


**U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE
ACADEMIC YEAR 2016**

CORE CURRICULUM

**THEATER STRATEGY AND
CAMPAIGNING COURSE**

DIRECTIVE



**U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA 17013-5050
1 December 2015 – 17 February 2016**

Middle States Accreditation

The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Middle States Commission on Higher Education (MSCHE), 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 19104, (267) 284-5000. MSCHE is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation. Initial accreditation was granted in 2004.

AY 2016

**THEATER STRATEGY
AND
CAMPAIGNING**

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Dr. J. E. Gordon**

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COURSE OVERVIEW

General. *Theater Strategy and Campaigning* (TSC) focuses on the examination and the implementation of national guidance through the application of joint doctrine, translated into theater strategies and campaign plans to conduct joint, unified, and multinational operations. This course explores and evaluates U.S. military ways and means to connect operational efforts to strategic ends (policy aims). This includes basic understanding, analysis, and synthesis of doctrine, organizations, and concepts. TSC also maintains complementary links with the Regional Studies Program (RSP) to emphasize contemporary application of U.S. operational doctrine in relation to U.S. national security interests in specific regions.

TSC aims to build upon the subjects already covered in the core curriculum to develop leaders capable of translating strategic policy and guidance into theater campaign plans that support national objectives. While most students have some experience in the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP), others do not. However, subtle differences in planning exist between the tactical, operational, and theater-strategic levels. The process similar to MDMP is the Joint Operation Planning Process (JOPP). Few students have had personal experience at this level of planning. The focus of JOPP is on the interaction between an organization's commander and staff, the commanders and staffs of the next higher and lower commands, as well as with supporting commander's staffs. You should continuously ask yourself "what is different at this level?"

You will also conduct a detailed examination of Operational Design. Operational Design is a creative and cognitive *commander-centric* methodology that seeks to develop an understanding of the strategic (national and/or multinational) guidance and objectives combined with a thorough understanding of the operational environment prior to and during campaign planning. This methodology leads to the development of the commander's vision for the conduct of the campaign, which enables the application of operational art through the JOPP. The result is an enduring strategic concept for sustained employment of military power to facilitate the accomplishment of national and/or multinational policy.

You will apply strategic leader skills and incorporate the National Strategies as we participate in an active learning environment. At the conclusion of the course, you will have studied the art and science of theater-strategic operations. You must actively contribute and participate, think critically and creatively at the strategic and operational levels, and apply innovative solutions to complex, ill-defined problems created by uncertainty and dynamic change in the world.

The course flows from focus on understanding the Environment of the Combatant Commander to Emerging Concepts. A scenario focusing on Southeast Asia provides the basis for contingency planning, during an in-seminar practicum. The scenario emphasizes the importance of all elements of national power. Vexing and complex problems associated with traditional warfare, irregular warfare, stability operations,

unified commands, theater of war organization, and multinational operations are addressed throughout the course.

COURSE STRUCTURE

1. General. The course contains five blocks. **Block I:** “Implementing National Strategy,” provides an examination of the strategic environment, national direction, defense and support of the homeland, and the unified action of the DoD in concert with other major U.S. Government actors in the comprehensive approach. This examination governs the design and planning actions of the Combatant Commander, emphasizing the military element of power. This block bridges the national policy covered in the NSPS course to its implementation at the Combatant Command level. **Block II:** “Building the Joint Force,” provides understanding of: 1) how joint doctrine defines the five domains (land, air, sea, space, and cyber) and how the characteristics of those domains shape Service operating concepts; 2) the use of military power in the domains; 3) Landpower in the 21st Century; and 4) Army and joint emerging concepts that may alter the perception, resourcing, and application of military force across the range of military operations. **Block III:** “Command Structures and Joint Functions,” explores each of the joint functions and evaluates how a commander integrates these functions to produce synergistic effects within a theater of operations. Additionally, the block will examine other elements inherent to military operations, such as setting and maintaining a theater and information operations. **Block IV:** “Theater Strategy and Design,” enables the students to understand Operational Art and Operational Design and to demonstrate the value of Operational Design as a way to address complex problems in the operational environment. Additionally, we will examine how senior officers give their best military advice to policy makers by providing options. **Block V:** “Application of the Joint Operation Planning Process,” through a series of exercises, this block will reinforce and generate student competence and confidence with the JOPP at the operational and theater levels of conflict. During this block, you will apply Operational Art, Operational Design, and the Joint Functions within the JOPP to develop operational approaches and COAs within a JIIM environment from Combatant Command and JTF/MNF perspectives.

2. Purpose. Explores and evaluates U.S. military ways and means to connect operational efforts to strategic ends (policy aims). This includes basic understanding, analysis, and synthesis of doctrine, organizations, and concepts.

3. Scope. TSC examines and applies joint doctrine in planning and conducting unified and multinational operations and analyzes the process through which national strategies are synthesized and translated into theater strategies and campaign plans. You will study the relationships that the military departments, functional components, and other governmental agencies have with Combatant Commanders. Recognizing that we exist in a dynamic international environment, your intellectual pursuits will encompass difficult issues such as the future of joint warfare and the complex issues involved when working with governmental and non-governmental agencies throughout

the range of military operations. Recent and current events, as well as historical case studies, are woven throughout the fabric of the course.

4. Objectives.

a. Analyze Combatant Commander relationships with the President, SecDef, CJCS, Service Chiefs, other Combatant Commands and key agencies in developing policy, strategy, and plans. (PLOs 1, 9)

b. Analyze Combatant Command development of policy, strategy, and plans in the context of Landpower and JIIM to include, IO, Cyberspace, Joint Intelligence, Joint Logistics, communication synchronization, and emerging concepts. (PLOs 2, 3, 10)

c. Evaluate the role of Landpower as part of the Joint Force in joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational operations. (PLOs 3,10)

d. Synthesize the integration of military capabilities and limitations across the range of military operations (ROMO) and plans to achieve strategic objectives using the joint operational planning process in a JIIM environment. (PLOs 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10)

e. Synthesize the development of Theater Strategies, Strategic Options, and operational level COAs to meet the National Strategic Goals in a joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational (JIIM) environment at the theater strategic level. (PLOs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10)

5. Curriculum Relationships.

a. TSC seeks to apply knowledge and skills derived from previous courses. In turn, students develop new skills that are essential to developing the requisite expertise to function at the theater-strategic level. TSC integrates operational design and operational art in pursuit of national security objectives while applying the military instrument of power.

b. Theater Strategy and Campaigning is an application course. Specifically, TSC draws upon lessons from the Introduction to Strategic Studies Course to build on the introduction of key concepts. Lessons in the Strategic Leadership course provide the basis to examine “complex problems” using critical and creative thought, viewed through a systems lens and cultural realities. Concurrently, students are exposed to the unique aspects of senior leaders and a very complex set of circumstances that require senior officer decisions. TSC also draws on the Theory of War and Strategy course, which provides the underpinnings of why wars are waged, ends, ways, means, and a theoretical foundation of doctrinal concepts. The National Security Policy and Strategy course provides an excellent precursor to understanding the environment of the Theater Commander, as he/she accepts, derives, and builds upon national guidance to accomplish theater requirements. Finally, TSC and the Regional Studies Program (RSP) are conducted concurrently. TSC maintains complementary links with the

Regional Studies Program (RSP) to emphasize contemporary application of U.S. operational doctrine in relation to U.S. national security interests in specific regions.

c. During the elective period, among other offerings, the Joint Warfighting Advanced Studies Program, and the Campaign Analysis Course, use and apply the concepts and doctrine taught during TSC. TSC is a vital part of the holistic experience of the U.S. Army War College. TSC will help prepare you to function effectively in roles as a strategic advisor, theorist, planner, or leader.

6. Joint Professional Military Education (JPME). Phase II, senior level, consists of 5 learning areas supported by 26 learning objectives focused primarily on the operational and theater strategic level. All of the course objectives and lessons in TSC support one or more of the JPME Phase II learning objectives. The TSC teaching faculty provides representation from the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, NSA, the German Army, and a civilian university. Jointness is a part, directly or indirectly, of every lesson in TSC.

7. Complementary Programs. The Noontime Lecture Program provides supplementary material to TSC. Noontime lectures occur periodically in Wil Washcoe Auditorium. Attendees may bring and eat their lunch during the lecture.

8. Course Critique. The computerized Course Critique will be available for you to complete on 17 February 2016. After Action Reviews (AAR's) occur mid-course as well as at the end of the course. You may provide feedback at any time during the course, and you are encouraged to do so. You may provide comments directly to your Faculty Instructor or the Course Director.

COURSE REQUIREMENTS

1. General. This course lends itself to the active learning process, requiring imaginative thought and student interaction. A simplified model to follow is to ask the WHAT of a topic or issue, the WHY of its significance, and the HOW of its utility to professional military responsibilities. The answer to many of these questions is subjective; often no clear-cut solution exists. Do not feel uncomfortable; uncertainty and ambiguity are frequently the norm. Honing creative thinking skills is central to the educational experience of TSC. Meaningful research, diligent preparation, thought-provoking presentations, and participation and contribution in seminar discussions are the principle ingredients in making the active learning process successful.

2. Daily Reading.

a. Required Readings. You must read this material prior to the class because seminar discussions are based on the readings. Readings are selected because they support lesson learning objectives. In general, you can accomplish the readings in about 2 ½ to 3 hours for each 3-hour seminar session. Readings provide basic knowledge and analysis of the topic. Follow-on discussions in the seminar room build

upon that knowledge and aim to achieve analysis, synthesis, and application of the topic. In seminar, you will review, refine, and integrate previous work into seminar solutions for complex problems. Please note that TSC uses “enabling objectives” in some lessons. Accomplish these objectives during your preparation for seminar. The seminar builds upon the enabling objectives to accomplish lesson objectives.

b. Suggested and Focused Readings. These readings provide material for additional research. Faculty Instructors may assign these readings to selected students and ask them to provide a brief oral report and analysis to the seminar. These reports may offer an opposing point of view from the required reading, provide a degree of understanding beyond that required in the lesson objectives, or support one or more of the “Points to Consider” for the lesson.

3. Student Academic Evaluation/Assessment Methods. Students are evaluated on their demonstrated performance towards achieving course objectives. All student coursework and seminar contribution will be assessed by faculty and provide the foundation for the student’s overall course evaluation. TSC assessment methodology is based on two components: 50% for the two writing requirements and 50% for seminar contribution which include exercise participation and oral presentations.

a. Writing Requirement.

(1) Students will complete two writing requirements. The first will be a one-page position/information paper focused on responding to questions from a four-star commander, due **12 January 2016**. Your instructor has the questions. The second writing requirement will be a five- to seven-page paper, due **11 February 2016**. Your faculty instructor will provide more detail on this paper.

(2) The intent of the second paper is to synthesize major points in the course. Topics are related to different aspects of the course learning objectives. You and your Faculty Instructor will work together to select a topic during the course. A format will be provided. Papers will be evaluated in consonance with the AY2016 Communicative Arts Directive. The Faculty Instructor will provide a copy of the evaluation to the students, identifying strengths, shortcomings, and recommendations.

b. Writing with Integrity.

(1) You must avoid plagiarism. Hugo Bedau wrote in *Thinking and Writing About Philosophy*, p. 141: "Writers plagiarize when they use another's words or ideas without suitable acknowledgement. Plagiarism amounts to theft -- of language and thought. Plagiarism also involves deception...[Plagiarism] wrongs the person from whom the words or thoughts were taken and to whom no credit was given; and it wrongs the reader by fraudulently misrepresenting the words or thoughts as though they are the writer's own." Although it sounds like a cliché, when you plagiarize you cheat yourself: first, by not developing the discipline and diligence to research, write, and edit well; second, because taking credit for other people's ideas will induce outrage and

resentment against you; and third, because the habit of plagiarism can end your career and destroy your reputation.

(2) To avoid plagiarism, you must cite your sources everywhere in your paper where you use the ideas of others. You must cite them when you quote them directly, and also where you paraphrase their points in your own words. In general, you should only use direct quotes when you find the author's wording to be especially effective. Your paraphrasing or summarizing other authors' points should be thorough. It is not fair to an author to change only a couple of words in a paragraph and then imply (by not using direct quotes) that the paragraph is entirely your own prose. It might help to imagine the author reading over your shoulder. Finally, using other's thoughts in academic writing is beneficial especially when you are not an expert in the field. Their research, their expertise, their conclusions, or analysis can strengthen your paper's argument and, therefore, their work should be used to good effect to make your paper more persuasive.

c. Seminar Contribution.

(1) Students must be actively involved in the seminar learning process - sharing ideas, analyses, and knowledge - and have a responsibility for establishing and contributing to seminar goals. Contribution involves being a good listener, an articulate spokesperson for a particular point of view, and an intelligent, tactful questioner or challenger of ideas. Contribution can include student performance in the seminar discussions and group work during Seminar Practicum, as well as formal and informal oral presentations and exercises. The Faculty Instructor will provide a copy of the evaluation, identifying strengths, shortcomings, and recommendations to the students.

(2) Practicum. A course of study designed for the supervised practical application of previously studied theory. The practicum will explore the characteristics of hypothetical current and future issues or conflicts, which allows participants the opportunity to consider and discuss strategic and operational concepts in a realistic situation. You will develop solutions and build upon them to arrive at seminar consensus. Written and oral responses will be required as products from the exercises.

d. Oral Requirements. Students will routinely prepare and present short oral presentations to their respective seminars. Oral presentations will be evaluated by the Faculty Instructor in accordance with the AY2016 Communicative Arts Directive and included in the "contribution" section of the final course evaluation. Students will be notified in advance of graded oral requirements. The Faculty Instructor will provide a copy of the evaluation to the students, identifying strengths, shortcomings, and recommendations.

4. Additional Student Requirement.

a. Read **the Exercise Scenario Material for the Block V exercise NLT 22 January 2016.** It will be used for all subsequent lessons.

b. Faculty Instructors may designate individual or group projects for presentation to the seminar.

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December

Academic Planning Schedule AY16

<i>Sun</i>	<i>Mon</i>	<i>Tue</i>	<i>Wed</i>	<i>Thu</i>	<i>Fri</i>	<i>Sat</i>
27 Nov-15 Feb Bliss Hall closed for Lighting project Fall Recess		8:30 AM Classes Resume 1300-1430 Comdt's Time BLOCK 1 Intro to TSC & Env of the CCDR TSC 1	Strategic Direction TSC 2	Unified Action Electives Fair TSC 3	Integrated USG Action NTL – CIV-Mil TSC 4	Christkindlesmarkt 5
6	7 HD/HS/DSCA (SPKR) NTL – Mil Response to Sandy	8 Student Army/Navy Game BLOCK 2 Sea & Air Domain NTL - CCTV Broadcast GEN Perkins	9 RWR	10 Qtrs 1 Holiday Reception Land Domain NTL- Space	11 National Guard Birthday Celebration Cyber/Space	12 Army Navy Game
Student Holiday Social						
13	14 Presentation of Forces Case Study NTL - UNCLOS Cyber Spkr Electives Practice TSC 9/10	15 Electives Practice RSP 1	16 BLOCK 3 Cmd Structures Multinational/NATO Opus NTL – CENTCOM Cmd Structures Electives Practice 1300-1430 Comdt's Time TSC 11	17 Electives Practice NTL- Multinational Operations RSP 2	18 Sustainment – Set the Theater Electives Practice 1300 Recess Begins TSC 12	19
20	21 TSC 9/10	22 RSP 1	23 TSC 11	24 RSP 2	25 TSC 12	26
27	28 Winter Recess	29 Winter Recess	30 Winter Recess	31 Training Holiday	Christmas Day	
2015						

January

Academic Planning Schedule AY16

<i>Sun</i>	<i>Mon</i>	<i>Tue</i>	<i>Wed</i>	<i>Thu</i>	<i>Fri</i>	<i>Sat</i>
					1 New Year's Day	2
					Winter Recess	
3 Winter Recess	4 0830 AM Classes Resume 1300-1430 Comdt's Time Intelligence and Protection	5 RSP 3	6 SRP 7	7 RSP 4	8 Mvt, Mvr & Fires w/IO TSC 14	9
10	11 Joint Functions Integration Ex 1300-1430 Comdt's Time TSC 13	12 TSC Paper Due RSP 5	13 BLOCK 4 Theater Strategy, Planning & Options NTL - History of Op Art SPKR- AFRICOM J-5 TSC 16	14 Op Art & Op Design TSC 17	15 RWR/Tng Holiday	16
17	18 Martin Luther King, Jr. Holiday TSC 15	19 RSP 6	20 Elements of Design TSC 18	21 Designex Brief 1300-1430 Comdt's Time Electives Registration TSC 22	22 Designex Civilian Social / Chili Cook-off TSC 19	23
24	25 Designex Designex TSC 20/21	26 RSP 8	27 RWR Academic Planning Conference	28 Designex Brief 1300-1430 Comdt's Time Electives Registration TSC 22	29 BLOCK 5 Intro to JOPP Electives Registration TSC 23	30

2016

February

Academic Planning Schedule AY16

Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat
	1 JOPP MA 1 JOPP MA 2 TSC 24/25	2 RSP 9	3 SRP 8	4 RSP 10	5 JOPP MA Brief & Intro to COA Dev 1300-1430 Comdt's Time TSC 26	6
7	8 JOPP COA Dev 1 JOPP COA Dev 2 TSC 27/28	9 1300-1430 Comdt's Time JOPP COA Dev 3 TSC 29	10 JOPP COA Dev Brief TSC 30	11 TSC Paper Due Completing JOPP and CAP TSC 31	12 RWR	13
14	15 Washington's Birthday Holiday TSC 27/28	16 Emerging Concepts NTL - JOPP and CAP in AFRICOM 1300-1430 Comdt's Time TSC 32	17 Course Synthesis & AAR TSC 33	18 DM Begins TSC 31	19 PAK Mil PME Visit (NTL)	20
21	22 TSC 27/28	23 TSC 32	DM 3	DM 1	DM 2	27
IF Unified Command Field Studies Trip						
	DM 3	1300-1430 Comdt's Time DM 4	RWR	DM 5	DM 6	
28	29 SRP 9					
IF Unified Command Field Studies						
2016						

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Block I Intent “Implementing National Strategy”

Block Chief: Prof Marra

Purpose: To provide an examination of the strategic environment, national direction, defense and support of the homeland, and the unified action of the DoD in concert with other major USG actors in the comprehensive approach which governs the design and planning actions of the Combatant Commander (CCDR). This module bridges the national policy covered in the NSPS course to its implementation at the Combatant Command level. Focus is on the Geographic and Functional Combatant Command.

Method: This module features guest lectures, a panel, seminar instruction, a case study, and student oral presentations on focused readings in support of lesson learning objectives.

End state: Each student should proceed from this module with an understanding of the strategic guidance, environment, processes, and procedures, which comprise the framework at the theater level and govern the integrated planning actions of the CCDR in a JIIM environment.

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TSC COURSE INTRODUCTION/ENVIRONMENT OF THE COMBATANT COMMANDER

Mode: Seminar

Lesson: TSC-00/01-S

1. Introduction.

a. Theater Strategy and Campaigning Course (TSC) Introduction. During the first hour, the Faculty Instructor (FI) will introduce TSC. Key points to cover will be the course objectives, linkages to other courses, schedule, sequence of lessons, expected outcomes, course requirements, and student assessments. The FI will also introduce the students to the Joint Electronic Library (JEL), <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/>, and Joint Doctrine, Education & Training Electronic Information System (JDEIS) for access to joint publications, (<https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/index.jsp?pindex=0>). NOTE: A DoD Common Access Card (CAC) is required to access the JDEIS site.

b. Environment of the Combatant Commander.

(1) Geographic Combatant Commanders (CCDRs) are the senior Department of Defense representatives in their respective areas of responsibility (AORs). CCDRs receive strategic direction from the President and Secretary of Defense through a variety of formal and informal methods (to be covered in TSC-02) and are responsible for planning and executing operations to achieve U.S. strategic ends. To shape their AORs effectively, CCDRs must accurately understand their environment and problems they face or will face, then fashion an adaptable strategy that meets current challenges, while preparing for future threats, challenges, and opportunities. This strategy must be flexible enough to prevent threats and challenges from arising when possible, mitigate threats when necessary, and take advantage of opportunities that might be “hidden” within the larger dynamic strategic environment. Therefore, before we undertake operational design and joint operation planning later in this course, we must first understand the nature and characteristics of the contemporary – and evolving – environment of the CCDR.

(2) This lesson will examine the nature and characteristics of the CCDR’s environment with a focus on the Asia-Pacific region. Its purpose is to assist you in framing the scope and complexity of the challenges and opportunities inherent in the evolving 21st Century environment and their impact on the CCDR’s ability to understand, envision, prioritize, and plan to meet current, as well as future, challenges and opportunities while managing risk and time.

2. Learning Objectives.

a. **Analyze** challenges Combatant Commanders face in envisioning, understanding, and prioritizing challenges and opportunities in complex environments while managing risk.

b. **Comprehend** the nature, character, and characteristics of the contemporary – and evolving – environment facing the Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, when developing and executing military strategy in the Asia-Pacific region.

3. Enabling Objectives.

a. **Understand** and be prepared to discuss the roles and responsibilities of the Ccdr in the formulation, articulation, translation, dissemination, and implementation of strategic direction.

b. **Comprehend** the role of the Combatant Commander in influencing long-term processes such as research and development, acquisition, and global posture and basing.

4. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks. Complete the required readings and be prepared to discuss the points to consider in seminar.

b. Required Readings.

(1) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, Joint Publication 1 (Washington, DC: US Joint Chiefs of Staff, March 25, 2013), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1.pdf (accessed September 11, 2015). Read pp. III-7 through III-12. **[Open Source URL] [Library Issued Text] [Blackboard] [TSC AY16 CD Rom]**

(2) James R. Clapper, *Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community*, Statement for the Record, Senate Armed Services Committee, February 26, 2015, http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Unclassified_2015_ATA_SFR_-_SASC_FINAL.pdf (accessed September 11, 2015). Read pp. 1-12 and 19-20. **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard] [TSC AY16 CD Rom]**

(3) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *The National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2015* (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, June 2015), http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Publications/National_Military_Strategy_2015.pdf (accessed September 11, 2015). Read pp. 1-13. **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard] [TSC AY16 CD Rom]**

(4) Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review 2014* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, March 4, 2014), http://archive.defense.gov/pubs/2014_Quadrennial_Defense_Review.pdf (accessed September 11, 2015). Read “Chairman’s Assessment,” pp. 59-64. **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard] [TSC AY16 CD Rom]**

(5) Thomas G. Mahnken, et. al., “Asia in the Balance: Transforming US Military Strategy in Asia,” June 2012, http://www.aei.org/files/2012/05/31/-asia-in-the-balance-transforming-us-military-strategy-in-asia_134736206767.pdf (accessed September 11, 2015). Read pp. 1-12. **[Open Source URL]**

(6) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020* (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, September 10, 2012), <http://www.dtic.mil/get-tr-doc/pdf?AD=ADA568490> (accessed August 4, 2015). Read pp. 1-8. **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard] [TSC AY16 CD Rom]**

c. Focused Readings. None.

d. Suggested Readings.

(1) Barack Obama, “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense” (Washington, DC, 2012), http://www.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf (accessed September 11, 2015).

(2) Center for Strategic and International Studies, “U.S. Force Posture Strategy in the Asia Pacific Region: An Independent Assessment” (Washington, DC, 2012), http://csis.org/files/publication/120814_FINAL_PACOM_optimized.pdf (accessed September 11, 2015).

5. Points to Consider.

a. What are the predominant characteristics of the contemporary and evolving operational environment and their impact on CCDRs’ ability to shape their AORs on terms favorable to national interests while managing risk?

b. What are U.S. strategic interests in the Asia Pacific region? What are the interests of U.S. Allies, partners, and friends? What opportunities exist that are beneficial to U.S. interests? What challenges could potentially damage U.S. interests?

c. What are the implications of an “over focus” of Joint Force capabilities on any one region of the conflict continuum? What are the associated impacts on long-term processes such as research and development, acquisition, and global posture and basing in an increasingly resource-constrained environment?

6. Relationship to Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) Joint Learning Areas (JLAs), Phase II.

- a. JLA 1.b,e. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.
- b. JLA 3.c Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.
- c. JLA 5.c. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

7. Relationship to USAWC Program Learning Objectives (PLOs), and Enduring and Special Themes.

- a. PLOs: 1, 4, 7, 9.
- b. Enduring Themes: Strategic Leadership and the exercise of discretionary judgment; Relationship of Policy and Strategy (relationship between ends, ways, and means); Instruments of national power and potential contributions to national security; Instruments of war and national security.
- c. Special Theme: Educating and Developing Adaptive Senior Leaders for a Complex World.

STRATEGIC DIRECTION

Mode: Seminar

Lesson: TSC-02-S

1. Introduction.

a. The National Security Policy and Strategy (NSPS) course introduced national-level policy and strategy formulation. This lesson is a “bridge” from that national-level focus to the theater-level focus of the Combatant Commander (CCDR) in the Theater Strategy and Campaigning (TSC) course. Joint planning and design must account for the strategic ends contained in strategic guidance documents and ensure that campaigns are consistent with national priorities and appropriate for the achievement of national security objectives derived from the available strategic direction whether formal or informal. Joint Publication 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, defines strategic direction as:

*The processes and products by which the President, Secretary of Defense, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff provide strategic guidance to the Joint Staff, combatant commands, Services, and combat support agencies.*¹

b. Combatant Commanders receive strategic guidance both explicitly and implicitly. Examples of explicit strategic direction include the National Security Strategy (NSS), Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) (aka Defense Strategy Review in NDAA FY2015), National Military Strategy (NMS), Unified Command Plan (UCP), Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF), Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), Global Force Management Implementation Guidance (GFMIG), and Global Force Management Allocation Plan (GFMAP). The President of the United States (POTUS) and Secretary of Defense (SecDef) may also provide strategic direction to CCDRs implicitly in Presidential Policy Decisions (PPDs), policy speeches, press conferences, public statements, other written guidance, and personal interaction with CCDRs. Some of this implicit guidance may amend or cancel explicit strategic direction.

c. CCDRs and staffs also monitor a variety of “strategic influencers” to anticipate changes to Strategic direction. These influencers include the media, think tanks, interest groups, and public opinion. Although they do not provide strategic direction, they can influence policy and subsequent strategic direction. In many cases these

¹Joint Publication 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, November 8, 2010, as amended through June 15, 2015, p. 228; incorporated from Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*, August 11, 2011, p. GL-15.

influencers have a bearing on the CCDR's interpretation and application of strategic guidance and inform their judgment and interaction with POTUS and the SecDef.

d. This lesson examines the formulation, articulation, dissemination, and interpretation of strategic direction. It will examine the relationships between various strategic direction products and the management of national military resources. These topics contribute to the foundation of Theater Strategy and Campaigning.

2. Learning Objectives.

a. **Comprehend** the doctrinal process and procedures by which Combatant Commanders receive strategic guidance and the relationships between the various National Planning Documents (NSS, DSR/QDR, NMS, UCP, GEF, & JSCP).

b. **Comprehend** how National Planning Documents influence the Global Force Management process and how Combatant Commanders use this process to receive forces required to accomplish assigned tasks.

c. **Analyze** how CDRUSPACOM assessed the strategic environment and evaluated various sources of strategic direction to achieve national security objectives in the Philippines during Operation Freedom Eagle.

