprise, uncertainty, and emerging conditions.

f. Evaluate key classical, contemporary and emerging concepts, including IO and cyber space operations, doctrine and traditional/ irregular approaches to war.

5. Learning Area 3 - National and Joint Planning Systems and Processes for the Integration of JIIM Capabilities.

a. Analyze how DoD, interagency and intergovernmental structures, processes, and perspectives reconcile, integrate and apply national ends, ways and means.

b. Analyze the operational planning and resource allocation processes.

c. Evaluate the integration of joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational capabilities, including all Service and Special Operations Forces, in campaigns across the range of military operations in achieving strategic objectives.

d. Value a joint perspective and appreciate the increased power available to commanders through joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational efforts.

e. Analyze the likely attributes of the future joint force and the challenges faced to plan, organize, prepare, conduct and assess operations.

6. Learning Area 4 - Command, Control and Coordination.

a. Evaluate the strategic-level options available in the joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational environment.

b. Analyze the factors of Mission Command as it relates to mission objectives, forces and capabilities that support the selection of a command and control option.

c. Analyze the opportunities and challenges affecting command and control created in the joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational environment across the range of military operations, to include leveraging networks and technology.

7. Learning Area 5 - Strategic Leadership and the Profession of Arms.

- a. Evaluate the skills, character attributes and behaviors needed to lead in a dynamic joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational strategic environment.
- b. Evaluate critical strategic thinking, decisionmaking and communication by strategic leaders.
- c. Evaluate how strategic leaders develop innovative organizations capable of operating in dynamic, complex and uncertain environments; anticipate change; and respond to surprise and uncertainty.
- d. Evaluate how strategic leaders communicate a vision; challenge assumptions; and anticipate, plan, implement and lead strategic change in complex joint or combined organizations.
- e. Evaluate historic and contemporary applications of the elements of mission command by strategic-level leaders in pursuit of national objectives.
- f. Evaluate how strategic leaders foster responsibility, accountability, selflessness and trust in complex joint or combined organizations.
- g. Evaluate how strategic leaders establish and sustain an ethical climate among joint and combined forces, and develop/ preserve public trust with their domestic citizenry.

APPENDIX VI

AY 16 THEMES

The special theme for AY16 will be **Educating and Developing Adaptive Senior Leaders for a Complex World”**

ENDURING THEMES

Elihu Root’s challenge provides the underpinnings for enduring themes within the USAWC curriculum. The enduring themes stimulate intellectual growth by providing continuity and perspective as we analyze contemporary issues.

STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP AND THE EXERCISE OF DISCRETIONARY JUDGMENT.

- Evaluate leadership at the strategic level (national security policy and strategy, especially in war)
- Understand the profession’s national security clients and its appropriate jurisdictions of practice
- Evaluate leadership of large, national security organizations
- Evaluate strategic thinking about the future (2nd and 3rd order effects)
- Analyze the framework for leading and managing strategic change, specifically the components of organizational change and the process by which organizations change

RELATIONSHIP OF POLICY AND STRATEGY (RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ENDS, WAYS, AND MEANS).

- Analyze how to accomplish national security aims to win wars
- Analyze how to connect military actions to larger policy aims
- Analyze how to resource national security
- Evaluate international relations as the context for national security

INSTRUMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER AND POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO NATIONAL SECURITY.

- Comprehend Diplomatic Power
- Comprehend Informational power
- Evaluate Military Power
- Comprehend Economic power

PROFESSIONAL ETHICS.

- Evaluate the ethics of military operations (to include *jus in bello* and *post bello*)
- Evaluate the ethics of war and the use of force (to include *jus ad bello*)

- Evaluate the ethics of service to society (domestic civil-military relations)

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS.

- Evaluate relationships between military and civilian leadership
- Evaluate relationships between the military and domestic society
- Evaluate relationships between armed forces and foreign populations

INSTRUMENTS OF WAR AND NATIONAL SECURITY.

- Joint: Evaluate the capabilities and domains of joint forces (especially land, maritime, air, space, cyber)
- Interagency: Understand other U.S. government agencies and departments
- Intergovernmental; Understand potential relationships with other national governments
- Multinational: Understand potential relationships with armed forces or agencies of other nations/coalition partners

HISTORY AS A VEHICLE FOR UNDERSTANDING STRATEGIC ALTERNATIVES AND CHOICES.

- Identify and analyze relevant historical examples of strategic leadership and strategic choices (across time and around the world)
- Evaluate historical examples relevant to war and other national security endeavors

ENDURING LANDPOWER THEME (BY CORE COURSE)

National Security Policy and Strategy: Evaluate Army/landpower and its scope in addressing national security policy aims. Analyze the diversity of landpower requirements over time (hence requirement for flexibility).

APPENDIX VII

BLOOM'S TAXONOMY *

Benjamin Bloom created this taxonomy for categorizing level of abstraction that commonly occurs in educational settings. The taxonomy provides a useful structure in which to categorize learning objectives and questions.

