


United States Army War College

Department of National Security and Strategy

Theory of War and Strategy



Course Directive

AY16

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ACADEMIC YEAR 2016

THEORY OF WAR AND STRATEGY

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
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COURSE OVERVIEW

1. General. This course, which is the bedrock of the U.S. Army War College curriculum, introduces students to the theory of war and strategy. Theory, defined as a body of ideas and principles that provides a basis for the study of a particular subject, offers a framework within which professional discussions can occur. It generates and defines the common language that facilitates communication. It provides ways to think about issues. It may provide advice on solving problems. Good theory is not dogmatic -- it allows and even encourages debate. When theory no longer seems to explain or fit the situation, new theory emerges to supplement or replace the old. The military officer or national security specialist must be well-grounded in both the theory of war and the theory of strategy to be effective at the higher levels of the national security hierarchy. Theory is essential to comprehension, and it is the basis of the sound thinking that wins wars. In essence, this course prepares students to think critically about strategy and the uses of military forces.

2. Purpose. The course purpose is two-fold:

a. To produce senior officers and leaders who understand the theory and nature of war and who can evaluate the relationships between warfare and the complex, interdependent, contemporary strategic environment.

b. To produce senior officers and leaders conversant in strategic theory.

3. Objectives. At the end of the course, the student should have developed a solid understanding of the theory of war and strategy that synthesizes past theory and practice with personal experience and ideas for the future. Specific objectives include:

a. Analyze the nature and theory of war as well as their evolving character and conduct.

b. Analyze the nature and theory of strategy.

c. Apply strategic thinking skills to the theory of war and strategy.

d. Comprehend the relationship between the theory of war and the formulation and execution of strategy.

4. Focus Questions.

a. The course will assist the student in thinking about several broad questions.

(1) What is war, and why do wars occur?

(2) What is strategy?

(3) How does one think about and evaluate a strategy?

(4) What characteristics of the international system are important considerations for

strategists?

(5) Why do states decide to use force?

(6) How do states and non-state actors fight wars? What constraints or limits are imposed on the conduct of war? What forces tend to expand war?

(7) How are wars won? What constitutes winning and how does one know when victory is achieved?

(8) How will an understanding of strategy contribute to the conduct of war in the future?

b. It is helpful when examining specific theories or theorists and strategies or strategists to consider the following:

(1) How does the theorist/strategist define war? (What is war?)

(2) Why does the theorist/strategist believe wars should be fought? (What is the object of war?)

(3) How does the theorist/strategist believe wars should be fought? (e.g., offense vs. defense, long vs. short wars, etc.)

(4) How does the theorist/strategist believe wars are won? (What constitutes victory and how is it achieved?)

(5) What concepts of enduring relevance does the theorist/strategist provide? How do those concepts influence contemporary strategic thinking?

5. Scope.

a. Strategy Construct (Ends/Ways/Means).




Figure 1.

(1) This graphic (Figure 1) offers a way to think about strategy. Both this course and the National Security Policy and Strategy course use this simple construct.

(2) The construct postulates that strategy is a calculated relationship among objectives (ends), concepts (ways), and resources (means). The depiction of the three-legged stool is a simple technique to portray that relationship. If the ends, ways, and means are in acceptable proportion (assuming that the legs of the stool are of nearly equal length), the strategy is probably in balance. However, that is an ideal state. In reality, because of the dynamic nature of the international system, there is always an imbalance and strategists continually search for ways to balance the three elements. If the legs are of unequal length (figure 2) – implying the objective (end) is too big for the resources allocated, or the ways under consideration are inappropriate for the means or ends, or that the concept (way) envisioned is too grandiose for the available means and ends – the strategist has identified risk. Ignoring risk is foolhardy; either the strategist must adjust the ends, ways, or means to rebalance the strategy, take steps in some other manner to ameliorate the risk, or, having recognized the risk, determine it is acceptable. Strategists can evaluate each leg of the stool to determine their respective feasibility (Do we have the means to execute the ways?), acceptability (Are the concepts appropriate? Does it have domestic and congressional support? Is it legal? Is it ethical? Is it worth the cost?), and suitability (Will it achieve the desired ends?). A strategy that fails any one of those tests is unsound.




Figure 2.

b. Course Organization. Two blocks constitute the course. The blocks and their constituent lessons are sequential and build on previous material.

(1) Block I: "Foundations of Strategy, Policy, and War," uses Thucydides' *The Peloponnesian War* as a vehicle for the student to understand some basic concepts related to war, policy, and strategy. In addition, this block introduces history as a tool for the strategist, and examines concepts of international relations theory (such as constructivism, realism and liberalism), and provides a survey of the causes of war, military power and the use of force, ethics, international law and order, and of victory and state-building. An analysis of geography's effect on policy and strategy concludes the block. At the end of this segment of the course, the student will understand the nature of war, the basics of strategic theory, the uses of history, essential concepts from international relations theory, and factors such as geography that influence the development and execution of strategy.

(2) Block II: "Theories of War and Strategy," analyzes theories regarding the employment of military power both strategically and at the high-operational level. It begins with lessons on foundational theorists, Carl von Clausewitz, Jomini, Sun Tzu, and Kautilya by examining their principal writings. With a foundation in classic military thought, it then introduces theories of military power in a variety of domains (sea, air, land, cyber, and space) and forms of warfare, including current issues in strategic decision-making. It relies on primary sources and principal secondary sources to expose the student to theory. The course concludes with an examination of strategy required for meeting future threats and challenges. At the end of the block, students will be familiar with specific warfighting concepts and strategies and be able to apply, analyze, and evaluate them and their applicability to past, current, and future military operations.

6. Student Readings. Student readings in this directive are annotated as follows:

a. "Student Issue"--Items received prior to the start of the academic year or distributed by the faculty during the year.

b. "Blackboard"--Copyright items provided digitally via Blackboard.

c. "Library Reserve"--Items placed on TWS reserve in the library. Please ask the librarians for assistance if you have any difficulty in locating a suggested reading.

d. "Database" -- Library provided databases: "ProQuest", "JSTOR", "Taylor and Francis", "EBSCOHOST", or others -- Resources available through accessing USAWC Library remote access. To link to the reading see Appendix VI and USAWC Library Staff for username and password.

e. "Online" -- Open source online resources available on the Internet. All required reading internet accessible resources will have a hyperlinked web address to indicate that the material is an open source online document.

7. [Curricular Relationships](#). The course directly supports the Program Learning Objectives (PLO) of: (1) think critically and creatively in applying joint warfighting principles at the strategic level; (3) anticipate and adapt to surprise and uncertainty; and (8) Apply theories of war and strategy to national security challenges. It also supports or provides the basis for study of all the other PLOs. This course builds on the Introduction to Strategic Studies course and the first week of the Strategic Leadership course and, in particular, critical and creative thinking skills, which is consistent with the main thrust of most of the PLOs. It also provides the broad theoretical basis and many of the conceptual tools used in the remainder of the curriculum.

8. [Joint Professional Military Education \(JPME II\)](#). Senior-level, Phase II joint education, is integrated into the resident core curriculum. The Theory of War and Strategy provides the student with the foundation for understanding the joint learning areas involving national security strategy, national military strategy, and theater strategy and campaigning. Specific JPME learning areas are listed in Section 5 of each lesson.

[COURSE REQUIREMENTS](#)

The essential requirement to accomplish the broad objectives of this course is to contribute actively to seminar discussions and activities. Through active participation, students contribute to the learning of others, and, in turn, learn from the contributions of others. Students are expected to participate by accomplishing the required readings, research, and tasks listed in Paragraph 3, Student Requirements, as appropriate, for each lesson or as assigned or modified by your FI. Active learning begins with thorough and thoughtful preparation that includes taking notes as you read the texts critically.

1. [Contribution](#):

a. Requirement. To complete Theory of War and Strategy successfully, students will meet established standards in each of the three basic requirements listed below. The FI will evaluate each requirement throughout the course and in a Course Evaluation Report (CER) at the end. The student's Faculty Advisor (FA) will use the CER as input to the year-end Academic Evaluation Report to be rendered by the U.S. Army War College on each student.

b. Evaluation Standard. The FI will evaluate contribution subjectively. There are no set numbers of times daily, weekly, or over the length of the course that a student must participate to meet standards. Quality of participation – in other words, the quality of contribution to seminar learning – is more important than frequency, although frequency counts in that all students are expected to be actively engaged. Contribution will equal 40% of the overall TWS grade.

2. [Written Requirement](#):

a. Requirement. Each student will complete two written requirements, each worth 50%

of the writing component grade, which itself comprises 60% of the overall course grade. The first requirement is a paper that uses Thucydides' *The Peloponnesian War*. The paper (called a guided response paper because you are responding to a specific question) is to be 3-4 pages and must be submitted to the FI no later than 17 September. The second requirement, due to the FI no later than 2 October, is for each student to research and write a 5-6 page analytical paper on one of the following questions/topics:

(1) "Which strategic theory or theorist do you believe best explains the nature and character of warfare in the 21st century?"

(2) "Apply one or more strategic theories to a specific national security challenge currently facing the United States or its allies."

b. Refer to Appendices I and II for a detailed description of these requirements.

c. Evaluation Standard. Papers will be evaluated based on content, organization and style. The criteria for evaluating the paper will address the student's ability to gather information, conduct research, organize material logically, compose and express thoughts clearly and coherently in effective writing, and to use the standard written English expected of educated senior officers and officials. Descriptions of the criteria for "Outstanding," "Exceeds Standards," "Meets Standards" and "Needs Improvement" are found in the Communicative Arts Directive. The FI will return papers that "Need Improvement" to the student for resubmission until the student achieves a "Meets Standard" evaluation or better. The grades for the two written requirements will be averaged and will comprise 60% of the overall TWS grade.

September TWS Planning Calendar AY16

SUN	MON	TUES	WED	THURS	FRI	SAT
		1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9 TWS-1 History, Theory, War, and Strategy	10 TWS-2 Theories of International Relations	11 TWS-3 Thucydides I - Strategy, Culture, Value, and Interest	12
13	14 TWS-4 Thucydides II - Power, Victory, and Defeat	15 TWS-5 The Causes of War, Military Power, and the Use of force	16	17 TWS-6 Victory and Conflict Termination Paper 1 Due	18 TWS-7 Geopolitical Theory and Power	19
20	21 TWS-8 Strategic Constraints, Just War, International Law, and Ethics	22 TWS-9 Clausewitz - Foundations of Strategic Landpower	23	24 TWS-10 Jomini, Clausewitz, and a Theory of Landpower in the 21st Century	25 TWS-11 Ancient Masters- Sun Tzu and Kautilya	26
27	28 TWS-12 Theories of Sea Power	29 TWS-13 Theories of Air Power	30			

October TWS Planning Calendar AY16

SUN	MON	TUES	WED	THURS	FRI	SAT
				1 TWS-14 Nuclear Weapons, Space, and Cyberpower Theories	2 TWS-15 Limited War Theory, Insurgency, and COIN Paper 2 Due	3
4	5 TWS-16 The Future of War and Strategy	6	7	8	9	10
11	12	13	16	17	18	19
20	21	22	23	24	25	26
27	28	29	30	31		

BLOCK I:

FOUNDATIONS OF STRATEGY, POLICY AND WAR

In this introductory block, students will learn some key concepts for understanding and analyzing war and strategy. We begin by examining the nature and character of war and the concept of strategy, major themes for the remainder of the War College education program. Dr. J. Boone Bartholomees' essay, the chapter on grand strategy from the British strategic thinker B.H. Liddell Hart and the other assigned essays provide the background. Next, we will consider how history may be used successfully by strategic thinkers, policymakers, and their advisors, followed by a survey of the major schools of international relations theory.

The fundamental relationships among war, policy, and strategy are perhaps best pondered through the lens of Thucydides' *The Peloponnesian War*. This text has long been foundational for historians, political scientists and military leaders. We will deeply analyze its most salient insights in two consecutive lessons. In a 1947 speech at Princeton University, Secretary of State George C. Marshall, the general who served as the U.S. Army's Chief of Staff during World War II and later as Secretary of State, underscored the importance of the Peloponnesian War for an understanding of contemporary international affairs. He stated, "I doubt seriously whether a man can think with full wisdom and with deep convictions regarding certain of the basic issues today who has not at least reviewed in his mind the period of the Peloponnesian War and the fall of Athens."

Using Marshall's words as a prompt, we will study such concepts as power, the coin of the realm in international relations, especially for the national security professional. What is it, from where does it come, and how can it be used? We also assess the motivations of the actors by exploring culture, values, and interests. What are national or state interests? From where do they come? We will also consider how uncertainty in the international system creates insecurity, that is, fear and mistrust among states as they vie for power or hegemony (domination) or an international order favorable to their interests. Modern theorists call this phenomenon the "security dilemma," whereby tensions and conflicts between states can occur, even unintentionally, as each side defensively reacts to the other's increase in military capacity or other seemingly belligerent measures.

Using Thucydides' landmark work as a basis, we will then move forward to more in-depth examinations of the causes of war, how military power and the use of force fit into grand strategy and diplomacy, and the role of ethics and international law in strategy. After examining how strategic victory, successful conflict termination, and post-conflict issues are defined in theory and achieved in practice, we will conclude the block with a concrete evaluation of the relationship between geography and international power, and how this relationship affects policy and strategy.

BLOCK I OBJECTIVES

- Introduce and analyze the nature and character of war.
- Introduce and analyze the concepts of strategy for application in subsequent blocks.
- Analyze the sources, dimensions, and complexity of power.
- Comprehend how uncertainty in the international system creates insecurity among nations and the potential for conflict.
- Synthesize the theoretical concepts of war causation and conflict termination.
- Synthesize the theoretical concepts of military power, the use of force within the international system, and the constraints imposed on war and strategy by that system.
- Synthesize the constraints imposed on war and strategy by ethical considerations.
- Synthesize theories of strategic victory.
- Analyze the relationship between geography and political power in the international system and their influence on strategy.

LESSON 1: HISTORY, THEORY, WAR, AND STRATEGY

Mode: Seminar

TWS-1-S

1. Introduction.

In this first lesson of the Theory of War and Strategy course, we begin our exploration of strategy and war. War is the pursuit of political objectives through the use of military force and power. Strategy is the calculated relationship among ends, ways, and means. Strategy is appropriate at several levels – grand, national, and theater. Grand strategy is the use of all elements of national power in peace and war to support a strategic vision of the nation's role in the world that will best achieve the nation's core objectives. What we call national strategies are high-level components of a grand strategy. Thus, a country might have a national defense strategy supported by a national military strategy, a national diplomatic or foreign affairs strategy, and/or a national homeland security strategy. The United States has had each of these – all supporting the overall grand strategy enunciated in the National Security Strategy. Regional combatant commanders develop theater strategies to achieve assigned goals. In each case, one might evaluate a strategy in any number of manners. The U.S. Army War College teaches the technique of evaluating feasibility, acceptability, and suitability (FAS). Any strategy at any level can be evaluated using that construct. In this course, we will focus on military strategy from a broader, historical, and international perspective. The outline below offers some clarity about the levels of strategy:

a. The Levels of Strategy

(1) National Policies – determined by a government/administration in power in a given state, and can change over time depending on national values and interests and the national leaders in power. Policies in turn inform the state's grand strategy.

(2) Grand Strategy – all elements of national power combined in a way that best achieves state's core objectives internationally and domestically. The DIME (Diplomatic, Informational, Military, Economic) construct represents these elements of national power. The U.S. *National Security Strategy* is a document of American grand strategy.

(3) National Strategies – the component strategies of the DIME that deal with only one element of national power, but taken together combine to contribute to the state's grand strategy. American examples include the National Military Strategy, and the National Homeland Defense Strategy which actually bridges several elements of national power.

(4) Theater or Specific Military Strategies – geographically specific military strategies that focus on one area of the world, such as the Middle East or the Pacific, or strategies that focus on one or more of a given state’s specific military instruments or capabilities, such as a nuclear deterrence strategy, a counterinsurgency strategy, or U.S. TRANSCOM’s Strategy for Global Distribution. Taken together, theater and specific military strategies combine to contribute to a state’s overall national military strategy. **Operations** support the attainment of theater strategic objectives (often called “campaigns”) or the success of specific military strategies, whereas **tactics** (often called “battlefield tactics”) support the achievement of operational objectives.

b. The nature of war, according to most military theorists and historians, is timeless. Certain fundamental aspects of war, such as the role of human decision-making, the impact of natural phenomena, and the calculus of means and ways to achieve ends, persist over millennia despite differences in political systems, technologies, geography. The character of war, however, may radically change over time, highly dependent as it is on scientific innovation, demographic shifts, national policies and international affairs, and even educational standards. Each war thus possesses its own distinct character, rooted in the context of its time and place, yet simultaneously shares a common nature with military conflicts from all eras.

c. This lesson includes an introduction to the objectives, structure, and requirements of the Theory of War and Strategy course. Students must be familiar with those basic administrative elements to proceed successfully through the course. Faculty Instructors will discuss most of the essential features of the course, but students must also use the assigned readings or other directions provided in the course directive.

d. The lesson also offers an introduction to the role of history in theory, strategy, and policy. The goal here is not to turn students into historians, but rather to introduce them to the many ways that an understanding of history and historical thinking can help strategists and policymakers analyze current-day problems and think proactively about the future. This lesson also aims to give students an introduction to the strategic thinking tools they will need to think critically about history and the use of historical examples.

e. History, the story of how the past became the present, can provide a context for problem-solving or help to foster a sense of understanding about why global situations are the way they are. As an adage goes, “want a new idea, read an old book.” Most of the problems we face today have historical analogies that, while never perfectly congruent, can provide insight if studied carefully. Historians rarely accept simple solutions to the problems of the past. Instead they look for polycausal explanations that take into account a wide variety of possible factors. As strategist, you, too, must question easy analogies and avoid simple answers. At best, good historical analysis offers strategic leaders guideposts with which they can better think about and process current and future national security problems. Poor or hasty historical analysis, however, can create pitfalls to the development of sound strategy and policy.

f. Historians sometimes talk about the “Five C’s” of their profession. First and

foremost, they study Causation, the examination of the key factors that force events to happen. Some see individual action as primary while others argue for the role of larger, often international, processes. For example, what caused the outbreak of war in 1914? Was it the development of large forces like imperialism, nationalism, and industrialization or was it the direct result of the decisions made by the leaders of Europe at that time? Historians also argue about Change over time (what is really new about our strategic environment and what is similar to eras of the past?), Comparison (between eras, cultures, and states), and Context (explaining the environment around which an event developed—essential to understanding why an event occurred and how thinking about it may have modern utility). Finally, historians examine Contingency, the effects that specific circumstances, such as decisions made by specific people, had on the course of events during a particular historical period.

2. Learning Objectives.

a. Comprehend the Theory of War and Strategy course objectives, block structure, course model, and the course contribution, written requirements, and standards.

b. Analyze the concept of strategy, the strategic ends-ways-means construct, and techniques of evaluating strategies.

c. Comprehend the distinctions and differences among grand strategy, national strategy, and military strategy.

d. Comprehend the differences between the nature of war and the character of war.

e. Evaluate the uses of history in providing depth, breadth, and context for strategic leaders' critical and creative thinking about current and future strategic problems.

3. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks. None.

b. Required Readings.

(1) U.S. Army War College, Department of National Security and Strategy. Theory of War and Strategy Directive (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 2014), 1-9 and Appendices I and II. **[Blackboard]**

(2) Basil H. Liddell Hart, "Grand Strategy," in *Strategy*, 2nd ed. (New York: Penguin, 1991), 353-360. **[Student Issue]**

(3) J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr., "A Survey of the Theory of Strategy," in *The U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues*, 5th ed., vol. I: *Theory of War and Strategy* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, July 2012): READ 13-27, SKIM rest of chapter at

[\[http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubid=1109\]](http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubid=1109) (accessed 22 May 2015). **[Online]**

(4) N.A.M. Rodger, "The Hattendorf Prize Lecture," *Naval War College Review* 66, no. 1 (Winter 2013): 7-15 in [\[ProQuest\]](#) (accessed 27 May 2015). **[Database]**

(5) Philip A. Crowl, "The Strategist's Short Catechism: Six Questions Without Answers," Harmon Memorial Lecture in *Military History*, no. 20 (1977), Department of History, U.S. Air Force Academy, available at: [\[http://www.usafa.edu/df/dfh/docs/Harmon20.pdf\]](http://www.usafa.edu/df/dfh/docs/Harmon20.pdf) (accessed 22 May 2015) **[Online]**

(6) Paul G. Lauren, Gordon A. Craig, and Alexander L. George, "Lessons of History and Knowledge for Statecraft," in *Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Challenges of Our Time* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 137-148. **SKIM. [Blackboard]**

c. Suggested Readings.

(1) Bernard Brodie, "Strategic Thinkers, Planners, Decision Makers," in *War and Politics* (New York: Macmillan, 1973), 433-496.

(2) Basil H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy*, 2nd ed. (New York: Penguin, 1991), 319-370.

(3) Colin S. Gray, "The Dimensions of Strategy," in *Modern Strategy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 16-47.

(4) GEN Martin Dempsey, "American Grand Strategy in an Age of Austerity," Lecture presented at a meeting of the Duke University Program in *Grand Strategy*, Durham, North Carolina, January 12, 2012. [\[http://sites.duke.edu/agsp/2012/01/12/gen-martin-dempsey-visit/\]](http://sites.duke.edu/agsp/2012/01/12/gen-martin-dempsey-visit/) (accessed 22 May 2015).

(5) Michael Howard, "The Forgotten Dimensions of Strategy," in *The Causes of War* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983), 101-109.

(6) Edward N. Luttwak, "The Conscious Use of Paradox in War," in *Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), 3-15.

(7) Colin S. Gray, "The Strategist as Hero," *Joint Force Quarterly*, no. 62 (3rd Quarter, 2011): 37-45 in [\[ProQuest\]](#) (accessed 22 May 2015).