3. Enabling Objectives.

a. **Know** the party responsible and purpose for the following strategic direction documents: NSS, QDR, UCP, GEF, NMS, JSCP, GFMIG, and GFMAP.

b. **Know** the definition of Assignment, Allocation, and Apportionment.

c. **Know** the six Geographic Combatant Commands' (GCC) Areas of Responsibility (AORs) and at least three responsibilities common to all GCCs.

d. **Know** the three Functional Combatant Commands (FCCs) and at least one responsibility unique to each FCC.

4. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks.

(1) Complete the required readings; refer frequently to learning objectives, enabling objectives, and points to consider.

(2) Be prepared to discuss the relationships among the various strategic direction documents.

(3) Be prepared to discuss how the CDRUSPACOM received strategic direction following September 11, 2001 and developed the plan that led to the deployment of JTF-510 and elements of 1st Special Forces Group to the Philippines in 2002.

b. Required Readings.

(1) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operation Planning*, Joint Publication 5-0, (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 11, 2011), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp5_0.pdf (accessed September 11, 2015). **Read** Chapter II, "Strategic Direction and Joint Operation Planning," pages II-1 to II-6, paras. 1 to 6 and Appendix H, "Global Force Management," H-1 to H-5. **[Open Source URL] [Library Issued Text] [Blackboard] [TSC AY16 CD Rom]**

(2) U.S. Army War College, Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations, *Campaign Planning Handbook*, Academic Year 2016 (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Academic Year 2016). **Read**, Chapter 1, "National Strategic Direction and Guidance," pp. 3 through 9 and Appendix B, "Global Force Management," pp. B-1 through B-4. **[DMSPO Issued Text] [TSC AY16 CD Rom]**

(3) President of the United States (POTUS), *Unified Command Plan* (April 6, 2011 with Change-1 dated September 12, 2011); For Official Use Only (FOUO). **(Scan) [Faculty Handout]**

(4) Operation Freedom Eagle –

(a) Jeffrey H. Michaels, *The Discourse Trap and the US Military: From the War on Terror to the Surge* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2013), 61-66 (*The Philippines*). **[Blackboard]**

(b) C. H. Briscoe, "Balikatan Exercise Spearheaded ARSOF Operations in the Philippines," *Special Warfare* 17, no. 1 (September 2004), [Proquest](#) (accessed September 11, 2015). **[Database]**

(c) Donald Rumsfeld, "Strategic Thoughts," MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT, September 30, 2001, <http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB358a/doc13.pdf> (accessed September 11, 2015). **[Blackboard] [Open Source URL] [TSC AY16 CD Rom]**

(d) Donald Rumsfeld, "Strategic Guidance for the Campaign Against Terrorism," MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, et al, October 3, 2001, <http://library.rumsfeld.com/doclib/sp/134/2001-10-03%20To%20Deputy%20SecDef%20et%20al%20re%20Strategic%20Guidance%20for%20Campaign%20Against%20Terrorism.pdf>. (accessed September 11, 2015). **[Blackboard] [Open Source URL] [TSC AY16 CD Rom]**

(e) Thomas E. Ricks, "Pacific Plan Seeks Clues to Al Qaeda Contacts," *The Washington Post*, November 4, 2001, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2001/11/04/pacific-plan-seeks-clues-to-al-qaeda-contacts/41e3cc3e-6abd-4433-aad0-8512bd8a3faf/> (accessed September 11, 2015). **[Open Source URL]**

(f) "Joint Statement Between the United States of America and the Republic of the Philippines, November 20, 2001" *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Administration of George W. Bush, 2001* (Washington, DC: Office of the Federal Register, 2002), <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/WCPD-2001-11-26/pdf/WCPD-2001-11-26-Pg1697-2.pdf> (accessed September 11 2015). Read pp. 1697-1700. **[Blackboard]**
[Open Source URL] [TSC AY16 CD Rom]

(g) Eric Schmitt, "Hurdle Leapt, U.S. Will Help Philippines Battle Rebels," *The New York Times*, January 30, 2002, <http://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/30/international/asia/30MILL.html?pagewanted=print> (accessed September 11, 2015). **[Open Source URL]**

c. Focused Readings. None.

d. Suggested Readings.

(1) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, Incorporating Change 1*, Joint Publication 1 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, March 25, 2013), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1.pdf (accessed September 11, 2015). Read pp. II-1 to II-7, paras 1 & 2.

(2) Andrew Feickert, *The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands: Background and Issues for Congress* (Washington, DC, U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, January 3, 2013), <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/202875.pdf> (accessed September 11, 2015). **(Copy and paste into your browser)**

(3) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, CJCS Instruction (CJCSI) 3141.01E, Management and Review of Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP)-Tasked Plans (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, September 15, 2011), http://www.dtic.mil/cjcs_directives/cdata/unlimit/3141_01.pdf (accessed September 11, 2015).

(4) Bob Woodward, "President Obama's Final Orders for Afghanistan Pakistan Strategy, or Terms Sheet," (Memorandum For the Principals from the National Security Adviser dated November 29, 2009) in *Obama's Wars* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2010), pp. 385-389.

(5) Barack Obama, national security strategy (Washington, DC: White House, February 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy.pdf (accessed September 11, 2015). Read pp. 1-14, scan remainder.

(6) U.S. Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review 2014* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, March 2014), http://archive.defense.gov/pubs/2014_Quadrennial_Defense_Review.pdf (accessed September 11, 2015). Read cover letter and Executive Summary, pp. III-XV; Scan remainder.

(7) Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *The National Military Strategy of the United States of America*, (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, June 2015), http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Publications/National_Military_Strategy_2015.pdf (accessed September 11, 2015). Read pp. i and 1-17.

(8) Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), *Chairman's Strategic Direction to the Joint Force*, February 6, 2012, http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/repository/020312135111_CJCS_Strategic_Direction_to_the_Joint_Force_6_Feb_2012.pdf (accessed September 11, 2015).

(9) Admiral Dennis Blair, PBS NEWSHOUR interview, December 19, 2001, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/terrorism-july-dec01-blair_12-19/ (accessed September 11, 2015).

(10) Geoffrey Lambert, Larry Lewis, and Sarah Sewall, "Operation Enduring Freedom—Philippines: Civilian Harm and the Indirect Approach," *Prism* 3, no. 4 (September 2012), http://cco.ndu.edu/Portals/96/Documents/prism/prism_3-4/prism116-135_lambert-lewis-sewall.pdf (accessed September 11, 2015). Read pp. 117-135.

(11) Richard Swain, "CASE STUDY: Operation Enduring Freedom Philippines," U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Center, October 2010, <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a532988.pdf> (accessed September 11, 2015).

5. Points to Consider.

a. What are the key differences between strategic direction and operational or tactical orders or guidance?

b. Which document do you believe Combatant Commanders consider the most important?

c. How effective is strategic direction in guiding CCDRs' use of the military instrument of power to achieve strategic ends?

- d. How do assigned, allocated, and apportioned forces influence Combatant Commanders' plans?
- e. Does Global Force Management enable or constrain Combatant Commanders?
- f. How did the SecDef communicate strategic direction to CDRUSPACOM about expanding the War on Terrorism?
- g. In what ways did JTF-510 and 1st Special Forces Group fulfill PACOM's requirements in the SecDef's strategic direction?
- h. How did PACOM integrate other elements of national power into JTF-510/1st Special Forces Group mission?

6. Relationship to Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) Joint Learning Areas (JLAs), Phase II.

- a. JLA 1.a, d. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.
- b. JLA 2.b, c, e. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.
- c. JLA 3.a, c. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.
- d. JLA 4.a. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.
- e. JLA 5.a, b, e. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

7. Relationship to USAWC Program Learning Objectives (PLOs), and Enduring and Special Themes.

- a. PLOs: 1, 4, 7, 9, 10.
- b. Enduring Themes: Relationship of Policy and Strategy (relationship between ends, ways, and means); Civil-Military Relations.
- c. Special Theme: Educating and Developing Adaptive Senior Leaders for a Complex World.

UNIFIED ACTION

Mode: Seminar

Lesson: TSC-03-S

1. Introduction.

a. According to former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Henry H. Shelton, “joint warfare is team warfare” and “the nature of modern warfare demands that we fight as a team.” In other words, success in conflict requires **unified action** – as described in Joint Publication 1 as “the synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort.” This unified action, however, is not automatic and takes place only when clear command relationships and unity of understanding and effort exist at all levels. The advantages of unified action are numerous. Nonetheless, given disparate Service, departmental, and interagency cultures and biases, working together in an integrated, cohesive manner requires much more than a simple willingness to do so and is not achieved without effort and diligence. The U.S. Congress, in recognition of these facts, set forth the principles of unified action in the National Security Act of 1947, the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, and, more recently, in the Goldwater Nichols Act of 1986.

b. In the pursuit of American policy objectives, all agencies of the U.S. Government (USG) are charged with promoting political and economic freedom, as well as fostering peaceful relations among nations. In peace, crisis, and war, the centerpiece of USG success is achieving **unified action** that brings all elements of U.S. diplomatic, informational, military, and economic power to bear in a coordinated, synchronized, and effective manner. The key to that success will be in integrating the cooperative efforts of all departments and agencies through a **comprehensive approach** to achieve a common set of goals that result in policy success. In recent years, the complexities of the operational environment and evolving challenges by irregular and non-state actors have made Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational (JIIM) operations imperatives for strategic success. In order to envision, plan, and synchronize such efforts effectively, the Combatant Commander must understand the organization and processes employed by our interagency partners in pursuing comprehensive goals. While Combatant Commanders may have varying degrees of influence in the policymaking process, this lesson is first and foremost an examination of how interagency actions are synchronized with combatant command theater strategy and actions to achieve comprehensive political-strategic effect.

c. This lesson on **unified action** and the **comprehensive approach** should serve as a fundamental and foundational lesson in your Army War College education. As a strategic leader, you will increasingly face challenges in which your ability to enhance unified action and craft comprehensive solutions will yield more effective achievement of

national political-strategic objectives. This lesson delves into the details of interagency planning and clarifies the similarities and differences with military planning. Additionally, it will show the linkages between the planning methods to attain unity of effort.

2. Learning Objectives.

a. **Analyze** the comprehensive approach in integrating all elements of national power — Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic (DIME) — to achieve political-strategic effect.

b. **Analyze** the primary actors and processes that facilitate the synchronization and implementation of national strategy at the theater level.

c. **Analyze** the primary ways the U.S. achieves Unified Action - through the “3-D Planning” Methodology, the Country Plan, the Integrated Country Strategy, and Promote Cooperation events.

3. Enabling Objectives. **Comprehend** the complex relationship the Combatant Commander has with his interagency counterparts as well as the unique role he has in implementing national military strategy to achieve political effects.

4. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks. Complete the required readings, reflect on the “points to consider,” and be prepared to contribute to seminar dialogue concerning the role of the President, Secretary of Defense, Combatant Commanders, and interagency leaders in achieving unified action and comprehensive political-strategic effect.

b. Required Readings.

(1) Former SecDef Leon E. Panetta, Dean Acheson Lecture: “Building Partnership in the 21st Century,” U.S. Institute of Peace, June 28, 2012. (**Read** all six pages, OR students may view the speech on YouTube). Use this link on your electronic device (start at the 13 minute, 13 second mark to hear the former SecDef) Leon E. Panetta, Dean Acheson Lecture: “Building Partnership in the 21st Century,” U.S. Institute of Peace, June 28, 2012, *YouTube*, streaming video, 13:13, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rvAji_cJnjik (accessed September 15, 2015).
[Blackboard].

(2) 3D Planning FAQs, July 2012 (Read all three pages) **[Blackboard]** **[TSC AY16 CD Rom]**

(3) U.S. Department of State, Integrated Country Strategy Overview, May 2012.
[Blackboard] **[TSC CD Rom]**

(4) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, Joint Publication 1 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, March 25, 2013), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1.pdf (accessed September 15, 2015). (Read Chapter II, "Doctrine Governing Unified Direction of Armed Forces," paragraph 3, "Unified Action," sections a, b and c, pp. II-7 and II-8. Also, paragraph 10, "Interagency Coordination," pp. II-13 to II-19). **[Open Source URL] [Library Issued Text] [Blackboard] [TSC CD Rom]**.

(5) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Instruction (CJCSI) 3141.01E, Management and Review of Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) Tasked Plans, September 15, 2011, Enclosure D, Planning for Interagency Integration. Read pp. D-1 and D-2. **[Blackboard] [TSC AY16 CD Rom]**

(6) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations*, Joint Publication 3-08 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, June 24, 2011), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_08.pdf (accessed September 15, 2015). (Read "Executive Summary" and "Commanders Overview," pp. ix through xxi) **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard] [TSC AY16 CD Rom]**

(7) Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security, *II Elements of National Power – Moving Toward a New Interagency Balance for US Global Engagement*, (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, July, 2014), http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/All_Elements_of_National_Power.pdf (accessed September 15, 2015). (Read Executive Summary and pp. 1-12) **[Open Source URL]**

c. Focused Readings.

(1) 3D Planning Guide, July 2012. Read pp. 4-26. **[Blackboard] [TSC AY16 CD Rom]**

(2) U.S. Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development, Integrated Country Strategy Guidance & Instructions, July 2012. Read pp. 1-13. **[Blackboard] [TSC AY16 CD Rom]**

d. Suggested/Reading.

Professor Harry Tomlin, "Speaking with One Voice," Occasional Paper, September 10, 2010. **[Blackboard] [TSC AY16 CD Rom]**

5. Points to Consider.

a. Given the current Combatant Command division between functional commands with global responsibilities and geographic commands with regional responsibilities, is there a potential for mission overlap and institutional impediments to unity of effort?

b. What are the characteristics of the interagency that influence the Combatant Commander and the development/execution of Theater Strategy?

c. What are some of the issues associated with the 3D Planning methodology, and how can the DoD integrate within the Integrated Country Strategy rubric used by the interagency?

d. What are some shortcomings of the current Combatant Command structure with regard to unified action across the DIME, and what are some possible options for organizational reform to underpin the comprehensive approach?

6. Relationship to Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) Joint Learning Areas (JLAs), Phase II.

a. JLA 1.a, b, d, e. Objectives, Points to Consider, Readings.

b. JLA 2.a, e. Objectives, Points to Consider, Readings.

c. JLA 3.a, b, c. Objectives, Points to Consider, Readings.

d. JLA 4.a, c. Objectives, Points to Consider, Readings.

e. JLA 5.c, e. Objectives, Points to Consider, Readings.

7. Relationship to USAWC Program Learning Objectives (PLOs), and Enduring and Special Themes.

a. PLOs: 1, 2, 7, 8, 9, 10

b. Enduring Themes: Strategic Leadership and the exercise of discretionary judgment; Relationship of Policy and Strategy (relationship between ends, ways, and means); Instruments of national power and potential contributions to national security; Civil-Military Relations.

c. Special Themes: None.

UNIFIED ACTION – THEATER AND COUNTRY LEVEL INTEGRATION

Mode: Seminar/Panel Discussion

Lesson: TSC-04-S

1. Introduction.

a. Today's class builds upon our previous session that focused on how civilian and military leaders integrate their efforts within Washington to develop and integrate U.S. policy and strategy objectives through integrated, coordinated interagency planning both before and during crisis. Building upon your understanding of the roles and organization of the "interagency" at the national level thus far, we will explore how organizational culture, differing design and planning approaches, etc. are dealt with by the Combatant Commands as they synchronize their overall theater campaign plan with the ongoing efforts of the U.S. Country Teams across the AOR.

b. The current complexities of the operational environment and evolving challenges by irregular and non-state actors have placed a premium on developing cohesive, integrated efforts across the JIIM partners for strategic success. Thus, the Combatant Commander's efforts to integrate DoD efforts with those of other U.S. agencies is accomplished through effective teamwork with the U.S. Ambassador and "Chief of Mission" (CoM) and the supporting interagency "Country Team" across the AOR. The challenges of bringing together civilian and military efforts at the national level extend to the country levels. This includes bringing together diverse agency partners, influenced and guided by their own organizational cultures, which drives the way they view problems, interpret guidance, and frame options and integrated responses to instability and conflict. We will analyze the organization and collaborative efforts of a Country Team and how the development and implementation of an integrated country strategy are designed to focus and orient Team efforts across the 3D's. We will discuss the challenges of bridging across organizational cultures to improve civil-military cooperation in conflict environments.

c. During the first half of the lesson, we will examine the practical approaches and challenges of how the CoM and Country Team would coordinate efforts during both peace and violent conflict within a partner nation. Given a fictional scenario in the PACOM region, a "mock" Country Team Panel will be convened in Will Washcoe Auditorium to present agency representatives' views on how they would work together to accomplish key elements of an integrated country strategy. Members of the panel will include:

- U.S. Ambassador who will discuss the role of the CoM in conducting diplomatic relations with the host-nation government, and leading integrated USG efforts in the Country Team.
- Foreign Assistance Mission Director, USAID, who will discuss their role in directing foreign assistance and development efforts, along with emergency disaster and humanitarian responses, that support CoM efforts.
- Director for Security Assistance for a major office of military cooperation, who will discuss DoD efforts to build host nation security capacity and coordination of program and exercise programs that support security development objectives.

d. While they will focus on how the Team operates during ongoing (peacetime) operations, panel members will also discuss 1) how they view effective relations with the GCC and the ongoing theater campaign plan, and 2) how they would view the deployment of military forces and initiation of operations into their country during a crisis situation [given the fictional scenario provided].

e. Selected seminar members will attend and participate in a question-and-answer session following the panel presentation in WWA, while the remainder of seminar members will view the presentation via webcast.

f. In the second half of today's lesson, the seminar will discuss how the Geographical Combatant Commands organize for and focus their ongoing efforts through the development and conduct of their theater campaign plan. The plan guides ongoing joint and Service Component Commands' operations to maintain regional/local stability and deter potential conflicts through security cooperation, military engagement, foreign humanitarian assistance and deterrence efforts across the Range of Military Operations (ROMO). We will also discuss how the GCC's organize and coordinate efforts to ensure collaboration and synchronization through interagency representatives working within the command.

2. Learning Objectives.

a. **Comprehend** the comprehensive approach in integrating all elements of national power (DIME) to achieve policy and strategy success at the Chief of Mission/Country Team level.

b. **Analyze** the primary actors, processes, and challenges that facilitate the synchronization and implementation of national strategy between the Geographical Combatant Commanders and the various Chiefs of Mission across the countries of the AOR.

c. **Analyze** the primary ways military efforts support and enable Unified Action under Chief of Mission authority at the country team level to achieve and maintain security and stability within a host nation during pre-conflict through post-conflict periods.

d. **Comprehend** the strategic thinking, decision making, and communication skills required of joint and interagency leaders in a strategic environment.

3. Enabling Objective. **Comprehend** that the Combatant Command is developing and conducting ongoing, effective civil-military integration of DoD/military efforts that accomplish the Commander's Theater Strategy and enable USG security policy success across the AOR.

4. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks. Complete the required readings, reflect on the "points to consider," and be prepared to contribute to learning through the development of questions and enabling senior leader-student dialogue on the principles for and challenges to effective, integrated interagency efforts at the Country Team level.

b. Required Readings.

(1) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operations*, Joint Publication 3-0 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 11, 2011), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_0.pdf (accessed October 27, 2015). Read pp. V-1 through V-5 (Joint Ops Across the ROMO) and Section C, pp. V-9 through V-11 (Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, and Deterrence). **[Open Source URL] [Library Issued Text] [Blackboard] [TSC AY16 CD Rom]**

(2) U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Plans, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, *Theater Campaign Planning – Planners' Handbook*, Version 1.0 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, February 2012), https://community.apan.org/usarpac_g5_tsccp/m/ascpc/128457.aspx (accessed October 27, 2015). Read pp. 1-4 (Introduction) and 8-16 (Mission Analysis – Theater and Country Planning). **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard] [TSC AY16 CD Rom]**

(3) U.S. Pacific Command, Fact Sheet: "USPACOM Strategy," (USPACOM, Undated), <http://www.pacom.mil/AboutUSPACOM/USPACOMStrategy.aspx> (accessed October 27, 2015). **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard] [TSC AY16 CD Rom]**

(4) Robert B. Brown and Jason N. Adler, "I Corps: U.S. Pacific Command's Newest Asset," *Joint Force Quarterly* 77 (Second Quarter 2015), [Proquest](#) (accessed October 27, 2015). **[Database] [Blackboard]**

(5) Review: U.S. Department of State, *Integrated Country Strategy Overview*, (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, May 2012). **[Blackboard] [TSC AY16 CD Rom]**

(6) Ronald E. Neumann, "Demystifying the Interagency Process and Explaining the Ambassador's Role," *Interagency Journal* 6, no. 3 (Summer 2015), <http://thesimonscenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/IAJ-6-3-Summer-2015.pdf> (accessed October 27, 2015). **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard]**

(7) United States Institute of Peace, United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2009), http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/guiding_principles_full.pdf (accessed October 27, 2015). Read Section 2 (Strategic Framework) and Section 3 (Cross Cutting Principles). Outlines the elements of a stable, functional state and the principles for U.S. efforts to enable secure and stable institutions. **[Open Source URL]**

(8) Lesson Guide and Fictional Scenario: Read the PACOM-based scenario used by the Mock Country Team Panel to develop their remarks on steady-state interface with the host nation, and view introduction of military forces into the country during crisis. This Guide also includes a brief overview of Country Team roles and an explanation of the challenges they face on a recurring basis in assessing and maintaining stability through support to the host nation government and institutions. **[Blackboard] [TSC AY16 CD Rom]**

c. Focused Readings. None.

d. Suggested/Readings.

(1) United States Institute of Peace, *Guide for Participants in Peace, Stability and Relief Operations*, ed. by Robert Perito (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2007). Read pp. 197-205 (Sections on Coordination in Washington and the Field, U.S. Diplomatic Mission Structure and Characteristics of Civilian Officials). **[Blackboard]**

(2) Institute of Land Warfare, "The U.S. Army in Motion in the Pacific" (Association of the United States Army, April 2015), www.ausa.org (accessed October 27, 2015).

(3) "Introduction to Department of State Agency Culture, V1.0," Department of State Course RS 401, http://www.state.gov/courses/rs401/page_26.htm (accessed October 27, 2015).

(4) Matthew C. Weed, et al., Congressional Research Service, "U.S. Diplomatic Missions: Background and Issues on Chief of Mission (COM) Authority," (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, March 10, 2014), <https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=751906> (accessed October 27, 2015).

(5) U.S. Agency for International Development, "Interagency Views - Conflict Assessment: Office of Conflict Mitigation and Management, US Agency for International Development," *Conflict Assessment Framework*, Version 2.0 (Washington, DC: U.S. Agency for International Development, June 2012), <http://www.usaid.gov/what-we-do/working-crises-and-conflict/technical-publications>

(6) Terrence K. Kelley, et al., *Security Cooperation Organizations in the Country Team: Options for Success*, RAND Report TR734 (Santa Monica, CA: 2010), http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical_reports/2010/RAND_TR734.pdf

(7) Harry A. Tomlin, USEUCOM Theater Strategic Level IA Planning Handbook, 2012. **[Blackboard]**

5. Points to Consider.

a. The Country Team is the embodiment of the interagency process at the local/host nation level; based upon our previous discussions, what are the key efforts and challenges that military leaders face in working effectively with non-DoD partners?

b. How do the Combatant Commander and his designated security assistance efforts work effectively with the Chief of Mission and Mission Director for USAID to accomplish Joint and DoD priorities at the local level?

c. How can doctrine/concepts for “stability” in joint operations enable us to better understand ongoing Country Team efforts and be prepared to design and plan efforts that retain or restore stability during rising violent conflict?

d. What are the key leader attributes and personal competencies that effective military leaders must have in working within a Country Team?

6. Relationship to Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) Joint Learning Areas (JLAs), Phase II.

- | | |
|-------------------|---|
| a. JLA 1.b. | Objectives, Points to Consider, Readings. |
| b. JLA 2.a, b. | Objectives, Points to Consider, Readings. |
| c. JLA 3.a, c, d. | Objectives, Points to Consider, Readings. |
| d. JLA 4.a, c. | Objectives, Points to Consider, Readings. |
| e. JLA 5.a, b, d. | Objectives, Points to Consider, Readings. |

7. Relationship to USAWC Program Learning Objectives (PLOs), and Enduring and Special Themes.

a. PLOs: 1, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10.

b. Enduring Themes: Strategic Leadership and the exercise of discretionary judgment; Relationship of Policy and Strategy (relationship between ends, ways, and means); Instruments of national power and potential contributions to national security; Civil-military relations.

c. Special Themes: None.

THE U. S. MILITARY’S DOMESTIC IMPERATIVE: HOMELAND SECURITY, HOMELAND DEFENSE, AND DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES

Mode: Lecture/Seminar

Lesson: TSC-05-L/S

Defending the homeland neither begins nor ends at U.S. borders, and departmental planning is guided by the concept of an active, layered defense – a global defense that aims to deter and defeat aggression abroad and simultaneously protect the homeland. It is a defense-in-depth that relies on collection, analysis, and sharing of information and intelligence; strategic and regional deterrence; military presence in forward regions; and the ability to rapidly generate and project warfighting capabilities to defend the United States, its Allies, and its interests.

—Strategy for Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities, Feb 2013

1. Introduction.

a. To fully understand the military’s role in the homeland, it is important for the strategic leader to make a distinction between homeland security, homeland defense, and defense support of civil authorities. The first is effectively a societal enterprise, for which the military’s role is a component of governments’ contribution at federal, state, and local levels. Homeland Defense (HD) and Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA), on the other hand, are doctrinal mission areas described respectively by our strategies as “the highest priority of the Department of Defense,” and “one of the Department’s primary missions.” But, if and when called upon, the military’s operating environment in executing or supporting these functions is, and will remain, markedly different from operations outside of the homeland. DSCA missions, to include responding to disasters, supporting law enforcement authorities, and other non-traditional military tasks, will be characterized far more as matters of Unity of Effort than Unity of Command. Homeland defense missions, particularly in the land domain, will occur only in extraordinary circumstances; but low likelihood should not turn our attention from the consequences of being ill-prepared to respond to a deliberate attack beyond the capabilities, capacity, and even purview of other security agencies. Whether DSCA or HD, all military operations in the homeland present the commander with a myriad of factors that are not encountered in operations conducted in other theaters.

b. Following the attacks of 9/11 and the devastation of Hurricane Katrina, the security environment in the U.S. became more complex, resulting in interagency reorganization within the federal government and a new focus on intergovernmental preparations, response and recovery against both man-made and natural disasters. Both have resulted in a concurrent re-examination of the role of the Army—the active

component, the Army Reserve, and the National Guard—when employed in the domestic environment. This lesson examines the inter-related missions and organizations providing overall security to the homeland, through Homeland Security, Homeland Defense, and Defense Support of Civil Authority (DSCA). The following key distinctions are important to consider.

