MISSILE DEFENSE STRATEGIC STATIONING
Lieutenant Colonel Edward J. O'Neill
U.S. Army War College Class of 2011
The views expressed in the document are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Army War College, the U.S. Department of the Army, the U.S. Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
This U.S. Army War College student author believes that a strategic stationing plan for existing THAAD and JLENS missile defense assets must be developed concurrent with acquisition of new air and missile defense capabilities. He argues:
---- Although the Army has conceptual plans and requirements for the development of new air and missile defense capabilities, specifically THAAD and JLENS, the Army has not defined a strategic employment / deployment plan to meet Combatant Commanders' demands.
---- Throughout the 1990s, the Army deployed PATRIOT task forces to Southwest Asia and South Korea with little overarching strategic planning balanced against competing and evolving demands for missile defense capabilities.
---- The constant deployments had an adverse impact on the AMD force from personnel, training, and operational readiness perspectives.
---- This caused the Army to reevaluate its employment plan to sustain operational demand without breaking the AMD force. The Army used the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model with 1:2 dwell time as means to sustain operational commitments.
---- Combatant Commanders' immediate demand for THAAD and JLENS, as they come off the production lines and lack of a clear stationing plan, could lead to a repeat of these 1990's challenges.
He concludes by recommending specific methods to employ these new capabilities without adversely impacting the AMD force.
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