(8) Hew Strachan, "Strategy and Contingency," *International Affairs* 87, no. 6 (November 2011): 1281-1296. [\[http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2011.01036.x/pdf\]](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2011.01036.x/pdf) (accessed 22 May 2015).

(9) Jay Luvaas, "Military History: Is It Still Practicable?" *Parameters* 12 (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, March 1982): 82-97 at: [\[http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/Articles/1995/luvaas.pdf\]](http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/Articles/1995/luvaas.pdf) (accessed 22 May 2015).

(10) Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May, *Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision-Makers* (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1986), 17-33 and 232-255.

(11) Eliot A. Cohen, "The Historical Mind and Military Strategy," *Orbis* 4 (Fall 2005), 575-588 at: [\[http://web.clas.ufl.edu/users/zselden/Course%20Readings/Cohen.pdf\]](http://web.clas.ufl.edu/users/zselden/Course%20Readings/Cohen.pdf) (accessed 22 May 2015).

(12) Peter N. Stearns, "Why Study History?" *American Historical Association* (1998) at: [\[www.historians.org/pubs/free/whystudyhistory.htm\]](http://www.historians.org/pubs/free/whystudyhistory.htm) (accessed 22 May 2015).

(13) Antulio J. Echevarria II, "The Trouble with History," *Parameters* 35, no. 2 (Summer 2005): 78-90 in [\[ProQuest\]](#) (accessed 27 May 2015).

4. Points to Consider.

a. The first three readings contain various definitions of strategy. What definition do you find most useful and why?

b. Is the distinction between levels of strategy necessary? Is it helpful?

c. Do you agree with Liddell Hart's assertion that the goal of war is a better peace? What are the implications of accepting that argument?

d. What is the difference between the nature and character of war?

e. How do societies across space and time use and understand history? How does their use of history affect their strategic thinking?

f. According to N.A.M. Rodger, what caveats or cautions would one do well to heed when looking to history for insights on how best to deal with a current problem or issue? How can history be useful?

g. What are some of the dangers of too hastily using historical analogies? Why do some policymakers and military leaders make false historical analogies?

h. What role does history play in the development of good strategy and statecraft?

i. How does an appreciation for history foster critical and creative thinking?

5. Relationship to Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) Phase II Learning Areas.

a. JLA 1 a, b, c, d. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

b. JLA 2 c, e, f. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

c. JLA 5 b, e. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

6. Relationship to USAWC Institutional Learning Objective (ILO), Program Learning Objectives, (PLOs), Enduring and Special Themes.

a. ILO: Our graduates are intellectually prepared to preserve peace, deter aggression and, when necessary, achieve victory in war through studying and conferring on the great problems of national defense, military science, and responsible command.

b. PLOs: 1, 2, 4, 8.

c. Enduring Themes: Relationship of Policy and Strategy (Relationship Between Ends, Ways, and Means), Instruments of National Power and Potential Contributions to National Security, Civil-Military Relations, History as a Vehicle for Understanding Strategic Choices and Alternatives.

LESSON 2: THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Mode: Seminar

TWS-2-S

1. Introduction.

a. This lesson has two primary goals. First, it will return to strategic definitions of some key terms from Introduction to Strategic Studies like balance of power, anarchy, and sovereignty. Second, it will provide a basic introduction to three schools of international relations theory: Realism, Liberalism, and Constructivism. These three schools are too complicated to analyze in one seminar, so we will be just skimming the surface. Nevertheless, these terms are central to any serious discussion of International Relations and we want to be sure to set a solid foundation of our understanding of them. Please note that these are theories. It may be valuable for you to think about which theory most makes sense to you but it is not necessarily valuable or even desirable for you to identify too closely with any of them in this lesson. Please note also that “Liberalism” here is used in something more akin to its 19th century sense not the sense, used in domestic politics today. One can be a “Liberal” in IR Theory terms yet still be a conservative in American political terms.

b. Briefly put, Realists believe that states behave as they do based on power and interests. They tend to see global power as a zero-sum game and see the world in competitive terms. Liberals examine not only points of competition between states, but points of cooperation as well in order to create cooperative international links like the United Nations or global trade agreements. Constructivists argue that a state behaves as it does based on its culture, its values, and its self-identity. These theories need not stand in opposition to one another. As the (admittedly difficult) Barkin reading will argue, Constructivism can inform Realism because a state’s identity helps to inform its interests.

c. Take the historical example of Germany in 1919. Realists saw value in reducing German power in order to create a more stable balance of power. Thus they tended to support limits to the size of German military forces, a reduction of its European possessions, and the removal of its overseas colonies. Liberals, by contrast, emphasized the League of Nations, increased trade, and cultural exchanges as ways of tying Germany into the international system. Constructivists might argue that Germany had to change its own values and see itself as something other than a militarist continental power before it could exist peacefully with its neighbors.

d. Strategists need to remember that a theory, or conceptual framework, will not tell them what to do in any particular case nor provide a blueprint for formulating a successful strategy. Nevertheless, theory provides an explanation for state and often non-state behavior that allows a strategist to anticipate the reaction of another state to a particular

action. Examining international relations theory can also help the strategist develop an awareness of his or her own assumptions concerning state behavior. Those assumptions need to be stated explicitly and may even need to be re-evaluated in light of evidence.

e. Finally, please note that these theories need not always be seen in opposition to one another. The key is less to figure out where you sit (although a certain level of self-awareness is always a good idea) than to understand and apply the theories. Take, for example, this anecdote from Joseph Nye from his days in the Clinton White House: "I was responsible for designing our East Asian security strategy. China had tripled its economy and was rapidly increasing its military expenditures. . . . There was a great deal of concern about the rise of Chinese power, and some voices advocated a policy of containment before China became too strong. In my view, such an approach would guarantee Chinese enmity and unnecessarily discount possible benign futures. Yet treating China as a friend would not guarantee friendship. We designed a strategy that drew upon both realism and liberalism. From a realist perspective, the three key powers in East Asia were the US, Japan and China. We first reinforced the US-Japan security relationship, which was then in disrepair, as many analysts regarded it as a Cold War relic and saw Japan as a "geo-economic" threat. By re-establishing the security relationship with Japan, we ensured that China could not play the Japan card against us. The second part of the strategy relied on liberalism. We eschewed the language of containment, opened markets with China and supported its accession to the World Trade Organization."

2. Learning Objectives.

a. Understand the following key concepts used to analyze the interaction of states in the international political system.

(1) Anarchy

(2) Sovereignty

(3) Power

(4) Levels of Analysis

b. Understand the implications of conceptual frameworks provided by realism, liberalism, and constructivism.

c. Use these concepts to analyze contemporary or historical examples of global crises.

3. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks. None

b. Required Readings.

(1) Deborah L. Hanagan, "International Order," in *U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues, Vol. 2: National Security Policy and Strategy* (5th Ed.), ed. J. Boone Bartholomees (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2012), 124-136, available at <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1110>. (accessed March 4, 2015). **Review** **[Online]**

(2) Joseph S. Nye, Jr. and David Welch, *Understanding Global Conflict and Cooperation: An Introduction to Theory and History*, 8th edition (Boston: Longman, 2011), 2-9, 33-64, 316-320 **[Student Issue]**

(3) Stephen M. Walt, "International Relations: One World, Many Theories," *Foreign Policy* 110 (Spring 1998): 29-35 in [\[ProQuest\]](#) (accessed 27 May 2015). **[Database]**

(4) J. Samuel Barkin, "Realist Constructivism," *International Studies Review* 5, no. 3 (September 2003): 325-342 in [\[JSTOR\]](#) (accessed 22 May 2015). **[Database]**

c. Suggested Readings.

(1) Deborah L. Hanagan, "The Democratic Peace," in *The U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues, vol. II: National Security Policy and Strategy*, 5th ed. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2012): 175-189 at: [\[http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdf/PUB1110.pdf\]](http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdf/PUB1110.pdf) (accessed 22 May 2015).

(2) David Dressler and John Owen, "Constructivism and the Problem of Explanation: A Review Article," *Perspectives on Politics* 3, no. 3 (September 2005): 597-610.

(3) Dale C. Copeland, "The Constructivist Challenge to Structural Realism: A Review Essay," *International Security* 25, no. 2 (Fall 2000): 187-212 in [\[JSTOR\]](#) (accessed 27 May 2015).

(4) Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravcsik, "Is Anybody Still a Realist?" *International Security* 24, no. 2 (Fall 1999): 5-55 in [\[JSTOR\]](#) (accessed 27 May 2015).

(5) Andrew Moravcsik, "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics," *International Organization* 51, no. 4 (Autumn 1997): 513-553.

(6) John Lewis Gaddis, "Looking Back: The Long Peace," *The Wilson Quarterly* XIII, no. 1 (New Year's 1989): 42-65.

(7) Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979).

(8) Hans Morgenthau, "Six Principles of Realism," in *Politics Among Nations* (New York: Knopf, any edition), Ch 1.

4. Points to Consider.

a. Think about your own definitions of anarchy and power. How do your definitions differ from (or resemble) those found in the Nye and Welch reading?

b. What is the difference among the three major theoretical approaches for understanding international politics? Think in terms of the assumptions they make, the underlying dynamic they identify, and the prospect for change or continuity in international politics. How do the three compare in their definition of national interest?

c. What function does "levels of analysis" serve for understanding international politics? Which level does each of the three strands of theory see as most important for shaping state behavior? Which do you see as most important and why?

d. Which system do Nye and Welch believe is more unstable, the bipolar or the multipolar system?

5. Relationship to Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) Phase II Learning Areas.

a. JLA 1.a, c, d. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

b. JLA 2.c, f. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

c. JLA 5.a, b. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

6. Relationship to USAWC Institutional Learning Objective (ILO), Program Learning Objectives, (PLOs), Enduring and Special Themes.

a. ILO: Our graduates are intellectually prepared to preserve peace, deter aggression and, when necessary, achieve victory in war through studying and conferring on the great problems of national defense, military science, and responsible command.

b. PLOs: 1, 2, 4, 8.

c. Enduring Themes: Relationship of Policy and Strategy, Instruments of Power and Potential Contributions to National Security, Professional Ethics, Civil-Military Relations, History as a Vehicle for Understanding Strategic Choices and Alternatives.

LESSON 3: THUCYDIDES I – STRATEGY, CULTURE, VALUES, AND INTERESTS

Mode: Seminar

TWS-3-S

1. Introduction.

a. This lesson begins our analysis of the Peloponnesian War, based upon the famous account written 2400 years ago by the Greek historian Thucydides. The book has been considered a classic over the centuries. It provides an excellent foundation for a study of the strategic level of warfare. Thucydides describes the sources of all war as “fear, honor, and interest.” As you do the reading for this part of the text, pay attention to these three factors and the ways that they affect the strategic visions and aims of the varied belligerents.

b. The twenty-seven year Peloponnesian War (431-404 BCE) was a clash primarily between democratic Athens and its empire of tributary allies and oligarchic Sparta and its allies. Thucydides declared the war to have been inevitable due to underlying power dynamics, but its outcome was not. What kinds of factors make the difference between victory and defeat in protracted armed conflicts? This is an important question that a study of Thucydides’ text can help us to address.

c. Thucydides’ work is rich in observations about the nature of war, the interface between strategy and policy, and the ethical dimensions of armed conflict and statecraft. It offers a treasure trove of insights that bolster the author’s aspiration to create what he hopes will be “a possession for all time.” These generalizations, many of which have an obvious contemporary relevance, are imbedded in a narrative that recounts the story of one of the greatest armed conflicts of classical antiquity. Reading Thucydides’ ancient text can be challenging for modern readers, but the story itself is engrossing. It is important that students read, understand, and internalize assigned readings as a foundation for engaging larger issues in strategic analysis during our seminar discussions in TWS and later core courses.

d. In our first lesson we will introduce Thucydides’ narrative, discuss the origins of the Peloponnesian War, evaluate the strategies of the respective belligerents, and look at the effects of the war upon the sophisticated societies of the ancient Greek world.

2. Learning Objectives.

a. Understand how fear, honor and interest shape strategic calculations.

b. Evaluate the origins of the Peloponnesian War including structural and contingent variables such as geography, chance, alliances, and culture.

c. Comprehend the strategies of Athens and Sparta and the ways in which they were affected by leading personalities, such as Pericles and Archidamus, and the dynamic of the conflict itself. Use the ends-ways-means construct to evaluate the degree to which the respective strategies may be considered feasible, acceptable, and suitable.

3. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks. None.

b. Required Readings.

Robert B. Strassler, ed., *The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War* (New York: The Free Press, 1996). **[Student Issue]**

Unless otherwise noted, read the chapters listed below (chapters are annotated with book number, a period, then the chapter number, for example, "1.66"). You should also read the brief summaries at the beginning of the omitted chapters (located in the page margins).

(1) Book One:

1.1 (3) (Introduction)

1.24-1.88 (16-49) (the Corcyra conflict, the origins of the war)

(2) Book Two:

2.10-2.25 (96-107) (Sparta invades Attica; Periclean strategy)

2.34-2.65 (110-128) (Pericles' Funeral Oration; the Great Plague of Athens; Pericles reiterates his grand strategy)

(3) Book Three:

3.1-3.15 (159-166) (the second Spartan invasion of Attica; Mytilene appeals to Sparta)

3.25-3.50 (171-184) (the Mytilene revolt; the debate between Cleon and Diodotus)

3.70-3.86 (194-202) (the Corcyran revolt; the evils of revolution)

c. Suggested Readings.

(1) Edith Foster, *Thucydides, Pericles, and Periclean Imperialism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

(2) Donald Kagan, *The Peloponnesian War* (London: Routledge, 2003).

(3) J. E. Lendon, *Song of Wrath: The Peloponnesian War Begins* (New York: Basic Books, 2010).

(4) James V. Morrison, *Reading Thucydides* (Bloomington, OH: Ohio State University Press, 2006).

(5) R. Craig Nation, "Thucydides and Contemporary Strategy," in *The U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues*, 4th ed., vol. I: *Theory of War and Strategy*, ed. J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr. (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, July 2010).

(6) Clifford Orwin, "The Just and the Advantageous in Thucydides: The Case of the Mytilenaeen Debate," *The American Political Science Review* 78, no. 2 (June 1984): 485-494 in [[JSTOR](#)] (accessed 27 May 2015).

(7) Martha C. Taylor, *Thucydides, Pericles and the Idea of Athens in the Peloponnesian War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

(8) Theodore George Tsakiris. "Thucydides and Strategy: Formations of Grand Strategy in the History of the Second Peloponnesian War (431-404 BC)," *Comparative Strategy* 25, no. 3 (July-September 2006): 173-208 in [[Taylor&Francis](#)] (accessed 27 May 2015).

(9) Perez Zagorin, *Thucydides: An Introduction for the Common Reader* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009).

4. Points to Consider.

a. What was the underlying cause of the war according to Thucydides? Are there other plausible explanations for the war? Was the war inevitable?

b. What role did justice play in the formulation of policy and strategy in ancient Greece? What role does justice have today in the formulation of policy and strategy?

c. How can the style of governance affect policy and strategy? Do policy decision-making and strategy formulation differ?

d. Which leader did a better job of assessing the strengths and weaknesses of his state before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, Pericles or Archidamus?

e. What were the political objectives of the main belligerents?

f. What were the strengths and weaknesses of Athens and Sparta? How well did each side understand the other?

g. What were the initial strategies and how did they relate to the policy aims?

h. Sparta and Athens entered a war neither wanted because of alliances that caused both powers to act against their interests and inclinations. Explain why you agree or

disagree with this statement.

5. Relationship to Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) Phase II Learning Areas.

- a. JLA 1.a, b. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.
- b. JLA 2.a. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.
- c. JLA 3.e. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

6. Relationship to USAWC Institutional Learning Objective (ILO), Program Learning Objectives, (PLOs), Enduring and Special Themes.

a. ILO: Our graduates are intellectually prepared to preserve peace, deter aggression and, when necessary, achieve victory in war through studying and conferring on the great problems of national defense, military science, and responsible command.

b. PLOs: 1, 3, 4, 5, 8.

c. Enduring Themes: Strategic Leadership and the Exercise of Discretionary Judgment, Relationship of Policy and Strategy (Relationship Between Ends, Ways, and Means), Instruments of National Power and Potential Contributions to National Security, Civil-Military Relations, History as a Vehicle for Understanding Strategic Alternatives and Choices.

LESSON 4: THUCYDIDES II – POWER, VICTORY, AND DEFEAT

Mode: Seminar

TWS-4-S

1. Introduction.

a. We continue our discussion of Thucydides' history with an evaluation of the ways in which strategy evolved as the conflict became protracted, the Peace of Nicias and the issue of conflict termination, the moral and ethical burden of warfare as depicted in the famous Melian Dialogue, the Sicilian Expedition and the underlying causes of Athens' defeat including political, social, cultural, ethical, economic and military factors.

b. During a period of armistice in the war between Athens and Sparta (The Peace of Nicias), the conflict continued through the indirect means of advisory efforts and peripheral campaigns. The campaign against Sicily altered the conflict dynamic and the destruction of the Athenian expeditionary force set the stage for a resumption of the war by Sparta that ultimately led to the defeat of Athens following the battle of Aegospotami nine years later. Evaluating the reasons for Athens' defeat (and the meaning of victory for Sparta) is an important goal of this lesson.

c. Thucydides' account trailed off in 411, in the twenty-first year of the war and almost seven years before the end of the war. Our knowledge of how the war ended is foreshadowed earlier in Thucydides' account (e.g., 2.65) and is summarized briefly in an epilogue to the edition of the book we have read. After it surrendered, Athens was stripped of its empire, its walls, and its fleet and was reduced to subservience to Sparta. Within two decades, however, Athens had partially rebuilt its empire, Sparta had mismanaged and lost most of its newly-won hegemony, and the Thebans rose to prominence in Greece. Their ascendancy was cemented in the climactic battle of Leuctra in 371 BCE, in which Thebes and its allies decisively defeated the Spartans on land, something no other Greek state had yet been able to accomplish. In the meantime, Persia increased its political influence and Macedonia slowly grew its power, so that by 350 BCE, under the leadership of Philip, it was ready to undertake the conquest of all of Greece.

2. Learning Objectives.

a. Analyze the sources, dimensions, and limits of power in a competitive international system.

b. Understand the dynamics of conflict termination on the basis of an evaluation of the Peace of Nicias.

c. Interpret the significance of the Melian Dialogue as a portrayal of the role of ethics in

the dynamics of strategic interaction.

d. Discuss the distinction between victory and defeat in war, including the role of empowered individuals and allies.

e. Synthesize the concept of war as elucidated in Thucydides' work and confer on its meaning for current and future strategy.

3. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks. None

b. Required Readings.

Robert B. Strassler, ed., *The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War* (New York: The Free Press, 1996). **[Student Issue]**

Unless otherwise noted, read the chapters listed below (chapters are annotated with book number, a period, then the chapter number, for example, "1.66"). You should also read the brief summaries at the beginning of the omitted chapters (located in the page margins).

(1) Book Four:

- 4.1-4.41 (223-246) (the Pylos affair)
- 4.78-4.88 (266-272) (Brasidas in Chalcidice)

(2) Book Five:

- 5.16-5.25 (310-316) (the Peace of Nicias)
- 5.84-5.116 (350-357) (the Melian Dialogue)

(3) Book Six:

- 6.1, 6.6-6.34 (361-379) (the Sicilian Expedition – the Athenian debate)
- 6.47-6.49 (387-388) (the Sicilian Expedition – Athenian strategic options)
- 6.89-6.92 (412-416) (Alcibiades in Sparta)

(4) Book Seven:

- 7.10-7.24 (432-440) (the Sicilian Expedition – the battle for Syracuse)
- 7.36-7.78 (448-478) (Athens' defeat in Sicily)
- Epilogue (549-554)

c. Suggested Readings.

(1) James A. Andrews, "Cleon's Hidden Appeals," *The Classical Quarterly* 50, no. 1 (2000): 45-62 in [[JSTOR](#)] (accessed 27 May 2015).

(2) Steven Forde, "Thucydides on Ripeness and Conflict Resolution," *International*

Studies Quarterly 48, no. 1 (March 2004): 177-195 in [[JSTOR](#)] (accessed 27 May 2015).

(3) Victor David Hanson, *A War Like No Other: How the Athenians and Spartans Fought the Peloponnesian War* (New York: Random House, 2005).

(4) Thomas Heilke, "Realism, Narrative and Happenstance, Thucydides' Tale of Brasidas," *The American Political Science Review* 98, no. 1 (February 2004): 121-127 in [[ProQuest](#)] (accessed 27 May 2015).

(5) Athanassios G. Platias and Constantinos Koliopoulos, *Thucydides on Strategy: Grand Strategies in the Peloponnesian War and their Relevance Today* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010).

(6) Donald Kagan, *Thucydides and the Reinvention of History* (New York: Viking, 2009).

(7) Richard Ned Lebow, *The Tragic Vision of Politics: Ethics, Interests and Order* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

(8) Lawrence A. Tritle, *A New History of the Peloponnesian War* (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010).

(9) Michael Whitby, *Sparta* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2002).

4. Points to Consider.

a. Should Athens have accepted the Spartan offer of a peace on terms following the capture of Pylos? Why or why not?

b. Why did each side eventually agree to the fifty-year treaty (Peace of Nicias)? What policy objectives had they achieved? Which ones had they not achieved? What conditions facilitate successful peace arrangements? Why does Thucydides describe the Peace of Nicias as a "treacherous armistice"?

c. What is the significance of strategic leadership in this account? What do the examples of Brasidas and Cleon suggest about effective relationships between political and military leaders?

d. Is the Melian Dialogue best understood as a case for political realism ("the strong do what they will") or as a cautionary tale about the brutalizing effect of protracted armed conflict and the abuse of power?

e. Was the Sicilian Expedition a good strategic choice executed badly, or was it a bad choice from the start? What can we learn about effective strategic leadership from a reading of Thucydides' text and the varied examples of leadership that he provides?

f. What, if anything, does the experience of Athens in the Peloponnesian War reveal about the kind of challenges democracies are likely to face in a protracted conflict with a determined, ideologically hostile adversary?

g. Analyze the role of Persia in the Spartan victory, Athenian defeat, and in the years following the war. How well did the Persians manage the “Greek War” to the furtherance of their national interests?

h. Assess the aftermath of the war and its long-term consequences. First Thebes, then Persia, and finally Macedon inherited the fruits of the Spartan victory. What does this tell us about the nature of victory in war?