(1) Federal Government: Our federal form of government is one of the overriding factors dictating how military activities are conducted inside our borders. The sovereign right of state governments is upheld in the U.S. Constitution, and in many ways the states' governors have significantly more authority to operate inside the boundaries of their constituency than does the federal government and its agencies. This holds true for disaster response and law enforcement. The use of federal military units in the homeland is defined by this relationship; thus federal support is subject to a Governor's request for assistance, and subordinate to state's authority in all but the most extreme circumstances.

(2) Homeland Security (HS): Homeland Security is defined in joint doctrine as, the "concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States; reduce America's vulnerability to terrorism, major disasters and other emergencies; and minimize the damage and recover from attacks, major disasters and other emergencies that occur." The Quadrennial Homeland Security Review similarly defines it as "a concerted national effort to ensure a Nation that is safe, secure, and resilient against terrorism and other hazards where American interests, aspirations, and way of life can thrive." Led by the Department of Homeland Security (or in some cases the Department of Justice), this complex and evolving mission set includes not just terrorist related events, but preparedness for and recovery from all disasters impacting the American people.

(3) Homeland Defense (HD): While threats to the U.S. homeland have changed considerably over time, the U.S. Armed Forces have always played a key role in countering them. Prior to World War II, hemispheric defense was the top planning priority for the War Department. During the Cold War, the threat of nuclear attack posed an enormous challenge to continental defense efforts. The homeland is now confronted with a wide spectrum of threats ranging from ballistic missile attack by nation-states to a variety of possible air, land, sea, space, or cyber attacks by national, transnational, and subnational groups. DoD has evolved to address these threats, most notably through the creation of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security, and the United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), the Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) assigned responsibility for most Homeland Defense and DSCA planning and execution.

(4) Defense Support of Civil Authority (DSCA): The 2013 Strategy for Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities defines DoD's role in assisting with protecting our populace and critical infrastructure from both natural and manmade threats. Throughout our history, military forces have supported civil authorities during domestic disasters, emergencies, and operations other than combat within U.S.

borders. Civil disturbance operations, support to law enforcement agencies, domestic disaster relief, and support to special events are only a few of the missions ably performed by American military forces every day. Several contemporary national and homeland security trends have raised the visibility and priority of DSCA missions in recent years. Historically, the military capabilities associated with accomplishing Civil Support were viewed as imbedded within the warfighting mission. However, increased emphasis and growing national expectations have resulted in reshaping DoD's thinking of DSCA which has resulted in a broadening of roles and authorities for this mission. This recent shift in mission emphasis and the inherent legal, policy, organizational, doctrinal, training, and resourcing implications has profound impact on when, how, and with what resources DoD responds.

2. Learning Objectives.

a. **Understand**, with respect to security and defense of the Homeland, the conceptual and practical responsibilities, authorities, and limitations of the Department of Defense surrounding homeland security, homeland defense, and defense support of civil authorities.

b. **Analyze** the factors that make the homeland unique as an area of operations: implications of our federal form of government; active layered defense; legal and policy restrictions on the employment of force; and unique capabilities required to respond to current and future threats in the land, maritime, air and space, and cyber domains.

c. **Understand** DoD's role as a component of the federal government in support of civil authorities in disaster response; the authorities and limitation surrounding the military's support to law enforcement agencies; and the legal, political, and practical factors that limit a commander's options in domestic security operations.

d. **Analyze** the C2 challenges and options for achieving unity of effort within the military response to civil requirements in times of crises, to include interaction between the active component and the National Guard in Title 10, Title 32, and State Active Duty statuses.

3. Enabling Objectives.

a. **Comprehend** the interrelated missions, and accompanying distinctions, of HS, HD, and DSCA.

b. **Comprehend** the roles/missions of DoD forces in support of civil authorities.

4. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks. Complete the required readings and be prepared to discuss the points attained therein, and from the speaker's presentation, in a seminar environment.

b. Required Readings.

(1) Ivan Luke, "DOD Operations in the Homeland: Context and Issues for the Commander," NWC 2067A (Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College, Joint Military Operations Department, July 2012), 2-19. **[Blackboard] [TSC AY16 CD Rom]**

(2) U.S. Department of Defense, *Strategy for Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, February 2013), <http://www.defense.gov/news/Homelanddefensestrategy.pdf> (accessed September 30, 2015). Read pp. 4-8 and 19-25; scan pp. 9-18. **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard] [TSC AY16 CD Rom]**

(3) Federal Emergency Management Activity, Information Sheet, National Response Framework (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, May 2013), http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1406722150024-5a3f2ef6da45e73b51f87eb46f8535c7/FINAL_InformationSheet_Response%20Framework_20140729.pdf (accessed September 30, 2015). **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard] [TSC AY16 CD Rom]**

c. Focused Readings. None.

d. Suggested Readings.

(1) U.S. Army War College, Department of Command, Leadership, and Management, *How the Army Runs: A Senior Leader Reference Handbook, 2013-2014* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, July 15, 2013), <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/orgs/SSL/dclm/pubs/HTAR.pdf> (accessed September 30, 2015). Read Chapter 21, "Defense Support of Civil Authority."

(2) U.S. Department of Defense, *Homeland Defense*, Joint Publication 3-27 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, July 29, 2013), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_27.pdf (accessed October 1, 2015). Read Executive Summary, Chapter I, and Chapter II.

(3) U.S. Department of Homeland Security, *The 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, June 2014), <http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/qhsr/2014-QHSR.pdf> (accessed October 1, 2015).

5. Points to Consider.

a. What are the boundaries and intersections of the Homeland Security, Homeland Defense, and DSCA missions?

b. What unique legal, policy, organizational, geographic, and operational factors and challenges must planners take into consideration during the campaign design process

for HD and DSCA? Do these factors vary significantly by domain (land, maritime, air and space, or cyber)?

c. What key documents determine the roles and responsibilities surrounding Homeland Security, Homeland Defense, and DSCA?

d. How should the DoD allocate its resources and activities among forward regions, approaches, and the homeland in order to fulfill the HS, HD, and DSCA missions?

e. How does the National Response Framework (NRF) frame DoD's role in interagency cooperation for incident response? What similar guidance would facilitate interagency cooperation in support of DoD pertaining to the homeland defense mission?

6. Relationship to Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) Joint Learning Areas (JLAs) Phase II.

a. JLA 1.a, b, c, e. Objectives; Points to Consider; Readings.

b. JLA 2.c, e. Objectives; Points to Consider; Readings.

c. JLA 3.a, d, e. Objectives; Points to Consider; Readings.

d. JLA 4.a, b, c. Objectives; Points to Consider; Readings.

e. JLA 5.a, b, c, e, g. Objectives; Points to Consider; Readings.

7. Relationship to USAWC Program Learning Objectives (PLOs), and Enduring and Special Themes.

a. PLOs: 1, 2, 5, 6, 7.

b. Enduring Themes: Strategic Leadership and the exercise of discretionary judgment; Relationship of Policy and Strategy (relationship between ends, ways, and means); Instruments of national power and potential contributions to national security; Civil-military relations; Instruments of war and national security.

c. Special Themes: Educating and Developing Adaptive Senior Leaders for a Complex World.

Block II Intent “The Domains, Landpower and Emerging Concepts”

Block Chief: COL Current

Purpose: To gain a better understanding of: 1) how joint doctrine defines the five domains (land, air, sea, space, and cyber) and how Service interpretations of each can lead to friction; 2) the use of military power in the domains; 3) Landpower in the 21st Century; and 4) Army and joint emerging concepts that may alter the perception, resourcing, and application of military force across the range of military operations.

Method: Through readings, students will refresh their background knowledge of the Services. Through assigned readings, seminar dialogue, FI instruction, student presentations, and supporting noontime lectures, students will gain an appreciation of how the domains influence each other and how the Services operate in each. Additionally, through readings and seminar dialogue, students will wrestle with emerging concepts that may shape and influence the future of the Services.

End state: Students can assess the application of military power in the domains of conflict, evaluate the underpinnings and potential influences associated with emerging concepts in the application of military force, and be able to inform senior commanders in regards to future security decisions, operations, and planning.

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INTRODUCTION TO DOMAINS: MARITIME AND AIR

Mode: Seminar

Lesson: TSC-06-S

1. Introduction.

a. The domains of conflict have continued to evolve, challenging theorists and strategists for much of recorded history. The Theory of War and Strategy (TWS) course addressed land, maritime, and air theorists and provided a basic understanding of the nature and characteristics of war and warfare. The National Security Policy and Strategy (NSPS) course provided insights into how the Joint Force – arrayed across the domains – is a “means” of national policy that is wielded in “ways” to achieve national “ends.” This block will focus on how the domains interface with each other as well as examining the unique impact of each upon the conduct of military operations. Students are expected to come to seminar with a basic understanding of the relevant Service organization, capabilities, limitations, and operating concepts as outlined in assigned readings. Seminar dialogue in this block of instruction will touch on these topics, but should focus on how the domains impact the CDR’s employment of military forces across the full range of military operations in the contemporary operating environment.

b. As warfare has evolved, the understanding and appreciation of the domains in which commanders employ forces have also evolved. At first, conflict was of necessity limited to the original domain, land. Maritime domain considerations quickly came about as man ventured forth upon the sea. With the advent of flight, air domain considerations have added to and complicated the thinking about the operational domains. Most recently, ventures into domains not traditionally geographically defined, such as space and cyberspace, further add to the number of dimensions a commander must consider in employing the Joint Force. This lesson begins a block of instruction on *Building the Joint Force* with a careful examination of the nature and characteristics of the domains and relationships to one another. Upon completion of this block, students should appreciate the uniqueness of each domain and understand how operations conducted therein integrate with operations in all of the other domains.

c. The Services that comprise the Joint Force are organized, trained, and employed for specific roles and missions. In this lesson we will examine the maritime and air domains, together with the Services that primarily operate within these domains. The U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard – known collectively as the Sea Services – provide the principal contribution to the military instrument of national power in the maritime domain, continuing in many ways the legacy of Mahan and Corbett discussed in the TWS course, yet also subject to the evolving demands of the operational environment. Finally, this lesson will also examine the air domain and the U.S. Air

Force. As the youngest Service, the Air Force brings to the Joint Force not only technology and access to a third dimension, but also a particular mindset – “air-mindedness” – for capitalizing upon their employment.

2. Learning Objectives.

a. **Evaluate** the air and maritime domains and the role of Seapower and Airpower as part of the Joint Force in Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multi-national operations (JIIM).

b. **Analyze** the Navy’s and Marine Corps’ Operating Concepts and how each Service presents forces to the Joint Force Commander.

c. **Analyze** the Air Force’s Operating Concept and how the Service presents forces to the Joint Force Commander.

3. Enabling Objective. **Comprehend** the characteristics, capabilities, limitations, and basic force presentation of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, and USSOCOM organizations.

4. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks. Complete the required readings and reflect on the “points to consider.”

b. Required Readings.

(1) U.S. Naval War College, *Forces Capabilities Handbook*, Joint Military Operations Reference Guide NWC 3153N (Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College, June 2014). **(Scan) [Blackboard] [TSC AY16 CD Rom]**

(2) Headquarters, U.S. Department of the Navy, *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, U.S. Department of the Navy, March 2015), <http://www.navy.mil/local/maritime/150227-CS21R-Final.pdf> (accessed September 15, 2015). **Read** pp. 1-26. **[Blackboard] [TSC AY16 CD Rom]**

(3) Combat Development Command, *Expeditionary Force 21 – Forward and Ready: Now and in the Future* (Quantico, VA: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps Capabilities Development and Integration, March 2014), http://www.mccdc.marines.mil/Portals/172/Docs/MCCDC/EF21/EF21_Capstone_Concept.pdf (accessed September 15, 2015). **Read** pp. 4-7 and 10-26. **[Blackboard] [TSC AY16 CD Rom]**

(4) Headquarters, Department of the Air Force, *Air Force Basic Doctrine*, Air Force Doctrine Volume 1 (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Curtis E. Lemay Center, February 27, 2015), <https://doctrine.af.mil/download.jsp?filename=Volume-1-Basic-Doctrine.pdf> (accessed September 15, 2015). **Read** pp. 23-35. **[Blackboard] [TSC AY16 CD Rom]**

(5) Headquarters, Department of the Air Force, *Annex 3-30 Command and Control* (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Curtis E. Lemay Center, November 7, 2014), <https://doctrine.af.mil/download.jsp?filename=3-30-Annex-COMMAND-CONTROL.pdf> (accessed September 15, 2015). **Read** pp. 38-39 and 54-62. **[Blackboard] [TSC AY16 CD Rom]**

c. Focused Readings. None.

d. Suggested Readings.

(1) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Special Operations*, Joint Publication 3-05 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 16, 2014), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_05.pdf **Read** Chapters 1 and 2.

(2) Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps Combat Development Command, *U.S. Marine Corps Concepts & Programs 2015* (Quantico, VA: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps Capabilities Development and Integration, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, December 2014), <https://marinecorpsconceptsandprograms.com/organization/marine-air-ground-task-force> (accessed September 15, 2015). **Read** *Marine Air Ground Task Force* Tab.

5. Points to Consider.

a. What characteristics of each domain of conflict (land, maritime, air, space, cyber) are unique or defining, and how do they impact the forces that operate in that domain?

b. Who occupies and/or operates in each domain? How high would you characterize the barriers to entry for armed forces in each domain, and what do they consist of?

c. What level of control does the current Joint Force enjoy in each domain (supremacy, superiority, parity, inferiority) across the range of military operations? What level is required in order to meet the strategic requirements of the GCCs?

d. How are the Services' operating concepts shaped by the domains in which they operate?

e. Are single domain operations decisive in contemporary operational environments? Why, or why not?

f. What capabilities, limitations, and comparative advantages do the Sea Services (Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard) and the Air Force provide to Geographic Combatant Commanders in executing their mission at the theater level across the Range of Military Operations (ROMO)?

6. Relationship to Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) Joint Learning Areas (JLAs), Phase II.

- a. JLA 1.c, e. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.
- b. JLA 2.b. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.
- c. JLA 3.c, d. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

7. Relationship to USAWC Program Learning Objectives (PLOs), and Enduring and Special Themes.

- a. PLOs: 1, 2, 7, 9.
- b. Enduring Theme: Instruments of war and national security.
- c. Special Theme: Educating and Developing Adaptive Senior Leaders for a Complex World.

LAND DOMAIN

Mode: Seminar

Lesson: TSC-07-S

1. Introduction.

a. This lesson continues the dialogue on Landpower in the core curriculum. The Theory of War and Strategy course considered the land theorists and Landpower's role in national security. The National Security Policy and Strategy course analyzed the use of Landpower as a means of national policy. This lesson furthers that dialogue with an analysis of the land domain and Landpower in its application in the operational domains. The lesson also addresses the U.S. Army's new operating concept and the Special Operations Forces operating concept. Lastly, this lesson examines Army and SOF Service capabilities and how these forces are presented to a Joint Force Commander.

b. Long before man thought of venturing on the sea or into the air, he lived on the land. He found food on the land. He built shelter on the land. He raised children on the land. When his aspirations conflicted with that of another, he fought and died on the land. Landpower in its various forms has been at the core of warfare since time immemorial and remains so today. Indeed, as other forms of military power like air and sea power were being developed, man defined these in relation to the land domain and the use of land forces.

2. Learning Objectives.

a. **Comprehend** the land domain and the role of Landpower as part of the Joint Force in joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational operations (JIIM).

b. **Evaluate** the U.S. Army's new operating concept and how its implementation might affect the way the Service trains, organizes, and equips its force.

c. **Analyze** the role of Special Operations Forces as part of the Joint Force in joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational operations (JIIM).

d. **Comprehend** how U.S. Army and SOF units are presented to a Joint Force Commander.

3. Enabling Objectives. None.

4. Student Requirements.

a. Required Readings.

(1) Headquarters, Department of the Army, *The Army*, Army Doctrine Publication 1 (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, September 2012), http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/adp1.pdf (accessed September 15, 2015). Read pp. 1-1 thru 1-8. **[Blackboard] [TSC AY16 CD Rom]**

(2) Headquarters, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, *The U.S. Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World*, Training and Army Doctrine Command Pamphlet 525-3-1 (Fort Eustis, VA: Headquarters, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, October 31, 2014), <http://www.tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/pams/tp525-3-1.pdf> (accessed September 15, 2015). Read pp. iv and 7-25. **[Blackboard] [TSC AY16 CD Rom]**

(3) H. R. McMaster, "Continuity and Change: The Army Operating Concept and Clear Thinking About Future War," *Military Review* 95, no. 2 (March/April 2015), [Proquest](#) (accessed September 15, 2015). Read pp. 6-20. **[Database] [Blackboard]**

(4) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Doctrine for Joint Special Operations*, Joint Publication 3-05 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 16, 2014), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_05.pdf (accessed July 28, 2015). Read Chapter I, "Overview of Special Operations," pp. I-1 thru I-9. **[Blackboard] [TSC AY16 CD Rom]**

(5) Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Army Special Operations Forces Operating Concept 2022* (Fort Bragg, NC: U.S. Army Special Operations Command, September 26, 2014), <http://www.soc.mil/Assorted%20Pages/ARSOF%20Operating%20Concept%202014.pdf> (accessed September 15, 2015). Read Chapters 1, 2, and 4. **[Blackboard] [TSC AY16 CD Rom]**

b. Focused Readings.

(1) U.S. Naval War College, *Joint Military Operations Reference Guide*, Forces Capabilities Handbook NWC 3153N (Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College, June 2014). Read "U.S. Army," pp. 30-66. **[Blackboard] [TSC AY16 CD Rom]**

(2) *Ibid.*, 142-154. **[Blackboard] [TSC AY16 CD Rom]**

c. Suggested Readings.

(1) William T. Johnsen, *Toward a Theory of Landpower for the 21st Century*, Working Paper (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Sept 2015). **[Blackboard]**

(2) Headquarters, Department of the Army, *The Army*, Army Doctrine Publication 1 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, September 2012 with Change 1, dated November 7, 2012), [http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/adp1.pdf] (accessed September 15, 2015). Read Chapter 3.

(3) Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Unified Land Operations*, Army Doctrine Publication 3-0 (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, October 2011), http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/adp3_0.pdf (accessed September 15, 2015). Read pp. 1-14.

(4) Headquarters, U.S. Special Operations Command, *United States Special Operations Command Special Operations Forces Operating Concept* (MacDill Air Force Base, FL: United States Special Operations Command, May 2013), <https://fortunascorner.files.wordpress.com/2013/05/final-low-res-sof-operating-concept-may-2013.pdf> (accessed September 15, 2015). Read pp. 3-18.

(5) Headquarters, U.S. Special Operations Command, *United States Special Operations Command Special Operations Forces 2020: Forging the Tip of the Spear* (MacDill Air Force Base, FL: United States Special Operations Command, May 2013), <http://www.defenseinnovationmarketplace.mil/resources/SOCOM2020Strategy.pdf> (accessed September 15, 2015). Read pp. 1-8.

(6) Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Army Special Operations Forces 2022* (Fort Bragg, NC: John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School), <http://www.soc.mil/USASOCTalks/ARSOF2022Pt1.html> (accessed September 15, 2015). Read pp. 8-18.

(7) Major Fernando M. Lujan, *Light Footprints: The Future of American Military Intervention* (Center for a New American Security, March 2013), http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_LightFootprint_VoicesFromTheField_Lujan.pdf (accessed September 15, 2015).

(8) G. K. Cunningham, "Landpower in Traditional Theory and Contemporary Application," in *U.S. Army War College: Guide to National Security and Strategy*, 2nd ed., ed. J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, June 2006), http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ssi/policy_strategy.pdf (accessed September 15, 2015).

(9) William T. Johnsen, *Re-Examining the Roles of Landpower in the 21st Century and Their Implications* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, November 2014), <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1237> (accessed September 15, 2015).

5. Points to Consider.

a. What is Landpower? What is the relationship between the land domain and Landpower? What is the difference between Landpower and land forces? Is the distinction important?

b. How does the U.S. Army's new operating concept differ from that of AirLand Battle? Why the change? What training, organizational, and equipment changes will likely be needed to create the force needed for the new operating concept? What opportunities and challenges might be presented during this transformation?

c. What is the role of Special Operations Forces? How do SOF contribute to the Joint land fight? What possible problem sets are appropriate for the application of SOF and, by contrast, which ones are not?

d. How are SOF and U.S. Army forces presented to a Joint Force Commander? What are the capabilities and limitations of SOF and what relationship should exist between general purpose land forces and Special Operations Forces?

6. Relationship to Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) Joint Learning Areas (JLAs), Phase II.

a. JLA 1.c, d. Readings, Objectives, Points to Consider.

b. JLA 2.c, f. Readings, Objectives, Points to Consider.

c. JLA 3.c, d, e. Readings, Objectives, Points to Consider.

d. JLA 5.c. Readings, Objectives, Points to Consider.

7. Relationship to USAWC Program Learning Objectives (PLOs), and Enduring and Special Themes.

a. PLOs: 1, 3, 8, 9, 10.

b. Enduring Themes: Instruments of national power and potential contributions to national security; Instruments of war and national security.

c. Special Themes: None.

CYBER and SPACE DOMAINS

Mode: Lecture/Seminar

Lesson: TSC-08-S

Lesson: TSC-10-L

1. Introduction.

a. Cyber and space are the newest of the defined military domains. In cyber, specific roles and “lanes in the road” within the U.S. government are often misunderstood and, frankly, murky. Lines become blurred as we view cyber through different lenses. There are numerous cyber stakeholders, which potentially complicates official policies and operations. There is a military 'piece,' a law enforcement 'piece,' an intelligence 'piece,' and a commercial 'piece,' just to name a few. Congress is looking at numerous pending cyber security bills which look to adjust responsibilities and authorities. Even at the Congressional level, there are equities amongst the various committees – Intel, Armed Services, Commerce, Homeland Defense, etc. While different organizations have various responsibilities, there is extensive cooperation "behind the scenes" with regards to identification and mitigation of cyber threats. Recent increased foreign malicious cyber activity has caused the U.S. government to increase its “whole of government” reaction. Likewise the space domain is often misunderstood, sometimes taken for granted, or considered too difficult to coordinate or not worth the effort. The space domain has evolved from a largely U.S. government dominated arena to a global environment entwined with military, national and commercial participants.

b. Students should leave with an appreciation for the complexity and the strategic value of the cyber and space domains. Students will be responsible for cyber defense as commanders and leaders in future assignments. Students should use a whole-of-government approach to cyber. Students should understand the appropriate limitations placed on the military by current legislation, and where the "lanes in the road" are for the military, DHS, and other government organizations. Our guest speaker, MG Paul Nakasone, is Commander of the Cyber National Military Forces, U.S. Cyber Command. Students should understand the role of CYBERCOM, the Service cyber components, Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Intelligence Community (IC), and private industry concerning cyber. With regards to the space domain, students should likewise develop an appreciation for the complexity and contested nature of the domain, and the value and criticality to our Nation.

2. Learning Objectives.

a. **Comprehend** current and evolving cyber and space definitions, structures, and employment methods.

b. **Analyze** the interaction of commercial, federal government and international interests in the cyber and space domains.

c. **Analyze** how the GCC integrates cyber and space to achieve the theater strategy.

3. Enabling Objectives. None.

4. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks. Complete the required readings and be prepared to discuss the “points to consider” in the seminar.

b. Required Readings.

(1) U.S. Department of Defense, Fact Sheet: The Department of Defense (DoD) Cyber Strategy (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, April 2015), http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/2015/0415_cyber-strategy/Department_of_Defense_Cyber_Strategy_Fact_Sheet.pdf. (accessed September 18, 2015). **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard] [TSC AY16 CD Rom]**

(2) U.S. Department of Defense, *Department of Defense Law of War Manual* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, June 2015), <http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/Law-of-War-Manual-June-2015.pdf>. (accessed September 18, 2015). Read Chapter 16, pp. 994-1004. **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard] [TSC AY16 CD Rom]**

(3) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Cyberspace Operations*, Joint Publication 3-12 (R) (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, February 5, 2013), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_12R.pdf. (accessed September 18, 2015). Read Chapter 3, “Authorities, Roles and Responsibilities” and Chapter 4, “Planning and Coordination.” **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard] [TSC AY16 CD Rom]**

(4) Brett T. Williams, MG (Ret), “The Joint Force Commander’s Guide to Cyberspace Operations,” *Joint Force Quarterly* 73 (Second Quarter, 2014), [Proquest](#) (accessed September 18, 2015). **[Database] [Blackboard]**

(5) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Space Operations*, Joint Publication 3-14 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, May 29, 2013), http://dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_14.pdf. (accessed September 18, 2015). Read “Executive Summary.” **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard] [TSC AY16 CD Rom]**

(6) Daniel Dant, “The National Space Policy: Sustainability and Cooperation in a Congested, Competitive, and Contested Domain,” *High Frontier* 7, no. 2 (February 2011), <http://www.afspc.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-110224-052.pdf> (accessed September 18, 2015). **[Open Source URL]**

c. Focused Readings. None.

d. Suggested Readings.

(1) Keith B. Alexander, "The Army's Way Ahead in Cyberspace," *Army Magazine* 63, no. 8 (August 2013), [Proquest](#) (accessed September 15, 2015).

(2) Gary D. Brown and Owen W. Tullos, "On the Spectrum of Cyberspace Operations," *Small Wars Journal* (11 December 2012), <http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/on-the-spectrum-of-cyberspace-operations> (accessed September 18, 2015).

(3) U.S. Department of Defense, *The DOD Cyber Strategy* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, April 17, 2015), http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/2015/0415_cyber-strategy/Final_2015_DoD_CYBER_STRATEGY_for_web.pdf

5. Points to Consider.

a. Is the U.S. government's organizational construct effective to conduct cyber operations and defend cyber in the future? What is USCYBERCOM's role?

b. How have the cyber and space domains affected the way we conduct Phase 0 operations and how we wage war?

c. How are commercial, civil, DoD, and international interests intertwined in the cyber and space domains? How does this impact the way we plan and execute operations?

d. Are commanders prepared to execute their missions when faced with degraded or denied cyber and/or space environments? How might a loss of confidence in systems affect operations and sustainment?

e. How does the use of cyber space assist the Combatant Commanders' execution of strategic guidance? What capabilities do they provide? What vulnerabilities do they present? How do CCDRs request and coordinate cyber and space support?

f. Are the critical infrastructures of the U.S. appropriately defended? What policy or technology changes need to happen to remedy the situation?

g. When a cyber attack is detected, who has the lead? Given that attribution is difficult, what if the attack originates from within the U.S.? How can sensitive (classified) attack information be passed to commercial interests or allies? Where do we draw the line between crime / hactivists / industrial espionage / foreign intelligence / insider threats and how does that affect operations and U.S. policies?

6. Relationship to Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) Joint Learning Areas (JLAs), Phase II.

- a. JLA 2.b. Objectives, Points to Consider, Readings.
- b. JLA 3.d,g. Objectives, Points to Consider, Readings.
- c. JLA 5.c,e. Objectives, Points to Consider, Readings.

7. Relationship to USAWC Program Learning Objectives (PLOs), and Enduring and Special Themes.

- a. PLOs: 7, 8, 9.
- b. Enduring Themes: Instruments of national power and potential contributions to national security; instruments of war and national security.
- c. Special Themes: None.