Competence	<u>Skills Demonstrated</u>
Knowledge	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• observation and recall of information• knowledge of dates, events, places• knowledge of major ideas• mastery of subject matter• <i>Question Cues:</i> list, define, tell, describe, identify, show, label, collect, examine, tabulate, quote, name, who, when, where, etc.
Comprehension	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• understanding information• grasp meaning• translate knowledge into new context• interpret facts, compare, contrast• order, group, infer causes• predict consequences• <i>Question Cues:</i> summarize, describe, interpret, contrast, predict, associate, distinguish, estimate, differentiate, discuss, extend
Application	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• use information• use methods, concepts, theories in new situations• solve problems using required skills or knowledge <p><i>Questions Cues:</i> apply, demonstrate, calculate, complete, illustrate, show, solve, examine, modify, relate, change, classify, experiment, discover</p>
Analysis	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• seeing patterns• organization of parts• recognition of hidden meanings• identification of components

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Question Cues:</i> analyze, separate, order, explain, connect, classify, arrange, divide, compare, select, explain, infer
Synthesis	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • use old ideas to create new ones • generalize from given facts • relate knowledge from several areas • predict, draw conclusions • <i>Question Cues:</i> combine, integrate, modify, rearrange, substitute, plan, create, design, invent, what if?, compose, formulate, prepare, generalize, rewrite
Evaluation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • compare and discriminate between ideas • assess value of theories, presentations • make choices based on reasoned argument • verify value of evidence • recognize subjectivity • <i>Question Cues</i> assess, decide, rank, grade, test, measure, recommend, convince, select, judge, explain, discriminate, support, conclude, compare, summarize

* Adapted from: Bloom, B.S. (Ed.) (1956) Taxonomy of educational objectives: The classification of educational goals: Handbook I, cognitive domain. New York ; Toronto: Longmans, Green.

APPENDIX VIII

OFFSITE ACCESS TO COURSE READINGS AND LIBRARY DATABASES

EZproxy - Enables access to licensed database content when you are not in Root Hall. It operates as an intermediary server between your computer and the Library's subscription databases.

Links - You will find EZproxy links to full text readings in online syllabi, directives, bibliographies, reading lists, and emails. Usually, instructors and librarians provide these links so that you can easily access course materials anytime, anywhere. It also helps us comply with copyright law and saves money on the purchase of copyright permissions.

Library Databases - You can use EZproxy to access Library databases when you are away from Root Hall. Go to the Library's webpage <http://usawc.libguides.com/current>, click on any database in the Library Databases column, such as ProQuest, EBSCO OmniFile, or FirstSearch, and then use your EZproxy username and password to login.

Username and Password - From home, when you click on a link that was built using EZproxy, or you are accessing a particular database, you will be prompted to provide a username and password. You only need to do this once per session. You will find EZproxy login information on the wallet-size card you were given by the Library. If you have misplaced yours, just ask at the Access Services Desk for another card, contact us by phoning (717) 245-3660, or email usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.libraryr@mail.mil <usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.libraryr@mail.mil>. You can also access the library portal from the Army War College homepage at: <https://internal.carlisle.army.mil/Pages/default.aspx>. Please do not share EZproxy login information with others.

Impact of Firewalls - Most Internet service providers (ISPs) do not limit the areas you can access on the Internet, so home users should not encounter problems with firewalls. However, corporate sites often do employ firewalls and may be highly restrictive in what their employees can access, which can impede EZproxy.

ACCESS SOLUTIONS

Try Again! Many problems with EZproxy are caused simply by login errors. If your first login attempt fails, try again. Check to make sure the Caps Lock is not on. Or, if you see a Page Not Found message after you do login, use the Back button and click on the link again. It may work the second time.

Broken Link - If a link appears to be broken, you can find the article by using the appropriate database instead. Go to the Library's webpage <http://usawc.libguides.com/current>, click on the database name, type in your EZproxy

username and password to login, and then search for the specific article.

Browsers - EZproxy works independently from operating systems and browsers, but problems may be caused by your browser if you have not downloaded and installed the newest version. Also, it is a good idea to check to make sure that the security settings on your browser are not too restrictive and that it will accept cookies and allow popups. Be aware ISPs that use proprietary versions of browsers, such as AOL, can interfere with EZproxy. A simple workaround is to connect to your provider, minimize the window, and then open a browser such as Mozilla Firefox or Microsoft Internet Explorer.

Databases - Not all remote access problems are caused by EZproxy. Occasionally databases will have technical problems. Deleting cookies might help. You may successfully pass through EZproxy only to find an error caused by the database. If this happens, back out of the database and try using another one. It is unlikely that both providers would be having technical problems at the same time.

Help and Tips - For assistance, please contact the USAWC Research Librarians by phoning (717) 245-3660, or email: usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.library@mail.mil.

Blackboard Access – All syllabus and digitally available media will be made available at Blackboard.com at <https://proedchallenge.blackboard.com/webapps/login/?action=relogin>, please contact Mr. Christopher Smart at Christopher.a.smart.civ@mail.mil, or 245-4874.

This document contains educational material designed to promote discussion by students of the U.S. Army War College. It does not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of the Army