5. Relationship to Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) Phase II Learning Areas.

a. JLA 1.a, b. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

b. JLA 2.a. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

c. JLA 3.e. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

6. Relationship to USAWC Institutional Learning Objective (ILO), Program Learning Objectives, (PLOs), Enduring and Special Themes.

a. ILO: Our graduates are intellectually prepared to preserve peace, deter aggression and, when necessary, achieve victory in war through studying and conferring on the great problems of national defense, military science, and responsible command.

b. PLOs: 1, 3, 4, 5, 8.

c. Enduring Themes: Relationship of Policy and Strategy (Relationship Between Ends, Ways, and Means), Instruments of National Power and Potential Contributions to National Security, Civil-Military Relations, Professional Ethics, History as a Vehicle for Understanding Strategic Choices and Alternatives.

LESSON 5: THE CAUSES OF WAR, MILITARY POWER AND THE USE OF FORCE

Mode: Seminar

TWS-5-S

1. Introduction.

a. This lesson examines the causes of war, military power and the use of force. The reason why wars occur is a significant topic in international relations theory and history; it is also an important subject in other disciplines such as anthropology and psychology. We will also explore what military power can accomplish to advance the interests of the state. Conversely, we also examine under what circumstances military power is poorly suited for this purpose. While we will address this topic throughout the course, it is best to introduce it early. Military power has specific traditional roles and an abundance of other potential uses, some legitimate and some not. Each has advantages and disadvantages for the strategic leader and strategist.

b. Another element of this lesson, which directly supports the discourse on the role of war, is the subject of how military power can be used. While the conventional perspective is to focus on military power as a means of effecting defeat through violence and damage to persons and property, political leaders do not always seek destruction as a means of attaining a policy objective. Thus, military power can be used in a number of ways other than using so-called "kinetic" measures. These components of security policy can include reassurance of allies and strategic partners through presence, and dissuasion, whereby a nation uses its military strength to preclude an adversary or potential adversary from seeking parity or surpassing it.

c. The nature of war is also a philosophical subject with immediate practical implications for the military leader and the strategist. Thomas Schelling, who received the 2005 Nobel Prize in economics for enhancing an understanding of conflict and cooperation using game-theory analysis, wrote in his classic work, *Arms and Influence*, that the concept of the power to hurt, as opposed to the power to seize and hold, is essential to understanding the nature of military power. From this distinction and working in an era under the Soviet nuclear threat, Schelling drew conclusions about coercion and deterrence theory and their relation to the human psyche that are essentially a different way of envisioning war and the political use of force.

2. Learning Objectives.

a. Analyze the causes of war using Geoffrey Blainey's argument as a foundation.

b. Analyze Schelling's concept of "hurting" as a violent diplomatic tool.

c. Analyze and evaluate the role of military power in international relations and its application.

3. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks. Read, understand, and analyze works about the role of war in its historical context and for its current and future application.

As you read, use the following questions to help organize your thoughts.

(1) How does the strategist define war? (What is war for?)

(2) Why should war be fought? (What is the object of war?)

(3) How should war be fought? (Offense vs. defense, long vs. short, etc.)

(4) How are wars won? (What constitutes victory and how is it achieved?)

(5) Based on your study of the theorists, identify concepts of enduring relevance that influence modern strategic thinking.

b. Required Readings.

(1) Geoffrey Blainey, "Power, Culprits and Arms," in *Conflict after the Cold War: Arguments on Causes of War and Peace*, ed. Richard K. Betts, 2nd ed. (New York: Longman, 2002). Note: Some students may receive an edition that is more recent.

[Student Issue]

(2) John F. Troxell, "Military Power and the Use of Force," 1-10.

[Blackboard]

(3) Thomas C. Schelling, "The Diplomacy of Violence," in *Arms and Influence* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966), 1-6, 12-34.

[Blackboard]

(4) Rupert Smith, "Direction: Setting the Purpose for the Use of Force," in *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World* (New York: Vintage Books, 2008), 308-334.

[Blackboard]

c. Suggested Readings.

(1) Robert J. Art and Kenneth N. Waltz, eds., *The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics*. 6th ed. (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2004).

(2) Daniel Byman and Matthew C. Waxman, *The Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign Policy and the Limits of Military Might* (New York: Cambridge University Press,

2002).

(3) Wendell John Coats, *Armed Force and Moderate Political Life: Essays on Politics and Defense, 1983-2008* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2009).

(4) Stephen D. Biddle, *Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006).

(5) Edward N. Luttwak, "Give War A Chance," *Foreign Affairs* 78, no. 4 (July/August 1999): 36-44.

(6) Quincy Wright, *A Study of War*. 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965).

(7) Colin McInnes and C. D. Sheffield, eds., *Warfare in the Twentieth Century: Theory and Practice* (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988).

(8) Patrick M. Cronin, *The Impenetrable Fog of War: Reflections on Modern Warfare and Strategic Surprise* (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2008).

(9) Angelo Codevilla, *War: Ends and Means* (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2006).

(10) David J. Lonsdale, *The Nature of War in the Information Age: Clausewitzian Future* (London: Frank Cass, 2004).

4. Points to Consider.

- a. What are the causes of war?
- b. What are the political purposes of military power?
- c. Does the use of force suggest a failure of diplomacy?
- d. Is force a last resort for a state? Or, is it a viable policy option at every step of the foreign policy process?
- e. Does Schelling's concept of using military force to hurt or coerce have practical applicability? How or why not?

5. Relationship to Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) Phase II Learning Areas.

- a. JLA 1. a, b, c. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.
- b. JLA 2.f Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

c. JLA 3.c, d. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

d. JLA 4.a, c. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

6. Relationship to USAWC Institutional Learning Objective (ILO), Program Learning Objectives, (PLOs), Enduring and Special Themes.

a. ILO: Our graduates are intellectually prepared to preserve peace, deter aggression and, when necessary, achieve victory in war through studying and conferring on the great problems of national defense, military science, and responsible command.

b. PLOs: 1, 3, 7, 8.

c. Enduring Themes: Relationship of Policy and Strategy, Instruments of Power and Potential Contributions to National Security, History as a Vehicle for Understanding Strategic Choices and Alternatives.

LESSON 6: VICTORY AND CONFLICT TERMINATION

Mode: Seminar

TWS-6-S

1. Introduction.

a. Today's lesson continues the process of thinking about the nature and character of war. It builds upon the previous lesson about what causes war. It explores conflict termination, conflict resolution, and what these terms mean for the strategist. In simple terms, the concept of victory forms the essence of effective strategy. The decision to terminate fighting, whether unilaterally or as part of a negotiated settlement, must be based on the ends, ways, and means that define the conflict in strategic terms. However, understanding when and how "victory" has been attained is essential. It is for good reason that Clausewitz observes in *On War* that "In war, the result is never final" (*On War*, 80). This leaves the conundrum of how the winner in war locks-in victory for the future, and thereby secures a better peace, even if only from the victor's own point of view (Liddell Hart, 353). Strategic victory, one that is capable of securing the peace by dealing with the underlying political causes of a conflict, still has a temporal aspect to it. We see these issues reflected in the ideas that strategy focuses on root causes and purposes as well as having a symbiotic relationship with time. Thus, the conditions under which fighting terminates have significant implications for post-conflict order due to their impact on the achievement of lasting desirable political results.

b. This observation takes us directly to the idea that conflict termination not only encompasses the formal end of fighting but also post-conflict transition as well. Thus, locking in victory requires extensive thought, planning, preparation, and resources in direct relation to the desired policy objective; otherwise one risks setting conditions where, as Geoffrey Blainey states, "victory is invariably a wasting asset" (*The Causes of War*, 294). But how does one achieve strategic victory in the face of today's increasingly uncertain and complex strategic environment in which threats come from multiple directions and the chameleon-like character of war can take many forms?

c. Armed conflict in the 21st century can often result from state failure while transnational threats emanate from ungoverned spaces within weak and failing states. In some cases, state failure and protracted conflict can give rise to embedded terrorism, with international terrorist organizations taking root in ungoverned territories. In many countries, under-governed or ungoverned spaces are really zones of contested authority where many groups—government forces, warlords, organized crime syndicates, guerrillas, terrorists and insurgents—struggle for control over a geographic area or its economic resources. Open-ended regional conflict can generate a dynamic of instability that may influence the vested interests of major states and either encourage or, in some

cases, inhibit outside intervention. The recent French intervention in Mali and the ongoing debate over Syria provide examples of different aspects of this strategic problem. The policy and strategy questions are complex. What defines winning and victory under these conditions?

d. Thus, whether we like it or not, the United States and its allies may find themselves in the position where successful post-conflict transition requires the reconstruction and even the restoration of political order in a weak or non-functional state. Successful stability operations, under these circumstances, require a civil-military commitment where strategic leaders have to navigate the inevitable tensions created between the need to create conditions of stability through peace-building interventions and longer-term developmental need—all in relation to the political objective(s) to be accomplished. In today's strategic environment, even if state-building is not the prime objective, strategists should not be surprised to find themselves involved in institution-building in order to secure a better peace. Thus, state-building may have a role in locking in strategic victory.

e. The lesson will begin with an overview of theories of victory, how to think about victory at the strategic level, and the post-conflict phase of wars. It will progress to an historical case study examining the conclusion of World War I in light of conflict termination theory, and then offer an explanation of the difference between state-building and nation-building after winning a successful war. The final two readings provide some thought-provoking commentary on the strategic difficulty of building or rebuilding failing or failed states and a contrarian view on why some great powers may actually prefer ungoverned spaces and failed states in certain situations, according to their own national interests.

2. Learning Objectives.

- a. Analyze the nature of conflict termination at the strategic level.
- b. Analyze theories of victory as they relate to strategic thought.
- c. Comprehend and analyze key conceptual schools associated with the state-building process.
- d. Analyze the local and international dimensions in resolving wars and achieving peace.

3. Student Requirements.

- a. Tasks. None
- b. Required Readings.

(1) J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr., ed. "A Theory of Victory," in *U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues*, 5th ed., vol. I: *National Security Policy and Strategy*

(Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, July 2012), 91-101 at: [<http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubid=1109>] (accessed 22 May 2015). **[Online]**

(2) Michael S. Neiberg, "To End All Wars? A Case Study of Conflict Termination in World War I," in *U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues*, 5th ed., vol. II: *National Security Policy and Strategy*, ed. J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, July 2012), 337-345 at: [<http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1110>] (accessed 22 May 2015). **[Online]**

(3) Nicolas Lemay-Hébert, "Statebuilding without Nation-building? Legitimacy, State Failure and the Limits of the Institutionalist Agenda," *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding* 3, no.1 (March 2009): 21-45 in [[Taylor&Francis](#)] (accessed 27 May 2015). Read page 23 (The Institutional Approach) – to page 35 (up to "....; both approaches imply interference), and pages 40-41 (Conclusion). **[Database]**

(4) Ken Menkhaus, "State Fragility as a Wicked Problem," *Prism* 1, no. 2 (March 2010): Read page 89 (Typologies by Type of Failure) – to page 98 in [http://cco.dodlive.mil/files/2014/02/6_Prism_85-100_Menkhaus.pdf] (accessed 27 May 2015). **[Online]**

(5) Jakub Grygiel, "Vacuum Wars," *The American Interest* (July/August 2009): 40-45 in [<http://www.the-american-interest.com/2009/07/01/vacuum-wars/>] (accessed 27 May 2015). **[Online]**

c. Suggested Readings.

(1) Rich Yarger, *Strategic Theory for the 21st Century: The Little Book on Big Strategy* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2006) at: [<http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/Pubs/display.cfm?pubid=641>] (accessed 22 May 2015).

(2) Dominic D. P. Johnson and Dominic Tierney, *Failing to Win: Perceptions of Victory and Defeat in International Politics* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006).

(3) Robert C. Orr, ed., *Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post- Conflict Reconstruction* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2004), See Part 1, 1-19.

(4) William Flavin, "Planning for Conflict Termination and Post-Conflict Success," *Parameters* 33 (Autumn 2003): 95-112 in [[ProQuest](#)] (accessed 27 May 2015).

(5) Shmuel Tzabag, "Termination of the Yom Kippur War between Israel and Syria: Positions, Decisions and Constraints at Israel's Ministerial Level," *Middle Eastern Studies* 37, no. 4 (October 2001): 182-205 in [[ProQuest](#)] (accessed 27 May 2015).

(6) J. Michael Greig and Patrick M. Regan, "When Do They Say Yes? An Analysis of the Willingness to Offer and Accept Mediation in Civil Wars," *International Studies Quarterly* 52, no. 4 (December 2008): 759-781 in [JSTOR] (accessed 27 May 2015).

(7) Colin S. Gray, *Defining and Achieving Decisive Victory* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2002) at [http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdf/files/pub272.pdf] (accessed 22 May 2015).

(8) Lien-Hang T. Nguyen, "Waging War on All Fronts: Nixon, Kissinger, and the Vietnam War, 1969-1972," in *Nixon in the World: American Foreign Relations, 1969-1977*, ed. Fredrik Logevall and Andrew Preston (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 185-203.

(9) Douglas Borer, "Victory in War: Foundations of Modern Military Policy," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 39, no. 1 (March 2009): 163-165 in [ProQuest] (accessed 27 May 2015).

(10) Paul Rexton Kan, "Making a Sandwich in Afghanistan: How to Assess a Strategic Withdrawal from a Protracted Irregular War," *Small Wars Journal* (February 24, 2011) at [http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/682-kan.pdf] (accessed 22 May 2015).

(11) James Dobbins, and Laurel Miller, "Overcoming Obstacles to Peace," *Survival* 55, no. 1 (February-March 2013): 103-120 in [Taylor&Francis] (accessed 27 May 2015).

(12) Amitai Etzioni, "Bottom-up Nation Building," *Policy Review* 158 (December 2009/January 2010): 51-62 in [ProQuest] (accessed 27 May 2015).

(13) Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart, *Fixing Failed States* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).

(14) William J. Durch, "Supporting Peace: The End," *Prism* 2, no. 1 (December, 2010): 43-56 at: [http://cco.dodlive.mil/files/2014/02/Prism_43-56_Durch.pdf] (accessed 22 May 2015).

(15) Greg Mills, "The Stabilization Dilemma," *Prism* 3, no. 4 (September, 2012): 77-89 at [http://cco.dodlive.mil/files/2014/02/prism76-89_mills.pdf] (accessed 22 May 2015).

4. Points to Consider.

a. What is victory? Is it imposing one's will? Is it creating a better peace? Is it merely the end of hostilities? Is victory situational? Is it conditional? Is it incremental? What conditions have to exist before a state can assess that it has achieved strategic victory? How do the concepts of nation-building and state-building affect this dynamic? Who defines victory and do other actors, including the defeated, have a say?

b. Is there a temporal aspect to victory? How long does a strategic success have to last before a state can declare victory? Do other actors, including the defeated, have a voice in this process? How do the concepts of nation-building and state-building affect this dynamic?

c. Is there a difference between winning and winning decisively? Why or why not?

d. Does the definition of victory change as a war continues? Can or should the definition change over time in a particular conflict? Why or why not?

e. How do strategists determine when their side has lost? Alternatively, how do strategists convince their adversary that they are beaten? Can a state attain military victory without securing political ends and vice versa?

f. What is the role of will in victory? Whose will counts? How is it expressed? What is the role of “will” in state-building or post-conflict resolution? How do culture and the concept of multiple perspectives affect state- building and/or post-conflict resolution?

g. What is nation-building and state-building? Can these two concepts be separated? Consider the differences between the two concepts of state-building: the “institutional” and the “legitimacy” approaches. How might the local dimensions of a conflict influence which approach becomes the main effort to “lock-in” victory?

h. How can external parties contribute to, or inhibit, a successful state-building process? Why would they choose one option over the other? How does international competition affect the United States’ and the international community’s approach to state-building or nation-building? How does this relate to the relationship between winning and victory?

5. Relationship to Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) Phase II Learning Areas.

a. JLA 1.a, b, c, d. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

b. JLA 2.b, c, e, f. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

c. JLA 3.a, c, d. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

d. JLA 4.a, c. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

e. JLA 5.a, b. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

6. Relationship to USAWC Institutional Learning Objective (ILO), Program Learning Objectives, (PLOs), Enduring and Special Themes.

a. ILO: Our graduates are intellectually prepared to preserve peace, deter aggression and, when necessary, achieve victory in war through studying and conferring on the great problems of national defense, military science, and responsible command.

b. PLOs: 1, 2, 4, 7, 8.

c. Enduring Themes: History as a Vehicle for Understanding Strategic Alternatives and Choices, Relationship Of Policy And Strategy (Relationship Between Ends, Ways, and Means), Civil-Military Relations.

LESSON 7: GEOPOLITICAL THEORY AND POWER

Mode: Seminar

TWS-7-S

1. Introduction.

a. The relative size, location and physical geography of a nation are fundamental to the way policymakers conceive threats, devise foreign and domestic policies, formulate strategies, and evaluate risks. While the marvels of modern technology have reduced some difficulties in communicating directions and projecting power, the tyranny of time, distance and climate, as well as the availability of human and material resources, still exert enormous influence on the capabilities and strategic options available to states. The purpose of this lesson is to introduce you to geopolitical theory and to familiarize you with its evolution since Swedish political scientist Rudolf Kjellén first coined the term in 1899.

b. Geopolitics has been a fact of international life since the beginning of recorded history. As Gearóid Ó Tuathail notes, however, the concept defies easy definition because its practitioners have framed the concept so differently since its inception. To geographers, geopolitics is a survey tool used to acquire a deep knowledge of territory, position and the people who occupy those spaces. For statesmen, geopolitics is shorthand for the influence of geography on policy choices guiding the conduct of statecraft, and as such is often viewed as falling in the Realist school of international relations theory, although the Liberal school clearly draws much from modern geopolitical thought. Strategists, sensitive to the deeper currents of history and the fixed realities of geography, formulate the long game of grand strategy by applying prescriptions of national power. These perspectives are not mutually exclusive, for they all possess in common an appreciation for the comparative advantages and limitations of a state's physical space and the influence of these factors on policy choices and strategy. As such, geopolitics is best considered an interdisciplinary field, with its practitioners drawing on multiple aspects of history, economy, demography, and social science.

c. The formal study of geopolitics began in the run-up to World War I when imperialist thinkers studied the world map with a view towards expanding political power against a field of rival empires. Two of this period's most notable theoreticians were U.S. naval historian Alfred Thayer Mahan, about whom you will study in Lesson 12, and British geographer Sir Halford J. Mackinder, who helped to develop the so-called Heartland thesis in response to the twin menace of a rising, unified Germany and the steady proliferation of rail lines in Russia. To Mackinder, the development of improved transportation networks would enable the Russians to consolidate their sprawling empire and threaten Britain's economic center of gravity, India, in a manner

undercutting Britain's sea power advantage.

d. During the interwar years, Karl Haushofer synthesized the work of Mackinder and others to become the leading light of German *Wehr-Geopolitik* which, when combined with Nazi Aryan race doctrines, formed the intellectual foundation of Hitler's expansive war aims. For a time, the association of geopolitical theory with imperialism and National Socialism brought the field into disrepute, even though various policies devised to contain Soviet expansion during the Cold War reflected Mackinder's appreciation for geography. Though never quite eliminated from the calculus of policymakers, geopolitical thought is enjoying a scholarly resurgence, brought about by rising global competition, environmental degradation, resource scarcity, and concerns for dwindling state capacity.

e. Because the relative quality and position of the terrain we inhabit constitute the most basic conditions affecting security and economy, geography strongly influences a nation's social organization, strategic culture and policies. French historian Fernand Braudel considered the *longue durée* – the slower and deeper currents of social interaction composed of "old attitudes of thought and action... dying hard, at times against all logic" – as playing continually in the background of human events. From this perspective one might link the Golden Horde's medieval domination of Kievan Rus to Russia's obsession with securing its 'near abroad,' a largely consistent foreign policy objective that has transcended the czarist, communist, and federation eras.

f. The analytical pull of geopolitics may tempt us to dismiss the role of human agency. Doing so, however, would be shortsighted because strategy formulation is an intrinsically human activity. Moreover, policy always remains the product of choices.

2. Learning Objectives.

a. Comprehend fundamental concepts underlying the relationships among physical geography, human geography, and national power.

b. Evaluate geography as a factor in the formulation of strategy and its influence on strategic leaders' thinking about threats to security and the attainment of national strategic aims.

c. Consider the role geographic position plays in the creation of foreign and domestic policies.

d. Consider U.S. strategy in the context of geopolitics.

3. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks. Be prepared to discuss the Points to Consider in Paragraph 4 below.

b. Required Readings.

(1) Halford J. Mackinder, "The Geographical Pivot of History," in *The Geopolitics Reader*, ed. Gearóid Ó Tuathail, Simon Dalby and Paul Routledge (London: Routledge, 1998), 27-31 at: [<http://frenndw.files.wordpress.com/2011/03/geopol-the-geopolitics-reader.pdf>] (accessed 22 May 2015). **[Online]**

(2) Saul Bernard Cohen, "Stages of Modern Geopolitics," in *Geopolitics of the World System* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), 12-29. **[Blackboard]**

(3) Colin Dueck, "The Return of Geopolitics," *Real Clear World* (July 27, 2013), at: http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2013/07/27/the_return_of_geopolitics_105345.html (accessed 22 May 2015). **[Online]**

(4) Robert D. Kaplan, "Geography Rules: It's All About Spheres of Influence," STRATFOR (August 21, 2013) at [<http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/geography-rules-its-all-about-spheres-influence>] (accessed 22 May 2015). **[Online]**

(5) Harsh V. Pant and Yogesh Joshi, "The American 'Pivot' and the Indian Navy," *Naval War College Review* 68, 1 (Winter, 2015), 47-69 at [<https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/ddacac3c-c6e2-4117-8e97-665d8e78d8eb/The-American--Pivot--and-the-Indian-Navy--It-s-Hed.aspx>] (accessed 22 May 2015). **[Online]**

c. Suggested Readings.