PRESENTATION OF FORCES CASE STUDY

Mode: Exercise

Lesson: TSC-09-EX

1. Introduction.

a. The previous three lessons have focused on a number of important concepts, all of which play a role across the range of military operations. However, these different areas require skillful integration to achieve a synergistic effect. This is an important part of the operational art and requires the active involvement of the Joint Force Commander.

b. Although we have focused on the domains and Service operating concepts somewhat individually, each is inherently connected to the others to form the Joint Force for the Combatant Commander.

c. We will conduct an exercise using Operation Desert Shield/Storm, the liberation of Kuwait, as a vehicle to explore how the Services presented/provided trained and ready forces to the CINCCENT in 1990/1991, followed by dialogue on how the Services would provide forces if the operation occurred today. You will be divided into four groups, with each focusing on a specific Service and Special Operations Force (SOF). Each group will conduct a presentation to the seminar as a whole, briefly describing how your Service presented forces to the Joint Force Commander during Operation Desert Shield/Storm, followed by how the Services would present forces using the current Service operating concepts as a guide.

d. This is an exercise using a case study as the basis for our study and dialogue. The case study provides background information. Feel free to incorporate other materials as you see fit. You may wish to review some of the material in the Introduction to Strategic Studies course that began the core curriculum. Focus your research in identifying the use and integration of Service provided forces to form the Joint Force across the domains in 1990/1991. Then use your studies in the previous three lessons to identify how the Services would provide forces across the domains if this operation occurred today.

2. Learning Objectives.

a. **Evaluate** the benefits, risks, and considerations for planning and executing an operation using a Combined and Joint Force.

b. **Evaluate** strategies and options to integrate Service forces into a Joint Force.

c. **Synthesize** the use of forces across the domains.

3. Enabling Objectives. **Comprehend** the characteristics, capabilities, limitations, and operating concepts of Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and U.S. Special Operations Command organizations.

4. Student Requirements.

a. Required Reading. Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations, *Case Study: Operation DESERT STORM*, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, August 17, 2015). **[Blackboard] [TSC AY16 CD Rom]**

b. Focused Readings.

(1) U.S. Department of Defense, *Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, April 1992). **[Blackboard] [TSC AY16 CD Rom]**

Group USAF Scan “The Air Campaign,” pp. 117-141.

Group USN/SOF Scan “The Maritime Campaign,” pp. 249-256.

Group Army Scan “The Ground Campaign,” pp. 311-348.

Group USMC Scan “The Ground Campaign,” pp. 311-348.

(2) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Doctrine for Joint Special Operations*, Joint Publication 3-05 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 16, 2014), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_05.pdf (accessed September 18, 2015). (**Group USN/SOF scan** Chapter I, “Overview of Special Operations,” pp. I-1 thru I-9) **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard] [TSC AY16 CD Rom]**

c. Suggested Readings. None.

5. Points to Consider. Questions for those assigned a Service/SOF:

a. How did your Service/SOF provide forces to the Joint Force Commander across the domains?

b. To what degree was your Service/SOF integrated with the other Services? Analyze the reasons for this integration or lack of integration if needed.

c. Using the Service Operating Concepts that we have reviewed over the previous lessons, how would the Services present forces across the domains to the Joint Force if the operation occurred today?

6. Relationship to Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) Joint Learning Areas (JLAs), Phase II.

- a. JLA 1.c. Readings, Objectives, Points to Consider, Seminar Dialogue, Group Presentations.
- b. JLA 2.a. Readings, Objectives, Points to Consider, Seminar Dialogue, Group Presentations.
- c. JLA 3.a,b,c,d,g. Readings, Objectives, Points to Consider, Seminar Dialogue, Group Presentations.
- d. JLA 4.a,b,c. Readings, Objectives, Points to Consider, Seminar Dialogue, Group Presentations.
- e. JLA 5.b,c,e. Readings, Objectives, Points to Consider, Seminar Dialogue, Group Presentations.
- f. JLA 6.a,c. Readings, Objectives, Seminar Dialogue, Group Presentations.

7. Relationship to USAWC Program Learning Objectives (PLOs), and Enduring and Special Themes.

- a. PLOs: 1, 2, 6, 9, 10.
- b. Enduring Themes: Instruments of war and national security; History as a vehicle for understanding strategic alternatives and choices.
- c. Special Themes: None.

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Block III Intent “Command Structures and Joint Functions”

Block Chief: Dr. Jussel

Purpose: The purpose of this block is to explore each of the joint functions and evaluate how a commander integrates these functions to produce synergistic effects within a theater of operations. Additionally, the block will examine Information Operations, an element inherent to military operations.

Method: This block uses seminar dialogue and a number of historical case studies to maximize the experiential learning associated with each of the lesson topics. Select noon time lectures will augment class lessons.

End state: Students should proceed from this set of lessons with an appreciation of the different elements that make up a functional theater of operations (administrative as well as operational), an ability to analyze and evaluate the interactive considerations of the joint functions, and an understanding of the role of the commander in each of the subject areas.

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COMMAND STRUCTURES AND MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

Mode: Seminar

Lesson: TSC-11-S

1. Introduction.

a. Command Structures. One of the most essential joint warfighting functions is command and control (C2). Of the two parts, the control aspect is extremely important to get correct before any operation begins. All too often, the analysis of what is needed is done quickly, the units are thrown together, and the command structure is inadequately addressed. Understanding how to organize a joint headquarters, the importance of the necessary control measures, and the proper attention to the command's staff helps to deal with the uncertainties and friction of global operations. While command includes both the authority and responsibility to effectively use available resources to accomplish assigned missions, control is the management and direction of forces and functions consistent with that command authority.

b. Theater Organization. This lesson analyzes the doctrinal options available to GCCs and JFCs to organize their areas of responsibility (AORs) and command and control their forces. Each C2 architecture is designed to operate across a specific range of joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) environments. The lesson will also provide the opportunity to evaluate case studies on C2 structures used during several recent operations.

2. Learning Objectives.

a. **Evaluate** the command authorities of a Combatant Commander and command relationships with subordinate components and how these affect theater organization.

b. **Synthesize** C2 doctrine to create a theater command and control structure that accounts for systems complexity within a joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) environment.

3. Enabling Objectives.

a. **Comprehend** the doctrinal terms and options used for organizing a theater of operations.

b. **Comprehend** the command authorities available to a Joint Force Commander.

c. **Comprehend** the doctrinal organization of the operational environment of a Joint Force operating within a Combatant Commander's area of responsibility (AOR) to include the joint operations area, the area of influence, and the area of interest.

4. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks.

(1) Complete the required readings with frequent referral to both learning objectives and “points to consider.”

(2) Be prepared to discuss the relationships among the various actors as reflected in the processes and products.

b. Required Readings.

(1) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, Joint Publication 1 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, March 25, 2013), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1.pdf. (accessed September 18, 2015). Read Chapter IV, “Joint Command Organizations,” para. 1-5, pp. IV-1 through IV-11; and Chapter V, “Joint Command and Control,” para. 1-10, pp. V-1 through V-14 and para. 11-13, pp. V-14 through V-18. **[Open Source URL] [Library Issued Text] [Blackboard] [TSC AY16 CD Rom]**

(2) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operations*, Joint Publication 3-0 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 11, 2011), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_0.pdf. (accessed September 18, 2015). Read Chapter III, “Joint Functions,” para 2. “Command and Control,” pp. III-2 through III-10, and Chapter IV, “Organizing for Joint Operations,” pp. IV-1 through IV-14. **[Open Source URL] [Library Issued Text] [Blackboard] [TSC AY16 CD Rom]**

(3) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Command and Control for Joint Land Operations*, Joint Publication 3-31 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, February 24, 2014), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_31.pdf. (accessed September 18, 2015). Read Chapter II, “The Joint Force Land Component Command,” pp. II-1 through II-25. **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard] [TSC AY16 CD Rom]**

(4) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, J7, Deployable Training Division, “Insights and Best Practices Focus Paper: Geographic Combatant Commanders Command and Control Organizational Options” (Suffolk, VA: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, J7, March 2014), <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/index.html>. (accessed September 18, 2015). **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard] [TSC AY16 CD Rom]**

c. Focused Readings.

(1) U.S. Army War College, Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations, “Case Study in Command and Control: Libya: Operation Odyssey Dawn” (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Academic Year 2016) **[Blackboard] [TSC AY16 CD Rom]**

(2) Major Edgar Fleri, Colonel Ernest Howard, Jeffrey Hukill, and Thomas R. Searle, *Operation Anaconda Case Study* (Maxwell AFB, Alabama: College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research and Education, November 13, 2003), http://www.au.af.mil/au/aui/school/awc/electives/6543_operationanaconda.pdf (accessed September 18, 2015). [Blackboard] [TSC AY16 CD Rom]

d. Suggested Readings.

(1) Timothy R. Reese, et al., *On Point II: Transition to the New Campaign: The United States Army in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, May 2003–January 2005* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, 2008), <http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/cgsc/carl/download/csipubs/OnPointII.pdf> (accessed September 18, 2015). Read pp. 157-189.

(2) William Slim, "Higher Command in War," *Military Review* 71, no. 5 (May 1990), <http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/p124201coll1/id/536> (accessed September 18, 2015).

5. Points to Consider.

a. What are the doctrinal designations for the physical areas in the operational environment?

b. How does the designation of the area of influence and interest assist the commander and staff in both planning efforts and execution of missions?

c. What are a Combatant Commander's options to organize the Joint Force, and what are the authorities and command relationships that affect it?

d. What are a Combatant Commander's options to organize the multinational or coalition force, and what are the authorities and command relationships that affect it?

e. Describe OPCON, TACON, and supporting/supported relationships. Does the JFC require OPCON of forces operating in his area of operations to sufficiently execute the doctrinal responsibilities of a Joint Force Commander?

f. What circumstances influence the way a Joint Force Commander would organize U.S. force components by Service, by function, or a combination of the two?

g. Mutual trust is an inherent element of mission command. How does one achieve this in an environment of rotating forces, multinational partners, rotational teams of brigades and battalions, and individual augmentees?

h. Using the case studies, describe the challenges each JFC faced and how each solved/did not solve the control issues through the command structure used.

6. Relationship to Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) Joint Learning Areas (JLAs), Phase II.

- a. JLA 1.e Readings, Objectives, Points to Consider, Seminar Dialogue.
- b. JLA 2.a,e,f. Readings, Objectives, Points to Consider, Seminar Dialogue.
- c. JLA 3.a,b,c,d. Readings, Objectives, Points to Consider, Seminar Dialogue.
- d. JLA 4.a,b,c. Objectives, Points to Consider, Seminar Dialogue.
- e. JLA 5.b,e,f. Readings, Objectives, Points to Consider, Seminar Dialogue.

7. Relationship to USAWC Program Learning Objectives (PLOs), and Enduring and Special Themes.

- a. PLOs: 6, 7, 9, 10.
- b. Enduring Themes: Instruments of national power and potential contributions to national security; Civil-military relations; Instruments of war and national security; History as a vehicle for understanding strategic alternatives and choices.
- c. Special Theme: Educating and Developing Adaptive Senior Leaders for a Complex World.

SUSTAINMENT: SET AND MAINTAIN THE THEATER

Mode: Seminar

Lesson: TSC-12-S

1. Introduction.

a. This lesson provides an introduction to the discussion of the Joint function, sustainment, its related tasks, and key considerations. The lesson also introduces the requirements and challenges in establishing/setting and supporting/sustaining a military theater of operations. Senior U.S. military officers often face restraints and constraints in applying the right force mix, timing, and resources needed to set a theater of operations quickly and effectively. We need to be ready for any future contingency environment to include the ability to execute rapid response with minimal staging, extended operational reach, and prolonged endurance. The commander is the individual who must ultimately balance the competing elements of mission, time, resources, capabilities, and risk. The commander's vision and intent for the campaign or operation provides the foundation upon which everything else rests.

b. A theater is never completely "set"; setting the theater is a continual process the Combatant Commander uses to shape the theater for strategic success. Included in setting the theater are those strategic activities directed at establishing favorable conditions for conducting Army and Joint operations. These activities identify priorities for theater shaping, force posture and access, partner capacity building, and steady-state operations that support achieving theater strategic end-states. Setting the theater includes the identification of lines of effort in accordance with the commander's objective, as well as whole-of-government initiatives, including bilateral or multilateral diplomatic agreements. These agreements allow U.S. forces to access ports, terminals, airfields, and bases within the area of responsibility to support future military contingency operations within Joint operations Phases 0, I, and II. Setting the theater implies that forces must conduct Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration.

c. Sustainment operations enable a military force capable of avoiding or withstanding hostile actions or environmental conditions while retaining the ability to fulfill its primary mission. Sustainment must be capable of supporting high-tempo, long duration operations to achieve objectives with numerous partners in complex, uncertain and austere environments, often at the ends of extended and contested lines of communications. Effective sustainment requires the ability to operate in multiple domains with reduced vulnerability to interdiction. While sustainment remains a Service responsibility, there are exceptions such as arrangements described in Service support agreements, CCDR-directed common-user logistics lead Service, or DoD agency responsibilities.

d. Today's lesson will explore a few of the issues and considerations associated with setting and sustaining a military theater. This is not just the realm of the Service logistician or contracting officer. The Combatant Commander, Joint Force Commander, J5, J4, and J3 all have an important role to play in developing the vision for the theater. Operational design provides the initial approach to the theater set from which planners, logisticians, and subordinate units create detailed plans.

e. The focused readings illustrate the challenges faced and lessons learned during Operations DESERT STORM and UNITED ASSISTANCE.

2. Learning Objectives.

a. **Comprehend** the key considerations and challenges requisite in the planning, synchronization, and execution of the sustainment Joint function.

b. **Evaluate** the roles, responsibilities, and missions of the Geographic Combatant Commander (GCC), Joint Force Commanders (JFC), the Army Service Component Command (ASCC), and the Service Component Commands to plan, set, and maintain a theater, including the use of contractors.

c. **Analyze** the challenges to set and maintain a theater during Operation DESERT STORM and Operation UNITED ASSISTANCE. Discuss challenges and lessons learned within the logistics functions and assess how each performed in reference to the principles of logistics within a JIIM environment.

3. Enabling Objectives. To prepare for seminar:

a. **Comprehend** the doctrinal foundation and underpinnings of the Joint functions.

b. **Comprehend** the totality of the theater, i.e. infrastructure, bases, ports, distribution systems, protection, and C2, and corresponding commands responsible for its development and operation.

4. Student Requirements.

a. Self-Paced Tutorial. (**U.S. Students Only**) "Operational Contract Support (OCS) Flag Officer-General Officer (FOGO) Essentials Course," <https://jkodirect.jten.mil/Atlas2/faces/page/login/Login.seam?ORG=JKO&cid=509967> **It will take you approximately 1 hour to go through the course.**

(1) After clicking link above, log in with your CAC. It will take you to the JKO homepage. Click on the "Course Catalog" tab.

(2) In the "Title Key Word Search" block type "Operational Contract Support (OCS) Flag Officer-General Officer" and click the purple "Search" icon. That title will

come up as Course J4S-T-US429. Click “Enroll.” A small window will open to ask if you want to enroll. “Click Continue.”

(3) A black header will scroll down to indicate you are now enrolled. Click on the “My Training” tab at the top of the page and you’ll see the course listed at the bottom of the page. Click “Launch.”

(4) A new window will open with an explanation of all the tabs and buttons used throughout the course.

(5) On the top left side of that new page click on the title “Start” button and the course will start. You will need to click on the six module links on the left side of the page and complete each to finish the course.

(6) After completion, print your certificate and turn in to your FI.

b. Required Readings.

(1) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Logistics*, Joint Publication 4-0 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, October 16, 2013), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp4_0.pdf (accessed October 2, 2015). Read pp. I-1 through I-11, II-1 through II-2, II-7 through II-12, III-1 through III-18, V-I through V-5. **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard] [TSC AY16 CD Rom]**

(2) U.S. Department of the Army, *Theater Army, Corps, and Division Operations*, FM 3-94 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, April 2014), http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/fm3_94.pdf (accessed October 2, 2015). Read pp. 2-1 through 2-4 and 2-8 through 2-15. **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard] [TSC AY16 CD Rom]**

(3) Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Theater Army Operations*, ATP 3-93 (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, November 2014), http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/atp3_93.pdf (accessed October 2, 2015). Read pp. 5-1 to 5-2, 6-1 to 6-10, **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard] [TSC AY16 CD Rom]**

c. Focused Readings/Student Presentations.

(1) United States Army Combined Arms Center, *Operation United Assistance - Setting the Theater: Creating Conditions for Success in West Africa*, Newsletter No. 15-09 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: United States Army Combined Arms Center, June 2015) http://usacac.army.mil/organizations/mccoe/call/publication/1509_OUA_Newsletter, (accessed October 2, 2015). Read pp. 1-5, and Chapters 3 and 4. **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard] [TSC AY16 CD Rom]**

(2) Jeff Reibestein, "Logistics in Support of Operation United Assistance: Teamwork, Transition and Lessons Learned", United States Africa Command, June 19, 2015, <http://www.africom.mil/newsroom/article/25458/logistics-in-support-of-operation-united-assistance-teamwork-transition-and-lessons-learned>. (accessed October 2, 2015). **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard] [TSC AY16 CD Rom]**

(3) Final Report to Congress, *Conduct of the Persian Gulf War*, April 1992, <http://www.ssi.army.mil/!Library/Desert%20Shield-Desert%20Storm%20Battle%20Analysis/Conduct%20of%20the%20Persian%20Gulf%20War%20-%20Final%20Rpt%20to%20Congress.pdf> (accessed October 2, 2015). Read pp. 295-296, 408-410, 416-418, 434-445, 458-478, 481-499, 504-510, 517-520, 525-547. **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard] [TSC AY16 CD Rom]**

(4) Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, Final Report to Congress, *Transforming Wartime Contracting, Controlling Costs, Reducing Risks*, (Washington, DC: Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, August 2011), http://cybercemetery.unt.edu/archive/cwc/20110929213820/http://www.wartimecontracting.gov/docs/CWC_FinalReport-lowres.pdf (accessed October 2, 2015). Read "Foreword," Chapter 3 and F.R. (5) or "Foreword" and Chapter 6. (accessed October 2, 2015). **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard] [TSC AY16 CD Rom]**

(5) United States Department of Defense, Office of the Inspector General, "Contingency Contracting: A Framework for Reform 2012 Update," Report No. DODIG-2012-134 (Washington, DC: United States Department of Defense, September 18, 2012), <http://www.dodig.mil/Audit/reports/fy12/DODIG-2012-134.pdf> (accessed October 2, 2015). Read Appendix E, pp. 56-59. **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard] [TSC AY16 CD Rom]**

d. Suggested Readings.

(1) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Logistics in Support of Multinational Operations*, Joint Publication 4-08 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, February 21, 2013), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp4_08.pdf (accessed October 2, 2015). Read "Executive Summary."

(2) Joseph T. Boos, "Developing a multinational logistics common operational picture," *Army Sustainment Magazine* (September-October 2015), http://www.army.mil/article/153756/Developing_a_multinational_logistics_common_operational_picture/ (accessed October 2, 2015).

(3) Theresa D. Christie, "Multinational Logistics Interoperability," *Army Sustainment Magazine* (September-October 2015), <http://go.usa.gov/3625Y> (accessed October 2, 2015).

(4) U.S. Department of Defense, Executive Agent List (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense), <http://dod-executiveagent.osd.mil/agentList.aspx> (accessed October 2, 2015).

(5) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Operational Contract Support*, Joint Publication 4-10 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 16, 2014), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp4_10.pdf (accessed October 2, 2015). Read “Executive Summary,” pp. ix-xvii, and “Contract Support Integration Process,” pp. III-1 through III-35.

5. Points to Consider.

a. What is the role of an established theater in a joint operation or campaign?

b. How should commanders and staffs integrate and synchronize U.S. forces, contractors, host-nation (HN) / Coalition assets, other governmental agencies (OGA), and non-governmental agencies (NGO) in a theater?

c. What are the challenges to set and maintain a theater given the future requirements of strategic agility to the Joint Force, freedom of movement and action during sustained and high tempo operations, and the end of extended lines of communication in austere environments as well as complications of anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) environments?

d. What are the consequences of insufficient oversight and planning regarding Operational Contracting Support?

6. Relationship to Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) Joint Learning Areas (JLAs), Phase II.

- | | |
|-------------------------|---|
| a. JLA 1.a, b, c, e. | Readings, Objectives, Points to Consider. |
| b. JLA 2.a, c, d, e. | Readings, Objectives, Points to Consider, Student Requirements. |
| c. JLA 3.a, b, c, d, e. | Readings, Objectives, Points to Consider. |
| d. JLA 4.a, b, c. | Readings, Objectives, Points to Consider. |
| e. JLA 5.c, d, e. | Readings, Objectives, Points to Consider. |

7. Relationship to USAWC Program Learning Objectives (PLOs), and Enduring and Special Themes.

- a. PLOs: 1, 3, 7, 9, 10.

b. Enduring Themes: Strategic leadership and the exercise of discretionary judgment; Instruments of war and national security; history as a vehicle of understanding strategic alternatives of strategic leadership.

c. Special Theme: Educating & Developing Adaptive Senior Leaders for a Complex World.

INTELLIGENCE AND PROTECTION

Mode: Seminar

Lesson: TSC-13-S

1. Introduction. This lesson focuses on two of the joint functions: intelligence and protection. The intelligence portion links to the earlier National Security Policy and Strategy (NSPS) Lesson 11 (Intelligence), which addresses intelligence as an element of statecraft.

a. Intelligence. Part one of this lesson analyzes intelligence with an emphasis on the scope and depth of U.S. “all-source” intelligence support to the Combatant Commander (CCDR), though much is also applicable to other Joint Force Commanders (JFCs). The CCDR provides guidance, prioritization, and feedback to ensure that joint intelligence effectively enhances understanding of the Operational Environment (OE) at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels across the theater. This informs CCMD strategy and planning at all levels. The J-2 leads the CCMD intelligence enterprise, leveraging and integrating capabilities assigned to the CCMD, the Service Components, multinational partners, and within the greater Intelligence Community (IC). The Joint Intelligence Operations Center (JIOC) is the focal point for intelligence analysis and production at the regional and functional CCMDs. Though these differ in actual size and capability across the CCMDs, they all share the same fundamental purpose. These organizational structures trace their roots to the Joint Intelligence Collection Agencies (JICA) of WWII. Lessons learned from Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM, the 9/11 attacks, and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM have resulted in CCMD intelligence capabilities that are better integrated and collaborative. Overall, the CCDR relies on timely intelligence and analysis to assess the developing situation and inform his decisions on the employment of military forces. In addition, timely intelligence reporting better enables participating elements of national and coalition power to achieve their desired end states.

b. Protection. Part two analyzes the CCDR's roles and responsibilities for protection, which focuses on preserving the fighting potential of the Joint Force. The basic approach to this is twofold. First, using active defensive measures that protect the Joint Force, its bases, necessary infrastructure, and LOCs from enemy attack. Second, using passive defensive measures that make friendly forces, systems, and facilities difficult to locate, strike, and destroy. This is frequently expanded to include designated non-combatants, systems, and infrastructure of friendly nations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and other government agencies (OGAs). Protection considerations impact the planning of joint operations at all levels and involve a wide range of protection tasks executed across the range of military operations. Overall, multiple layers of protection for joint forces and facilities at all levels, beginning at home, enable freedom of action from pre-deployment through employment and redeployment. The fluid OE, with the ability of adversaries to

orchestrate threats against joint forces, necessitates that the Ccdr seek all available means of protection.

c. **Intelligence Support to Force Protection.** The joint functions are mutually reinforcing. They complement each other and integration across them is essential to mission accomplishment. This is true of intelligence and force protection. Understanding the nature of threats to DoD personnel and resources across the Joint Security Area (JSA) requires accurate and timely intelligence. DoD counterintelligence (CI) elements have a directed responsibility to ensure comprehensive, aggressive, and integrated support to force protection across the CCMD area of responsibility (AOR).

2. Learning Objectives.

a. **Analyze** the Ccdr's role and key considerations in the planning, integration, synchronization, and execution of intelligence as a joint function across the area of responsibility.

b. **Analyze** the Ccdr's role and key considerations in the planning and implementation of protection as a joint function across the area of responsibility.

c. **Analyze** the application of the intelligence and protection functions in the context of a major military operation.

3. Enabling Objectives. To prepare for seminar:

a. **Comprehend** the intelligence resources and capabilities available to the Ccdr.

b. **Comprehend** the Ccdr's role and responsibilities for protection across the Joint Security Area.

4. Student Requirements.

a. Required Readings (Intelligence). Read, in order.

(1) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operations*, Joint Publication 3-0 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 11, 2011), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_0.pdf (accessed October 2, 2015). Read pp. III-20 - III-22. [**Open Source URL**] [**Library Issued Text**] [**Blackboard**] [**TSC AY16 CD Rom**]

(2) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Intelligence*, Joint Publication 2-0 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, October 22, 2013), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp2_0.pdf (accessed October 2, 2015). Read pp. ix through xi, xiv through xvi, I-6 through I-9, II-2 through II-3, II-4 through II-6, III-1 through III-13, and V-8 through V-10. **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard] [TSC AY16 CD Rom]**

(3) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations*, Joint Publication 2-01 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 5, 2012), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp2_01.pdf (accessed October 2, 2015). Read pp. I-1 through I-5, II-1 through II-6, and II-24 through II-27. **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard] [TSC AY16 CD Rom]**

(4) U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense Directive Number 3000.06, Combat Support Agencies (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, June 27, 2013), <http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/300006p.pdf> (accessed October 2, 2015). Read Directive and Enclosure 2, pp. 8 and 10. **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard] [TSC AY16 CD Rom]**

- Required Readings (Protection). Read, in order.

(5) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operations*, Joint Publication 3-0 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 11, 2011), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_0.pdf (accessed October 2, 2015). Read pp. III-29 through III-34. **[Open Source URL] [Library Issued Text] [Blackboard] [TSC AY16 CD Rom]**

(6) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Security Operations in Theater*, Joint Publication 3-10 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, February 3, 2010), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_10.pdf (accessed October 2, 2015). Read pp. I-1 through I-7 and III-1 through III-21. **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard] [TSC AY16 CD Rom]**

b. Focused Readings (Intelligence).

(1) U.S. Congress, House Armed Services Committee, *Intelligence Successes and Failures in Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM* (Washington, DC: U.S. Congress, August 16, 1993), <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a338886.pdf> (accessed October 2, 2015). **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard] [TSC AY16 CD Rom]**

(2) Tyler Akers, "Taking Joint Intelligence Operations to the Next Level," *Joint Force Quarterly* 47 (4th Quarter 2007), [Proquest](#) (accessed October 2, 2015). **[Database] [Blackboard]**

- Focused Readings (Protection).

(3) Vincent P. O'Hara and Enrico Cernuschi, "Frogmen Against A Fleet: The Italian Attack on Alexandria 18/19 December 1941," *Naval War College Review* 68, no. 3 (Summer 2015), [Proquest \[Database\] \[Blackboard\]](#)

(4) U.S. Department of Defense, Department of Defense Instruction Number 5240.22, Counterintelligence Support to Force Protection (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, September 24, 2009, Incorporating Change 1, October 15, 2013), <http://dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/524022p.pdf> (accessed October 2, 2015). Read pp. 1, 4-5, and 7-8. **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard] [TSC CD AY16 Rom]**

c. Suggested Readings (Intelligence).

(1) The White House, *United States Intelligence Activities (U)*, in Executive Order 12333 as Amended by Executive Orders 13284, 13355, and 13470 (Washington, DC: The White House, 2008), <http://ise.gov/executive-order-12333-united-states-intelligence-activities> (accessed October 2, 2015).

(2) James R. Clapper, *The National Intelligence Strategy of the United States of America 2014* (Washington, DC: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, September 17, 2014), http://www.odni.gov/files/documents/2014_NIS_Publication.pdf (accessed October 2, 2015).

(3) U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense Directive Number 5105.21, Defense Intelligence Agency (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, March 18, 2008), <http://dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/510521p.pdf> (accessed October 2, 2015). Read pp. 1-5.

(4) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Insights and Best Practices Focus Paper: Intelligence Operations, First Edition (Reprint)* (Suffolk, VA: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Staff J7, Deployable Training Division, July 2013), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/fp/fp_intel_ops.pdf (accessed October 2, 2015). Read pp. 1-12.

(5) James D. Marchio, "Days of Future Past: Joint Intelligence in World War II," *Joint Force Quarterly* 11 (Spring 1996), <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jfq/jfq-11.pdf> (accessed October 2, 2015).

(6) Central Intelligence Agency, "The Evolution and Relevance of the Joint Intelligence Centers," *Studies in Intelligence* 49, no. 1 (Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2005), https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol49no1/html_files/index.html (accessed October 9, 2015)

(7) John Patch, "Fortuitous Endeavor: Intelligence and Deception in Operation Torch," *Naval War College Review* 61, no. 4 (Newport, RI: Autumn 2008), [Proquest](#) (accessed October 9, 2015).

- Suggested Readings (Protection).

(8) Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Protection*, ADRP 3-37 (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, August 2012), Incorporating Change 1, February 28, 2013, http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/adrp3_37.pdf (accessed October 9, 2015). Read Chapter 1, pp. 1-1 through 1-3 and Chapter 4, pp. 4-1 through 4-4. Scan Chapter 1, pp. 1-4 through 1-15.

(9) Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command, *Force Protection Measures in Joint Security Area (JSA) Bahrain* (FPO AE 09805: COMUSNAVCENT, January 23, 2014), <http://www.cusnc.navy.mil/command/FP%20MEASURES%20JSA%20BAHRAIN.pdf>

5. Points to Consider.

a. How does the CCDR provide the guidance, prioritization, and feedback essential to the ability of joint intelligence to facilitate understanding the operational environment and ensure mission accomplishment?

b. How does the J-2 lead and synchronize the CCMD intelligence enterprise, to include the Service components, in support of joint and multinational operations?

c. How do CCDRs and their J-2s leverage external strategic intelligence resources, capabilities, and information in support of the range of military operations?

d. How does the House Armed Services Committee Report on Intelligence Successes/Failures in Operation Desert Shield/Storm illustrate CCDR and J-2 challenges working across multiple organizations/nations and echelons in support of joint and multinational operations? How has this changed since 1990-1991?

e. How does a CCDR conduct military Joint Security Operations (JSO) across an area of responsibility outside the homeland?

f. What are key considerations in the planning and implementation of JSO across the range of military operations?

g. How does the 1941 Italian special operations attack against the British Mediterranean fleet in Alexandria Harbor illustrate the difficulties of active and passive protection against an innovative and determined enemy in the Joint Security Area?

h. How does intelligence support protection?

6. Relationship to Joint Professional Military Education Joint Learning Areas (JLAs), Phase II.

- a. JLA 1.d. Readings, Objectives, Points to Consider, Seminar Dialogue.
- b. JLA 2.a,b. Readings, Objectives, Points to Consider, Seminar Dialogue.
- c. JLA 3.a,c,d. Readings, Objectives, Points to Consider, Seminar Dialogue.
- d. JLA 4.a,b,c. Readings, Objectives, Points to Consider, Seminar Dialogue.
- e. JLA 5.a,b,c,d,e. Readings, Objectives, Points to Consider, Seminar Dialogue.

7. Relationship to USAWC Program Learning Objectives (PLOs), and Enduring and Special Themes.

- a. PLOs: 1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 9.
- b. Enduring Themes: Instruments of National Power and Potential Contributions to National Security; Civil-Military Relations; Instruments of War and National Security; History as a Vehicle for Understanding Strategic Alternatives and Choices.
- c. Special Theme: Educating and Developing Adaptive Senior Leaders for a Complex World.

MOVEMENT, MANEUVER AND FIRES & INFORMATION OPERATIONS

Mode: Seminar

Lesson: TSC-14-S

1. Introduction.

a. Movement, maneuver, fires and operations in the information environment are common to joint operations at all levels of war and across the range of military operations. Movement and maneuver encompasses the deployment and employment of Joint Forces to conduct campaigns, major operations, and other contingencies, specifically achieving both operational reach and positional advantage before combat operations commence. Movement incorporates Joint Force projection which delivers Joint Forces to theater. Successful maneuver utilizes surprise, speed, and momentum to gain situational or psychological dominance over the enemy to maximize the effect of fires. Joint fires from two or more components, both lethal and non-lethal, produce desired effects in support of a common objective. These fire tasks include targeting, joint fire support, countering air/missile threats, interdicting enemy capabilities, conducting strategic attack, and employing information operations capabilities. Information operations concerns coordinating the efforts of numerous information related capabilities to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision making of adversaries to gain advantage.

b. A significant challenge for the Joint Force Commander (JFC) is in the planning, sophistication, and coordination required to integrate multi-service and coalition capabilities most effectively. The mutual support and cooperation of subordinate air, land, and maritime component commanders, as well as special operations commanders, are vital to achieve joint synergy and subsequent mission success.

c. This lesson will examine the joint functions of Movement and Maneuver, and Fires, as well as operations in the information environment and consider a practical example. The Arab-Israeli conflict of October 1973 demonstrates the complexity in planning and integrating these functions, and explores the challenges to achieve success in the joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) environment.

2. Learning Objectives.

a. **Analyze** the implications of applying movement, maneuver, and fires in diverse operating environments, across all domains, at the theater strategic level.

b. **Analyze** the impact of policy, strategy, and technology on the planning and employment of operational movement, maneuver, and fires.

c. **Analyze** information operations as an integral component of the campaign design, planning, and execution process.

3. Enabling Objectives.

a. **Comprehend** the key considerations and challenges requisite in the planning, integration, and synchronization of the joint functions Movement and Maneuver, and Fires.

b. **Comprehend** the JFC's role in the application of the joint functions at the theater/campaign level across the spectrum of conflict.

4. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks. Complete the required readings, reflect on the "Points to Consider," and be prepared to contribute to seminar dialogue concerning the role and application of movement, maneuver, and fires in the conduct of operations or a campaign.

b. Required Readings.

(1) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operations*, Joint Publication 3-0 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 11, 2011), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_0.pdf (accessed October 13, 2015). Read "Strategic Communications and Communications Strategy," pp. III-15 through III-20 and "Fires" and "Movement and Maneuver," pp. III-22 through III-29. **[Open Source URL] [Library Issued Text] [Blackboard] [TSC AY16 CD Rom]**

(2) U.S. Department of Defense, *Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC)*, Version 1.0 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, January 17, 2012), http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/JOAC_Jan%202012_Signed.pdf (accessed October 13, 2015). Read "Executive Summary," pp. i through iii, "Fires," pp. 29-30, and "Movement and Maneuver," pp. 30-31. **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard] TSC AY16 CD Rom]**

(3) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Information Operations*, Joint Publication 3-13 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, November 27, 2012, Incorporating Change 1, November 20, 2014), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_13.pdf (accessed October 13, 2015). Read "Executive Summary," pp. vii through xii, Chapter II, "Information Operations," pp. II-1 through II-13. **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard] [TSC AY16 CD Rom]**

(4) Read Elizabeth Monroe and A. H. Farrar-Hockley, Chapter II, "The October War," in Adelphi Papers, No. 111, *The Arab-Israeli War, October 1973: Background and Events* Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1975). **[Blackboard]**

(5) Scan U.S. Army War College, Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations, "Chronology of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War" (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, January 6, 2005). **[Blackboard]**

(6) Scan and "Maps of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War," in *The West Point Atlas of Warfare Since 1945* (West Point, NY: United States Military Academy, Department of History, 1994). **[Blackboard]**

c. Focused Readings. None.

d. Suggested Reading. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Commander's Communication Synchronization, Joint Doctrine Note 2-13 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, December 16, 2013), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/notes/jdn2_13.pdf (accessed October 13, 2015). Read "Executive Summary," pp. v through xi.

5. Points to Consider.

a. What are the relationships between movement and operational reach, as well as maneuver and a position of advantage? What are the strategic implications for the Joint Force attempting to gain and maintain both?

b. What are the key considerations for the integration and synchronization of non-lethal and lethal fires with movement and maneuver in various operational environments throughout the ROMO?

c. How does the application of movement, maneuver, and fires differ across the spectrum of conflict and from traditional warfare to irregular warfare, e.g. counterinsurgency?

d. What are the challenges for the Joint Force to be correctly postured in doctrine, leadership, and training to execute effective movement, maneuver, and fires given the contemporary and projected security environment?

e. How do Joint Force Commanders (JFCs) ensure the integrated employment of information-related capabilities?

f. How do JFCs ensure communications strategies nest with and support USG communications strategies, programs, and actions to influence key audiences?

6. Relationship to Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) Joint Learning Areas (JLAs), Phase II.

a. JLA 1.a,c. Objectives, Points to Consider, Readings.

b. JLA 2.a,c. Objectives, Points to Consider, Readings.

c. JLA 3.a,c,d,e. Objectives, Points to Consider, Readings.

- d. JLA 4.c. Objectives, Points to Consider, Readings.
- e. JLA 5.b,c,d,e. Objectives, Points to Consider, Readings.

7. Relationship to USAWC Program Learning Objectives (PLOs), and Enduring and Special Themes.

- a. PLOs: 6, 7, 9, and 10.
- b. Enduring Themes: Instruments of national power and potential contribution to national security; Civil-military relations; Instruments of war and national security; History as a vehicle for understanding strategic alternatives and choices.
- c. Special Theme: Educating and Developing Adaptive Senior Leaders for a Complex World.

INTEGRATION OF THE JOINT FUNCTIONS

Mode: Exercise

Lesson: TSC-15-EX

1. Introduction.

a. The previous four lessons have focused on the joint functions, all of which play a role across the range of military operations. However, these different areas require skillful integration to achieve a synergistic effect. The active involvement of the Joint Force Commander is required to achieve that synergistic effect, as is the full understanding of the subordinate commands.

b. Although we have focused on the joint functions somewhat individually, each function is inherently connected to the others. A force cannot maneuver long without sustainment. Fires cannot be effective without proper command and control as well as intelligence. Protection concerns often influence movements as well as maneuvers. Mission command provides the vision to focus efforts, while allowing subordinate commanders room to seize opportunities. The proper balance of joint functions can provide tactical, operational, and strategic effects.

c. We will conduct a short exercise using Operation HUSKY, the invasion of Sicily, as a vehicle to explore the challenges in integrating the joint functions. Launched on the evening of 9-10 July 1943, HUSKY was a large amphibious and airborne operation that launched the Allied Italian campaign. The operation lasted just six weeks. By 17 August, the Allies had conquered the island of Sicily, but Axis forces had managed to evacuate most of their personnel and equipment. An examination of each side provides insights into use of the joint functions that are worth exploring.

d. This is an exercise using a case study as the basis for our study and dialogue. The case study provides background information, but additional research using outside materials is also required. Feel free to incorporate other materials as you see fit. Focus your research in identifying the use and integration of the various joint functions, as well as use of strategic communications and joint operations.

2. Learning Objectives.

a. **Evaluate** the benefits, risks, and considerations for planning and executing an operation using a combined and Joint Force.

b. **Evaluate** the options to integrate the joint functions, examining German/Italian defensive operations and British/American operations.

c. **Synthesize** the use of mission command.

3. Enabling Objectives.

a. **Comprehend** the doctrinal foundations and concepts of the joint functions.

b. **Comprehend** the role of specific operations within a larger campaign.

4. Student Requirements.

a. Required Reading. U.S. Army War College, Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations, Case Study: "Operation HUSKY, The Invasion of Sicily" (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2015). **[Blackboard] [TSC AY16 CD Rom]**

b. Additional Source Materials.

(1) Internet

(a) Matthew G. St. Clair, "The Twelfth U.S. Air Force [electronic resource]: tactical and operational innovations in the Mediterranean theater of operations, 1943-1944" (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Air University, 2003), <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a466970.pdf> (accessed October 13, 2015).

(b) Center of Military History, *Sicily*, Pub 72-16 (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 2004), <http://www.history.army.mil/brochures/72-16/72-16.htm> (accessed October 13, 2015).

(c) Jon M. Swanson, *Operation Husky, the Campaign in Sicily: A Case Study*, USAWC Military Studies Program Paper (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, April 7, 1992), <http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA251393> (accessed October 13, 2015).

(2) USAWC Library Reserve

(a) Ben Macintyre, *Operation Mincemeat: How a Dead Man and a Bizarre Plan Fooled the Nazis and Assured an Allied Victory* (New York: Harmony Books, 2010). D810.S7 M246 2010

(b) Ewen Montagu, *The Man Who Never Was, 1901-1985* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 1996). D810.S8 M61 1996

(c) Rick Atkinson, *The Day of Battle: The War in Sicily and Italy, 1943-1944* (New York: Henry Holt, 2008). (1st Holt paperback ed.) D763.I8 A85 2008

(d) Tristan T. A. Lovering, *Amphibious Assault: Maneuvre From the Sea: Amphibious Operations from the Last Century* (Great Britain, December 21, 2005). U261 .A43 2005

(e) John C. Hatlem, *The War Against Germany and Italy: Mediterranean and Adjacent Areas*, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 2005). D769 .A533 V.5 PT.1

(f) Samuel W. Mitcham, "How the Allies Lost Their Chance for Total Victory," in *The Battle of Sicily*, 1st ed. (New York: Orion Books, 1990). D763.S5 M58 1991

(g) David Jablonsky, *War by Land, Sea, and Air: Dwight Eisenhower and the Concept of Unified Command* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2010). E836 J33 2010

(h) Evelyn M. Cherpak, *The Memoirs of Admiral H. Kent Hewitt* (Naval War College Press, 2004). V63.H49 A3 2004

(i) Albert N. Garland, *Sicily and the Surrender of Italy* (Washington, DC, Center of Military History, 2002). D769 .A533 V.11 PT.2 2002

(j) James E. Prescott, *What Operational Level of War Lesson Can be Learned from the Allied Invasion of Sicily?* (Newport, RI: Department of Operations, U.S. Naval War College, 1994). V420 .P74 1994

(k) John L. La Monte, *The Sicilian Campaign, 10 July-17 August 1943* (Washington, DC: Naval Historical Center, Department of the Navy, 1993). D763.S5 L3 1993

(l) Carlo D'Este, *Bitter Victory: the Battle for Sicily, 1943* (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1988). D763.S5 D47 1988

(m) Joseph Edward Browne, "Deception and the Mediterranean Campaigns of 1943-1944," U.S. Army War College Military Studies Program Paper (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, March 31, 1986). AD-A 168 052 1986

(n) Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe, 1890-1969*, 1st ed. (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1948). D743 .E35 1948

(o) Martin Blumenson, *The Patton Papers, 1940-1945*, 1st Da Capo Press ed. (New York: Da Capo Press, 1996). E745.P3 B551 1996;

(p) *The Thousand Days [videorecording]: Sicily, Key to Victory*, United States, Office of War Information (Chicago, IL: International Historic Films, 1980). D768.15 .T56 1980

(q) David Jablonsky, "War by Land, Sea, and Air: Dwight Eisenhower and the Concept of Unified Command" (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2010). E836 .J33 2010

(3) Army Heritage and Education Center/Military History Institute:

(a) U.S. Army, 7th Army, "Report of Operations of the United States Seventh Army in the Sicilian Campaign, 10 July - 17 August 1943", 1943. 03 -7 1943 OVERSIZE

(b) Allied Force Headquarters, Commander-in-Chief's dispatch: Sicilian Campaign/[Dwight D. Eisenhower], Headquarters, Allied Forces, 1943). D763.S5 A44 1943a

(c) Ian Blackwell, *The Battle for Sicily: Stepping Stone to Victory* (Barnsley, South Yorkshire: Pen & Sword Military, 2008). D763.S5 B54 2008

(d) Robert L. Clifford and William J. Maddocks, "Naval Gunfire Support of the Landing in Sicily" (Oklahoma City, OK: 45th Infantry Division Museum, 1984). D763.S5 C65 1984

(e) James S. Corum, *Wolfram von Richthofen: Master of the German Air War* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2006). D604 .C67 2008

(f) Ken Ford, *Assault on Sicily, Monty and Patton at War* (Phoenix Mill, Thrupp, Stroud, Gloucestershire: Sutton, 2007). D763.S5 F67 2007

(g) D. J. Haycock, *Eisenhower and the Art of Warfare: A Critical Appraisal* (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Co., 2004). E836 .H39 2004

(h) Albert Kesselring, *The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Kesselring*, translated by Lynton Hudson (London: W. Kimber, 1953). DD247.K45 .A3213 1953

5. Points to Consider.

a. Questions for those assigned a joint function:

(1) How did your joint function influence the outcome of the battle? Was the execution different from the planned role for the function?

(2) To what degree was your joint function integrated with other functions? Analyze the reasons for this integration or lack of integration.

b. For those assigned a senior leader:

(1) How well did your senior leader balance operational art and science? What factors may have influenced his performance?

(2) Assess your leader's integration of the joint functions. What were some of the results of this integration?

(3) Was your leader effective? Why or why not?

c. Questions for all:

(1) Using the joint functions as a lens, describe the changes that should have been made to improve the outcome for either side.

(2) What were some of the challenges of conducting joint and multinational operations? How could some of these challenges be overcome?

(3) Do you see evidence of mission command in use during the battle? Where?

(4) Describe what could have been the strategic themes and messages for your side. Analyze how strategic communication and information operations played, or could have played, a role in the battle.

(5) How effective was each side in establishing a viable theater of operations? What could have been done differently to improve the outcome?

(6) What lessons can we learn from Husky for future operations?

6. Relationship to Professional Joint Military Education (JPME) Joint Learning Areas (JLAs), Phase II.

- | | |
|----------------------------|---|
| a. JLA 1.a, b, c, e. | Readings, Objectives, Points to Consider, Seminar Dialogue. |
| b. JLA 2.a, b, c, e. | Readings, Objectives, Points to Consider, Seminar Dialogue. |
| c. JLA 3.b, c, d. | Readings, Objectives, Points to Consider, Seminar Dialogue. |
| d. JLA 4.a, b, c. | Readings, Objectives, Points to Consider, Seminar Dialogue. |
| e. JLA 5.a, b, c, d, e, f. | Readings, Objectives, Points to Consider, Seminar Dialogue. |

7. Relationship to USAWC Program Learning Objectives (PLOs), and Enduring and Special Themes.

- a. PLOs: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 10.
- b. Enduring Themes: Strategic Leadership and the exercise of discretionary judgment; Relationship of Policy and Strategy (relationship between ends, ways, and means); Instruments of national power and potential contributions to national security; Civil-Military Relations; Instruments of war and national security; and History as a vehicle for understanding strategic alternatives and choices.
- c. Special Theme: Educating and Developing Adaptive Senior Leaders for a Complex World.

Block IV Intent “Theater Strategy and Design”

Block Chief: Prof Lord

Purpose: Analyze the use of Theater Strategy and the Theater Campaign Plan by Combatant Commanders. Show how senior officers give their best military advice to policy makers by providing options. Enable the students to understand Operational Art and Operational Design and to demonstrate the value of design methodology as a way to address complex problems in the operational environment.

Method: Facilitate lessons on Theater Strategy, the Theater Campaign Plan, the planning process and Operational Art & Operational Design. Using design methodology, conduct a 3-day exercise to develop planning guidance that will inform the Joint Operation Planning Process for Block V.

End state: Students have a working knowledge of the role of theater strategy, operational art, and the use of the design methodology.

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THEATER STRATEGY, PLANNING, AND OPTIONS

Mode: Seminar

Lesson: TSC-16-S

1. Introduction.

a. Geographic Combatant Commanders translate national strategy into theater strategy and executable Theater Campaign Plans. Functional Combatant Commanders also must translate national strategy into military strategy for specified global problems and develop those functional strategies into Functional Campaign Plans. The **Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF)**, prepared by SecDef and approved by POTUS, transitions DoD's planning from a contingency-centric approach to a strategy-centric approach. It directs the CCDRs to create theater strategies, expressed in single theater campaign plans to achieve GEF-directed campaign objectives that are in accord with strategic direction from the national level. It also directs that certain contingencies be treated as branches to the theater's single campaign plan. The GEF is developed in parallel with the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) to ensure complementary guidance from the SecDef and CJCS.

b. In the first part of today's lesson, we will discuss how a Combatant Commander translates national strategic direction into a theater strategy, and then into a Theater Campaign Plan (TCP). We will discuss the linkage between the Theater Campaign Plan and the Country Security Cooperation Section (AKA Theater Security Cooperation Plan), the Theater Posture Plan, Contingency Plans, and other supporting plans. We will look at the methods by which DoD executes the Theater Security Cooperation Plan. These "Phase 0" activities enable us to assist other nations in the development of their defense and security capabilities, while also posturing us to achieve our own national objectives.

c. For the second topic of today's discussion, we will address planning from the Combatant Commander's point of view. Military planning is integrated within a more comprehensive environment in order to produce plans and orders that achieve the national objectives established by the President, and to consider the objectives and capabilities of other relevant actors. Joint operation planning integrates military actions with those of other instruments of national power and our multinational partners in time, space, and purpose to achieve a specified end state. Joint operation planning focuses on two types of planning: deliberate planning and crisis action planning (CAP). Both use the Joint Operations Planning Process (JOPP) and relate equally to Operational Design. Deliberate planning occurs in non-crisis situations. Deliberate planning produces Theater and Functional Campaign Plans (TCP/FCP) that are the basis for execution of theater strategies, contingency plans, which are branches to the TCP/FCP, and supporting plans of various types. All geographic CCDRs are currently required by the GEF and JSCP to develop and execute TCPs. Functional CCDRs and occasionally

Geographic CCDRs may be directed to lead the deliberate planning of specified FCPs. CCDRs must also develop contingency plans specified in the GEF and JSCP, but may also direct planning not specified in the GEF/JSCP to meet emerging requirements as they see fit for their theater. Deliberate planning is an iterative process and is adaptive to situational changes within the operational and planning environments. The process allows for changes in plan priorities, changes to the review and approval process, and contains the flexibility to adjust the specified development timeline to produce and refine plans. TCPs and FCPs are aimed at desired steady-state strategic conditions, and therefore must be inherently flexible to react to changing assumptions. Contingency plans, however, are based on specific assumptions; a review of critical assumptions is essential to ensure the continuing relevance of the contingency plan.

d. In the last part of today's lesson, we will discuss options at the operational and strategic level. A major function of the CCDR is to assist the CJCS in his advisory role in informing the President and SecDef about military options to help them form national strategy and guidance. This is a different requirement from developing plans that are directed in the GEF or directed during crises; those plans are dependent on the guidance provided, and generally focus on a single mission. Options may not technically be courses of action, but may be developed into them. Options assist the senior civilian leaders thinking about the use of military force in the context of the entire array of instruments of national power: diplomatic, information, military and economic (DIME). Likewise, options are not developed as an afterthought during planning, but rather are addressed as a precursor to planning efforts. Options can be theater-centric or more specific and require CCDR involvement (or functionally-centric in the case of functional CCDRs).

2. Learning Objectives.

a. **Synthesize** Combatant Commander relationships with the President, SecDef, CJCS, Service Chiefs, other Combatant Commands, and key agencies in developing policy, strategy, and plans.

b. **Evaluate** how a Theater Strategy translates into a Theater Campaign Plan, its structure and purpose, and its relationship to the Theater Security Cooperation Plan, Theater Posture Plan, Contingency plans, and other supporting plans.

c. **Synthesize** the development of Theater Strategies, Strategic Options, and operational level COAs to meet the National Strategic Goals in a joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational (JIIM) environment at the theater-strategic level.

3. Enabling Objectives.

a. **Comprehend** the components of Theater Strategy.

b. **Analyze** the challenges facing DoD in developing plans and executing military strategy in a dynamic environment.

4. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks. None.

b. Required Readings.

(1) U.S. Army War College, Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations, *Campaign Planning Handbook* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Academic Year 2016). Read Chapter 2 "Joint Operations Planning," pp. 10-14, 18-20 (Options) and Chapter 4, "Development of Theater Strategy." **[DMSPO Student Issue] [Blackboard] [TSC AY16 CD Rom]**

(2) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Letter to the Senate Armed Services Committee, July 19, 2013, Options for the use of force in the Syrian Conflict, http://thehill.com/images/stories/news/2013/07_july/22/dempsey.pdf (accessed October 26, 2015). Addresses options for the use of force in the Syrian Conflict. **[Blackboard] [TSC AY16 CD Rom]**

(3) Graham Allison and Phillip Zelikow, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 2nd ed. (New York: Longman, 1999), 109-120 and 338-347. **[Blackboard]**

(4) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, joint operation planning, Joint Publication 5-0 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 11, 2011), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp5_0.pdf (accessed October 23, 2015). Read pp. I-3 (para 3) through I-4, II-6 (para 7.a) through II-9 (para 8.c), and II-11 (para 11) through II-13. **[Open Source URL] [Library Issued Text] [Blackboard] [TSC AY16 CD Rom]**

c. Focused Readings.