(1) Seongho Sheen, "Northeast Asia's Aging Population and Regional Security: 'Demographic Peace?'" *Asian Survey* 53, no. 2 (March/April 2013): 292-318.

(2) Henry Kissinger, "Realpolitik Turns on Itself," in *Diplomacy* (New York: Simon & Schuster), 137-167.

(3) Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Balancing the East, Upgrading the West: U.S. Grand Strategy in an Age of Upheaval," *Foreign Affairs* 91 no. 1 (January/February 2012): 97-104 in [[ProQuest](#)] (accessed 27 May 2015).

(4) Andrey V. Demidov, "Russia's Foreign Policy in the Emerging Global Order," *Journal of European Studies* 28, no. 2 (December 31, 2012): 1-10 in [[ProQuest](#)] (accessed 27 May 2015).

(5) Emre Erşen, "Geopolitical Codes in Davutoğlu's Views toward the Middle East," *Insight Turkey* 16, no. 1 (2014): 85-101 in [[ProQuest](#)] (accessed 27 May 2015).

(6) Gearóid Ó Tuathail, "Problematizing Geopolitics: Survey, Statesmanship and Strategy," *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 19, no.3 (1994): 259-272 in [[JSTOR](#)] (accessed 27 May 2015).

(7) Nicholas J. Spykman, "Geography and Foreign Policy, I," *The American Political Science Review* 32, no. 1 (February 1938): 28-50 in [\[JSTOR\]](#) (accessed 27 May 2015).

(8) Nicholas J. Spykman, "Geography and Foreign Policy, II," *The American Political Science Review* 32, no. 2 (April 1938): 213-236 in [JSTOR](#) (accessed 27 May 2015).

4. Points to Consider.

a. How does geographic position influence the formation of alliances? How do changes in resource availability influence strategic choices?

b. Mackinder describes the post-Columbian era as a closed system. What is the prospect for state conflict in a closed system?

c. For U.S. citizens, how might the geography of the United States influence our world view and, thus, our strategic choices? How might geography influence the worldview and strategic choices of other nations?

d. Robert Kaplan notes that ideological policy objectives are not always compatible with geographic realities. How does strategic culture influence the acceptance of strategic theory? How might we apply geopolitical analysis to the situation in Ukraine?

e. How might demography influence geopolitics?

5. Relationship to Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) Phase II Learning Areas.

a. JLA 1.a, b, c. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

b. JLA 2.c, f. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

b. JLA 4.a. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

c. JLA 5 a, b. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

6. Relationship to USAWC Institutional Learning Objective (ILO), Program Learning Objectives, (PLOs), Enduring and Special Themes.

a. ILO: Our graduates are intellectually prepared to preserve peace, deter aggression and, when necessary, achieve victory in war through studying and conferring on the great problems of national defense, military science, and responsible command.

b. PLOs: 1, 2, 7, 8, 10.

c. Enduring Themes: History as a Vehicle for Understanding Strategic Alternatives and Choices; Relationship of Policy and Strategy (Relationship between Ends, Ways, and Means).

BLOCK II

THEORIES OF WAR AND STRATEGY

This block moves from the general examination of strategy and war to address the more specific question of how to conduct war. As we study specific strategists and theorists, you should analyze how that strategist/theorist thinks about war; why he thinks wars should be fought, how he believes a state or a non-state should fight a war, and how he thinks wars are won.

We begin by considering what four major theorists, Clausewitz, the Prussian military thinker; Antoine Henri de Jomini, the Swiss military officer; Sun Tzu, the ancient Chinese philosopher of war; and Kautilya, an early Indian theorist of statecraft, have to say about the nature and character of war. We will look successively at their theories of war, their understanding of ends, ways, and means; and the relationship between war and policy. We will also consider how these theorists apply to modern warfare.

From this beginning, we proceed to consideration of specific types of war. First, we will explore domain theories of warfare, beginning with an examination of land power. What is it? How has theory about it changed since Jomini's foundational writings? How does it interact with the other traditional domains? Next, we will move into an analysis of the other traditional domains of sea and air power: Alfred Thayer Mahan (who was also a geopolitical theorist), Julian Corbett, Giulio Douhet, and others present their thoughts on sea power and air power, their employment, utility, and decisiveness. Space and cyber power theories are comparatively much newer but, arguably, just as strategically significant in the twenty-first century. How do they, and recent and classic thought on nuclear power, add to the strategist's intellectual toolkit? We also have a lesson on the subject of limited war, a topic that has regained relevance because of international concern about attainment of national strategic aims in a globalized world with increased interdependence and renewed nuclear proliferation. An examination of theories of insurgency and counterinsurgency are also part of this lesson. Finally, we will conclude the course with an exploration of contemporary thinkers who are studying strategy, power, and the future of war, including the salient theories of network warfare, unrestricted warfare, and strategic civil-resistance.

As we examine theories and theorists, we will continue to use the strategy construct – the relationship of ends, ways, and means – as a framework to guide our thinking. We will use historical examples to study various aspects of war and strategy. The ability to use historical analysis effectively and to assess the strategy of past conflicts is essential to progress as a strategic thinker. We are studying strategy at the national and theater levels and should strive to think expansively, creatively, and critically in dealing with the broad strategic problems. As British Field Marshal William Slim is supposed to have said, to be a strategist, you must know how to THINK BIG!

BLOCK II OBJECTIVES

- Analyze the writings of Clausewitz, Jomini, Sun Tzu, and Kautilya as foundational theorists of war and strategy for the contemporary strategic environment.
- Analyze theories of military power on the sea, in the air, and on land, comprehending their historical and contemporary strategic applications.
- Analyze theories of cyber, space, and nuclear power and their contemporary and future strategic applicability.
- Analyze the concept of limited war in the modern era, and assess the factors that constrain conflict in terms of ends.
- Analyze the theories of insurgency and counterinsurgency.
- Analyze the nature and character of war in the future and the implications for strategy formulation and execution.

LESSON 8: STRATEGIC CONSTRAINTS: JUST WAR, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND ETHICS

Mode: Seminar

TWS-8-S

1. Introduction.

a. War is never conducted in a vacuum, and many of the factors that influence its environment provide opportunities for, or impose constraints upon, strategic leaders and strategists. Understanding those factors is essential to success in the strategic arena. One of the largest, most effective (at least for traditional western strategy), and most potentially limiting strategic considerations is the moral philosophy of war and its major expression in the just war tradition and the laws of modern warfare. Today we will examine how the laws of war and just war theory impact strategic planning and decision-making.

b. The just war tradition is ancient. Warriors have always had some moral norm for issues like the treatment of women, children, and prisoners. This was often evident in terms of honor; some acts have commonly been deemed honorable, while others are dishonorable. The specifics of what is considered honorable may differ from age to age and culture to culture, but the concept is widespread, if not universal. What we study today as just war criteria is derived from Greek and Roman philosophy, Jewish and Christian theology, and secular military customs. Influential thinkers in the just war tradition include Cicero, Augustine, Aquinas, Vitoria and Grotius, along with modern ethicists Paul Ramsey, Michael Walzer, James Turner Johnson, and Anthony Coates.

c. International law and the law of armed conflict are closely related to the just war tradition. Some argue that international law is mere window dressing—usually based on the argument of the 17th century English philosopher Thomas Hobbes that “covenants, without the sword, are but words”— but it exists and affects state behavior as well as the behavior of many responsible non-state actors. With the creation of the International Criminal Court and its entering into force in 2002, international law is now designed to help end impunity for the perpetrators of the most serious crimes of concern to the international community.

d. One category of international law directly influences strategy: the laws of war. Laws of war are the international community’s attempt to codify morally-based traditions in internationally accepted laws—ideally embodied in universally accepted treaties. The first Geneva Convention covering the treatment of wounded on the battlefield was signed in 1864 and was followed by the more comprehensive Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907. From those early treaties, the laws of war have grown increasingly complex, comprehensive, multilateral, and intrusive on the sovereignty of nations. The intent, of

course, is to limit as much as possible the circumstances under which war can be initiated and to mitigate as much as possible the horrors of its conduct. The intent is thus unabashedly to constrain warfare and strategy, and as the law of war matures and becomes increasingly effective, the possibilities available to the strategist decrease. Reversing the trend is unlikely (and arguably also undesirable), so strategists must learn to work within the constraints imposed.

2. Learning Objectives.

- a. Analyze the strategic considerations inherent in the concept of just war.
- b. Analyze how international law affects the development and execution of strategy within the international system.
- c. Analyze the ways ethics, norms, and laws, impact the formulation and execution of strategy.

3. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks. None

b. Required Readings.

(1) J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr., ed. *U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues*, 5th ed., vol. II: *National Security Policy and Strategy* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, July 2012) at:

<http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB11110.pdf> (accessed 27 May 2015).

[Online]

(a) Martin L. Cook, "Ethical Issues in War: An Overview," 217-228.

(b) Thomas W. McShane, "International Law and the New World Order: Redefining Sovereignty," 229-244.

(2) Michael Waltzer, *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations*, 4th ed. (New York: Basic Books, 2000), 3-20.

[Blackboard]

c. Suggested Readings.

(1) Hans Kelsen, *Peace through Law* (New York: Garland Publishers, 1973).

(2) Francisco De Vitoria, "On the Law of War," In *Political Writings*, ed., Anthony Pagden and Jeremy Lawrence (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

(3) Geoffrey Best, *War and Law since 1945* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994).

(4) Paul Christopher, *The Ethics of War & Peace: An Introduction to Legal and Moral Issues* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1994).

(5) James Turner Johnson, *Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War: A Moral and Historical Inquiry* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981).

(6) David Scheffer, "Atrocity Crimes Framing the Responsibility to Protect," *Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law* 40, no. 1 and 2 (2008): 111-135 in [\[ProQuest\]](#) (accessed 27 May 2015).

(7) Gary Solis, *The Law of Armed Conflict* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

(8) Michael Byers, *War Law: Understanding International Law and Armed Conflict* (New York: Grove Press, 2005).

(9) John Fabian Witt, *Lincoln's Code: The Law's of War in American History* (New York: Free Press, 2012).

4. Points to Consider.

a. What does the Just War tradition attempt to achieve? Has it been an effective constraint on war-making?

b. How does international law differ from domestic law? What are the ramifications of those differences for strategic leaders?

c. Is international law effective? Why or why not? Why should a strategist consider it in his deliberations?

d. What should be changed in—or added to—current international law?

e. Do the laws of war impact considerations of ends, ways, means, and/or the FAS test? If so, how?

f. Define *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello*, and consider how, and to what degree, strategic leaders are impacted by each.

5. Relationship to Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) Phase II Learning Areas.

a. JLA 1. a. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

b. JLA 2. c. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

c. JLA 5. a, b, c, f, g Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

6. Relationship to USAWC Institutional Learning Objective (ILO), Program Learning Objectives, (PLOs), Enduring and Special Themes.

a. ILO: Our graduates are intellectually prepared to preserve peace, deter aggression and, when necessary, achieve victory in war through studying and conferring on the great problems of national defense, military science, and responsible command.

b. PLOs: 1, 2, 4, 8.

c. Enduring Themes: Relationship of Policy and Strategy, Instruments of Power and Potential Contributions to National Security, Professional Ethics, Civil-Military Relations, History as a Vehicle for Understanding Strategic Choices and Alternatives.

LESSON 9: CLAUSEWITZ—FOUNDATIONS OF STRATEGIC LANDPOWER

Mode: Seminar

TWS-9-S

1. Introduction.

a. This is the first of two lessons that focus on the classical underpinnings of landpower. For those steeped in the application of military power on land, the concept of landpower seems self-evident: our first ancestors exercised landpower, even if they did not know the term, when they used their fists, rocks, and clubs to defend themselves from predators (human or animal) or to acquire new hunting grounds. Additionally, for most of recorded history, strategy and the application of landpower were synonymous. Thus, practitioners of landpower may take the term for granted. However, for those less practiced in its application, the concept of landpower may not be readily transparent. This lesson, therefore, seeks to place landpower in its historical context, examine its theoretical foundations, and identify its contributions to modern warfare.

b. We begin this examination of landpower with the great Prussian philosopher of war, Carl von Clausewitz. Although Clausewitz did not use the term explicitly, war for Clausewitz was the application of landpower. Clausewitz entered Prussian military service as an officer cadet at the age of twelve and participated in the wars against revolutionary France and Napoleon. The defining moment in his life came in October 1806, when Napoleon's *Grande Armée* destroyed the vaunted Prussian army at the twin battles of Jena and Auerstädt and the ensuing pursuit. Clausewitz spent the rest of his life trying to come to grips with this traumatic event. His masterwork, *On War*, was his effort to understand the transformation of war from the limited dynastic wars of the 18th century to the national wars unleashed by the French Revolution and Napoleon.

c. *On War* is not easy to read. Writing in the style of 19th century German idealist philosophy, Clausewitz used a method known as the dialectic, in which opposite ideas (the thesis and the antithesis) are posed in contrast to one another. Moreover, Clausewitz wrote the book over many years, rarely a good thing for purposes of clear exposition. Lastly, Clausewitz died at the relatively young age of 51, and left behind notes indicating that he intended to revise his work. Unfortunately, the date of those notes is unclear. As a result, practitioners and scholars have been arguing about *On War* ever since.

d. The readings for the lesson begin with Book 1, Chapter 1, "What is War?" containing Clausewitz's two classic definitions of war ("an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will" and "the continuation of policy by other means"), as well as his famous concept of the "remarkable trinity" (violence, chance, and reason). You will want to read this chapter carefully, absorbing its language, rhythms, and logic. The "trinity," in particular, has been the source of a great deal of confusion and misinterpretation within U.S. military culture.

e. The next readings are from Book 8. In a note dated 10 July 1827, Clausewitz disclaimed, "Several chapters of it have been drafted, but they must not in any sense be taken in final form. They are really no more than a rough working over of the raw material, done with the idea that the labor itself would show what the real problems were." Nonetheless, this material represents some of his most refined thoughts on key theoretical concepts surrounding "absolute vs. real" war and the role of war as an instrument of policy.

f. The last group of readings from Book 1 delves more deeply into the problems that Clausewitz identified as part of the very nature of war (i.e., present in all times and in all ages): fog, friction, danger, and the role that the "genius" of the commander can play in overcoming them.

2. Learning Objectives.

- a. Analyze the meaning of war as an instrument of policy.
- b. Analyze Clausewitz's distinction between absolute and real war.
- c. Assess Clausewitz's theory of the "paradoxical trinity" and its application to current and future strategic problems.
- d. Analyze Clausewitz's concept of military genius and the role of the commander.

3. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks. None

b. Required Readings.

Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, eds. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976). **[Student Issue]**

READ (in order):

(1) Book One:

Chapter 1, "What is War?," 75-89.

Chapter 2, "Purpose and Means in War," 90-99.

(2) Book Eight
Chapter 2, "Absolute War and Real War," 579-581.
Chapter 3a, "Interdependence of the Elements of War," 582-584.
Chapter 3b, "Scale of the Military Objective and of the Effort to be Made," 585-586 (end of second full paragraph: "...whether these roles are united in a single individual or not.") and 593 (start of third full paragraph: "At this point our historical...")-594.
Chapter 6b, "War is an Instrument of Policy," 605-608.

(3) Book One
Chapter 3, "On Military Genius," 100-112. Chapter 4, "On Danger in War," 113-114.
Chapter 5, "Physical Effort in War," 115-116. Chapter 7, "Friction in War," 119-121.

c. Suggested Readings.

- (1) Michael Howard, *Clausewitz* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983).
- (2) Azar Gat, *The Origins of Military Thought: From the Enlightenment to Clausewitz* (New York: Oxford, 1989). See Chapters 6 and 7.
- (3) Antulio J. Echevarria II, *Clausewitz and Contemporary War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).
- (4) Hew Strachan and Andreas Herberg-Rothe, *Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century*, ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).
- (5) Stuart Kinross, *Clausewitz and America: Strategic Thought and Practice from Vietnam to Iraq* (London: Routledge, 2008).
- (6) Andreas Herberg-Rothe, "Clausewitz's Concept of Strategy: Balancing Purpose, Aims, and Means," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 37, 6, 903-925.
- (7) Janeen Klinger, "The Social Science of Carl von Clausewitz," *Parameters* 36, no.1 (Spring 2006): 79-89 in [\[ProQuest\]](#) (accessed 27 May 2015).
- (8) Robert M. Citino, "The Legacy of Clausewitz," in *The German Way of War* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2005), 143-47.

d. Optional Video Clips.

- (1) Chris Bassford, "Clausewitz's Trinity." 0:20, [\[http://www.clausewitz.com/Flash/FLVs/ROMP.htm\]](http://www.clausewitz.com/Flash/FLVs/ROMP.htm) (accessed 27 May 2015).

(2) Antulio Echevarria, "Clausewitz and Contemporary Warfare," July 16, 2014, *YouTube*, streaming video, 64:00 (start at 4:00) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QqtOsMXMwEo> (accessed 27 May 2015).

(3) Donald Stoker, "Clausewitz: His Life and Work," December 30, 2014, *YouTube*, streaming video, 46:03, [<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g8K312sz9to>] (accessed 27 May 2015). He addresses Clausewitz's experience as a soldier up to minute 26. If you want to focus on theory, see 26:00 to 46:03.

(4) For a differing interpretation of Clausewitz, see Jon Sumida, "Decoding Clausewitz: A New Approach to *On War*," CSpan, December 2, 2011, 10:46, <http://www.c-span.org/video/?303077-2/book-discussion-decoding-clausewitz> (accessed 27 May 2015).

4. Points to Consider.

a. What are Clausewitz's two definitions of war? Are the two definitions contradictory? How does war in reality differ from war on paper? What are the practical implications of each?

b. What is the trinity Clausewitz describes, and what is its applicability in the modern strategic environment?

c. What is "absolute war," according to Clausewitz, and how is it different from "real war?" Is "real war" interchangeable with "limited war?"

d. What are the key characteristics that Clausewitz identifies in an effective commander? Are the elements he discusses essential for today's commanders? At what level of command? Is any element obsolete today?

e. Given what you have read from Clausewitz, what is the relevance of Clausewitz's theory for both policymakers and strategists today?

f. Which areas of Clausewitzian theory do you think may be most susceptible to misinterpretation?

5. Relationship to Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) Phase II Learning Areas.

a. JLA 1.a, b, c, d. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

b. JLA 2.f. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

c. JLA 5.b, e. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

6. Relationship to USAWC Institutional Learning Objective (ILO), Program Learning Objectives, (PLOs), Enduring and Special Themes.

a. ILO: Our graduates are intellectually prepared to preserve peace, deter aggression and, when necessary, achieve victory in war through studying and conferring on the great problems of national defense, military science, and responsible command.

b. PLOs: 1, 2, 3, 4, 8.

c. Enduring Themes: Strategic Leadership and the Exercise of Discretionary Judgment, Relationship of Policy and Strategy (Relationship between Ends, Ways, and Means), Instruments of National Power and Potential Contributions to National Security, Civil-Military Relations, History as a Vehicle for Understanding Strategic Alternatives and Choices.

LESSON 10: JOMINI, CLAUSEWITZ, AND A THEORY OF LANDPOWER FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

Mode: Seminar

TWS-10-S

1. Introduction:

a. This lesson adds to our understanding of landpower by first addressing the seminal contributions of Baron Antoine Henri de Jomini, perhaps the most influential military thinker of the 19th and 20th centuries. Using extracts from his influential work, *The Art of War*, you will explore Jomini's ideas on war, strategy, and operational art, to include Jomini's considerable and continuing influence on U.S. Joint and Army doctrine.

b. In the second portion of the lesson, you will assess Jomini's principles by comparing and contrasting them with those of Clausewitz, as examined in the previous lesson.

c. The third element of the lesson examines a proposed theory of landpower for the 21st century. Such a theory is important because, while the nature of war may be immutable, the character of warfare is not. As warfare evolves beyond the concept of joint or even interdependent operations, national security professionals need a firm conceptual understanding of landpower if national and military leaders are to fully integrate and synthesize all aspects of military power into a coherent whole to serve national interests.

d. As you examine landpower as a theory, recall Clausewitz's observation: "Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult." (Book 1, Chapter 7, p. 119.) Consider, for example, that while the concept of landpower may be obvious to many, it is opaque to others. In exploring the theory of landpower, ask yourself: What is it? How should we define the concept in modern terms? What constitutes landpower? How might landpower interact with the theories of the air, cyberspace, sea, and space power?

2. Learning Objectives:

a. Analyze the ideas of Antoine Henri de Jomini and their utility to the modern student of war, policy, and strategy.

b. Compare and contrast the key tenets of Clausewitz and Jomini.

c. Comprehend a modern theory of landpower and assess its value for modern warfare.

d. Establish a basis for the future assessment of the relationships of landpower with

and among theories of air, cyberspace, sea, and space power that will follow.

3. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks. None.

b. Required Readings.

(1) John Shy, "Jomini," in *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 143-155 in **[Student Issue]**

(2) Extracts, Antoine Henri Jomini, *The Art of War*, Translated from the French by Capt. G.H. Mendell, Corps of Topographical Engineers, U.S. Army, and Lieut. W.P. Craighill (Corps of Engineers, U.S. Army. Originally published in 1862) from Jomini, *The Art of War*, Memphis TN: Bottom of the Hill Press, 2011, pp. 8-20 and 36-39.

[Blackboard]

(3) William T. Johnsen, "Toward a Theory of Landpower for the 21st Century."

[Blackboard]

(4) Christopher Bassford, "Jomini and Clausewitz: Their Interaction." An edited version of a paper presented to the 23rd Meeting of the Consortium on Revolutionary Europe at Georgia State University February 26, 1993, at:

[\[http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/Bassford/Jomini/JOMINIX.htm\]](http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/Bassford/Jomini/JOMINIX.htm) (accessed 26 May 2015).

[Online]

c. Suggested Readings:

(1) Col. (ret.) Michael R. Matheny, Ph.D., "The Roots of Modern American Operational Art" (n.d.), at:

http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/army-usawc/modern_operations.pdf.

(accessed 26 May 2015).

(2) Headquarters, Department of the Army, *The Army*, ADP-1, (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, September 17, 2012), at:

[\[http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/adp1.pdf\]](http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/adp1.pdf) (accessed 26 May 2015).

(3) Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Unified Land Operations*, ADP 3-0 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, October 10, 2011), at:

[\[http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/adp3_0.pdf\]](http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/adp3_0.pdf) (accessed 26 May 2015).

(4) William T. Johnsen, *Re-Examining the Roles of Landpower in the 21st Century and Their Implications*. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, November 2014.

<http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1237> (accessed 26

May 2015).

(5) Michael Evans, *The Continental School of Strategy: The Past, Present, and Future of Land Power*, Land Warfare Studies Centre Study Paper No. 305 (Duntroon ACT, Australia: Land Warfare Studies Centre, 2004).
<http://www.army.gov.au/Our-future/Publications/Research-Papers/StudyPapers/SP305>
(accessed 26 May 2015).

(6) Harry Richard Yarger, "Land Power: Looking Towards the Future through a Green lens," *Strategic Review* (Winter 1999): 22-30 [**USAWC library periodical holdings**].

(7) Optional Video Clip. "Albert Comments on Jomini and Clausewitz," November 18, 2010, *YouTube*, streaming video, 8:39, [https://youtu.be/82_INcKwToo] (accessed 27 May 2015).

4. Points to Consider.

a. Jomini is generally considered the father of western operational theory, although he believed himself to be a strategist. Do Jomini's views on war and strategy remain valid? Can we extrapolate from his operational ideas into the realm of modern strategy?

b. Where do Clausewitz and Jomini converge? Diverge? Does it matter?

c. What are the strengths and weaknesses of landpower in the modern strategic environment?

d. Consider the next two decades. Are we moving beyond joint operations into something else? What might that be?

e. What constitutes a theory of landpower in the 21st century?

5. Relationship to Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) Phase II Learning Areas.

a. JLA 1. a, b, c, d. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

b. JLA 2.a, f. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

c. JLA 5.b, c. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

6. Relationship to USAWC Institutional Learning Objective (ILO), Program Learning Objectives, (PLOs), Enduring and Special Themes.

a. ILO: Our graduates are intellectually prepared to preserve peace, deter aggression and, when necessary, achieve victory in war through studying and conferring on the great problems of national defense, military science, and responsible command.

b. PLOs: 1, 2, 3, 7, 8.

c. Enduring Themes: Strategic Leadership and the Exercise of Discretionary Judgment, Relationship of Policy and Strategy (Relationship between Ends, Ways, and Means), Instruments of National Power and Potential Contributions to National Security, Civil-Military Relations, History as a Vehicle for Understanding Strategic Alternatives and Choices.

25 September 2015
(0830-1130)
Dr. Paul Kan, 245-3021
Dr. Larry Goodson 245-3176

LESSON 11: ANCIENT MASTERS – SUN TZU AND KAUTILYA

Mode: Seminar/Lecture

TWS-11-L/S

1. Introduction.

a. Although Clausewitz enjoys a hallowed place in the canon of theorists of war and strategy, strategic thought did not begin with him. Twenty-five centuries earlier, the Chinese philosopher Sun Tzu (also known as Sun Zi) formulated a theory of war (*The Art of War*) that is the earliest existing work about military affairs. While present-day scholars generally understand Sun Tzu's writing to have evolved during the last half of the 4th century BCE, that the chapters were written at different times, and that it was likely the effort of more than one person, this work has influenced modern thinking on strategy as much as Clausewitz or others you will read in this course. We will begin our lesson today with a Bliss Hall lecture explaining the historical and personal context of Sun Tzu's life and times.

b. Sun Tzu begins his book on strategic thought with the observation that war is of vital importance to the state and deserves thorough study. Best known for aphoristic comments on how to conduct war—such as “All warfare is based on deception” (p.66)—Sun Tzu's work should not be understood simply as a collection of proverbs. Instead, his style of writing is a form of wisdom literature, a philosophical guide through which the student learns the art of generalship by internalizing certain principles. A state must sometimes go to war to protect its interests and conceivably to ensure its survival, but war is the final option, and when taken, it should be conducted with the slightest effort and risk, with the least expenditure of resources and loss of life. The most adept general, therefore, is the one who can defeat the enemy without fighting. Along with Clausewitz and others, Sun Tzu's writing has had a substantial influence on Chinese military strategy in the past two millennia, and *The Art of War* occupies an important place in East Asian intellectual history. Mao Zedong, the Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party and of the People's Republic of China, deemed Master Sun's tenet that if one knows oneself and one's adversary, one will not be vanquished in a thousand battles (p.84), to be of immense value. Mao accorded this precept the status of a “scientific truth.” Western military leaders and thinkers have also embraced Master Sun's work. So valued is Sun Tzu in China and around Asia, that the leaders of today's China see him as a cultural icon that can be exported as a part of “soft power” along with other towering Chinese figures like Confucius.

c. Kautilya (also known as Chanakya) wrote his treatise *Arthashastra* (often translated from the Sanskrit as *The Science of Polity*) in the 4th century BCE. As is the case with Sun Tzu, the text is likely the product of his work and later modifications by

his followers. Regardless, Kautilya served as an advisor to the Indian king Chandragupta Maurya, founder of the Maurya Empire (ruled circa 320 BCE – 298 BCE). The purpose of the *Arthashastra* was to educate the king on how to rule and inform him of the elements necessary for maintaining power while undermining the capabilities of his enemies. In other words, it is a manual of statecraft. While the text discusses bureaucratic administration of the state like other texts of this type of political writing (called “mirrors for princes”), it pays particular attention to war, preparation for it, and its successful execution. Kautilya’s instructions are considered a forerunner of political realism (*realpolitik*), earning him comparison with the great Italian Renaissance thinker Machiavelli and his work, *The Prince*, for its practical insights. In some ways Kautilyan theory also foreshadows Bismarckian diplomacy that characterized the second half of the 19th century in Europe.

2. Learning Objectives.

- a. Comprehend Sun Tzu’s theory of war and compare it to Kautilya’s theories.
- b. Analyze and synthesize the fundamental concepts of both theorists in light of rising Asian power, and assess their value to the modern student of war, policy, and strategy.

3. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks. None.

b. Required Readings.

(1) Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, trans. Samuel Griffith (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), 63-110. **[Student Issue]**

(2) Roger Boesche, “Kautilya’s *Arthashastra* on War and Diplomacy in Ancient India,” *The Journal of Military History* 67, no. 1 (January 2003): 9-37 in [\[ProQuest\]](#) (accessed 26 May 2015). **[Database]**

c. Suggested Readings.

(1) Mark McNeilly, *Sun Tzu and the Art of Modern Warfare* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003).

(2) Michael I. Handel, *Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought*, 3rd ed. (Portland, OR: Cass, 2001).

(3) Chester W. Richards, *A Swift, Elusive Sword: What if Sun Tzu and John Boyd Did a National Defense Review?* (Washington, DC: Center for Defense Information, 2003).

(4) Farid Ahmed Bhuiyan, "Sun Tzu, Kautilya and Clausewitz: A Brief Study of Asian and Non-Asian Strategic Thoughts," in *Mirpur Papers*, no. 5, ed. Muhammad Siddique Alam (Mirpur Dhaka, Bangladesh: Defence Services Command and Staff College, 1998).

(5) Robert E. Neilson, *Sun Tzu and Information Warfare: A Collection of Winning Papers from the Sun Tzu Art of War in Information Warfare Competition* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1997).

(6) Michael I. Handel, *Sun Tzu and Clausewitz: The Art of War and On War Compared* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1991).

(7) Charles Chao Rong Phua, "From the Gulf War to Global War on Terror—A Distorted Sun Tzu in US Strategic Thinking?", *RUSI Journal* 152, no. 6 (December 2007): 46-53.

(8) Kautilya, *The Arthashastra*, edited, rearranged, translated, and introduced by L.N. Rangarajan (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 1992).

(9) Roger Boesche, *The First Great Political Realist: Kautilya and his Arthashastra* (Lanham, MD: Lexington, 2002).

(10) P.K. Gautam, "Relevance of Kautilya's Arthashastra," *Strategic Analysis*, 37, no. 1 (January/February 2013): 21–28 in [[Taylor&Francis](#)] (accessed 27 May 2015).

(11) Rashed Uz Zaman, "Kautilya: The Indian Strategic Thinker and Indian Strategic Culture," *Comparative Strategy* 25, no.3 (2006): 231-247 in [[Taylor&Francis](#)] (accessed 27 May 2015).

(12) Torkel Brekke, "Wielding the Rod of Punishment – War and Violence in the Political Science of Kautilya," *Journal of Military Ethics* 3, no. 1 (2004): 40-52 in [[Taylor&Francis](#)] (accessed 27 May 2015).

(13) George Modelski, "Kautilya: Foreign Policy and International System in the Ancient Hindu World," *American Political Science Review* 58, no. 3 (September 1964): 549-560 in [[JSTOR](#)] (accessed 27 May 2015).

(14) Michael Warner, "The Divine Skein: Sun Tzu on Intelligence," *Intelligence and National Security* 21, no. 4 (August 2006): 483-492.

(15) Edward O'Dowd and Arthur Waldron, "Sun Tzu for Strategists," *Comparative Strategy* 10, no. 1 (1991), 25-36 in [[Taylor&Francis](#)] (accessed 27 May 2015).

(16) Glenn K. Cunningham, "Eastern Strategic Traditions: Un-American Ways of War," in *U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues*, 5th ed., vol. I:

Theory of War and Strategy ed. J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, June 2012): 133-141 at [<http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubid=1109>] (accessed 26 May 2015).

4. Points to Consider.

- a. If war is of vital interest to the state, what are the political leader's and the general's motives for conducting war in the manner Sun Tzu advocates?
- b. What lessons does Sun Tzu have for contemporary strategic leaders regarding unconventional warfare?
- c. Does Sun Tzu promote a form of Just War theory (during war and in its aftermath)?
- d. How does Sun Tzu understand the relationship between the political leader and the general (i.e., civil-military relations)?
- e. What lessons do Kautilya and/or Sun Tzu offer contemporary strategic leaders regarding unconventional or irregular warfare?
- f. Does Kautilya's concept of permanent war fit the modern democratic state or the current international order?
- g. What elements of Kautilya's and Sun Tzu's theories do you find useful for modern strategists? Are there anachronistic elements? Are there ideas that are too culturally specific to their time and place?

5. Relationship to Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) Phase II Learning Areas.

- a. JLA 1.c. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.
- b. JLA 2.c. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.
- b. JLA 5.e. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

6. Relationship to USAWC Institutional Learning Objective (ILO), Program Learning Objectives, (PLOs), Enduring and Special Themes.

- a. ILO: Our graduates are intellectually prepared to preserve peace, deter aggression and, when necessary, achieve victory in war through studying and conferring on the great problems of national defense, military science, and responsible command.
- b. PLOs: 1, 3, 4, 8.

c. Enduring Themes: History as a Vehicle for Understanding Strategic Alternatives and Choices, Relationship Of Policy And Strategy (Relationship Between Ends, Ways, and Means, Civil-Military Relations).

LESSON 12: THEORIES OF SEA POWER

Mode: Seminar

TWS-12-S

Britain's sea power...lay not just in the navy or the battlefleet, but in the effective integration of her administration, political system, army, colonies and maritime economy towards the ends of the state.

—Richard Harding

1. Introduction.

a. Today's lesson examines the nature and utility of sea power as a tool of grand strategy. Although nations have been using organized seagoing forces for well over two millennia, there were very few comprehensive theories on how to employ those forces until U.S. theorist Alfred Thayer Mahan wrote in the late 19th century. The fundamental question that theorists had to deal with was how sea power differed from landpower in their respective impacts on national interests. Put another way, since people live on land, how do military and commercial power at sea affect national welfare? Mahan surveyed history to address the factors that contribute to a nation's potential sea power, noting the need for careful investment and preparation in proportion to strategic vulnerability. British theorist Julian Corbett, a near contemporary of Mahan, also tackled the vagaries of maritime strategy. Using similar methodologies and sources, he came to different conclusions about the nature of sea power and its relationship to grand strategy, which Corbett called "Major Strategy." His sophisticated recognition of the interrelationships of various continental, maritime, and ultimately air strategies inform modern views on grand strategy. John Gooch summarizes the vast amount of work by these two fundamental theorists, noting that their theories became the basis of thought regarding sea power throughout much of the 20th Century. Such classic theory remains indispensable for placing the development of modern warfare into context. Our task is to comprehend the theories significance in our own time and mold that knowledge to serve our ends.

b. Sea power offers intrinsic advantages of adaptability, flexibility, and mobility on, under, and over an environment that covers 71% of the earth's surface and which surrounds continental lands. However, that quality is a limitation as well as a source of advantage. Except for those rare strategic contexts wherein naval warfare, power projection ashore, or coercive diplomacy by naval means alone can generate adequate strategic effect for war termination, sea power can only be an enabler. As the example of ancient Athens and Sparta offers, maritime power encounters intrinsic difficulties dealing with great continental power. Sea power's primary contributions are to obtain the use of the sea for friendly forces while denying the same to the enemy. Beyond those simple strategic goals, sea power enables the application of landpower at the time and place that

offers the best strategic opportunity, and it offers a long-term and effective means of economic inducement or, if necessary, strangulation. The distinctive role of sea power provides the means for a great power to “manipulate the placement, the timing, and, in great measure, the weight of the strategic centers of gravity on the land.” Joseph Caldwell Wylie, “Military Strategy,” *Classics of Sea Power* (Annapolis: US Naval Institute Press, 1989), 133.

c. Geoffrey Till, a contemporary naval historian and maritime theorist, argues that globalization is the key feature of the strategic environment at the beginning of the current century. How governments approach globalization will determine grand strategy as well as defense and maritime policies, and therefore the composition and use of navies. Globalization has significant defense implications, bringing with it unfamiliar threats to the sea-based trading system. In dealing with those threats, two competing schools of thought exist, offering differing visions of the nature of sea power in the 21st century. Hence, Till notes two tendencies in the title of the chapter you will read.

d. Hew Strachan explores the inherent difficulty facing strategists in defining and differentiating maritime and naval strategies within the greater sphere of military strategy and its place within a national strategy. Noting that the evolution of sea power was linked more to the development of economic and legal theory rather than military theory, he attempts to put sea power in its proper place “athwart the line between strategy and national policy.” This then provides us a bridge to future lessons, particularly regarding nuclear power. How does the element of deterrence present in the undersea leg of the nuclear triad fit within naval strategy as part of a national policy for prevention of war (or its escalation from the conventional)?

2. Learning Objectives.

- a. Analyze the theories of Alfred Thayer Mahan and Julian Corbett and assess their utility to the modern student of war, policy, and strategy.
- b. Evaluate the relationship between geography, landpower, and sea power.
- c. Analyze modern theories of sea power and their relevance to contemporary warfare.
- d. Analyze the emerging roles and challenges of sea power in the 21st Century.

3. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks. None.

b. Required Readings.

(1) John Gooch, “Maritime Command: Mahan and Corbett,” in *Seapower and Strategy*, ed. Colin S. Gray and Roger W. Barnett (Annapolis, MD: US Naval Institute Press, 1989), 27-45.

[Blackboard]

(2) Geoffrey Till, "Seapower in a Globalized World: Two Tendencies," in *Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century*, 3rd ed. (London and New York: Routledge, 2013), 27-44. **[Blackboard]**

(3) Hew Strachan, *The Direction of War*, (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 151-165. **[Student Issue]**

c. Suggested Readings.

(1) A.T. Mahan, "Discussion of the Elements of Sea Power," in *The Influence of Sea Power upon History: 1660-1783* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1890).

(2) Philip A. Crowl, "Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Naval Historian," in *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 444-477.

(3) Colin S. Gray, "Mahan was (Mainly) Right," *Modern Strategy* (Oxford University Press, 1999), 217-227.

(4) Julian S. Corbett, *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy* (New York, Longmans, Green and Co., 1911).

(5) Michael I. Handel, "Corbett, Clausewitz, and Sun Tzu," *Naval War College Review* 53, no. 4 (Autumn 2000): 106-124 in [\[ProQuest\]](#) (accessed 28 May 2015).

(6) Liam J. Cleaver, "The Pen behind the Fleet: The Influence of Sir Julian Stafford Corbett on British Naval Development, 1898-1918," *Comparative Strategy* 14, no. 1 (January-March 1995): 45-57 in [\[Taylor&Francis\]](#) (accessed 28 May 2015).

(7) Geoffrey Till, "Who said what and why it matters," in *Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century*, 3rd ed. (London and New York: Routledge, 2013), 45-86.

(8) David Jablonsky, ed., *The Roots of Strategy: Book 4* (Stackpole Books, Mechanicsburg, PA, 1999), 47-52.

(9) Norman Friedman, "The Cold War as a Maritime War," in *Seapower as a Strategy: Navies and National Interests* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2001), 201-207.

(10) Geoffrey Till, "A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower: A View from Outside," *Naval War College Review* 61, no. 2 (Spring 2008): 25-38 at: [\[http://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/5ee8dc34-ad28-4817-b76c-8b453365ba61/-Cooperative-Strategy-for-21st-Century-Seapower,-A.aspx\]](http://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/5ee8dc34-ad28-4817-b76c-8b453365ba61/-Cooperative-Strategy-for-21st-Century-Seapower,-A.aspx) (accessed 26 May 2015).

(11) Colin S. Gray, *The Leverage of Sea Power* (New York: The Free Press, 1994).

(12) John Lehman, *Command of the Seas* (New York: Scribner, 1988).

(13) Eric Grove, *The Future of Sea Power* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1990).

(14) Bernard Brodie, "Sea Power in Modern War" and "The Air Arm of Sea Power," in *A Guide to Naval Strategy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1944), 1-15 and 210-213, 224-229.

4. Points to Consider.

a. What differentiates Corbett's theories from Mahan's theories? Which theorist has had more influence on the development of sea power over time? Which is more applicable today?

b. How do Mahan and Corbett view sea power as an element of grand strategy?

c. What aspects of sea power have remained constant over time? Does technology change the nature of sea power or only the "grammar?"

d. Has the proliferation of modern domains reduced the impact/importance of geography to sea power?

e. How do Till's thoughts on sea power compare to Mahan's and Corbett's theories? How does globalization influence modern sea power?

f. What are the roles of navies in modern warfare? How do changes in the geostrategic environment influence maritime strategy?

g. In what ways do information warfare, intelligence, and asymmetric capabilities play a role in modern sea power? Can the center of gravity on land still be effectively manipulated through the use of sea power?

5. Relationship to Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) Phase II Learning Areas.

a. JLA 1.a, b, c. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

b. JLA 3.a, c, f. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

6. Relationship to USAWC Institutional Learning Objective (ILO), Program Learning Objectives, (PLOs), Enduring and Special Themes.

a. ILO: Our graduates are intellectually prepared to preserve peace, deter aggression and, when necessary, achieve victory in war through studying and conferring on the great problems of national defense, military science, and responsible command.

b. PLOs: 1, 4, 6, 7, 8.

c. Enduring Themes: History as a Vehicle for Understanding Strategic Alternatives and Choices, Relationship of Policy and Strategy (Relationship between Ends, Ways, and Means), Instruments of National Power and Potential Contributions to National Security.

LESSON 13: THEORIES OF AIR POWER

Mode: Seminar

TWS-13-S

In my view, air power is an immense entity in itself, but it is interlocked with sea and land power, and all three are interdependent.