(1) Michael Hartmayer and John Hansen, "Security Cooperation in Support of Theater Strategy," *Military Review* 93, no. 1 (January/February 2013), [Proquest](#) (accessed October 23, 2015). **[Database] [Blackboard]**

(2) Derek Reveron and James Cook, "From National to Theater: Developing Strategy," *Joint Force Quarterly* 70 (3rd Quarter 2013), [Proquest](#) (accessed October 23, 2015). **[Database] [Blackboard]**

(3) Jon C. Wilkinson, "The Resurrection of Adaptive Planning," *Army War College Review* 1, no 2 (May 2015), <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/AWCReview/Issues/May2015.pdf> (accessed October 23, 2015). **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard] [TSC AY16 CD Rom]**

(4) U.S. Army War College, Department of National Security and Strategy, *Guide to National Security Policy and Strategy* 2nd Edition (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, June 2006), <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdf/files/PUB708.pdf> (accessed October 23, 2015). Read John F. Troxell, "Military Power and the Use of Force," pp. 217-239. **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard] [TSC AY16 CD Rom]**

(5) North American Aerospace Defense Command/United States Northern Command, "Theater Strategy," November 18, 2011 (Peterson Air Force Base, CO: North American Aerospace Defense Command, November 18, 2011). **[Blackboard] [TSC AY16 CD Rom]**

(6) Statement of Admiral William E. Gortney, U.S. Navy, Commander, U.S. Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command before the Senate Armed Services Committee. 2015 NORAD and USNORTHCOM Posture Statement, March 12, 2015, http://www.northcom.mil/Portals/28/Documents/Gortney_03-12-15_posture%20statement.pdf (accessed October 26, 2015). **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard] [TSC AY16 CD Rom]**

(7) Statement of General Philip Breedlove, Commander, U.S. Forces Europe before the House Armed Services Committee. U.S. European Command Congressional Posture Statement, February 25, 2015, http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CB0QFjAAahUKEwj9ioq10eDIAhWCXh4KHSCiCAM&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.eucom.mil%2Fdoc%2F31979%2Fu-s-european-command-posture-statement-2015&usq=AFQjCNGnfmCd87wWG416rl_XkBegLs-erA (accessed October 26, 2015). **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard] [TSC AY16 CD Rom]**

(8) Statement of General David Rodriguez, U.S. Army, Commander, U.S. Africa Command Before the House Armed Services Committee. U.S. Africa Command Congressional Posture Statement, March 17, 2015, http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=3&ved=0CCwQFjACahUKEwju7ljd0-DIAhWFGH4KHV14Dhg&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.africom.mil%2Fnewsroom%2Fdocument%2F25285%2Fusafricom-posture-statement-2015&usq=AFQjCNFcCOQd8U8TmHVKUN-DFkh_rU79ug&bvm=bv.105841590,d.dmo (accessed October 26, 2015). **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard] [TSC AY16 CD Rom]**

(9) Commander, United States Africa Command, *Commander, Theater Campaign Plan 2000-16*, **FOUO** (Stuttgart, FRG, 18 AUG 2015), Available on DMSPO "G" Drive, FI will email document via .mil accounts to students: pp. iv-ix, 15-54

d. Suggested Readings.

(1) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3141.01E, *Management and Review of Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP)-Tasked Plans* (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, September 15, 2011), http://www.dtic.mil/cjcs_directives/cdata/unlimit/3141_01.pdf (accessed October 26, 2015). Read Enclosure A, A-1 through A-3 and Enclosure B, B-1 through B-16.

(2) James M. Dubik, "Partner Capacity Building and U.S. Enabling Capabilities," *ARMY Magazine* 62, no. 5 (May 2012), [Proquest](#) (accessed October 26, 2015).

(3) Robert M. Gates, "Helping Others Defend Themselves: The Future of U.S. Security Assistance," *Foreign Affairs* 89, no. 3 (May/June 2010), [Proquest](#) (accessed October 26, 2015).

(4) Tom Galvin, "Extending the Phase Zero Campaign Mindset," *Joint Force Quarterly* 45 (2nd Quarter 2007), [Proquest](#) (accessed October 26, 2015).

(5) Statement of General John F. Kelly, U.S. Marine Corps, Commander, U.S. Southern Command before the Senate Armed Services Committee. U.S. Southern Command Congressional Posture Statement, March 12, 2015, [http://www.southcom.mil/newsroom/Documents/SOUTHCOM_POSTURE STATEMENT_FINAL_2015.pdf](http://www.southcom.mil/newsroom/Documents/SOUTHCOM_POSTURE_STATEMENT_FINAL_2015.pdf) (accessed October 26, 2015).

(6) Statement of Admiral Cecil D. Haney, U.S. Navy, Commander, U.S. Strategic Command before the Senate Armed Services Committee, March 19, 2015, [https://www.stratcom.mil/speeches/2015/130/Senate Armed Services Committee Testimony](https://www.stratcom.mil/speeches/2015/130/Senate_Armed_Services_Committee_Testimony) (accessed October 26, 2015).

5. Points to Consider.

- a. How does theater strategy relate to national strategy and military strategy?
- b. How does the CCDR translate national level strategy and direction into military plans to implement a theater strategy?
- c. How does the CCDR integrate interagency activities into the Theater Campaign Plan?
- d. How does the theater strategy and the Theater Campaign Plan lay the groundwork for contingency plans?
- e. What is security cooperation and what are some types of associated activities?
- f. What is the relationship between security cooperation, security assistance, building partner capacity, and security force assistance?

g. What is the utility of deliberate planning, given that we have rarely, if ever, actually executed a prepared contingency plan?

h. How does the CCDR provide options to national leadership?

i. What makes APEX adaptive? What are the required elements to achieve this adaptability? What, if any, friction points are associated with this capability?

6. Relationship to Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) Joint Learning Areas (JLAs), Phase II.

a. JLA 1.a, c, d, e. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider, Seminar Discussion.

b. JLA 2.a, b, c. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider, Seminar Discussion.

c. JLA 3.a, b, c, d. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider, Seminar Discussion.

d. JLA 4.a. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider, Seminar Discussion.

e. JLA 5.b, c, e. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider, Seminar Discussion.

f. JLA 6.a, d. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider, Seminar Discussion.

7. Relationship to USAWC Program Learning Objectives (PLOs), and Enduring and Special Themes.

a. PLOs: 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 9, 10.

b. Enduring Theme: Strategic Leadership and the exercise of discretionary judgment; Relationship of Policy and Strategy (relationship between ends, ways, and means); Instruments of national power and potential contributions to national security; Civil-military relations; Instruments of war and national security; History as a vehicle for understanding strategic alternatives and choice.

c. Special Themes: Educating and Developing Adaptive Senior Leaders for a Complex World.

OPERATIONAL ART AND OPERATIONAL DESIGN

Mode: Seminar

Lesson: TSC-17-S

1. Introduction.

a. Operational Art is an approach by commanders to develop strategies, campaigns, and operations. This includes the employment of military forces by integrating ends, ways, and means. This lesson considers the origins and development of Operational Art and its utility today.

b. Operational Design is the conception of a framework that underpins a campaign or operation plan and its subsequent execution. This encompasses a set of elements, or tools, to help frame thinking and a methodology for the development into a plan. While there are some differences between the Army Design Methodology and Operational Design, the principles are the same.

c. In this lesson we will consider the origins and development of Operational Art and its modern application. We will then look at Operational Design as a methodology to aid in planning and execution of military strategy and operations.

2. Learning Objectives.

a. **Analyze** the concepts of operational art and operational design.

b. **Evaluate** the use of the operational design methodology to help understand, synthesize, and develop an approach for complex, ill-structured problems.

3. Enabling Objectives. None.

4. Student Requirements.

a. Required Readings.

(1) U.S. Army War College, *Campaign Planning Handbook*, AY16 (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Academic Year 2016). Read Chapter 3, Operational Design, pp. 24-48. **[Student Issue] [Blackboard] [TSC AY16 CD Rom]**

(2) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operation Planning*, Joint Publication 5-0 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 11, 2011), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp5_0.pdf (accessed October 13, 2015). Read pp. III-1 through III-17. **[Open Source URL] [Library Issued Text] [Blackboard] [TSC AY16 CD Rom]**

(3) James J. Schneider, "The Loose Marble - and the Origins of Operational Art," *Parameters* (March 1989), <http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/Articles/1989/1989%20schneider.pdf> (accessed October 13, 2015). **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard]**

(4) Grant Martin, "A Tale of Two *Design* Efforts (and why they both failed in Afghanistan)," *Small Wars Journal* (July 7, 2011), <http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrn/art/a-tale-of-two-design-efforts-and-why-they-both-failed-in-afghanistan> (accessed October 13, 2015). **[Open Source URL]**

(5) Adam Elkus, "A Critical Perspective on Operational Art and Design Theory," *Small Wars Journal* (April 30, 2012), <http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrn/art/a-critical-perspective-on-operational-art-and-design-theory> (accessed October 13, 2015). **[Open Source URL]**

(6) Joint Staff J7, "Insights and Best Practices Focus Paper: Design and Planning" (Suffolk, VA: Deployable Training Division, Joint Staff J7, July 2013), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/fp/fp_design_planning.pdf (accessed October 13, 2015). Read 1.0 "Executive Summary." **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard] [TSC AY16 CD Rom]**

b. Focused Readings. None.

c. Suggested Readings.

(1) Simon Murden, "Purpose in Mission Design: Understanding the Four Kinds of Operational Approach," *Military Review* 93, no. 3 (May/June 2013), [Proquest](#) (accessed October 13, 2015).

(2) Wayne W. Grigsby, et al., "Integrated Planning: The Operations Process, Design, and the Military Decision Making Process," *Military Review* 91, no. 1 (January/February 2011), [Proquest](#) (accessed October 13, 2015).

(3) Alex Vohr, "Design in the Context of Operational Art," *Marine Corps Gazette*, 94, no.10 (October 2010), [Proquest](#) (accessed October 13, 2015).

(4) Justin Kelly and Michael J. Brennan, "The Leavenworth Heresy and the Perversion of Operational Art," *Joint Force Quarterly* 56 (1st Quarter 2010), [Proquest](#) (accessed October 13, 2015).

(5) Brigadier Justin Kelly and Dr. Michael J. Brennan, *Alien: How Operational Art Devoured Strategy* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, September 2009), <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=939> (accessed October 14, 2015). Read pp. vii through viii and 1-25.

(6) Ben Zweibelson, "Three Design Concepts Introduced for Strategic and Operational Applications," *Prism* 4, no. 2 (2013), http://cco.dodlive.mil/files/2014/02/prism87-104_Zweibelson.pdf (accessed October 14, 2015).

5. Points to Consider.

a. Is the definition of operational art useful? Does it constrain our use of operational art in modern warfare? If so, do you have an alternative definition that may make it better fit modern warfare?

b. What is operational design? How is it related to operational art?

c. What are the differences between Army design (described in Army Doctrine Reference Publication 5-0) and operational design (described in Joint Publication 5-0)? Are they substantial? Why might they be different? Which do you find more useful for application at the theater strategic level?

6. Relationship to Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) Joint Learning Areas (JLAs), Phase II.

a. JLA 1.a,c. Readings, Points to Consider, Seminar Discussion.

b. JLA 2.a,c. Readings, Points to Consider, Seminar Discussion.

c. JLA 3.a,b,c,d,e. Readings, Points to Consider, Seminar Discussion.

d. JLA 4.a,b,c. Readings, Points to Consider, Seminar Discussion.

e. JLA 5.a,d,e. Readings, Points to Consider, Seminar Discussion.

7. Relationship to USAWC Program Learning Objectives (PLOs), and Enduring and Special Themes.

a. PLOs: 1, 2, 3, 7, 10.

b. Enduring Themes: Strategic Leadership and the exercise of discretionary judgment; Relationship of Policy and Strategy (relationship between ends, ways, and means); Instruments of national power and potential contributions to national security; Instruments of war and national security; History as a vehicle for understanding strategic alternatives and choices.

c. Special Theme: Educating and Developing Adaptive Senior Leaders for a Complex World.

ELEMENTS OF OPERATIONAL DESIGN

Mode: Seminar

Lesson: TSC-18-S

1. Introduction.

a. Operational design provides a methodology to apply cognitive skills to understand military problems and develop concepts to solve them. Commanders, planners, and operators employ several tools, known as elements of operational design, to help them better understand the problem and visualize and describe recommended solutions to the problem. These elements can best be thought of as the language of the operational approach and will be essential in follow-on planning. Through the interactive use of these elements, commanders and their staffs can better understand the operational environment, understand and define the problem, and develop an operational approach which will be consistent with the Joint Operational Planning Process (JOPP).

b. Some of the elements of operational design are especially critical to enable the commander to better understand the situation and help define the problem. In particular, an understanding of the relationship between the intended termination criteria for an operation or campaign and the military end state is extremely important in enabling the theater commander to determine what he must accomplish to support the national strategy. This understanding allows the commander to determine appropriate objectives to achieve the desired outcome of the operation or campaign.

c. Other elements of operational design that are equally critical are those that enable the commander to outline the approach to solve the problem. Identification of center(s) of gravity (COGs) that relate to the problem and the intended objectives to solve the problem, and an analysis of those COG(s), can help lead to development of the decisive points of the campaign or operation. Activities that address these decisive points can then be organized into lines of effort and/or lines of operation that will lead to the accomplishment of designated objectives.

d. Most students should have a general understanding of the elements of operational design based on their background and experience as military professionals. For the students that are unfamiliar with some or all of the elements of operational design, particular attention will be required during the JP 5-0 reading assignment to ensure solid comprehension prior to seminar dialogue.

2. Learning Objectives.

a. **Analyze** the relationship among the elements of operational design.

b. **Evaluate** the utility of the elements of operational design by using examples of major operations, campaigns, or areas of potential conflict.

3. Enabling Objectives. None.

4. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks. In preparation for TSC-18, each student will read Joint Publication 5-0 to understand or refresh their understanding of the elements of operational design. Students will then read the second and third readings to more closely examine the element of Center of Gravity from two different perspectives. Next, students will read the fourth reading which analyzes the element of center of gravity utilizing three different lenses (presented in the first three readings) using ISIL/ISIS as a backdrop scenario for COG comparisons. Students will then read the Lewis article which uses some of the elements of operational design in its analysis of the Islamic State. Lastly, students should scan the designated section of the Campaign Planning Handbook to further enhance their understanding of operational design and its elements.

b. Required Readings, in order.

(1) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operation Planning*, Joint Publication 5-0 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 11, 2011), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp5_0.pdf (accessed October 14, 2015). Read pp. III-18 through III-38. **[Open Source URL] [Library Issued Text] [Blackboard] [TSC AY16 CD Rom]**

(2) Dale Eikmeier, "Redefining the Center of Gravity," *Joint Force Quarterly* 59, (Fourth Quarter 2010), [Proquest](#) (accessed October 14, 2015). **[Database] [Blackboard]**

(3) James Butler, "Godzilla Methodology: Means for Determining Center of Gravity," *Joint Force Quarterly* 72 (First Quarter 2014), [Proquest](#) (accessed October 14, 2015) **[Database] [Blackboard]**

(4) Daniel Smith, et al, "Three Approaches to Center of Gravity Analysis: The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant," *Joint Force Quarterly* 78 (Third Quarter 2015), [Proquest](#) (accessed October 14, 2015). **[Database] [Blackboard]**

(5) Jessica Lewis, "The Islamic State: A Counter-Strategy for a Counter State," *Middle East Report Security Report* 21 (July 2014), <http://www.understandingwar.org/report/islamic-state-counter-strategy-counter-state> (accessed October 14, 2015). **[Open Source URL]**

(6) Scan U.S. Army War College, Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations, *Campaign Planning Handbook*, AY16 (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Academic Year 2016). Chapter 3, "Design", pp. 31-47. **[Student Issue] [Blackboard] [TSC AY16 CD Rom]**

c. Focused Readings.

(1) Lawrence Freedman, "Stop Looking for the Center of Gravity," *War on the Rocks*, June 24, 2014, <http://warontherocks.com/2014/06/stop-looking-for-the-center-of-gravity/> (accessed October 14, 2015). **[Open Source URL]**

(2) Daniel Steed, "Strategy: Renewing the Center of Gravity," *War on the Rocks*, July 17, 2014, <http://warontherocks.com/2014/07/strategy-renewing-the-center-of-gravity/> (accessed October 14, 2015). **[Open Source URL]**

d. Suggested Readings.

(1) Daniel McCauley, "The Practitioner's Guide to the Facets and Elements of Design," 2013. (Unpublished product made available for distribution by expressed written permission of the author.) **[Blackboard]**

(2) Joe Strange and Richard Iron, "Understanding Centers of Gravity and Critical Vulnerabilities – Part I: What Clausewitz (Really) Meant by Center of Gravity," undated. <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usmc/cog1.pdf> (accessed October 14, 2015).

(3) Joe Strange and Richard Iron, "Understanding Centers of Gravity and Critical Vulnerabilities – Part 2: The CG-CC-CR-CV Construct," undated. <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usmc/cog2.pdf> (accessed October 14, 2015).

(4) Joe Strange, "Centers of Gravity & Critical Vulnerabilities: Building on the Clausewitzian Foundation So That We Can All Speak the Same language," *Marine Corps University Perspectives on Warfighting Number Four, Second Edition* (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University, Marine Corps War College, 1996), http://jpsc.ndu.edu/Portals/72/Documents/JC2IOS/Additional_Reading/3B_COG_and_Critical_Vulnerabilities.pdf (accessed October 14, 2015).

5. Points to Consider.

a. What are the elements of operational design? Which of these are most applicable to problem framing? Which are most applicable to describing approaches to solving problems?

b. What is the relationship between end state, termination criteria, and objectives?

c. What is an effect? How can a description of desired and undesired effects assist in linking objectives to activities?

d. What is a Center of Gravity? Is this concept useful in helping to frame a problem and develop the appropriate solution to the problem?

e. What is the relationship between a COG and objectives?

f. How can an analysis of the COG, through describing its Critical Capabilities, Critical Requirements, and Critical Vulnerabilities, help formulate approaches to solving a problem?

g. Is the COG a useful or valid concept for a Theater Strategic Plan or Steady State/Phase 0 operations?

h. What is a Decisive Point? How can one develop potential decisive points?

i. What are Lines of Effort? How do they differ from Lines of Operation?

j. What is the relationship between COG, decisive points, and Lines of Operation/Lines of Effort?

6. Relationship to Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) Joint Learning Areas (JLAs), Phase II.

a. JLA 1.a,c. Readings, Points to Consider, Seminar Discussion.

b. JLA 2.a,c. Readings, Points to Consider, Seminar Discussion.

c. JLA 3.a,b,c,d,e. Readings, Points to Consider, Seminar Discussion.

d. JLA 4.a,b,c. Readings, Points to Consider, Seminar Discussion.

e. JLA 5.a,d,e. Readings, Points to Consider, Seminar Discussion.

7. Relationship to USAWC Program Learning Objectives (PLOs), and Enduring and Special Themes.

a. PLOs: 1, 2, 3, 7, 10.

b. Enduring Themes: Strategic Leadership and the exercise of discretionary judgment; Relationship of Policy and Strategy (relationship between ends, ways, and means); Instruments of national power and potential contributions to national security; Instruments of war and national security; History as a vehicle for understanding strategic alternatives and choices.

c. Special Theme: Educating and Developing Adaptive Senior Leaders for a Complex World.

22 January 2016 (0830-1130)
25 January 2016 (0830-1600)
28 January 2016 (0830-1130)
Lesson Author: Prof Al Lord, 245-4858

DESIGN EXERCISE (DESIGNEX) AND BRIEFING

Mode: Exercise

Lesson: TSC-19, 20, 21, and 22-EX

1. Introduction. This is a three-day (12-hour) exercise designed to enable students to use operational design to develop an approach that will inform the planning process to address a hypothetical regional contingency. To conduct this exercise, seminar students will be divided into two groups as determined by the FI. Students will serve as members of a Geographic CCDR staff and use the design methodology to develop planning guidance that will feed the follow-on TSC planning exercise. Students will succeed by understanding the environment, defining the problem, and developing an approach that will likely achieve the desired conditions for the U.S. and key regional allies and partners.

2. Learning Objectives.

a. **Synthesize** the role and perspective of the Combatant Commander in developing an operational approach given a hypothetical regional scenario.

b. **Evaluate** the operational design methodology by understanding the operational environment, defining the problem, and developing an operational approach given a hypothetical regional scenario.

c. **Evaluate** the products of operational design (planning guidance) as a way to inform the Joint Operational Planning Process.

d. **Evaluate** the integration of joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational capabilities across the range of military operations and plans.

3. Enabling Objectives. None.

4. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks.

(1) The first part of this exercise will require familiarity with a hypothetical regional contingency. The TSC Southeast Asia Scenario will be used. The seminar will be divided into two joint planning groups and work independently to fulfill the objectives of the exercise. The groups will brief their conclusions to each other.

(2) Students will work through operational design, in accordance with Joint Doctrine to provide planning guidance, which includes the operational approach. There is no right format for the end product or brief. Groups are encouraged to use creative and critical thinking to provide the elements of planning guidance in accordance with FI direction.

(3) Based on the TSC Southeast Asia Scenario, student groups will work to analyze the operational environment, assess strategic guidance provided (if any), and describe the desired outcomes for the region and the corresponding conditions that will enable those outcomes. Students should project the current environment into the future (that set of conditions likely to exist if the current trends continue), identify the competing objectives of other actors, and identify tensions and opportunities presented by the synthesis of desired outcomes and conditions with those of other actors. Students should possess a basic understanding by reading the scenario prior to meeting in seminar for the exercise. To define the problem, students will need to define a strategic horizon, explore key trends in the region, recognize developing threats to U.S. and partner interests, and evaluate tensions, forces, and opportunities among the various competing sets of desired conditions. Groups will then work to conceptualize and describe a broad approach that will achieve the strategic guidance. As the possible approaches are explored, it is likely that more questions and insights about the environment will arise, desired outcomes and conditions may need to be redefined, and the definition of the problem may evolve. Once an approach to solve the problem emerges, the group will describe the approach in a logical way. The group will also assess the effects of the approach on the environment to determine areas of risk and anticipate and mitigate unintended negative effects. Elements of operational design such as objectives, effects, decisive points, and lines of effort may help in explaining the approach.

(4) Students will brief their results. Though no template or format is provided for the brief, in accordance with joint doctrine, planning guidance should include the following elements:

Planning Guidance

- Understanding of the operational environment - A description of the most important aspects of the environment along with desired theater outcomes and their linkage to national interests and goals or objectives.
- Definition of the problem(s).
- Description of the operational approach - explains how resources will be applied within a timeframe for expected outcomes.
- Commander's Intent
 - Purpose
 - End state
 - Operational Risk
 - Method
- Strategic narrative that will explain the approach to the broadest range of stakeholders.

(5) After student groups have described their approaches, dialogue will focus on “what’s next.” The products of the design methodology (i.e. planning guidance) will feed the Joint Operational Planning Process.

b. Required Readings.

(1) Read U.S. Army War College, Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations, *Southeast Asia Scenario* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Academic Year 2016). **[DMSPO Student Issue] [Blackboard] [TSC AY16 CD Rom]**

(2) U.S. Army War College, Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations, *Campaign Planning Handbook* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Academic Year 2016). Review Chapter III. **[DMSPO Student Issue] [Blackboard] [TSC AY16 CD Rom]**

c. Focused Readings. None.

d. Suggested Readings. Review U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operation Planning*, Joint Publication 5-0 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 11, 2011), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp5_0.pdf (accessed October 14, 2015). Chapter III. **[Open Source URL] [Library Issued Text] [Blackboard] [TSC AY16 CD Rom]**

5. Points to Consider.

a. How does the operational design methodology work? Describe the iterative nature of the methodology.

b. How can we best use operational design to provide value to the planning process? What is the role of the Combatant Commander in operational design?

6. Relationship to Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) Joint Learning Areas (JLAs), Phase II.

- | | |
|-------------------|---|
| a. JLA 1.a, b, c. | Readings, Exercise, Points to Consider. |
| b. JLA 1.d, e. | Objectives, Readings, Exercise, Points to Consider. |
| c. JLA 2.a, b, c. | Readings, Exercise, Points to Consider. |
| d. JLA 3 b, c, d. | Objectives, Readings, Exercise, Points to Consider. |
| e. JLA 4.a, b, c. | Readings, Exercise, Points to Consider. |

7. Relationship to USAWC Program Learning Objectives (PLOs), and Enduring and Special Themes.

- a. PLOs: 1, 2, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10.

b. Enduring Themes: Relationship of Policy and Strategy (relationship between ends, ways, and means); Instruments of war and national security.

c. Special Themes: None.

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Block V Intent “Application of JOPP”

Block Chief: COL Warren

Purpose: Generate and reinforce student competence and confidence with the JOPP at the operational and theater levels of conflict. Develop student ability to analyze and apply the concepts of Operational Art, Operational Design, and the Joint Functions within the JOPP to develop operational approaches and COAs within a JIIM environment from Combatant Command and JTF/MNF perspectives.

Method: Balancing seminar dialogue and a scenario-driven exercise, students will evaluate the interaction between Op Art, Op Design, and the Joint Functions through the lens of the JOPP by developing a mission, intent, and COAs for a theater contingency. Readings will focus on joint doctrine and other readings to introduce planning TTPs and reinforce service, interagency, and multinational contributions to the proposed solution(s).

End state: Although we are not creating planners, students should possess confidence in and a working knowledge of the integration of Op Art, Op Design, and the Joint Functions through the JOPP to visualize complex problems, develop solutions in a JIIM environment, and communicate those solutions to a commander and subordinate components at the theater and operational levels.

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INTRODUCTION TO THE JOINT OPERATION PLANNING PROCESS

Mode: Seminar

Lesson: TSC-23-S

1. Introduction.

a. The purpose of this lesson is to analyze the joint operation planning process (JOPP) and its relationship to operational design, operational art, and the joint functions. Together, the relationships and procedures introduced in this lesson establish the intellectual framework and process that guide the remainder of this block of lessons. In short, the JOPP is a military problem solving process, but the logic of the JOPP has many similarities with problem-solving in the business and wider governmental communities.

b. With an understanding of the previous lessons on operational design, operational art, and the joint functions, this lesson will weave that understanding together through the JOPP to help solve complex and unfamiliar problems. The JOPP is how the joint planning and execution community ultimately converts the results of operational art and operational design into clear tasks, objectives, and solutions for members of the wider Joint Force. The JOPP is not simply Service doctrine (e.g. MDMP) with “bigger arrows on the map.” It is different in that it will likely deal with situations and problems with higher levels of ambiguity and complexity and possibly less developed higher guidance than Service doctrines. The JOPP also serves as a common language for problem-solving across the entire Joint Force, thereby driving jointness deeper.

c. Operational art and operational design do not end with the start of the JOPP; they continue to exert their influence within the JOPP and through execution of the joint campaign or operation. Joint Force Commanders, other leaders and staff officers need to remain alert to changes in the operational environment and when these changes require “reframing,” use operational design, which may result in new problems or objectives that require the application of the JOPP to find an adequate, feasible, acceptable, and complete solution. This lesson will also examine flexible deterrent and flexible response options and how these are incorporated into the larger context of the theater campaign plan.

2. Learning Objectives.

a. **Analyze** the JOPP as a problem-solving process and how it relates to and benefits from operational design, operational art, and the synchronization of the joint functions.

b. **Analyze** flexible deterrent and response options and how they influence plans and strategic decisionmaking.

- c. **Synthesize** the planning initiation and mission analysis steps of the JOPP.
3. Enabling Objectives.
- a. **Comprehend** operational design, operational art, and the joint functions.
 - b. **Comprehend** the joint operation planning process (JOPP) as a problem-solving process.
4. Student Requirements.
- a. Tasks.
 - (1) Homework. Master the enabling objectives in paragraph 3 through required readings and personal research. As needed, review TSC Block IV notes, products, and readings.
 - (2) In-Class Work. None.
 - b. Required Readings.
 - (1) U.S. Army War College, Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations, *Campaign Planning Handbook*, AY16 (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Academic Year 2016). **Read** pp. 65-77 and **Review** pp. 18-20 (section on options). **[DMSPO Student Issue] [Blackboard] [TSC AY16 CD Rom]**
 - (2) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Planner's Handbook for Operational Design*, Version 1.0 (Suffolk, VA: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, October 7, 2011), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/doctrine/jwfc/opdesign_hbk.pdf (accessed October 14, 2015). Read pp. VII-1 through VII-8. **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard] [TSC AY16 CD Rom]**
 - (3) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning* (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 11, 2011), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp5_0.pdf (accessed October 14, 2015). **Scan** Chapter IV, pp. 1-16 and **Read** pp. E-1 through E-4 and F-1 through F-4 (FDOs and FROs). **[Open Source URL] [Library Issued Text] [Blackboard] [TSC AY16 CD Rom]**
 - (4) **Review** U.S. Army War College, Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations, *Southeast Asia Scenario* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Academic Year 2016). **[DMSPO Student Issue] [Blackboard] [TSC AY16 CD Rom]**
 - c. Focused Readings. None.
 - d. Suggested Readings. None.