—Lord Tedder Marshal of the RAF
Deputy Supreme Commander Allied Expeditionary Forces, WWII
(from *Air Power in War*)

1. Introduction.

a. In evaluating any military instrument of power it is essential to understand the theory or theories upon which its utility rests. What is the mechanism that links the use of military power with the political objective that one seeks to achieve by its use? In this particular case, how does the use of air power contribute to the political aims an actor is seeking to achieve, either in wartime or in peacetime? What is the role of air power in deterrence and coercive diplomacy? How does air power interact with other instruments of power--as a tool of deterrence and as a tool of war-fighting?

b. This lesson opens with a discussion about the evolution of aviation as an instrument of power, and the theories that underscore the use of air power. In addition to providing a bit of historical grounding, the first part of the lesson asks you to pare your thinking right back to the most fundamental theoretical assumptions about the way air power affects an enemy's fighting behavior and structures an enemy's incentives. (Nuclear forces and nuclear deterrence will be covered later in a subsequent lesson, so here we will be focusing mainly on conventional air power--but you ought to think about the coercive power of nuclear weapons).

c. How did the presence of airplanes change the way field commanders had to conceptualize the battlespace? What advantages do aircraft convey to those who employ them in war? Why is it so important to be able to protect your own airspace and penetrate your adversary's airspace? Who were some of the key theorists as aviation began to develop? What did they believe? Why? How did their environment--the historical forces shaping the era in which they lived--influence their thinking and their assumptions? Why did many of them believe that long-range bombing, in particular, would have a radical (indeed revolutionary) impact on war?

d. Many of the early air power theorists who emphasized strategic bombing were not explicit about articulating the details of their theories of victory. In other words, they did not tend to spell out the linkage between the dropping of bombs and the capitulation of the

enemy. A key part of your task in this lesson is to analyze the claims these theorists made, and the assumptions upon which these claims rested. What social and political factors may have influenced their assumptions? To what extent do these early assumptions (or echoes of them) still affect and/or influence contemporary thinking about the use of air power?

e. As you discuss air power as a coercive tool, you must evaluate how its coercive leverage might affect a particular adversary. Here you must understand the significance of an adversary's domestic power structure, resource utilization, sources of resilience and resistance, and civil-military relations.

f. Most nations adopting aircraft as instruments of military power saw early and sometimes ongoing struggles over the question of who should own and control aircraft. There was no simple answer to this question, leading to a myriad of individual outcomes in different places. This struggle was largely unavoidable since aircraft proved, very quickly, to be essential assets in nearly all realms of warfare. The problem is not unlike the contemporary problem of cyber or space assets today: they are extremely useful, so everyone wants them.

g. In the post-9/11 world, the US has found itself up against non-state actors who try to shape behavior through the infliction of terror. How have air assets been employed to cope with this threat? What were its strengths and weaknesses in the wars the U.S. fought in Afghanistan and Iraq?

h. What are the larger implications of the extensive use of unmanned aerial vehicles for targeted killing? What are the strategic arguments for and against the use of drones in the battle against Al-Qaeda and its affiliates?

i. The readings include a brief survey of historical events, which also includes text from several important air power theorists. As you read the survey of history and theory, pay particular attention to the quoted text. It is important that you learn to read such text with an exceptionally analytical eye. On which assumptions are these theorists resting their arguments? What evidence do they muster to support their claims?

j. Colin Gray's analysis of air power, from his book *Explorations in Strategy*, provides a general guide to the advantages and limitations of air power. What do you think of his analysis overall? Can you think of any other advantages or limitations that he overlooked?

k. Mark Bowden's article in *The Atlantic* (August 2013) offers an overview of the development of drones, and an analysis of their utility and their drawbacks. Read this carefully. Unmanned aerial vehicles are here to stay and their roles will expand and evolve over time. You need to understand the theories that animate their use and the ethical implications that come along with their use.

2. Learning Objectives.

a. Evaluate the impact of aircraft upon warfare as it emerged and then evolved in the

20th and 21st centuries. Be able to identify and explain key roles that aircraft, including unmanned aerial vehicles, perform as instruments of military power.

b. Evaluate the claims of the early advocates of independent air power and strategic bombing. On what did they base their ideas? How were they shaped by their environment/experience?

c. Evaluate how military services have learned, over time, to cooperate in the control of aerial assets and the allocation of aerial resources.

d. Analyze the role of aerial weapons in supporting strategic deterrence. What role does air power, including unmanned aerial vehicles, play in coercive diplomacy? What ethical implications must be considered?

3. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks. None

b. Required Readings.

(1) Tami Davis Biddle, "The Airplane and Warfare: Theory and History" (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, October 2013). **[Blackboard]**

(2) Colin Gray, "The Advantages of Air Power," in *Explorations in Strategy* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1996): 67-77 in [\[Praeger\]](#) (accessed 28 May 2015). **[Database]**

(3) Giulio Douhet. *The Command of the Air*, translated by Dino Ferrari (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1998) (Reprint of original English edition) at: [\[http://www.afhso.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-100924-017.pdf\]](http://www.afhso.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-100924-017.pdf) (accessed 26 May 2015). **[Online]**

Read:

Book One, Part 1
7-10, "The New Possibilities"
15-19, "The Offensive Arm"
24-28, "The Command of the Air"

(4) Mark Bowden, "The Killing Machines: How to Think about Drones," *The Atlantic Monthly* (14 August 2013): 58-70. [\[http://search.proquest.com/docview/1432140920/fulltextPDF/79256856B1484DC4PQ/5?accountid=4444\]](http://search.proquest.com/docview/1432140920/fulltextPDF/79256856B1484DC4PQ/5?accountid=4444) (accessed 26 May 2015). **[Database]**

c. Suggested Readings.

(1) Clayton K. S. Chun, *Aerospace Power in the Twenty-First Century: A Basic Primer* (Colorado Springs, CO and Maxwell AFB, AL: U.S. Air Force Academy in cooperation with Air University Press, July 2001) at: http://aupress.au.af.mil/digital/pdf/book/b_0080_chun_aerospace_power_primer.pdf (accessed 26 May 2015).

(2) Eliot Cohen, "The Mystique of US Air Power," *Foreign Affairs* 73, no. 1 (January/February 1994): 109 in [\[ProQuest\]](#) (accessed 28 May 2015).

(3) David Maclsaac. "Voices from the Central Blue: The Air Power Theorists," in *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986).

(4) Barry D. Watts, *The Foundations of US Air Doctrine: The Problem of Friction in War* (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1984) at: [\[http://aupress.au.af.mil/bookinfo.asp?bid=52\]](http://aupress.au.af.mil/bookinfo.asp?bid=52) (accessed 26 May 2015).

(5) Robert A. Pape, *Bombing to Win* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996).

(6) Conrad C. Crane, "Raiding the Beggar's Pantry: The Search for Airpower Strategy in the Korean War," *Journal of Military History* 63, no. 4 (October 1999): 885-920 in [\[ProQuest\]](#) (accessed 28 May 2015).

(7) Tami Davis Biddle, *Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare: The Evolution of British and American Ideas about Strategic Bombing, 1914-1945* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002).

4. Points to Consider.

a. How have theories about the employment of air power in war been shaped by the period in which they were created?

b. What is the relationship between air power theory and technological innovation?

c. Why does a strategist considering the use of air power need to know a lot about the domestic political structure of an adversary?

d. What are the strategic advantages and liabilities associated with UAV's and drones? What are the ethical ramifications associated with the strategic employment of drones?

5. Relationship to Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) Phase II Learning Areas.

a. JLA 1.a, b. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

b. JLA 3.a. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

6. Relationship to USAWC Institutional Learning Objective (ILO), Program Learning Objectives, (PLOs), Enduring and Special Themes.

a. ILO: Our graduates are intellectually prepared to preserve peace, deter aggression and, when necessary, achieve victory in war through studying and conferring on the great problems of national defense, military science, and responsible command.

b. PLO's 1, 3, 4, 8.

c. Enduring Themes: Relationship of Policy and Strategy, Instruments of National Power and Potential Contributions to National Security, History as a Vehicle for Understanding Strategic Choices and Alternatives.

LESSON 14: NUCLEAR WEAPONS, SPACE, AND CYBERPOWER THEORIES

Mode: Seminar

TWS-14-S

1. Introduction.

a. As we learned in the previous Airpower lesson, technology always has the potential to open new domains and new styles of warfare. In many cases, the tactical and operational effectiveness and potential of new systems or the opening of new domains becomes apparent before the strategic implications of what has happened are readily understood. For the strategist, as Colin Gray points out in his article, “War – Continuity in Change and Change in Continuity,” it is a case where “every new set of technological marvels brings with it specific novel challenges.” That brings us to the topic of today’s lesson: the impact of space, cyber and nuclear theories on 21st century international security and politics and their relationship to war.

b. Even before the Soviet Union tested its first atomic weapon in 1949, scholars were debating the employment of these weapons in state vs. state warfare. In this debate, the predominant leaders in military theory and strategy were a group of academicians, economists, mathematicians, physicists, and political scientists. The ideas of these “Wizards of Armageddon,” as Fred Kaplan called them, influenced U.S. policy and nuclear strategy even to the present day and subsequently migrated into non-nuclear theory. However, the collapse of the Soviet Union saw the hope rise that the threat of nuclear war was a thing of the past, thus rendering concepts in nuclear strategy and military doctrine such as massive retaliation, mutual assured destruction, and second strike a part of Cold War history. Such hope now seems premature, at best.

c. Technology, both in the development of “new tech” in the form of antiballistic missile systems, and in the proliferation of “old tech,” as witnessed by the active pursuit of nuclear weapons by North Korea and Iran, has led to a reconsideration of the role of nuclear weapons in national strategy. For example, in the Defense Department’s 2012 strategic guidance, “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense,” the Pentagon underscored concerns about proliferation and use of nuclear weapons and fissile components and reemphasized the importance of maintaining a “safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent.” Strategic leaders and strategists are rediscovering the importance of deterrence theory. Related concepts such as legitimacy, dissuasion, and assurance are still viable in the strategic arena although their use is more nuanced and has been modified to address specific challenges—such as the so-called tailored deterrence. Thus, today’s aspiring strategist must understand the historic basis for elements of nuclear theory in order to adapt or develop theories and concepts for confronting the challenges of the 21st century, including terrorism.

d. After two nervous hours on a Tuesday in April 2011, the crew of the International

Space Station was given the “all clear.” Previously, NASA had warned the crew to begin making plans to take shelter in the Russian Soyuz capsule as debris from a Chinese weather satellite was tracked to be coming dangerously close to the station and the crew. Four years earlier, the Chinese had destroyed the satellite with an anti-satellite weapon. At the time, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman stated, “There's no need to feel threatened about this” and argued that “China will not participate in any kind of arms race in outer space.” Should the United States and other space powers take these assurances seriously? What role does space have in future conflicts? How should space as a domain be incorporated into national and military strategies?

e. National security professionals must be fully aware of how the space domain can be used in any potential military conflict. U.S. history draws attention to how space capabilities underpin its global leadership; the space enterprise, for example, is embedded in the fabric of the nation's economy. Space power has also come to play an increasingly important role for the military services. Global situational awareness via satellites provides the ability to plan and respond effectively to potential challenges, to monitor arms control agreements, and to facilitate strategic deterrence. Space capabilities serve as a force multiplier in military operations as well as providing a unique advantage in force projection.

f. In October 2012 a cyberattack shut down the Saudi oil company ARAMCO and in 2013 a hackers penetrated the Navy Marine Corps Internet (NMCI). Both of these hacks are attributed to Iran's growing presence in the cyber domain. A few days after the bombings at the Boston Marathon in April 2013, the Associated Press reported via Twitter, “Breaking: Two Explosions in the White House and Barack Obama is injured.” The Dow Jones Industrial lost nearly 150 points; \$136 billion of equity disappeared. The AP's Twitter account, whose feed had been integrated into the reporting algorithms of the New York Stock Exchange a few days prior, was hacked by a group calling itself the Syrian Electronic Army, allowing it to tweet the fake message. Fortunately, the loss in national wealth was short-lived as stocks recovered their value within three minutes. But how do we place a context around what happened within those three minutes? Was this a salvo in a cyberwar initiated by the Syrian regime or a prank done by an unaffiliated group for “lulz” (a corruption of “lol”, “laugh out loud”)? There is a sense of seriousness about these episodes that reveals the genuine limits of our understanding of the cyber domain in the national security arena.

g. Given its recent emergence, manmade origins, and constantly changing nature, cyberpower presents newfound challenges that prompt national security professionals to reach for comfortable and familiar approaches and analogies. Cyberattacks occur almost every nanosecond every day and require cybersecurity. National leaders warn of a cyberwar and cyberterrorism that may lead to a potential cyber Pearl Harbor. To prevent such an occurrence requires cyberdefense or even some sort of cyber deterrence. Some argue for cyber arms control among the major powers to limit what types of cyberattacks can be perpetrated against another country. All of these concepts are a retrofitting of those used in the physical domains to describe violent acts and ways to respond to them. How, then, do we build strategies that successfully incorporate the new cyber domain?

h. Unifying all three major topics for today's lesson is the impact technology has on

national security issues. Clausewitz states that what remains peculiar to war is simply the peculiar nature of its means and that these means will never do more than modify the political aims of an actor (Clausewitz, 87). It is clear from the above examples that space, cyber, and nuclear power provide ways and means with which to achieve strategic effects. However, in terms of military or grand strategy, when it comes to the use of power for the achievement of a strategic objective (END), what has changed with the advent and evolution of these technology-based domains? Thus, the fundamental question before us asks whether these domains offer the possibility of changing the fundamental nature of war or, given that war is a human endeavor, are they nothing more than new manifestations of the chameleon-like character of war? (Clausewitz, 593)

2. Learning Objectives.

- a. Analyze theories of nuclear weapons, space power, and cyberpower and assess their value for modern students of war, policy, and strategy.
- b. Discuss on the future of space and cyberpower and their relevance as domains in 21st century international security and politics.
- c. Analyze modern deterrence theories and their implications for war in the current century.

3. Student Requirements.

- a. Tasks. Review the Troxell reading from TWS Lesson 5.
- b. Required Readings.

(1) Polly M. Holdorf, "Limited Nuclear War in the 21st Century," in *A Collection of Papers from the 2010 Nuclear Scholars Initiative*, Washington D.C.: CSIS, 2011
http://csis.org/files/publication/110916_Holdorf.pdf (accessed 26 May 2015). **[Online]**

(2) John J. Klein, "Corbett in Orbit: A Maritime Model for Strategic Space Theory," *Naval War College Review* 57, no. 1 (Winter 2004): 59-71 in [\[ProQuest\]](#) (accessed 28 May 2015). **[Database]**

(3) Therese Delpech, "Space and Cyberdeterrence," in *Nuclear Deterrence in the 21st Century*, Santa Monica, CA.: Rand Corporation, 2012
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2012/RAND_MG1103.pdf
(accessed 26 May 2015). **[Online]**

(4) Paul Rexton Kan, "Cyberwar in the Underworld: Anonymous versus Los Zetas in Mexico," *Yale Journal of International Affairs* (Winter 2013): 40-50 at:
<http://yalejournal.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Kan.pdf> (accessed 26 May 2015). **[Online]**

(5) Amit Sharma, "Cyber Wars: A Paradigm Shift from Means to Ends," *Strategic*

Analysis 34, no. 1 (February 04, 2010): 62-73 in [[Taylor&Francis](#)] (accessed 28 May 2015). **[Database]**

(6) CYLANCE, *OPCLEAVER*, (CYLANCE, December 2014), http://www.cylance.com/assets/Cleaver/Cylance_Operation_Cleaver_Report.pdf (accessed 26 May 2015) 5-17 (through Attribution),63-66. **[Online]**

(7) Adam Elkus, "Artificial Intelligence: War's New Grammar," 6 March, 2014, linked from *War on the Rocks* at <http://warontherocks.com/2014/03/artificial-intelligence-wars-new-grammar/> (accessed 26 May 2015). **[Online]**

c. Suggested Readings.

(1) Thomas Rid, "Cyber War Will Not Take Place", *Journal of Strategic Studies* 35, no. 1 (February 2012): 5-32 in [[Taylor&Francis](#)] (accessed 28 May 2015).

(2) John Stone, "Cyber War Will Take Place," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 36, no. 1(February 2013): 101-108 in [[Taylor&Francis](#)] (accessed 28 May 2015).

(3) Timothy Junio, "How Probable is Cyber War? Bringing IR Theory Back In to the Cyber Conflict Debate," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 36, no. 1(February 2013): 125- 133 in [[Taylor&Francis](#)] (accessed 28 May 2015).

(4) Bruce M. DeBlois, ed., *Beyond the Paths of Heaven: The Emergence of Space Power Thought* (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1999) at: [<http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA421934>] (accessed 26 May 2015).

(5) Chris Demchak, "Hacking the Next War", *American Interest* (September/October 2012) in [[AmericanInterest](#)] (accessed 26 May 2015).

(6) Parmy Olson, *We Are Anonymous*, (New York: Little and Brown, 2012).

(7) James Wood Forsyth, "What Great Powers Make It: International Order and the Logic of Cooperation in Cyberspace," *Strategic Studies Quarterly* (Spring 2013): 93- 110 at: http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/digital/pdf/spring_13/forsyth.pdf (accessed 26 May 2015).

(8) Nazli Choucri, *Cyberpolitics and International Relations* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2012).

(9) Peter Singer and Allan Friedman, *Cybersecurity and Cyberwar* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014).

(10) Colin Gray, *Making Sense of Cyber Power: Why the Sky is Not Falling*, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2014).
<http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/download.cfm?q=1147> (accessed 26 May 2015)

(11) Michael Howard, "Brodie, Wohlstetter, and American Nuclear Strategy," *Survival* 34, no. 2 (Summer 1992): 107-116 in [[TaylorandFrancis](#)] (accessed 26 May 2015)

(12) Keith B. Payne, "On Nuclear Deterrence and Assurance." *Strategic Studies Quarterly* 3, no. 1 (Spring 2009): 43-80 in [[ProQuest](#)] (accessed 28 May 2015).

(13) Richard K. Betts, "The Lost Logic of Deterrence: What the Strategy that Won the Cold War Can—and Can't—Do Now," *Foreign Affairs* 92, no. 2 (March-April 2013): 87-99 in [[ProQuest](#)] (accessed 28 May 2015).

(14) Colin S. Gray, *Maintaining Effective Deterrence*. (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2003). See v-xi and 1-27.
<http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdf/files/pub211.pdf> (accessed 26 May 2015).

(15) Colin S. Gray "Strategy in the Nuclear Age: The United States, 1945-1991," in *The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States, and War*, ed. Williamson Murray, Macgregor Knox, and Alvin Bernstein (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 579-613.

(16) Colin S. Gray, "Into Orbit: Revolutions in Military Affairs (RMAs), Space and Cyberspace," in *Modern Strategy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999): 243-272

(17) Peppi DeBioso, "Proliferation, Missile Defense and the Conduct of Modern War," *Comparative Strategy* 25, no. 3 (2006): 157-171 in [[Taylor&Francis](#)] (accessed 28 May 2015).

(18) Bernard Brodie, *Strategy in the Missile Age*. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1959).

(19) Albert Wohlstetter, "The Delicate Balance of Terror," *Foreign Affairs* 37, no. 2 (January 1959): 211-234.

(20) Herman Kahn, *On Thermonuclear War*. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1960).

(21) Henry A. Kissinger, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*. (New York: W. W. Norton, 1969).

(22) Michael S. Gerson, "Conventional Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age,"

Parameters 39, no. 3 (Autumn 2009): 32-48 in [[ProQuest](#)] (accessed 28 May 2015).

(23) Nikolai N. Sokov, "Why Russia Calls a Limited Nuclear Strike 'De-Escalation'," linked from *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* at <http://thebulletin.org/why-russia-calls-limited-nuclear-strike-de-escalation> (accessed 26 May 2015).

(24) Hans Rühle, "Deterrence in an Increasingly Nuclear World," *Comparative Strategy* 32, no. 2 (2013): 93-97 in [[TaylorandFrancis](#)] (accessed 26 May 2015).

(25) Nart Villeneuve, Ned Moran, Thoufique Haq and Mike Scott, *Fireeye Special Report: Operation Saffron Rose*, (Fireeye, 2013), <https://www.fireeye.com/resources/pdfs/fireeye-operation-saffron-rose.pdf> (accessed 26 May 2015).

4. Points to Consider.

a. Could a limited nuclear exchange accomplish a political purpose other than retaliation? What are the ethical dilemmas of using nuclear weapons associated with retaliation or first use?

b. What is the role of nuclear weapons as a deterrent in the current international security environment? Are the concepts associated with classic nuclear strategy still effective in the 21st century?

c. What are the limits of nation-state power and authority in the cyber domain? How much control should a government have over cyberspace? Are there easily identifiable lines between private and public in cyberspace? What sort of cyber attack constitutes a war and what constitutes a crime?

d. What are the strategic features of the cyber domain/environment? In what ways is the cyber environment similar or different from other environments? Are any theories about the strategic use of the other domains useful to apply when thinking about space and cyberspace?

e. Is strategy an art, a science, or does it contain elements of both? Can a future war be fought only in space or only in cyberspace? What are the interactions with the other domains?

f. How is deterrence different from coercion, dissuasion, or other uses of power? What are the implications of deterrence theory for 21st century strategists? How do space, cyber and nuclear capabilities affect or influence the uses of power? Could an attack utilizing one domain warrant a response in another?

g. What is the relationship between technology/science and warfare? How might changes in this relationship affect the nature, character, or characteristics of war?

5. Relationship to Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) Phase II Learning Areas.

- a. JLA 1. a, b, c, d. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider
- b. JLA 3. d. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider

6. Relationship to USAWC Institutional Learning Objective (ILO), Program Learning Objectives, (PLOs), Enduring and Special Themes.

a. ILO: Our graduates are intellectually prepared to preserve peace, deter aggression and, when necessary, achieve victory in war through studying and conferring on the great problems of national defense, military science, and responsible command.

b. PLOs: 3, 4, 7, 8.

c. Enduring Themes: Relationship of Policy and Strategy (Relationship Between Ends, Ways, and Means); Instruments of National Power and Potential Contributions to National Security; Instruments of War and National Security; Professional Ethics; History as a Vehicle for Understanding Strategic Choices and Alternatives; Understand the International environment, particularly the 'security paradox' posed by positive global trends potentially subject to increasingly dangerous threats; Evaluate the relevance of post-9/11 experience with respect to anticipated future challenges.

LESSON 15: LIMITED WAR THEORY, INSURGENCY, AND COUNTERINSURGENCY

Mode: Seminar

TWS-15-S

1. Introduction.

a. Clausewitz argued that all wars are limited by their very nature; otherwise they would escalate to unlimited commitment of all existing resources regardless of political objective. His famous maxim, “War is the continuation of policy by other means,” emphasizes that political objectives shape the conduct of war; when political objectives are limited, then the conduct of war too, is normally limited. States can intentionally limit war by emphasizing political, moral, or other considerations, even at the expense of reducing their operational or tactical effectiveness, as both the Introduction to Strategic Studies course and the Ethics lesson of this course highlight.

b. Disparities in the ends for which states fight can create strategic imbalances in war, as in cases where one of the adversaries seeks unlimited destruction but the other seeks only territorial control. This clear-cut definition, however, creates theoretical problems. Some wars begin as limited wars and become less limited. Other wars become more limited over time in their ends; in the Korean War, for example, the United States and its coalition partners abandoned their objective of eliminating North Korea as a state through the use of military means after China intervened. Other conflicts featured limited aims on one side but not on the other; in World War II, for example, the United States fought in the Pacific theater in order to destroy the Japanese regime, while Japan fought for the more limited goal of hegemony over eastern China and the western Pacific.

c. In this lesson, you will be introduced to one of the founding theorists of modern limited war theory, Robert E. Osgood. Writing in the shadow of the Korean War and the expansion of nuclear weapons, Osgood attempted to offer an updated, American-centric interpretation of Clausewitz’s initial observations on the nature of limited military conflict. The strategic problem of how to limit war in an age of thermonuclear weapons, although rooted in the context of the Cold War in his book, still linger today. It may be as salient in the early 21st century as it was in the 1950s.

d. The Korean War was not, however, America’s first limited war. Shortly after the founding of the Republic and despite George Washington’s advice to the contrary, the young United States found itself embroiled in the affairs of a Europe convulsed by the advent of the French Revolution. The “Quasi-War with France,” fought in the earliest days of our nation, serves as an example that has set guideposts for limited wars throughout American history. The Quasi-War itself occurred during an age when the character of war was changing immensely in Europe, as the reading by R.R. Palmer illustrates. His chapter on Frederick the Great offers an historical case study in limited war that offers insights into the contemporary international order. Throughout much of the 18th century, the

dynastic system and Enlightenment philosophical era limited both war's ends and means in a world with many strategic parallels to our own. Schlomo Brom's chapter on Israel's involvement in the Second Lebanon War offers a contemporary examination of limited war that similarly yields insights into its nature, its modern character, and possible implications for the immediate future; he emphasizes the frustration of achieving unlimited political ends with limited means in a war against a non-state adversary.

e. Clearly, limited war is not simply a subject of historical interest. Recently, there has been considerable discussion among military officers and academics about limited war and nuclear escalation in South Asia as well as the relationship between deterrence and limited war in the Middle East if Iran becomes a state with nuclear weapons. Further, war can be a model of limited confrontation between a non-state actor (such as a terrorist or guerrilla group) and a state or coalition of states, with the ensuing difficulty of defining and achieving political and military objectives in this type of confrontation. It can also involve a non-state actor, like ISIS, fighting for unlimited aims with limited means against a coalition that has limited both its means and its ends. Essentially, we must ask how limits imposed from both within and without impact the formulation of strategy.

f. In the second half of the lesson you will examine topics that some scholars argue are subsets of limited wars: insurgencies, guerrilla warfare, terrorism, and counterinsurgencies. Guerrilla warfare as a technique used by an inferior power against a superior power is as old as war itself. The addition of a nationalistic element during the French Revolution and a set of theoretical writings in the twentieth century turned a tactical technique into a strategic way. As members of militaries that fight insurgencies, we must understand the theories that underlie insurgencies and guerrilla warfare before we can develop effective counter-strategies. We must also understand that not all irregular wars and insurgencies are limited in their ends, especially from the perspective of the irregular or insurgent.

g. Irregular or guerrilla warfare may simply be a technique used by an efficiently organized, politically or ideologically motivated, and effectively-led group of dedicated insurgents. Such was the case for Chinese insurgent leader—and later Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party—Mao Zedong. Successful insurgents (those who last long enough to cause major problems for states) tend to be more than simply armies of the disaffected. They invariably have a political, ideological, or religious grievance that strikes enough of a chord in the minds of the population in which they operate to generate acquiescence if not support. Effective insurgent movements tend to aim for unlimited ends like the overthrow of a state, and frequently do not feel bound by the same set of rules by which the government plays. This gives them a certain freedom of choice and makes available types of “unlimited” actions (like kidnappings, torture, summary executions, or terrorism) that a state fighting an insurgency cannot adopt without losing its most basic advantage—legitimacy. Insurgents usually operate in small groups in complex terrain and are difficult to locate. Intelligence is at a premium in a counterinsurgency; it is also difficult to obtain when the insurgents are even modestly competent. As Anthony Joes points out, successful prosecution of irregular warfare by either insurgents or counterinsurgents requires patience, motivation, strong leadership, popular support, and most significantly, good strategy. It can also involve a non-state actor, like ISIS, fighting for total aims with limited means against a coalition that has limited both its means and its ends. Essentially,

we must ask how limits imposed from both within and without impact the formulation of strategy.

h. Finally, in this lesson we will analyze the two major schools of thought related to counterinsurgency (COIN). In the last thirteen years the United States and its allies have engaged in and, depending on one's perspective, become more proficient at counterinsurgency warfare in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Yet what, exactly, COIN is at the strategic level is still hotly debated within the U.S. Department of Defense, among coalition partners' joint staffs, and in the halls of academe. The Austin Long reading will first revisit some of the basic fundamentals of insurgency in order to think hard about how to develop effective strategies against them. Then it will explore the two dominant interpretations regarding how to defeat insurgency (the "hearts and minds" approach vs. the "incentive/disincentive" approach), compare them to other extant theories, and examine their constituent elements.

2. Learning Objectives.

a. Comprehend the theoretical foundations of limited war in the modern era, and assess the factors that may limit a conflict in terms of securing national interests.

b. Evaluate how political and military objectives, economic ends and means, international law, and cultural mores influence the execution of strategy in limited wars.

c. Analyze the natures and strategies of insurgency and COIN in their historical and contemporary contexts.

d. Comprehend the two principal theories of counterinsurgency.

3. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks. None

b. Required Readings.

(1) Robert E. Osgood, *Limited War: The Challenge to American Security* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), 1-4, 9-10. **[Blackboard]**

(2) Mao Tse-tung, "What is Guerrilla Warfare?" in Mao Tse-tung on *Guerrilla Warfare*, Fleet Marine Force Reference Publication (FMFRP) 12-18 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Navy, 1989), 41-50 at: <http://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/FMFRP%2012-18%20%20Mao%20Tse-tung%20on%20Guerrilla%20Warfare.pdf> (accessed 26 May 2015). **[Online]**

(3) Anthony J. Joes, "Guerrilla Strategy and Tactics," in *Resisting Rebellion: The History and Politics of Counterinsurgency* (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2006), 10-23 in **[EBSCOHOST]** (accessed 28 May 2015). **[Database]**

(4) JP-1, *Doctrine of the Armed Forces of the United States* (25 March 2013), 6- 7

(Scan Only) at: http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1.pdf (accessed 23 June 2014).

[Online]

(5) Austin Long, "COIN Theory: What Are Insurgencies and How Does One Fight Them?", in *On Other War Lessons from Five Decades of RAND Counterinsurgency Research* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2006), 21-30 at:

<http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG482.html> (accessed 26 May 2015). [Online]

c. Focused Readings.

(1) R.R. Palmer, "Frederick the Great, Guibert, Buelow: From Dynastic to National War," in Peter Paret, ed., *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984): 91-105. [Online]

(2) Schlomo Brom, "Political and Military Objectives in a Limited War Against a Guerrilla Organization," in *the Second Lebanon War: Strategic Perspectives*, ed. Schlomo Brom and Meir Elan (Tel Aviv: Institute for National Security Studies, 2007), 13-23 at: [http://www.inss.org.il/uploadimages/Import/\(FILE\)1285063319.pdf](http://www.inss.org.il/uploadimages/Import/(FILE)1285063319.pdf) (accessed 28 May 2015). [Online]

d. Suggested Readings.

(1) Ingo Truschweizer, "Atomic Weapons and Limited War," in *The Cold War U.S. Army: Building Deterrence for Limited War* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2008), 41-80.

(2) Christopher Gacek, *The Logic of Force: The Dilemma of Limited War in American Foreign Policy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994).

(3) Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov, *The Israeli-Egyptian War of Attrition, 1969-1970: A Case-Study of Limited Local War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980).

(4) Jay Luvaas, "Frederick the Great: The Education of a Great Captain," in *The John S. Biggs Cincinnati Lectures in Military Leadership and Command, 1986*, ed. Henry S. Bausum, (Lexington, VA: VMI Foundation, 1986), 23-27.

(5) Gregory E. Fehlings, "America's First Limited War," *Naval War College Review* 53, no. 3 (Summer 2000): 101-132 in [ProQuest] (accessed 26 May 2015).

(6) Max Boot, "The Evolution of Irregular War: Insurgents and Guerrillas from Akkadia to Afghanistan," *Foreign Affairs* 92, no. 2 (March-April 2013): 100-114 in [ProQuest] (accessed 28 May 2015).

(7) Vo Nguyen Giap, *People's War, People's Army* (New York: Praeger

Publishers, 1967).

(8) Anthony J. Joes, *America and Guerrilla War* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2000).

(9) Anthony J. Joes. *Urban Guerrilla Warfare* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 2007).

(10) Robert R. Mackey, *The Uncivil War: Irregular Warfare in the Upper South, 1861-1865* (Norman Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 2004).

(11) Jeffrey Record, *Beating Goliath: Why Insurgences Win* (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2007).

(12) I.F.W. Beckett, *Modern Insurgencies and Counter-insurgencies: Guerrillas and Their Opponents since 1750* (New York: Routledge, 2001).

(13) David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (New York: Praeger, 1964), 63-86.

(14) John A. Nagl, *Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam: Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife* (Westport CT: Praeger, 2002).

(15) Che Guevara, "Guerrilla Warfare: A Method," in *Guerrilla Warfare* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1998), 142-158.

(16) Anthony J. Joes, "Elements of a Counterinsurgent Strategy," in *Resisting Rebellion: The History and Politics of Counterinsurgency* (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2006), 232-246 in [[EBSOHOST](#)] (accessed 28 May 2015).

(17) Kori Schake, "Lessons from the Indian Wars" Policy Review 177 (February-March 2013): 71-79 at [<http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/139421>] (accessed 26 May 2015).

(18) Roger Trinquier, *Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency*, trans. Daniel Lee (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), 43-60, 67-93.

(19) Steven Metz, *Learning From Iraq: Counterinsurgency in American Strategy* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2007) at: [<http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdf/files/pub752.pdf>] (accessed 26 May 2015).

(20) Andrew J. Birtle, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1860-1941* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center for Military History, 1998).

4. Points to Consider.

a. How does the factor of time influence the waging of limited war? Does time favor one party to the conflict over the other?

b. Has technological advantage on the part of one of the parties in a limited war led to an overreliance on military means and a failure to set realistic political objectives? How do domestic and international public opinion as well as international norms (legitimacy, international law) limit the waging of war?

c. George F. Kennan argued that the basis of U.S. foreign policy in the post-World War II era should be the “long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansionist tendencies.” How does such a policy relate to the concept of limited war against non-state actors and guerrilla organizations today?

d. How does the miscalculation of the enemy’s intent affect the conduct of limited war? Do mistaken calculations and assessments weaken deterrence as the principal theory underlying limited war?

e. Using the wars of Frederick the Great and his contemporaries as examples, how do economics, societal norms, and political or strategic culture limit wars?

f. Using the ends-ways-means paradigm, how would you explain a conflict as a limited war on the part of one side but not the other, as in the case of the Second Lebanon War?

g. How does Mao Zedong define guerrilla war and its nature?

h. What is the relationship between guerrilla warfare and political goals in Mao Zedong’s theory? According to Anthony Joes? Is Maoist doctrine still applicable for insurgents in the modern world?

i. Is there such a thing as a bona fide “guerrilla strategy” or “irregular strategy?” How has the concept of a successful insurgency changed over time?

j. Do you agree with Joes’s assessment of what makes an insurgency successful or not, particularly his assertion that factors intrinsic to the state (geography, government effectiveness) are the primary determinants?

k. Are the two principal theories of counterinsurgency that Long discusses still valid? How should they be applied and what factors favor the application of one over the other? Can the two theories be combined effectively to offer a third approach?

5. Relationship to Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) Phase II Learning Areas.

a. JLA 1.a, b, c, d. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

b. JLA 2.c, f. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

c. JLA 5.b, g. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

6. Relationship to USAWC Institutional Learning Objective (ILO), Program Learning Objectives, (PLOs), Enduring and Special Themes.

a. ILO: Our graduates are intellectually prepared to preserve peace, deter aggression and, when necessary, achieve victory in war through studying and conferring on the great problems of national defense, military science, and responsible command.

b. PLOs: 1, 3, 4, 7, 8.

c. Enduring Themes: Relationship of Policy and Strategy (Relationship Between Ends, Ways, and Means), Instruments of National Power and Potential Contributions to National Security, History as a Vehicle for Understanding Strategic Choices and Alternatives, Civil-Military Relations.

LESSON 16: THE FUTURE OF WAR AND STRATEGY

Mode: Seminar and Lecture

TWS-16-L/S

1. Introduction.

a. Carl von Clausewitz argued that every age has its own kind of war (*On War*, 593-594). Our challenge is recognizing when the peculiar preconceptions that comprise our understanding of war and warfare change to the point where our comprehension of the relationship between war and strategy is no longer valid, and we find ourselves fighting the last war. Accurate assessment of the future is literally a hit-or-miss proposition. This is not to denigrate thinking about the future as merely a foolish parlor game; it is not for the faint-hearted or self-effacing. It requires complete utility of one's strategic thinking skills, particularly reasoned judgment and the ability to analyze historical trends with a modicum of precision; even then, there is a sizable probability of failure. The late British philosopher Sir Isaiah Berlin provided a sobering admonition for those who dare take up this challenge: "...if only men [and women] would learn how little the cleverest and most gifted among them can control, how little they can know of all the multitude of factors the orderly movement of which is the history of the world."

b. In this, the final lesson of TWS, we will apply all the theoretical and historical knowledge gained throughout the course to speculate about strategic theory and its application to conflict in the future. There are multiple contending viewpoints to this debate. We will examine just a few of them. One concept concerns the nature and character of war as driven by technology and, particularly, the concept of the network. This school of thought seeks to find a scientific basis for warfare using chaos and complexity theories. A second concept assesses the future strategic environment as one in which irregular warfare will be the dominant form, although the terminology used to describe this type of warfare is diverse, with hybrid war and fourth (or even fifth) generation warfare currently in vogue. Many of those who share this outlook see the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah conflict as a harbinger of things to come and the environment for which militaries must prepare. Perhaps the Russian actions in Ukraine in the spring of 2014, described by some as a form of unrestricted warfare, provide a glimpse of the future. Another concept deals with non-violent action, as some observers see an increasing trend in conflicts that rely less on military force to effect strategic change. This theory is not a form of pacifism, but rather a method for applying power. Thus, it may inform our thinking about how non-state actors attain political power without the use of force and how the international community views them as legitimate. The Velvet Revolutions that led to the collapse of communism, the Color Revolutions in Eastern and Central Europe, the Intifada in Israel, or the Arab Spring movements across North Africa may be harbingers of new ways of conflict that fall well short of war. These new strategies of conflict may lead to U.S. participation in operations that do not resemble war, but still require the application of military power in order to achieve U.S. interests. The final concept in this lesson deals with the relationship between war and strategy, and, in particular, the argument that Cold

War thinking and paradigms still dominate strategic theory in an era of regional wars. In addressing this post-Cold War reality, the nature of war must be reexamined in the manner Bernard Brodie prescribed: “Strategic thinking, or ‘theory’ if one prefers, is nothing if not pragmatic.” As Hew Strachan contends, the attainment of political objectives demands that future strategy be “responsive to the situation on the ground,” while also recognizing the criticality of defining the political objectives--the ends--to be attained.

c. Despite criticism from scholars regarding whether any nation can actually do grand strategy, as well as complaints about how strategy has been divorced from either theory or practice, the fact remains that strategy development and execution are critical subjects of study for policymakers and other national security professionals. In the end, strategy is about making choices in the face of an uncertain environment where one’s adversaries have a vote. Thus, policy-makers are forced to make guesses about the future, making strategy formulation an anticipatory, not predictive, process (Yarger). However, understanding the nature, character, and characteristics of war is critical to making choices that effectively link ends, ways and means together for future strategy. As Colin Gray puts it, our strategic successors should lament, “if only,” solely with regard to past errors that are distinctly survivable. Our task for today is determining whether and how changes--or continuities--in the strategic environment affect this dynamic. Do they change the nature, character, or characteristics of war?

2. Learning Objectives

a. Assess the relationship between theory and practice with respect to strategy, considering how political objectives can be defined and attained in a future world where limited war (or as Clausewitz puts it, real war) is the most likely case.

b. Analyze the theories of network warfare, and unrestricted warfare and assess their likely effect on the future of strategy.

c. Evaluate the effect of, or the dependence on, science and technology as means toward achieving strategic ends.

d. Analyze how nonviolent resistance relates to our understanding of war and how non-state actors use power to gain political control.

3. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks. None.

b. Required Readings.

(1) Hew Strachan, “Strategy and Continuity,” in *The Direction of War: Contemporary Strategy in Historical Perspective* (United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 5 December 2013), 253-282. **[Student Issue]**

(2) Christopher Mewitt, “Understanding War’s Enduring Nature Alongside Its

Changing Character,” 21 January, 2014, linked from *War on the Rocks* at <http://warontherocks.com/2014/01/understanding-wars-enduring-nature-alongside-its-changing-character/> (accessed 26 May 2015). **[Online]**

(3) T. X. Hammes, “Fourth Generation Warfare Evolves, Fifth Emerges,” *Military Review* 87, no. 3 (May/June 2007): 14-23 in [\[http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20070630_art006.pdf\]](http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20070630_art006.pdf) (accessed 23 June 2014). **[Blackboard]**

(4) Andrew Mumford, “Proxy War and the Future of Conflict,” *The RUSI Journal*, vol 158, no.2 (2013): 40-46 in [\[http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/03071847.2013.787733\]](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/03071847.2013.787733) (accessed 26 May 2015). **[Online]**

(5) Steven Metz, “Strategic Horizons: In Ukraine Russia Reveals Its Mastery of Unrestricted Warfare,” 16 April, 2014, linked from *World Politics Review* at <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/13708/in-ukraine-russia-reveals-its-mastery-of-unrestricted-warfare> (accessed 26 May 2015). **[Online]**

c. Suggested Readings.

(1) Craig Stockings, “The End of Strategy?,” *Australian Army Journal* 4, no. 1 (Autumn 2007): 11-31.

(2) Antulio J. Echevarria II, *Fourth-Generation War and Other Myths* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2005) at: [\[http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=632\]](http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=632) (accessed 23 June 2014).

(3) Terry Terriff, Aaron Karp and Regina Karp, eds., *Global Insurgency and the Future of Armed Conflict: Debating Fourth-Generation Warfare* (New York: Routledge, 2008).

(4) Robert Latham, ed., *Bombs and Bandwidth: The Emerging Relationship between Information Technology and Security* (New York: New Press, 2003).

(5) Emily O. Goldman and Leslie C. Eliason, eds., *The Diffusion of Military Technology and Ideas* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003). <http://usawc.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.orbis.2008.07.012> (accessed 28 May 2015).

(7) Donald J. Reed, “Beyond the War on Terror: Into the Fifth Generation of War and Conflict,” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 31, no. 8 (2008): 684-722.

- (8) Martin Van Creveld, "The Transformation of War Revisited," in *Non-State Threats and Future Wars*, ed. Robert J. Bunker (London: Frank Cass & Co., 2003).
- (9) Colin S. Gray, "How Has War Changed Since the End of the Cold War?" *Parameters* 35, no. 1 (Spring 2005): 14-26 in [\[ProQuest\]](#) (accessed 28 May 2015).
- (10) Colin S. Gray, "War – Continuity in Change, and Change in Continuity," *Parameters* 40, no. 2(Summer 2010): 5-13 in [\[ProQuest\]](#) (accessed 28 May 2015).
- (11) Colin S. Gray, *Another Bloody Century* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2005).
- (12) Richard D. Hooker, "The Strange Voyage: A Short Précis on Strategy," *Parameters* 42/43, no. 4/1 (Winter-Spring 2013): 59-68 in [\[http://usawc.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/1368613348/3307F6262F814348PQ/2?accountid=4444\]](http://usawc.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/1368613348/3307F6262F814348PQ/2?accountid=4444) (accessed 28 May 2015).
- (13) Rod Thornton, *Asymmetric Warfare: Threat and Response in the Twenty-First Century* (Malden, MA: Polity, 2007).
- (14) Thomas X. Hammes, *The Sling and The Stone: On War in the 21st Century* (St. Paul MN: Zenith Press, 2004).
- (15) Frank G. Hoffman, *Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars* (Arlington, VA: Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, 2007).
- (16) Antoine J. Bousquet and Michael J. Dwyer, *The Scientific Way of Warfare: Order and Chaos on the Battlefields of Modernity* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009).
- (17) Peter Singer, *Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the 21st Century* (New York: Penguin Press, 2009).
- (18) Tony Corn, "Peaceful Rise through Unrestricted Warfare: Grand Strategy with Chinese Characteristics," *Small Wars Journal* (June 5, 2010) <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/449-corn.pdf> (accessed 26 May 2015).
- (19) Shawn Brimley, Ben FitzGerald and Kelly Sayler, *Game Changers: Disruptive Technology and U.S. Defense Strategy* (Washington D.C.: Center for New American Security, September 2013) http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_Gamechangers_BrimleyFitzGeraldSayler_0.pdf (accessed 26 May 2015).

(20) Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, *Unrestricted Warfare* (Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House, February 1999) [<http://www.c4i.org/unrestricted.pdf>] (accessed 26 May 2015).

(21) Gene Sharp, *Waging Nonviolent Struggle: 20th Century Practice and 21st Century Potential* (Boston: Extending Horizons Books, 2005).

(22) Adam Roberts and Timothy Garton Ash, eds. *Civil Resistance and Power Politics: The Experience of Non-violent Action from Gandhi to the Present* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).

d. Suggested Viewings.

(1) Peter Ackerman, "What is Civil Resistance," October 1, 2010, *YouTube*, streaming video, 3:58, [<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5VdK1z-SQqo>] (accessed 26 May 2015).