5. Points to Consider.

a. How would you characterize the relationship and dependencies between operational design, operational art, the joint functions, and the JOPP?

b. What are the differences and similarities between the JOPP at the CCMD level and the military decisionmaking process (MDMP) at the tactical level?

c. In what ways do operational art and operational design remain alive inside of JOPP?

d. How is the JOPP applicable to problems higher than the operational level and to those that do not lend themselves to the clear use of military force?

e. How do steps 1 and 2 (initiate planning and mission analysis) of the JOPP shape the remainder of planning?

f. What is the difference between FDOs and FROs, and how do they help national leaders with strategic decisionmaking?

g. How are FDOs and FROs developed?

6. Relationship to Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) Joint Learning Areas (JLAs), Phase II.

a. JLA 1.d. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

b. JLA 2.a,f. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

c. JLA 3.a,b,c,d,e. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

7. Relationship to USAWC Program Learning Objectives (PLOs), and Enduring and Special Themes.

a. PLOs: 3, 7, 9.

b. Enduring Themes: Instruments of national power and potential contributions to national security; Instruments of war and national security.

c. Special Theme: Educating and Developing Adaptive Senior Leaders for a Complex World.

1 February 2016 (0830-1130)
1 February 2016 (1300-1600)

Lesson Author: COL Tarn Warren, 245-4792

MISSION ANALYSIS I AND II

Mode: Exercise

Lessons: TSC-24-EX
TSC-25-EX

1. Introduction.

a. These lessons begin the mission analysis portion of a multiple-day exercise focusing on a fictitious, futuristic, and complex regional scenario in Southeast Asia. The purpose of this series of lessons is to enable students to practice how a Geographic Combatant Commander and staff might apply the concepts of operational design, operational art, and the joint functions within the mission analysis portion of the joint operation planning process to understand the scope, nature, and context of the command's tasks and mission. Over the course of this exercise, as directed by the seminar FI, the seminar will develop a mission analysis briefing based on the provided scenario.

b. During this three-lesson exercise, the seminar will execute JOPP Steps 1 and 2 as directed by the FI. This work will focus on the synthesis of operational design and mission analysis and will result in a mission analysis briefing during Lesson 26.

2. Learning Objectives.

a. **Synthesize** operational design, operational art, the joint functions, and the JOPP to conduct mission analysis.

b. **Evaluate** mission analysis within the context of a fictitious regional exercise with a complex problem set.

3. Enabling Objectives.

a. **Comprehend** JOPP Steps 1 (Planning Initiation) and 2 (Mission Analysis).

b. **Comprehend** the SEA exercise materials and possess an understanding of the scenario's operational environment to include the capabilities, limitations, activities, and desired outcomes of U.S., friendly, neutral, and adversarial state/non-state and military/non-military actors and the regional political, economic, and diplomatic trends.

4. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks.

(1) Homework. Master the enabling objectives in paragraph 3 through required readings and personal research. As needed, review TSC Block III and IV notes, products, and readings.

(2) In-Class Work. Seminar planning team exercise.

b. Required Readings.

(1) U.S. Army War College, Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations, *Campaign Planning Handbook* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Academic Year 2016). **Review** pp. 65-77. **[DMSPO Student Issue] [Blackboard] [TSC AY16 CD Rom]**

(2) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning* (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 11, 2011), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp5_0.pdf (accessed October 14, 2015). **Review** Chapter IV, pp. 1 through 16, E-1 through E-4, and F-1 through F-4 (FDOs and FROs). **[Open Source URL] [Library Issued Text] [Blackboard] [TSC AY16 CD Rom]**

(3) U.S. Army War College, Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations, *Southeast Asia Scenario* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Academic Year 2016). **Review** portions as needed. **[DMSPO Student Issue] [Blackboard] [TSC AY16 CD Rom]**

c. Focused Readings. None.

d. Suggested Readings. None.

5. Points to Consider.

a. How do operational design and mission analysis influence each other during planning?

b. In what ways is the commander's planning guidance to the staff critical while planning in an international environment with complex and unfamiliar problems?

c. How would you characterize the relationship between planning assumptions, risk, and commander's critical information requirements (CCIR)?

d. In what ways does the nature of specified and implied tasks change at the operational and theater-strategic levels (in the JOPP) as compared to the tactical level (in MDMP for example)?

e. How does mission analysis shape COA development in the JOPP?

6. Relationship to Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) Joint Learning Areas (JLAs), Phase II.

- a. JLA 1.b, d. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider, Exercise.
- b. JLA 2.a, b, c, f. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider, Exercise.
- c. JLA 3.a, b, c, d, e. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider, Exercise.
- d. JLA 4.b, c. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider, Exercise.

7. Relationship to USAWC Program Learning Objectives (PLOs), and Enduring and Special Themes.

- a. PLOs: 3, 7, 9.
- b. Enduring Themes: Instruments of national power and potential contributions to national security; Instruments of war and national security.
- c. Special Theme: Educating and Developing Adaptive Senior Leaders for a Complex World.

MISSION ANALYSIS BRIEFING

Mode: Exercise

Lesson: TSC-26-EX

1. Introduction.

a. The mission analysis briefing represents a key opportunity for the staff to brief and interact with the commander and set the course for the rest of the JOPP. The briefing is a methodical expression of the synthesis of operational design and mission analysis that further enables the commander's decision cycle and eventually drives future action. Important results of mission analysis include a mission statement for the command; key assumptions; a deeper and wider understanding of the environment and the attendant problems the command must address; draft objectives; a likely set of diverse implied tasks; and draft commander's critical information requirements, among others.

b. In this lesson, the seminar planning groups will brief their mission analysis to the FI, who will play the role of the PACOM Commander. This briefing represents the seminar planning groups' operational design and mission analysis synthesis of the previous two lessons. Seminar FIs will give the briefing format to the students in advance, will dialogue with the student planning teams during and after the brief, and will issue updated planning guidance to these teams after the brief to guide them as they prepare to develop courses of action for the scenario in the subsequent portions of this exercise.

2. Learning Objectives.

a. **Evaluate** the effectiveness of mission analysis at the higher levels of joint and multinational operations in a complex environment and its ability to inform the remainder of the JOPP.

b. **Apply** operational design, operational art, and the joint functions within the JOPP to **communicate** the results of mission analysis to a CCDR.

3. Enabling Objective. **Comprehend** the importance of applying strategic, critical systems, and creative thinking skills while communicating with senior leaders.

4. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks.

(1) Homework. Accomplish the enabling objective; prepare and rehearse the MA brief.

(2) In-Class Work. Planning team briefings.

b. Required Readings.

(1) U.S. Army War College, Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations, *Campaign Planning Handbook* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Academic Year 2016). **Review** pp. 65-77. **[DMSPO Student Issue]**
[Blackboard] **[TSC AY16 CD Rom]**

(2) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning* (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 11, 2011), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp5_0.pdf (accessed October 14, 2015). **Review** Chapter IV, pp. 1 through 16, E-1 through E-4, and F-1 through F-4 (FDOs and FROs).
[Open Source URL] **[Library Issued Text]** **[Blackboard]** **[TSC AY16 CD Rom]**

(3) U.S. Army War College, Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations, *Southeast Asia Scenario* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Academic Year 2016). **Review** portions as needed. **[DMSPO Student Issue]**
[Blackboard] **[TSC AY16 CD Rom]**

c. Focused Readings. None.

d. Suggested Readings. None.

5. Points to Consider.

a. How do operational design and mission analysis influence each other during planning, to include the impact of operational design on the mission analysis briefing?

b. How would you characterize the relationship between planning assumptions, risk, and commander's critical information requirements (CCIR)?

c. How should the commander's updated planning guidance at the end of the mission analysis brief affect COA development?

6. Relationship to Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) Joint Learning Areas (JLAs), Phase II.

a. JLA 1.b,d. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider, Exercise.

b. JLA 2.a,b,c,f. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider, Exercise.

c. JLA 3.a,b,c,d,e. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider, Exercise.

d. JLA 4.b,c. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider, Exercise.

7. Relationship to USAWC Program Learning Objectives (PLOs), and Enduring and Special Themes.

- a. PLOs: 3, 7, 9.
- b. Enduring Themes: Instruments of national power and potential contributions to national security; Instruments of war and national security.
- c. Special Theme: Educating and Developing Adaptive Senior Leaders for a Complex World.

JOPP COURSE OF ACTION DEVELOPMENT I, II AND III

Mode: Seminar/Exercise

Lesson: TSC-27-S/EX
TSC-28-EX
TSC-29-EX

1. Introduction.

a. Purpose. The purpose of this lesson is to develop student understanding of how a course of action (COA) is developed to ensure the requirements identified from operational design, mission analysis, and planning guidance are met.

b. Concept. This lesson consists of three complete seminar periods focused on Step 3 of the Joint Operation Planning Process (JOPP). The seminar continues practical application as a PACOM planning staff and develops a broadly-stated potential solution to an approved mission developed during the previous lesson (TSC-26). Integrating a shared understanding of the environment and regional problem set developed during operational design and mission analysis, the students will generate viable COAs that satisfy the mission, intent, and guidance of the commander. The desired result is an understanding and articulation of operational art through joint functions across domains to achieve theater objectives. The lesson is structured in the following sequence:

- (1) One-hour seminar discussion/introduction of JOPP Step 3 (COA Dev).
- (2) Student group work (three seminar periods).
- (3) Preparation of a COA out brief with supporting concepts.

2. Learning Objectives.

a. **Analyze** how mission analysis, operational design, the joint functions, and command authorities plus relationships influence the development of courses of action at the operational and theater-strategic levels.

b. **Apply** the concept of operational art to achieve theater objectives.

c. **Comprehend** the inputs and outputs of JOPP Step 3 required to develop a course of action that is adequate, feasible, acceptable, distinguishable, and complete.

d. **Evaluate** the JOPP as a problem solving process.

3. Enabling Objectives.

a. **Comprehend** the information outputs from Steps 1 (planning initiation) and 2 (mission analysis) of the JOPP (from previous lesson).

b. **Analyze** the commander's course of action guidance (instructor provided).

c. **Examine** Step 3 of the JOPP (course of action development) of the JOPP (reading)

4. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks.

(1) Homework. Complete required readings and master the enabling objectives listed in paragraph 3.

(2) In-Class Work.

(a) Complete the JOPP course of action development step as directed by the FI.

(b) Execute seminar IPRs and prepare results, as directed by the FI, for presentation during TSC-30.

b. Required Readings.

(1) Read U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning* (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 11, 2011), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp5_0.pdf (accessed October 14, 2015). pp. IV-17 through IV-26. **[Open Source URL] [Library Issued Text] [Blackboard] [TSC AY16 CD Rom]**

(2) Read U.S. Army War College, Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations, *Campaign Planning Handbook* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Academic Year 2016). pp. 77 to 86. **[DMSPO Student Issue] [Blackboard] [TSC AY16 CD Rom]**

(3) Review U.S. Army War College, Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations, *Southeast Asia Scenario* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Academic Year 2016). **[DMSPO Student Issue] [Blackboard] [TSC AY16 CD Rom]**

(4) Review U.S. Naval War College, Department of Joint Military Planning and Operations, NWC 3153N, *Forces Capabilities Handbook* (Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College, June 2014). **[Blackboard] [TSC AY16 CD Rom]**

(5) Review Commander's Intent and "Planning Guidance for Southeast Asia Contingency Plan." **[Faculty Instructor Handout]**

c. Focused Readings. None.

d. Suggested Reading. Michael A. Santacroce, *Planning for Planners, Volume I, Joint Operation Planning Process (JOPP) Joint Planning and Global Force Management (GFM) Processes Explained* (Bloomington, IN: iUniverse, 2011), https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/7d3f6744-b9c4-479b-9c8d-da2c132e368e/Planning-for-Planners_Jan_2012_new.aspx Read pp. 291 through 307.

5. Points to Consider.

a. What are decisive points? Why are they important at the theater/strategic level?

b. How do planning assumptions affect COA development? How does a staff articulate and mitigate the concept of "risk" at the theater-level?

c. How does a Joint Force Commander arrange a campaign? Are phasing and transitions important during a joint operation? Why or why not?

d. How does the joint military planner integrate other national power instruments to support a campaign?

e. In what ways do the elements of Operational Design and the Joint Functions shape COA Development?

6. Relationship to Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) Joint Learning Areas (JLAs), Phase II.

a. JLA 1.b, d. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider, Exercise.

b. JLA 2.a, b, c, f. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider, Exercise.

c. JLA 3.a, b, c, d, e. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider, Exercise.

d. JLA 4.b, c. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider, Exercise.

e. JLA 5.c. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider, Exercise.

7. Relationship to USAWC Program Learning Objectives (PLOs), and Enduring and Special Themes.

a. PLOs: 1, 2, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10.

b. Enduring Themes: Relationship of Policy and Strategy (relationship between ends, ways, and means); Instruments of war and national security.

c. Special Theme: Educating and Developing Adaptive Senior Leaders for a Complex World.

JOPP COURSE OF ACTION BRIEF

Mode: Exercise

Lesson: TSC-30-EX

1. Introduction.

a. Purpose. The purpose of this lesson is to provide students opportunity to communicate a valid theater-level course of action (COA).

b. Concept. During this lesson, the seminar will outbrief the results of group work conducted during TSC-27-29. COA brief(s) should include, at a minimum: a sequential graphic and narrative, tentative task organization, identification of critical events, transitions, and the following supporting concepts: deployment, fires, sustainment, strategic communication and interagency coordination. The product should answer the validity criteria detailed below:

(1) Adequate – Does the COA comply with commander’s planning guidance, accomplish the purpose and tasks while meeting required end state, objects and effects?

(2) Feasible – Does the COA accomplish the assigned mission within available time, space, and resources available?

(3) Acceptable – Does the COA achieve ends that justify cost in resources, balanced by risk?

(4) Distinguishable – Does the COA differ significantly (concept of operations, task organization, use of main/supporting efforts, use of reserve) from other COA’s?

(5) Complete – Does the COA include all tasks (specified, implied, essential), support the entire Joint Force, and answer all key elements of the mission statement (5 W’s)?

2. Learning Objectives.

a. **Evaluate** how the elements of operational design, the joint functions, forces, and domains are useful in the development of viable courses of action for a joint operation.

b. **Synthesize** and communicate a course of action that connects operational efforts to strategic ends.

3. Enabling Objectives.

a. **Comprehend** the inputs and outputs of the JOPP Step 3 required to develop a course of action that is adequate, feasible, acceptable, and complete.

b. **Apply** the concept of operational art to achieve theater objectives.

4. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks.

(1) Homework. None.

(2) In-Class Work. Present Course of Action Brief(s) to the seminar, as directed by the FI.

b. Required Readings. None.

c. Focused Readings. None.

d. Suggested Reading. Michael A. Santacroce, *Planning for Planners, Volume I, Joint Operation Planning Process (JOPP) Joint Planning and Global Force Management (GFM) Processes Explained* (Bloomington, IN: iUniverse, 2011), https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/7d3f6744-b9c4-479b-9c8d-da2c132e368e/Planning-for-Planners_Jan_2012_new.aspx Review pp. 291 through 307.

5. Points to Consider.

a. How does the commander determine joint/multinational force organization and command relationships?

b. What is a theater reserve? What are some of the considerations for composition and employment?

c. How does the Joint Force Commander determine mission success?

d. What is termination criteria? Why is it important? Who establishes it?

e. How does a Joint Force Commander and staff manage transitions between phases of a campaign?

6. Relationship to Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) Joint Learning Areas (JLAs), Phase II.

a. JLA 1.b, d. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider, Exercise.

- b. JLA 2.a, b, c, f. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider, Exercise.
- c. JLA 3.a, b, c, d, e. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider, Exercise.
- d. JLA 4.b, c. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider, Exercise.
- e. JLA 5.b, c. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider, Exercise.

7. Relationship to USAWC Program Learning Objectives (PLOs), and Enduring and Special Themes.

- a. PLOs: 1, 2, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10.
- b. Enduring Themes: Relationship of Policy and Strategy (relationship between ends, ways, and means); Instruments of war and national security.
- c. Special Theme: Educating and Developing Adaptive Senior Leaders for a Complex World.

COMPLETING THE JOPP AND CRISIS ACTION PLANNING

Mode: Seminar

Lesson: TSC-31-S

1. Introduction.

a. The purpose of this lesson is to complete the understanding of the Joint Operation Planning Process (JOPP). It will explore how deliberate and crisis action planning (CAP), enabled by operational design are used as problem-solving processes to develop operational approaches to regional crises having varying time horizons.

b. The lesson will explain the remaining steps in the JOPP that lead to an operational plan (OPLAN) or order. The seminar will examine the linkages between a completed OPLAN and the theater campaign plan and discuss the plan assessment process. Finally, the seminar will explore the relationship between CAP and deliberate planning within the adaptive planning and execution (APEX) system.

2. Learning Objectives.

a. **Analyze** how courses of action developed in JOPP Step 3 are transformed into plans and orders in JOPP Steps 4 through 7.

b. **Synthesize** the plan assessment process and its critical linkage to the theater campaign plan.

c. **Evaluate** the differences between deliberate planning and crisis action planning (CAP) in the adaptive planning and execution (APEX) system and the utility of CAP to help the Joint Force Commander and other strategic leaders respond to crises.

3. Enabling Objectives.

a. **Comprehend** JOPP Steps 4 through 7.

b. **Comprehend** the linkages between tasks, effects, decisive points, objectives, and endstate.

c. **Comprehend** the components, products, and personnel roles involved in CAP.

4. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks. Complete the required readings, reflect on the “points to consider” below, and be prepared to contribute to seminar dialogue on the learning objectives.

b. Required Readings.

(1) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operation Planning*, Joint Publication 5-0 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 11, 2011), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp5_0.pdf (accessed October 14, 2015). **Scan** Appendix G, "COA Comparison," pp. G-1 through G-5; **Read** Chapter II, "Orders Produced during CAP," pp. II-28 through II-35. **[Open Source URL] [Library Issued Text] [Blackboard] [TSC AY16 CD Rom]**

(2) U.S. Army War College, Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations, *Campaign Planning Handbook* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Academic Year 2016). **Read** Chapter 5, "JOPP Steps 4-7," pp. 87-107; Appendix A, "APEX IPR Process," pp. A-1 through A-5; Appendix D, "CAP: General," pp. D-1 through D-4. **Scan** Appendix D, "CAP: 6 Components," pp. D-5 through D-18. **[DMSPO Student Issue] [Blackboard] [TSC AY16 CD Rom]**

(3) Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Plans, *Theater Campaign Planning, Planner's Handbook*, version 1.0 (Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, February 2012), [http://www.alu.army.mil/ALU_DOCS/Planners_Handbook_Master_Final%20Draft%202-22-12%20\(2\).pdf](http://www.alu.army.mil/ALU_DOCS/Planners_Handbook_Master_Final%20Draft%202-22-12%20(2).pdf) (accessed October 14, 2015). **Read** Chapter 7, "Plan Assessment and Adaptation," pp. 30-39. **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard] [TSC AY16 CD Rom]**

(4) Ronald H. Cole, *Operation URGENT FURY Grenada* (Washington, DC: Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1997), <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/doctrine/history/urgfury.pdf> (accessed October 14, 2015). **Scan** "Overview," pp. 1-8. **Read** "Planning for Military Operations," pp. 19-22, and "Final-Political Military Coordination 23 October 1983," pp. 32-34 and 39-40. **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard] [TSC AY16 CD Rom]**

c. Focused Readings. None.

d. Suggested Readings.

(1) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operation Planning*, Joint Publication 5-0 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 11, 2011), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp5_0.pdf (accessed October 14, 2015). **Review** Chapter IV, "COA Development," pp. IV-17 through IV-27. **Read** Appendix D, "Assessment," pp. D-1 to D-10.

(2) U.S. Army War College, Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations, *Campaign Planning Handbook* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Academic Year 2016). **Read** Appendix D, "CAP: General," pp. D-1 through D-4.

(3) Ronald H. Cole, *Operation URGENT FURY, Grenada* (Washington, DC: Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1997), <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/doctrine/history/urgfury.pdf> (accessed October 14, 2015). Read Chapter 1 and the remainder of Chapter 2.

(4) Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Plans, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, *Theater Campaign Planning, Planner's Handbook*, version 1.0 (February 2012), [http://www.alu.army.mil/ALU_DOCS/Planners_Handbook_Master_Final%20Draft%202-22-12%20\(2\).pdf](http://www.alu.army.mil/ALU_DOCS/Planners_Handbook_Master_Final%20Draft%202-22-12%20(2).pdf) (accessed October 14, 2015). Read Chapter 1 and Chapter 6.

(5) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Combat Capability Assessment*, CJCSI 3401.01E (Washington, DC: Joint Staff, May 19, 2014), http://www.dtic.mil/cjcs_directives/cdata/unlimit/3401_01.pdf (accessed October 14, 2015). Read Appendix A through Enclosure D, pp. D-A-1 through D-A-15.

(6) Deployable Training Division, *Insight and Best Practice Focus Paper: Assessment*, 2nd edition (Suffolk, VA: Joint Staff J7, July 2013), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/fp/fp_assessment.pdf Read "Executive Summary and Assessment Basics," pp. 1-6.

(7) Doctrine Networked Education and Training (DOCNET) podcast "JP 5-0 *Joint Operation Planning*, August 11, 2011," http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/docnet/podcasts/JP_5-0/podcast_JP_5-0.htm

(8) Doctrine Networked Education and Training (DOCNET) course "Crisis Action Planning Vignette." The vignette follows the activities of a fictional geographic command, XCOM, during a crisis action planning scenario. NOTE: It is based on the 2006 version of JP 5-0 *Joint Operation Planning*. You will notice some doctrinal differences from the 2011 version used during TSC. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/docnet/podcasts/JP_5-0/podcast_JP_5-0.htm

5. Points to Consider.

a. What is the purpose of wargaming, and how can it be adapted to the CCMD level? How does a CCMD staff "wargame" a Theater Campaign Plan (TCP) that is mostly and perpetually in phase 0?

b. What are the critical linkages between a contingency plan (completed product) and the theater campaign plan and theater security cooperation plan?

c. What are the different aspects of assessing a plan?

d. How do considerations of risk, time, and future posture influence a CCDR's judgment in the formulation of an operational approach to respond to a crisis?

- e. Compare and contrast deliberate planning and CAP.
- f. What are the strengths and weaknesses of the CAP process?
- g. What is the relationship between CAP and the TCP?

6. Relationship to Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) Joint Learning Areas (JLAs), Phase II.

- a. JLA 1.c, d. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.
- b. JLA 2.a. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.
- c. JLA 3.b, e. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.
- d. JLA 4.a, c. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.
- e. JLA 5.e. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

7. Relationship to USAWC Program Learning Objectives (PLOs), and Enduring and Special Themes.

- a. PLOs: 1, 3, 6, 7, 9, 10.
- b. Enduring Themes: Strategic Leadership and the exercise of discretionary judgment; Relationship of Policy and Strategy (relationship between ends, ways, and means); Instruments of national power and potential contributions to national security; Instruments of war and national security; History as a vehicle for understanding strategic alternatives and choices.
- c. Special Theme: Educating and Developing Adaptive Senior Leaders for a Complex World.

EMERGING CONCEPTS

Mode: Seminar

Lesson: TSC-32-S

1. Introduction.

a. The U.S. military is in the midst of an era characterized by four environments: 1) a global political environment dominated by disparate and conflicting state and regional interests, creating potentially volatile security areas exacerbated due to the availability and proliferation of advanced weapon systems; 2) a global social environment where the world's populace continues to migrate to urbanization, creating governance and resource challenges that could potentially lead to strife and conflict fueled by the collision of differing cultures in congested spaces; 3) a global physical environment subjected to rapid, unpredictable, and sometimes catastrophic weather patterns due to climate change; and 4) a domestic economic environment that will likely drive the Joint Force to operate under an umbrella of fiscal austerity for at least the near and possibly mid-term. Simply put, the U.S. military will likely continue to shrink as the potential need for its rapid worldwide engagement grows. As such, it is paramount that the future, Joint Force operates as efficiently as possible across the domains and spectrum of conflict. An understanding of the emerging issues surrounding how best to operationalize "cross-domain synergy," as described in the *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020*, is thus fundamental in the development of tomorrow's military strategic leader.

b. One family of emerging concepts which has recently migrated into doctrine is comprised of the Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC) and its subordinate, supporting concepts, Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons (JAM-GC), and the Joint Concept for Entry Operations (JCEO). Though designed to address a specific problem set in the context of the current and future Operational Environment (OE), the proliferation of Anti-Access / Area Denial capabilities and the challenges which they pose to the Joint Force in carrying out their missions, the JOAC family of concepts also provides a useful vehicle to examine the future of domain integration. JOAC's core concept of "cross-domain synergy" begs the question of just how far the Services have come since the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act. In an environment of increasingly constrained resources, rising peer competitors, and technological challenges to U.S. access, the JOAC challenges the Joint Force to, in Chairman Dempsey's words, "drive jointness deeper." In the first two hours of the lesson, students will evaluate these new doctrinal concepts and implications for the future of the Joint Force.

c. During the third hour of the lesson, students will discuss the military's requirement to develop a future force capable of operating in megacities. A megacity is defined as a city with a population of 10 million or more. According to a 2011 United Nations Report, by 2025 there will be over 40 megacities in the world. Some of these megacities already do or will reside in areas marked by instability. Cognizant that the world's population continues to gravitate to the littorals and in complement to the United Nation's report, many futurists not surprisingly predict that tomorrow's crises requiring U.S. military engagement are less likely to occur in remote areas, like Afghanistan, than in highly populous coastal ones within politically failing or failed states. As in Japan in 2011, the U.S. military will likely be called to conduct disaster relief for megacities in well governed areas as well. However, currently the U.S. Army, as well as the Joint Force as a whole, is not structured for the complexities of such missions. In no other environment will the call for integrated operations across the domains and spectrum of conflict be so acute than in the complex, confined, contested, and congested space of a megacity. It is time to take such a potentiality seriously and plan for it accordingly.

2. Learning Objectives.

a. **Analyze** emerging doctrine and current dialogue surrounding the concepts JOAC, JCEO, JAM-GC, and operations within megacities.

b. **Assess** the underpinnings for each of the concepts discussed and potential areas for synergy or friction between the Services.

c. **Evaluate** each concept discussed and the implications for the future force.