(2) Peter Ackerman, "Key Elements of Civil Resistance," October 1, 2010, *YouTube*, streaming video, 3:36, [<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yYXPlkCffcl>] (accessed 26 May 2015).

(3) Steve York, dir., *Bringing Down a Dictator*, DVD, Peter Ackerman, about the end of Slobodan Milosevic's rule (Washington, DC: York Zimmerman Inc., 2001). [USAWC Library, DR1318 .B63 2001]

(4) Gene Sharp, "How to Start a Revolution," February 24, 2011, *YouTube*, streaming video, 3:58, [<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Vk1XbyFv51k>] (accessed 26 May 2015).

(5) Peter Singer, "Drones: The Future of War?" August 5, 2001, *Youtube*, streaming video, 6:29, [<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MMArUA9iHsw>] (accessed 26 May 2015).

4. Points to Consider.

a. Colin Gray asserts "... that enormous changes in the tactical and operational grammar of strategy matter not at all for the nature and function of war and strategy." Do you agree with his contention? Why or why not?

b. How can strategists prepare for an uncertain future? How can they prepare for a variety of threats? What are the potential consequences for strategy of more intra-state rather than inter-state wars? How might strategies of conflict affect the application of military power?

c. Has warfare remained primarily Clausewitzian (determined by the interplay of

violence, chance, and reason) or has it become non-Clausewitzian as critics like Martin Van Creveld claim? Or is it something else entirely?

d. Do you agree that future challenges to national security and the world order will be hybrid, asymmetric, 4th generation, or even 5th generation threats? If so, what are the implications for states and their governments and militaries? If not, what are the implications? How does thinking about these strategic challenges relate to the nature, character, or characteristics of war?

e. What is the relationship between technology/science and warfare? How might changes in this relationship affect the nature, character, or characteristics of war?

f. According to Peter Ackerman, why has civil resistance succeeded or failed?

g. Is strategy an art, a science, or does it contain elements of both? How does one's understanding of the nature of strategy influence how wars are fought and won?

5. Relationship to Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) Phase II Learning Areas.

a. JLA 1.a, b, c, d. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

b. JLA 3.e. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

c. JLA 5.d. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider.

6. Relationship to USAWC Institutional Learning Objective (ILO), Program Learning Objectives, (PLOs), Enduring and Special Themes.

a. ILO: Our graduates are intellectually prepared to preserve peace, deter aggression and, when necessary, achieve victory in war through studying and conferring on the great problems of national defense, military science, and responsible command.

b. PLOs: 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8.

c. Enduring Themes: Relationship of Policy and Strategy (Relationship Between Ends, Ways, and Means), Instruments of National Power and Potential Contributions to National Security, Instruments of War and National Security, History as a Vehicle for Understanding Strategic Choices and Alternatives.

APPENDIX I

WRITING A GUIDED RESPONSE PAPER: REQUIREMENTS AND GUIDELINES

1. *General.* The first writing requirement for the Theory of War and Strategy (TWS) course is a paper using Thucydides' *The Peloponnesian War* as the principal source. It is called a guided response paper because it requires you to react to a specific question to produce a critical analysis. You are reacting in a critical manner to what you have read. It is not a research paper.

2. *Purpose.* The purpose of this TWS paper is to enhance your ability to think critically and analytically. Successful completion of this requirement demonstrates the student's capacity to refine, evaluate, and synthesize material in a coherent and persuasive manner. Writing of this type is an essential competency for senior leaders and those who advise them. This requirement also seeks to make you a more careful and attentive reader, another important skill for those who hold senior positions.

3. *Assignment.* You have read Thucydides and have examined his views on war, policy and strategy as it relates to the Peloponnesian War. For this paper, your assignment is to respond to one of the following four questions.

a. Identify and analyze the Athenian and Spartan strategies as they were initially formulated and as they developed over the course of the war using the ends-ways-means paradigm. How much did Spartan strategy change, and why? How much did Athenian strategy change, and why? Which belligerent was better able to adapt its strategy as the realities, risks, and length of the war changed, and why?

b. Analyze the motivations behind the planning for and the execution of the Athenian expedition to Sicily using the ends-ways-means construct. How well did Athenian leaders evaluate risk? How well did they formulate their objectives in light of their national interests and the means available to them at the time, and how successfully did their ways strike towards achievement of those objectives? Why, in your opinion, did the expedition ultimately fail?

c. Consider the cultures, national interests, strengths, and weaknesses of Athens and Sparta at the outbreak of the war. You are the most esteemed strategist of the ancient Greek world and may choose your allegiance. Which side will you choose and why? Placing yourself in the context of the time, knowing only what an ancient Greek strategist would likely know, how would your strategy differ from those promoted by Archidamus and Pericles?

d. War can have a corrosive effect on a democracy. What can we learn from Thucydides' account of this ancient struggle that informs us about the consequences that protracted conflict has on political culture, decision-making, national values, ethics, domestic politics and a state's economic viability?

4. *Method.* Back up your points with good evidence. You may use other course readings

and outside sources as well (see the suggested readings for Lessons 4-7). If you quote directly from the text or make use of thoughts that are not your own, such as borrowing from another's article or book, then cite your source appropriately as outlined in the Communicative Arts Directive using endnotes. (See the "Guide to Writing and Researching for Strategic Leaders" and the "Endnote Citation Format" sections of the directive for detailed information.)

5. *Formatting.* Line spacing will be 2 (double-spaced); the font will be Arial 12 point, left justified. There will be a one-inch margin on all sides. One-sided printing is to be used. (For other specific information regarding formatting to include page numbering, punctuation spacing, and paragraph indentation, see the "Document Formatting" section of the Communicative Arts Directive.) A title page is required (Guided Response Paper, your name, and the course title). The requirement for a paper of 3-4 pages applies to the body of the paper. The title page does not count toward this requirement.

6. *Preparing to Write.* Review the sections of the book you are going to use for your paper carefully and thoroughly; take notes as needed.

7. *Evaluation.* Your paper will be evaluated in accordance with the criteria in "Assessment of Student Work--Written Work" section of the Communicative Arts Directive. Papers that receive an overall grade of "needs improvement" will be resubmitted according to directions from your FI until a "meets standards" effort or better is recorded. Generally, an evaluation of needs improvement will result in the student being placed on academic probation until the rewrite meets standards.

Important Date. The paper is due to the course FI no later than 17 September 2015.

APPENDIX II

WRITING AN ANALYTICAL PAPER: REQUIREMENTS AND GUIDELINES

1. *General.* The second writing requirement for the Theory of War and Strategy (TWS) course evaluates the student's ability to communicate his or her understanding of the course objectives and the course content. Specifically, the requirement is for you to write an analytical paper that addresses a specific question or topic. The paper should present a clear and logical argument supported by authoritative sources. (Wikipedia, for example, is not an authoritative source.)

2. *Purpose.* The purpose of this TWS paper is to further your ability to think critically and analytically about war and strategy. Successful completion of this requirement demonstrates the student's ability to evaluate and synthesize the material presented in the course in a coherent and persuasive manner.

3. *Topic.* Students will write on one of the following questions or topics:

a. "What strategic theory or theorist do you believe best explains the nature and character of warfare in the Twenty-First Century?"

b. "Apply one or more strategic theories to a specific national security challenge currently facing the United States or its allies."

Students may refine that basic question if desired, but must do so in coordination with the FI. Students considering modifying the topic question in any manner should not begin their papers until the FI has specifically approved the modification.

4. *Research.* To write an acceptable course paper you will need to conduct research and document sources using the guidance in the Communication Arts Directive. While TWS readings can be helpful and are a good starting point, this paper requires the use of sources beyond the readings. Once your research is complete, you must synthesize that research into a clear, concise, and logical presentation. The "Rules for Writing and Research" section of the Communicative Arts Directive provides useful information as well as documentation policies and some example citations. Individual FIs may require submission of an outline or bibliography to monitor technique or progress on the paper.

5. *Content.*

a. It is possible to answer topic question 3a in one sentence—that, of course, would not meet the standards. You must explain and rationalize your selection. As a minimum, it requires a description of the strategic environment you envision and a detailed discussion and analysis of the theory or theorist selected. Acceptable papers may also discuss the reasons for rejecting other theories or theorists as not applicable to the strategic environment in which warfare will occur. Superlative papers will analyze additional theories or theorists you have studied, select the most appropriate ideas of each, and synthesize those ideas into a coherent whole to define the nature and character of war.

b. Topic 3b is a different but related task because it also requires you to examine the theorists you have read to support your arguments about what constitutes war and how it may be manifested in the near future in an issue of national security. This topic seeks a direct analysis, synthesis, and evaluation of several of the major concepts found in the course and application of those concepts to a current strategic or grand strategic problem facing the United States and/or its allies. Possible national security issues might include but are not limited to the following: the continuing war against terror; the future of U.S.-China relations; North Korean threats and aggression; cyber-attacks on national security networks and infrastructure; Russian nationalism; Iranian pursuit of nuclear weapons; the future of NATO; intervention in Syria; and global climate change. Appropriate references are required to support the analysis, which should describe and synthesize the work of several theorists. Superlative papers will address the same basic areas with discussion enriched by detailed analysis of theories and concepts examined but rejected with appropriate reasoning that reflects the evaluation of competing theories and concepts.

6. *Formatting.* Line spacing will be 2 (double-spaced); font will be Arial 12 point, left justified. There will be a one-inch margin on all sides. Section headings, introductory quotations, and other material that consumes space without conveying information are discouraged. A title page (title, name and course title) and endnotes are required and should be formatted as explained in the section “Guide to Writing and Research for Strategic Leaders” in the Communicative Arts Directive as well as those sections dealing with source documentation and citation requirements and format. The requirement for a paper of 5-6 pages applies to the body of the paper. The title page and endnotes do not count toward this requirement.

7. *Notes On Sources.*

a. TWS readings are a necessary starting point for your research; however, as noted previously, you will need to explore specific theories/theorists in more detail. The suggested readings for appropriate lessons offer ideas for more detailed examination of the theories/theorists. Your FI can also recommend sources.

b. You must cite and reference in endnotes any exact quotations, paraphrases, ideas, facts, data, or other materials derived directly from, or inspired by, the work of someone else. Failure to document such information is plagiarism. For more on this subject see “Rules for Writing and Research” in the Communicative Arts Directive.

8. *Evaluation.*

Your paper will be evaluated in accordance with the criteria in “Assessment of Student Work--Written Work” section of the Communicative Arts Directive. Papers that receive an overall grade of “needs improvement” will be resubmitted according to directions from your FI until a “meets standards” effort or better is recorded. Generally, an evaluation of needs improvement will result in the student being placed on academic probation until the rewrite meets standards.

9. *Important Dates.*

a. Topic approved by course FI NLT: 25 September 2015

b. Paper due to course FI NLT: 2 October 2015

APPENDIX III

MISSION

The United States Army War College educates and develops leaders for service at the strategic level while advancing knowledge in the global application of Landpower.

AY16 PROGRAM LEARNING OBJECTIVES (PLOs)

To accomplish its mission, the USAWC presents a curriculum designed to produce graduates who can:

PLO 1: Think critically and creatively in applying joint warfighting principles at the strategic level.

PLO 2: Communicate clearly, persuasively, and courageously.

PLO 3: Anticipate and adapt to surprise and uncertainty.

PLO 4: Recognize change and lead transitions.

PLO 5: Make ethical decisions and promote military cultures that reflect the values and traditions of the Profession of Arms.

PLO 6: Operate on intent through trust, empowerment, and understanding (Mission Command).

PLO 7: Assess the strategic security environment and the contributions of all instruments of national power.

PLO 8: Apply theories of war and strategy to national security challenges.

PLO 9: Assess the processes and relationships of the Department of defense, as well as those of interagency, intergovernmental, multinational, and non-governmental organizations.

PLO 10: Appreciate the utility of, and creatively employ, Landpower in joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational operations.

APPENDIX IV

SERVICE SENIOR-LEVEL COLLEGE JOINT LEARNING AREAS AND OBJECTIVES (JPME-II)

The REP and DEP curricula address requirements for JLAs and JLOs derived from CJCSI 1800.01E, *Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP)*, 29 May 2015.

1. Overview. Service SLCs develop strategic leaders who can think critically and apply military power in support of national objectives in a joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational environment. Service War Colleges hone student expertise and competency on their respective Service's roles, missions and principal operating domains and focus on integrating them into the joint force, unfettered by Service parochialism across the range of military operations.

2. Mission. Each Service SLC is unique in mission and functional support. However, a fundamental objective of each is to prepare future military and civilian leaders for high-level policy, command and staff responsibilities requiring joint and Service operational expertise and warfighting skills by educating them on the instruments of national power (diplomatic, informational, military and economic), the strategic security environment and the effect those instruments have on strategy formulation, implementation, and campaigning. The goal is to develop agile and adaptive leaders with the requisite values, strategic vision and thinking skills to keep pace with the changing strategic environment. SLC subject matter is inherently joint; JPME at this level focuses on the immersion of students in a joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational environment and completes educational requirements for JQO (level 3) nomination.

3. Learning Area 1 - National Strategies.

a. **Apply** key strategic concepts, critical thinking and analytical frameworks to formulate and execute strategy.

b. **Analyze** the integration of all instruments of national power in complex, dynamic and ambiguous environments to attain objectives at the national and theater-strategic levels.

c. **Evaluate** historical and/or contemporary security environments and applications of strategies across the range of military operations.

d. **Apply** strategic security policies, strategies and guidance used in developing plans across the range of military operations and domains to support national objectives.

e. **Evaluate** how the capabilities and limitations of the U.S. Force structure affect the development and implementation of security, defense and military strategies.

4. Learning Area 2 - Joint Warfare, Theater Strategy and Campaigning for Traditional and Irregular Warfare in a Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental and Multinational

Environment.

a. **Evaluate** the principles of joint operations, joint military doctrine, joint functions (command and control, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection and sustainment), and emerging concepts across the range of military operations.

b. **Evaluate** how theater strategies, campaigns and major operations achieve national strategic goals across the range of military operations.

c. **Apply** an analytical framework that addresses the factors politics, geography, society, culture and religion play in shaping the desired outcomes of policies, strategies and campaigns.

d. **Analyze** the role of OCS in supporting Service capabilities and joint functions to meet strategic objectives considering the effects contracting and contracted support have on the operational environment.

e. **Evaluate** how strategic level plans anticipate and respond to surprise, uncertainty, and emerging conditions.

f. **Evaluate** key classical, contemporary and emerging concepts, including IO and cyberspace operations, doctrine and traditional/irregular approaches to war.

5. Learning Area 3 - National and Joint Planning Systems and Processes for the Integration of JIIM Capabilities.

a. **Analyze** how DoD, interagency and intergovernmental structures, processes, and perspectives reconcile, integrate and apply national ends, ways and means.

b. **Analyze** the operational planning and resource allocation processes.

c. **Evaluate** the integration of joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational capabilities, including all Service and Special Operations Forces, in campaigns across the range of military operations in achieving strategic objectives.

d. **Value** a joint perspective and appreciate the increased power available to commanders through joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational efforts.

e. **Analyze** the likely attributes of the future joint force and the challenges faced to plan, organize, prepare, conduct and assess operations.

6. Learning Area 4 - Command, Control and Coordination.

a. **Evaluate** the strategic-level options available in the joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational environment.

b. **Analyze** the factors of Mission Command as it relates to mission objectives, forces and capabilities that support the selection of a command and control option.

c. **Analyze** the opportunities and challenges affecting command and control created in the joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational environment across the range of military operations, to include leveraging networks and technology.

7. Learning Area 5 - Strategic Leadership and the Profession of Arms.

a. **Evaluate** the skills, character attributes and behaviors needed to lead in a dynamic joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational strategic environment.

b. **Evaluate** critical strategic thinking, decisionmaking and communication by strategic leaders.

c. **Evaluate** how strategic leaders develop innovative organizations capable of operating in dynamic, complex and uncertain environments; anticipate change; and respond to surprise and uncertainty.

d. **Evaluate** how strategic leaders communicate a vision; challenge assumptions; and anticipate, plan, implement and lead strategic change in complex joint or combined organizations.

e. **Evaluate** historic and contemporary applications of the elements of mission command by strategic-level leaders in pursuit of national objectives.

f. **Evaluate** how strategic leaders foster responsibility, accountability, selflessness and trust in complex joint or combined organizations.

g. **Evaluate** how strategic leaders establish and sustain an ethical climate among joint and combined forces, and develop/preserve public trust with their domestic citizenry.

APPENDIX V

AY 16 THEMES

ENDURING THEMES

Elihu Root's challenge provides the underpinnings for enduring themes within the USAWC curriculum. The enduring themes stimulate intellectual growth by providing continuity and perspective as we analyze contemporary issues.

STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP AND THE EXERCISE OF DISCRETIONARY JUDGMENT.

- Evaluate leadership at the strategic level (national security policy and strategy, especially in war)
- Understand the profession's national security clients and its appropriate jurisdictions of practice
- Evaluate leadership of large, national security organizations
- Evaluate strategic thinking about the future (2nd and 3rd order effects)
- Analyze the framework for leading and managing strategic change, specifically the components of organizational change and the process by which organizations change

RELATIONSHIP OF POLICY AND STRATEGY (RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ENDS, WAYS, AND MEANS).

- Analyze how to accomplish national security aims to win wars
- Analyze how to connect military actions to larger policy aims
- Analyze how to resource national security
- Evaluate international relations as the context for national security

INSTRUMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER AND POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO NATIONAL SECURITY.

- Comprehend Diplomatic Power
- Comprehend Informational power
- Evaluate Military Power
- Comprehend Economic power

PROFESSIONAL ETHICS.

- Evaluate the ethics of military operations (to include *jus in bello* and *post bello*)
- Evaluate the ethics of war and the use of force (to include *jus ad bello*)
- Evaluate the ethics of service to society (domestic civil-military relations)

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS.

- Evaluate relationships between military and civilian leadership
- Evaluate relationships between the military and domestic society
- Evaluate relationships between armed forces and foreign populations

INSTRUMENTS OF WAR AND NATIONAL SECURITY.

- Joint: Evaluate the capabilities and domains of joint forces (especially land, maritime, air, space, cyber)
- Interagency: Understand other U.S. government agencies and departments
- Intergovernmental; Understand potential relationships with other national governments
- Multinational: Understand potential relationships with armed forces or agencies of other nations/coalition partners

HISTORY AS A VEHICLE FOR UNDERSTANDING STRATEGIC ALTERNATIVES AND CHOICES.

- Identify and analyze relevant historical examples of strategic leadership and strategic choices (across time and around the world)
- Evaluate historical examples relevant to war and other national security endeavors

ENDURING LANDPOWER THEME (BY CORE COURSE)

Theories of War and Strategy: Evaluate Armies/landpower as instruments of war. Evaluate relative decisiveness and adaptability of landpower as it affects the control of people, territory and resources.

APPENDIX VI

OFFSITE ACCESS TO COURSE READINGS AND LIBRARY DATABASES

EZproxy - Enables access to licensed database content when you are not in Root Hall. It operates as an intermediary server between your computer and the Library's subscription databases.

Links - You will find EZproxy links to full text readings in online syllabi, directives, bibliographies, reading lists, and emails. Usually, instructors and librarians provide these links so that you can easily access course materials anytime, anywhere. It also helps us comply with copyright law and saves money on the purchase of copyright permissions.

Library Databases - You can use EZproxy to access Library databases when you are away from Root Hall. Go to the Library's webpage <http://usawc.libguides.com/current>, click on any database in the Library Databases column, such as ProQuest, EBSCO OmniFile, or FirstSearch, and then use your EZproxy username and password to login.

Username and Password - From home, when you click on a link that was built using EZproxy, or you are accessing a particular database, you will be prompted to provide a username and password. You only need to do this once per session. You will find EZproxy login information on the wallet-size card you were given by the Library. If you have misplaced yours, just ask at the Access Services Desk for another card, contact us by phoning (717) 245-3660, or email usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.libraryr@mail.mil <usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.libraryr@mail.mil>. You can also access the library portal from the Army War College homepage at: <https://internal.carlisle.army.mil/Pages/default.aspx>. Please do not share EZproxy login information with others.

Impact of Firewalls - Most Internet service providers (ISPs) do not limit the areas you can access on the Internet, so home users should not encounter problems with firewalls. However, corporate sites often do employ firewalls and may be highly restrictive in what their employees can access, which can impede EZproxy.

ACCESS SOLUTIONS

Try Again! Many problems with EZproxy are caused simply by login errors. If your first login attempt fails, try again. Check to make sure the Caps Lock is not on. Or, if you see a Page Not Found message after you do login, use the Back button and click on the link again. It may work the second time.

Broken Link - If a link appears to be broken, you can find the article by using the appropriate database instead. Go to the Library's webpage <http://usawc.libguides.com/current>, click on the database name, type in your EZproxy username and password to login, and then search for the specific article.

Browsers - EZproxy works independently from operating systems and browsers, but

problems may be caused by your browser if you have not downloaded and installed the newest version. Also, it is a good idea to check to make sure that the security settings on your browser are not too restrictive and that it will accept cookies and allow popups. Be aware ISPs that use proprietary versions of browsers, such as AOL, can interfere with EZproxy. A simple workaround is to connect to your provider, minimize the window, and then open a browser such as Mozilla Firefox or Microsoft Internet Explorer.

Databases - Not all remote access problems are caused by EZproxy. Occasionally databases will have technical problems. Deleting cookies might help. You may successfully pass through EZproxy only to find an error caused by the database. If this happens, back out of the database and try using another one. It is unlikely that both providers would be having technical problems at the same time.

Help and Tips - For assistance, please contact the USAWC Research Librarians by phoning (717) 245-3660, or email: usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.library@mail.mil.

Blackboard Access – All syllabus and digitally available media will be made available at Blackboard.com at <https://proedchallenge.blackboard.com/webapps/login/?action=relogin>, please contact Mr. Christopher Smart at Christopher.a.smart.civ@mail.mil, or 245-4874.