3. Enabling Objectives. None.

4. Student Requirements.

a. Required Readings.

(1) U.S. Department of Defense, *Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC)*, Version 1.0 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, January 17, 2012), http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/JOAC_Jan%202012_Signed.pdf (accessed October 2, 2015). Read pp. 2-27. **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard] [TSC AY16 CD Rom]**

(2) William O. Odom and Christopher D. Hayes, "Cross-Domain Synergy: Advancing Jointness," *Joint Force Quarterly* 73 (2nd Quarter 2014), http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-73/jfq_123-128_Odom-Hayes.pdf (accessed October 2, 2015). **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard]**

b. Focused Readings.

(1) Team One (JCEO). U.S. Department of Defense, *Joint Concept for Entry Operations (JCEO)* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, April 7, 2014), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/concepts/joint_concepts/jceo.pdf (accessed October 2, 2015). Read pp. 1-35. **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard] [TSC AY16 CD Rom]**

(2) Team Two (JAM-GC).

(a) U.S. Department of Defense, Air-Sea Battle Office, *Air-Sea Battle: Service Collaboration to Address Anti-Access & Area Denial Challenges* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, May 2013), <http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/ASB-ConceptImplementation-Summary-May-2013.pdf> (accessed October 2, 2015). Read pp. 1-13. **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard] [TSC AY16 CD Rom]**

(b) John Callaway, "The Operational Art of Air-Sea Battle," July 18, 2014, linked from the *Center for International Maritime Security Home Page*, <http://cimsec.org/operational-art-air-sea-battle> (accessed October 2, 2015). **[Open Source URL]**

(c) David Forman, "The First Rule of Air-Sea Battle," *Proceedings* 140, no. 4 (April 2014), [\[Proquest\]](#) (accessed October 2, 2015). **[Database] [Blackboard]**

(d) Amitai Etzioni, "Air-Sea Battle: A Dangerous Way to Deal with China," September 3, 2013, linked from *The Diplomat Home Page*, <http://thediplomat.com/2013/09/air-sea-battle-a-dangerous-way-to-deal-with-china/?allpages=yes> (accessed October 2, 2015). **[Open Source URL]**

(e) Paul McLeary, "New US Concept Melds Air, Sea and Land," January 24, 2015, <http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/policy-budget/warfare/2015/01/24/air-sea-battle-china-army-navy/22229023/> (accessed October 2, 2015). **[Open Source URL]**

(3) Team Three (Megacities).

(a) Chief of Staff of the Army, Strategic Studies Group, *Megacities and the United States Army: Preparing for a Complex and Uncertain Future*, June 2014, linked from the *US Army Home Page*, <http://usarmy.vo.llnwd.net/e2/c/downloads/351235.pdf> (accessed October 2, 2015). **[Open Source URL] [Blackboard] [TSC AY16 CD Rom]**

(b) Kevin M. Felix and Frederick D. Wong, "The Case for Megacities," *Parameters* 45, no. 1 (Spring 2015), [Proquest](#) (accessed October 2, 2015). **[Database] [Blackboard]**

(c) Michael Evans, "The Case *against* Megacities," *Parameters* 45, no. 1 (Spring 2015), [Proquest](#) (accessed October 2, 2015). [Database] [Blackboard]

(d) William G. Adamson, "Megacities and the US Army," *Parameters* 45, no. 1 (Spring 2015), [Proquest](#). (accessed October 2, 2015). [Database] [Blackboard]

(e) Army Chief of Staff's Future Study Plan, "The Megacity: Operational Challenges for Force 2025 and Beyond," http://www.arcic.army.mil/app_Documents/ARCIC_Report_Unified-Quest-14_The-Megacity-Operational-Challenges-for-Force-2025-and-Beyond_08MAY2014.pdf (accessed October 2, 2015). [Open Source URL] [Blackboard] [TSC AY16 CD Rom]

c. Suggested Readings. All team readings.

5. Points to Consider.

a. What are JOAC, JCEO, and JAM-GC? What are they not? What assumptions are these concepts predicated upon? Are the assumptions valid? How does each concept relate to the others and other operational concepts and strategic guidance documents?

b. What is meant by cross-domain synergy? How can the Joint Force maximize it? How do we "drive jointness deeper?" What does that mean, and what might it look like in terms of the future Joint Force?

c. What improvements might be made to better align tomorrow's Joint Force to meet the demands of operating in megacities? Are these changes compatible with other force structure initiatives, such as JOAC? Where might there be areas of friction?

6. Relationship to Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) Joint Learning Areas (JLAs), Phase II.

- | | |
|-------------------|---|
| a. JLA 1.a,b,d,e. | Readings, Objectives, Points to Consider, Seminar Dialogue. |
| b. JLA 2.a,f. | Readings, Objectives, Points to Consider, Seminar Dialogue. |
| c. JLA 3.a,d | Readings, Objectives, Points to Consider, Seminar Dialogue. |
| d. JLA 5.c,d. | Readings, Objectives, Points to Consider, Seminar Dialogue. |

7. Relationship to USAWC Program Learning Objectives (PLOs), and Enduring and Special Themes.

a. PLOs: 1, 2, 3, 4, 9, 10.

b. Enduring Themes: Strategic Leadership and the exercise of discretionary judgement; Instruments of war and national security.

c. Special Themes: None.

COURSE SYNTHESIS AND END-OF-COURSE AAR

Mode: Seminar

Lesson: TSC-33-S

1. Introduction.

a. The purpose of this lesson is to assess the students' understanding of Theater Strategy and Campaigning (TSC) course objectives. It is enabled both by the students' papers and the points to consider in the lessons which synthesize key points in the course. The lesson offers an opportunity to review the course objectives while offering an opportunity for students to share their insights from these objectives and their course papers. While the emphasis will be on assessing achievement of course learning objectives, current doctrine and ongoing efforts in current operations will also be discussed.

b. The final hour of this lesson is dedicated to conducting an end-of-course After Action Review (AAR).

2. Learning Objectives.

a. **Synthesize** the integration of military capabilities (including limitations) across the range of military operations and plans to achieve strategic objectives using the joint operation planning process in a joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) environment.

b. **Evaluate** the principles of joint warfare, joint military doctrine and emerging concepts across the range of military operations, and the role of landpower as part of the Joint Force in JIIM operations.

c. **Synthesize** the development of theater strategies and theater campaign plans to meet national strategic goals in a JIIM environment at all levels of war.

3. Enabling Objectives. None.

4. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks. Each student completes course writing requirement.

b. Required Reading. Review TSC course directive, learning objectives and "points to consider."

c. Focused Readings. None.

d. Suggested Readings. None.

5. Points to Consider.

a. Discuss the relevant interdependencies of the domains of conflict as they relate to the application of Landpower anywhere in the world. Highlight the unique role of Landpower in a joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational environment, either as part of a U.S. Joint Force or as a member of an alliance/coalition.

b. The 2012 Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO) introduced the concept of globally integrated operations to allow the Joint Force to operate successfully in the present and future security environments. You have studied several new or emerging concepts this year, such as the Joint Operational Access Concept, Joint Concept for Entry Operations, Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons, Joint Concept for Rapid Aggregation, and the Army's Regionally Aligned Forces. Select one or more of these concepts (or select another not listed here) and: (1) Use the eight elements of globally integrated operations in the CCJO as criteria to evaluate the integration and utility of your chosen concept(s) into existing joint doctrine, (2) Does your emerging concept enable greater jointness, or promote Service parochialism, or both, and why?

c. Working together, are operational design and the Joint Operation Planning Process sufficiently adaptable and robust enough to capture and address the complexity and threats in the operational environment? Are they capable of delivering adequate, feasible, acceptable, and complete approaches to these problems? Explain your answers.

d. The U.S. should assume that for the near future it will exercise military power as a member of a multinational alliance or coalition, with interagency and intergovernmental partners. What are the challenges and opportunities posed to the Combatant Commander or Joint Force Commander in conducting operations in such an environment? What actions can he or she take during Phase 0 to set the condition for success in later phases of operations?

e. Do you agree with the description of operational art as "the bridge between tactics and strategy?" Alternatively, do you prefer an alternate definition of "the linkage of military activity across time and space?" How would you describe operational art and its uses for planning at the strategic level? Defend your answers.

f. Evaluate operational design as a cognitive framework for strategy formulation at the theater strategic level. Highlight the role of the Geographic Combatant Commander and staff in design and the utility and shortfalls of design in the development of Theater Campaign Plans.

g. Evaluate the elements of operational design in JP 5-0 and the joint functions in JP 3-0 as organizing constructs for campaign planning and execution at the operational and Combatant Commander (CCDR) levels. Are they adequate tools to account for the complexity of contemporary operational environments? On the other hand, are they archaic Jominian baggage that detracts from the potential of the operational design approach? If so, what alternative construct(s) would you suggest to aid the CCDR in addressing complex problems and missions in today's operational environment?

h. Assess the Army's Operating Concept. What, if any, changes would you propose to enable senior leaders to better articulate the roles (and limits) of the Army? How does the Army best employ Landpower, as part of the Joint Force to achieve national strategic objectives in peace, conflict, and war?

i. The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review's first strategic pillar declares that "Protect the Homeland" is the Department of Defense's first priority. However, the 2015 National Military Strategy (p.7) asserts, "[The U.S. military] supports the Nation by providing a full range of options to protect the homeland and our interests while assuring the security of our allies." In a resource-constrained environment, how can DoD most effectively balance homeland protection against "assuring the security of our allies?"

6. Relationship to Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) Joint Learning Areas (JLAs), Phase II.

- a. JLA 1.c, d. Objectives, Readings, Student Papers, Points to Consider.
- b. JLA 2.a. Objectives, Readings, Student Papers, Points to Consider.
- c. JLA 3.b, e. Objectives, Readings, Student Papers, Points to Consider.
- d. JLA 4.a, c. Objectives, Readings, Student Papers, Points to Consider.
- e. JLA 5.e. Objectives, Readings, Student Papers, Points to Consider.

7. Relationship to USAWC Program Learning Objectives (PLOs), and Enduring and Special Themes.

- a. PLOs: 1, 3, 6, 7, 9, 10.
- b. Enduring Themes: Strategic Leadership and the exercise of discretionary judgment; Relationship of Policy and Strategy (relationship between ends, ways, and means); Instruments of national power and potential contributions to national security; Instruments of war and national security; History as a vehicle for understanding strategic alternatives and choices.
- c. Special Theme: Educating and Developing Adaptive Senior Leaders for a Complex World.

APPENDIX A

DMSPO STUDENT CRITIQUE

1. Analyses of student views of the USAWC courses are an extremely important input to the curriculum planning process. The course evaluation consists of a computer-assisted questionnaire. You can access the computerized survey system through any of the computers in the Executive Skills Center or your seminar room in Root Hall. Directions on how to use the computer survey system are in your *Automation Handbook*.

2. You will be contacted via email once the computer survey is available, and you will be notified of the desired completion date at that time. Questions on the survey should be directed to the Director of Institutional Assessment, 245-3365.

3. The stated objectives of “Theater Strategy and Campaigning” are on page 3 of the Course Directive. For your convenience, they are listed below. Please review them prior to completing the course evaluation survey.

a. **Analyze** Combatant Commander relationships with the President, SecDef, CJCS, Service Chiefs, other Combatant Commands and key agencies in developing policy, strategy and plans. (PLOs 1, 9)

b. **Analyze** Combatant Command development of policy, strategy, and plans in the context of Landpower and JIIM to include, IO, Cyberspace, joint Intelligence, Joint Logistics, communication synchronization, and emerging concepts. (PLOs 2, 3, 10)

c. **Evaluate** the role of Landpower as part of the Joint Force in joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational operations. (PLOs 3, 10)

d. **Synthesize** the integration of military capabilities and limitations across the range of military operations (ROMO) and plans to achieve strategic objectives using the joint operational planning process in a JIIM environment. (PLOs 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10)

e. **Synthesize** the development of Theater Strategies, Strategic Options, and operational level COAs to meet the National Strategic Goals in a joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational (JIIM) environment at the theater strategic level. (PLOs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10)

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APPENDIX B

USAWC AY16 PROGRAM LEARNING OBJECTIVES

PLO 1: Apply critical and creative thinking to national security issues and the environment at the strategic level.

PLO 2: Demonstrate the ability to communicate clearly, persuasively, and candidly.

PLO 3: Demonstrate anticipation and adaptation to surprise and uncertainty.

PLO 4: Understand how to recognize change and lead transitions.

PLO 5: Analyze ethical decisions and distinguish military cultures that reflect the values and traditions of the American profession of arms.

PLO 6: Understand the ability to operate on intent through trust, empowerment, and understanding (Mission Command).

PLO 7: Assess the strategic security environment and the contributions of all instruments of national power.

PLO 8: Apply theories of war and strategy to national security challenges.

PLO 9: Assess the processes and relationships of the Department of Defense, as well as those of interagency, intergovernmental, multinational, and nongovernmental organizations.

PLO 10: Understand the utility of Landpower in joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational operations.

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APPENDIX C

JOINT LEARNING AREAS AND OBJECTIVES (JPME Phase II)

1. Overview. Service SLCs develop strategic leaders who can think critically and apply military power in support of national objectives in a joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational environment. Service War Colleges hone student expertise and competency on their respective Service's roles, missions, and principal operating domains and focus on integrating them into the Joint Force, unfettered by Service parochialism across the range of military operations.

2. Mission. Each Service SLC is unique in mission and functional support. However, a fundamental objective of each is to prepare future military and civilian leaders for high-level policy, command and staff responsibilities requiring joint and Service operational expertise and warfighting skills by educating them on the instruments of national power (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic), the strategic security environment and the effect those instruments have on strategy formulation, implementation, and campaigning. The goal is to develop agile and adaptive leaders with the requisite values, strategic vision and thinking skills to keep pace with the changing strategic environment. SLC subject matter is inherently joint; JPME at this level focuses on the immersion of students in a joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational environment and completes educational requirements for JQO (level 3) nomination.

3. Learning Area 1 – National Strategies.

a. Apply key strategic concepts, critical thinking and analytical frameworks to formulate and execute strategy.

b. Analyze the integration of all instruments of national power in complex, dynamic and ambiguous environments to attain objectives at the national and theater-strategic levels.

c. Evaluate historical and/or contemporary security environments and applications of strategies across the range of military operations.

d. Apply strategic security policies, strategies and guidance used in developing plans across the range of military operations and domains to support national objectives.

e. Evaluate how the capabilities and limitations of the U.S. Force structure affect the development and implementation of security, defense and military strategies.

4. Learning Area 2 – Joint Warfare, Theater Strategy and Campaigning for Traditional and Irregular Warfare in a Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental and Multinational Environment.

a. Evaluate the principles of joint operations, joint military doctrine, joint functions (command and control, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection and sustainment), and emerging concepts across the range of military operations.

b. Evaluate how theater strategies, campaigns and major operations achieve national strategic goals across the range of military operations.

c. Apply an analytical framework that addresses the factors politics, geography, society, culture and religion play in shaping the desired outcomes of policies, strategies and campaigns.

d. Analyze the role of OCS in supporting Service capabilities and joint functions to meet strategic objectives considering the effects contracting and contracted support have on the operational environment.

e. Evaluate how strategic level plans anticipate and respond to surprise, uncertainty, and emerging conditions.

f. Evaluate key classical, contemporary and emerging concepts, including IO and cyber space operations, doctrine and traditional/irregular approaches to war.

5. Learning Area 3 – National and Joint Planning Systems and Processes for the Integration of JIIM Capabilities.

a. Analyze how DoD, interagency and intergovernmental structures, processes, and perspectives reconcile, integrate and apply national ends, ways and means.

b. Analyze the operational planning and resource allocation processes.

c. Evaluate the integration of joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational capabilities, including all Service and Special Operations Forces, in campaigns across the range of military operations in achieving strategic objectives.

d. Value a joint perspective and appreciate the increased power available to commanders through joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational efforts.

e. Analyze the likely attributes of the future joint force and the challenges faced to plan, organize, prepare, conduct and assess operations.

6. Learning Area 4 – Command, Control and Coordination.

- a. Evaluate the strategic-level options available in the joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational environment.
- b. Analyze the factors of Mission Command as it relates to mission objectives, forces and capabilities that support the selection of a command and control option.
- c. Analyze the opportunities and challenges affecting command and control created in the joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational environment across the range of military operations, to include leveraging networks and technology.

7. Learning Area 5 – Strategic Leadership and the Profession of Arms.

- a. Evaluate the skills, character attributes and behaviors needed to lead in a dynamic joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational strategic environment.
- b. Evaluate critical strategic thinking, decisionmaking and communication by strategic leaders.
- c. Evaluate how strategic leaders develop innovative organizations capable of operating in dynamic, complex and uncertain environments; anticipate change; and respond to surprise and uncertainty.
- d. Evaluate how strategic leaders communicate a vision; challenge assumptions; and anticipate, plan, implement and lead strategic change in complex joint or combined organizations.
- e. Evaluate historic and contemporary applications of the elements of mission command by strategic-level leaders in pursuit of national objectives.
- f. Evaluate how strategic leaders foster responsibility, accountability, selflessness and trust in complex joint or combined organizations.
- g. Evaluate how strategic leaders establish and sustain an ethical climate among joint and combined forces, and develop/preserve public trust with their domestic citizenry.

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APPENDIX D

AY16 THEMES

ENDURING THEMES

Elihu Root's challenge provides the underpinnings for enduring themes within the USAWC curriculum. The enduring themes stimulate intellectual growth by providing continuity and perspective as we analyze contemporary issues.

STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP AND THE EXERCISE OF DISCRETIONARY JUDGMENT.

- o Evaluate leadership at the strategic level (national security policy and strategy, especially in war)
- o Understand the profession's national security clients and its appropriate jurisdictions of practice
- o Evaluate leadership of large, national security organizations
- o Evaluate strategic thinking about the future (2nd and 3rd order effects)
- o Analyze the framework for leading and managing strategic change, specifically the components of organizational change and the process by which organizations change

RELATIONSHIP OF POLICY AND STRATEGY (RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ENDS, WAYS, AND MEANS).

- o Analyze how to accomplish national security aims to win wars
- o Analyze how to connect military actions to larger policy aims
- o Analyze how to resource national security
- o Evaluate international relations as the context for national security

INSTRUMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER AND POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO NATIONAL SECURITY.

- o Comprehend Diplomatic Power
- o Comprehend Informational power
- o Evaluate Military Power
- o Comprehend Economic power

PROFESSIONAL ETHICS.

- o Evaluate the ethics of military operations (to include jus in bello and post bello)
- o Evaluate the ethics of war and the use of force (to include jus ad bello)
- o Evaluate the ethics of service to society (domestic civil-military relations)

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS.

- o Evaluate relationships between military and civilian leadership
- o Evaluate relationships between the military and domestic society
- o Evaluate relationships between armed forces and foreign populations

INSTRUMENTS OF WAR AND NATIONAL SECURITY.

- o Joint: Evaluate the capabilities and domains of joint forces (especially land, maritime, air, space, cyber)
- o Interagency: Understand other U.S. government agencies and departments
- o Intergovernmental; Understand potential relationships with other national governments
- o Multinational: Understand potential relationships with armed forces or agencies of other nations/coalition partners

HISTORY AS A VEHICLE FOR UNDERSTANDING STRATEGIC ALTERNATIVES AND CHOICES.

- o Identify and analyze relevant historical examples of strategic leadership and strategic choices (across time and around the world)
- o Evaluate historical examples relevant to war and other national security endeavors

ENDURING LANDPOWER THEME (BY CORE COURSE)

Theater Strategy and Campaigning: Evaluate Army/Landpower contributions to the Joint Force, to include partnership opportunities and building partner capacity. Analyze the complexity of Landpower organizations and related requirements for sustained operations. Evaluate the nature of Landpower cost and benefits with respect to various national security aims.

SPECIAL THEME FOR AY16

We will use the special theme for developing the Commandant's Lecture Series as well as to provide suggested guidance for student Strategy Research Projects (group or individual), faculty research, case study development, and conferences.

The AY16 special theme is: **“Educating and Developing Adaptive Senior Leaders for a Complex World”** [This draws on key elements from Chief of Staff of the Army priorities: “Adaptive Army Leaders for a Complex World” and “A Globally Responsive and Regionally Engaged Army”]. This is the same theme as AY15.

Supporting elements of the theme:

- Analyze means for strengthening education and life-long learning
- Evaluate the evolving roles and challenges for strategic leaders
- Evaluate and refine concepts of strategic leadership and mission command
- Evaluate ways to better work across domains (land, sea, air, space and cyber)
- Understand and evaluate competing visions of American grand strategy as they affect evolving joint concepts and capabilities, particularly with respect to Landpower
- Understand the International environment, particularly the ‘security paradox’ posed by positive global trends potentially subject to increasingly dangerous threats
- Understand American domestic political priorities and constraints
- Evaluate Integration with allies and partners—traditional and non-traditional
- Evaluate the relevance of post-9/11 experience with respect to anticipated future challenges

The Commandant's Lecture Series (CLS) presents prominent speakers of the highest quality, representing diverse backgrounds, expertise, and varied perspectives. A limited number of lecturers, with a formal invitation by the Commandant, will explore the special theme. Chairman DMSPO, with the assistance of the Deputy Dean, will schedule the lectures throughout the academic year. Faculty will nominate speakers and the Commandant will approve speakers and topics. Students may have assigned readings to provide context and background information for the series and will have seminar time to reflect upon the lecture.

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APPENDIX E

BLOOM'S TAXONOMY *

Benjamin Bloom created this taxonomy for categorizing level of abstraction that commonly occurs in educational settings. The taxonomy provides a useful structure in which to categorize learning objectives and questions.

Competence	Skills Demonstrated
Knowledge	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • observation and recall of information • knowledge of dates, events, places • knowledge of major ideas • mastery of subject matter • <i>Question Cues:</i> list, define, tell, describe, identify, show, label, collect, examine, tabulate, quote, name, who, when, where, etc.
Comprehension	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • understanding information • grasp meaning • translate knowledge into new context • interpret facts, compare, contrast • order, group, infer causes • predict consequences • <i>Question Cues:</i> summarize, describe, interpret, contrast, predict, associate, distinguish, estimate, differentiate, discuss, extend
Application	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • use information • use methods, concepts, theories in new situations • solve problems using required skills or knowledge • <i>Question Cues:</i> apply, demonstrate, calculate, complete, illustrate, show, solve, examine, modify, relate, change, classify, experiment, discover
Analysis	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • seeing patterns • organization of parts • recognition of hidden meanings • identification of components • <i>Question Cues:</i> analyze, separate, order, explain, connect, classify, arrange, divide, compare, select, explain, infer

<p>Synthesis</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • use old ideas to create new ones • generalize from given facts • relate knowledge from several areas • predict, draw conclusions • <i>Question Cues:</i> combine, integrate, modify, rearrange, substitute, plan, create, design, invent, what if?, compose, formulate, prepare, generalize, rewrite, develop
<p>Evaluation</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • compare and discriminate between ideas • assess value of theories, presentations • make choices based on reasoned argument • verify value of evidence • recognize subjectivity • <i>Question Cues</i> assess, decide, rank, grade, test, measure, recommend, convince, select, judge, explain, discriminate, support, conclude, compare, summarize

* Adapted from: Bloom, B.S. (Ed.) (1956) *Taxonomy of educational objectives: The classification of educational goals: Handbook I, cognitive domain.* New York; Toronto: Longmans, Green.

APPENDIX F

OFFSITE ACCESS TO COURSE READINGS AND LIBRARY DATABASES

Blackboard

Blackboard is a Web-based learning management system (LMS) designed to support fully online courses or provide a space for face-to-face course supplementation. The USAWC uses Blackboard as a means to deliver USAWC curriculum content to mobile devices. Communication and collaboration opportunities are accessible with a wide variety of personal computing devices such as desktops, laptops, tablets, netbooks, e-readers, media players, smart phones, and others. All syllabus and digitally available media will be made available at Blackboard.com at <https://usawc.blackboard.com/>, please contact Mr. Christopher Smart at Christopher.a.smart.civ@mail.mil, or 245-4874.

EZproxy

EZproxy enables access to licensed database content when you are not on Carlisle Barracks. It operates as an intermediary server between your computer and the Library's subscription databases.

Links

You will find EZproxy links to full text readings in online syllabi, directives, bibliographies, reading lists, and emails. Usually, instructors and librarians provide these links so that you can easily access course materials anytime, anywhere. It also helps us comply with copyright law and saves money on the purchase of copyright permissions.

Library Databases - You can use EZproxy to access Library databases when you are away from Root Hall. Go to the Library's webpage <http://usawc.libguides.com/current>, click on any database in the Library Databases column, such as ProQuest, EBSCO OmniFile, or FirstSearch, and then use your EZproxy username and password to login.

Username and Password - From home, when you click on a link that was built using EZproxy, or you are accessing a particular database, you will be prompted to provide a username and password. You only need to do this once per session. You will find EZproxy login information on the wallet-size card you were given by the Library. If you have misplaced yours, just ask at the Access Services Desk for another card, contact us by phoning (717) 245-3660, or email usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.libraryr@mail.mil <usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.libraryr@mail.mil>. You can also access the library portal from the ArmyWar College homepage at: <https://internal.carlisle.army.mil/Pages/default.aspx>. Please do not share EZproxy login information with others.

Impact of Firewalls

Most Internet service providers (ISPs) do not limit the areas you can access on the Internet, so home users should not encounter problems with firewalls. However, corporate sites often do employ firewalls and may be highly restrictive in what their employees can access, which can impede EZproxy.

ACCESS SOLUTIONS

Try Again!

Many problems with EZproxy are caused simply by login errors. If your first login attempt fails, try again. Check to make sure the Caps Lock is not on. Or, if you see a Page Not Found message after you do login, use the Back button and click on the link again. It may work the second time.

Broken Link - If a link appears to be broken, you can find the article by using the appropriate database instead. Go to the Library's webpage <http://usawc.libguides.com/current>, click on the database name, type in your EZproxy username and password to login, and then search for the specific article.

Browsers

EZproxy works independently from operating systems and browsers, but problems may be caused by your browser if you have not downloaded and installed the newest version. Also, it is a good idea to check to make sure that the security settings on your browser are not too restrictive and that it will accept cookies and allow pop ups. Be aware ISPs that use proprietary versions of browsers, such as AOL, can interfere with EZproxy. A simple workaround is to connect to your provider, minimize the window, and then open a browser such as Mozilla Firefox or Microsoft Internet Explorer.

Databases

Not all remote access problems are caused by EZproxy. Occasionally databases will have technical problems. Deleting cookies might help. You may successfully pass through EZproxy only to find an error caused by the database. If this happens, back out of the database and try using another one. It is unlikely that both providers would be having technical problems at the same time. Generally, database problems are resolved quickly.

Help and Tips - For assistance, please contact the USAWC Research Librarians by phoning (717) 245-3660, or email: usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.libraryr@mail.mil. Or Root Hall, **ACCESS SERVICES, INTERLIBRARY LOAN, and COURSE RESERVES**, (717) 245-4288; (717) 245-4298; (717) 245-4610. Email: usawc.libraryc@us.army.mil.