Strength & Honor: The Quest for 'Sustainable Security'

Lieutenant Colonel Isaiah Wilson III, PhD, U.S. Army

This paper is a futures piece and as such an exploration in "heresy." This paper reconsiders what we have come to regard as the modern-age of war and consider a new alternative *future of war and peace*. The specific analytical focus attempts to go beyond the popular contemporary descriptions of the *paradox within the American way of war* (the tendency to fail to win the peace in spite of unmatched prowess at winning the battles in our war-fare) and even beyond the debates over whether or not we are witnessing and experiencing a new era of Fourth-Generation War-fare (4GW). The analysis centers on the *how* of contemporary US/Western intervention practices, as a tool of national and 'Westphalian' intervention policy and strategies particularly relating to issues of *security,* and in the reflection of what can be seen in our manner of intervention (how we tend to wage war and wage peace) what we can learn about ourselves in terms of how we "see" war and war-fare and differentiate these concepts and practices from how we have traditionally tended to view peace – and participate in peace operations (peace-fare). The theoretical apparatus that allows for this sort of reconsideration goes well beyond traditional modern-era realists approaches and explanations to international affairs (which seek answers to the question of why nations conflict and cooperate through the lens of material-based power political relationships) toward critical theory apparatuses – specifically, constructivism. Constructivism allows one to consider – reconsider – the standing notions of war and peace (war-fare and peace-fare) in a dynamic and humanist way . . . as a creation of man, and therefore malleable and reflective of any particular given time and place in world affairs and human history. In short, this constructivist examination allows the author to propose that War . . . and Peace, at any given time and place is a *sign of the times*. As such, the essential question – the prior even to the important question of whether or not we today live in an era of 4th Generation War-fare – is the question of whether our current understandings of what constitutes a state, condition or act of "war" versus peace is an accurate and healthy sign of the contemporary times?

The Essential Question ~ How to Achieve a 'Viable Peace' through Intervention

Getting at this essential question forces one – as a student and as a practitioner of war and peace – to think beyond the modern-age focuses on the instrumentality of war-fare and peace-fare and more toward the purpose of war and war-fare. Refocusing on purpose as a prior to a consideration of tasks, it is hypothesized in this paper, rightly-aligns our thoughts and new practices toward both war and peace in this new century – new thoughts and practices that the author proposes will more effectively and legitimately reflect the challenges and opportunities of the contemporary environment of conduct.

Democracy Promotion and Human Rights Development in the Middle East: A Path Dependency Theory Approach

Pippi Van Slooten

This paper argues that while the US is learning the lessons necessary to wage an on-going battle against Al Qaeda and international terror organizations that seek to destabilize world peace efforts, the United Nations has already learned the lessons necessary to encourage and promote democracy in the global community. The author advocates a division of labor where the US withdraws from a democracy promotion agenda which it is not suited for and that the UN adapts Linz and Stepan's path dependency approach to democracy promotion which takes into account the particular nation's start point and guides it through the democratic transition process through to eventual democratic consolidation*.

To explain this argument, this paper is divided into the following sections, the problems with the US role in democracy promotion abroad, the promise of UN democracy promotion and its contribution to global peace and security, and finally an analysis of the case of Qatar as a promising example of internal democracy promotion which should be encouraged along its current path of development to democratic consolidation.

*. Linz, Juan J. & Stepan, Alfred (1996), *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*, John Hopkins University Press: Baltimore, Maryland

Combating Complex Irregular Warfare: Grand Strategic & Operational Considerations

F. G. Hoffman

This paper reviews the rise of what some call Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW), or what the author prefers to call Complex Irregular Warfare (CIW). Today's Long War makes the originators of 4GW more than prophetic. Kaplan's "Coming Anarchy" has arrived with full force, but with more transnational connectivity and political direction. The future portends more lethal strains of system perturbation. While its proponents have done an excellent job of laying out the nature of the challenge, we need to move on to prescriptions to combat the rise of 4GW.

Strategic Considerations. Rather than typical of strategies of annihilation versus exhaustion, this paper suggests looking at *destructive* versus *constructive* strategies. This may be a far better way of examining overall strategies and subcomponents in 4GW or CIW in the future. There are four to five components to each of these fundamental approaches. The more destructive approaches emphasize kinetic destruction and physical properties.

More constructive approaches are needed to stem a 4GW approach. A constructive strategy seeks to undermine the true source of strength of the adversary in 4GW, his ideological base and the attractiveness of his appeal for support, intelligence, or resources. There are a number of indirect approaches within this broader and less kinetic suite of strategies. These two approaches may be also thought of in terms of being Counter force or Counter value. The "Counter Value" approach is recommended as the primary strategy.

Operational Considerations for Combating the 4GW Adversary. Although there is no prescribed set of phases for the conduct of CIW, it is useful for commanders and their staffs to consider the nominal set of activities listed below. The acronym "MINDOPS" offers a useful device for thinking about the operational efforts involved to successfully thwart a cunning 4GW adversary. This provides a useful grouping of tasks that may allow the commander to envision the application of interagency task force's efforts in time and place. These activities may be phased but should not be considered sequential. The actual missions and tasks assigned to the Joint Task Force commander may vary this set:

- Mission Analysis.
- Isolate Insurgent/Contending Elements from Support.
- Neutralize (not destroy) Anti-government Forces.
- Develop Host Governance Mechanisms.
- Organize Indigenous Security and Intelligence Mechanisms.
- Penetrate (if possible).
- Sustain and Reintegrate.

Digital Blitzkrieg: Updating the Pearl Harbor Analogy and Combating it with Multi-Domain Civilian Red Cells

Timothy S. Rosenberg, JD

The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate why the Digital Pearl Harbor analogy should be abandoned and replaced with a more accurate Digital Blitzkrieg. The paper fully explores a hypothetical Digital Blitzkrieg scenario. Further, the paper demonstrates how the creation of government funded; civilian staffed Red Cell teams can operate with the necessary freedom on U.S. soil to help identify possible Digital Blitz scenarios. These scenarios can then be used for enhanced training operations as well as assessments that will help secure the critical infrastructure. The paper also includes a sample Red Cell team attack plan that shows how a small team of broadly trained individuals can successfully integrate physical and cyber attacks along with offensive information operations into a sustainable multi-domain attack cycle.

The Digital Pearl Harbor has been used as the warning slogan for many. It has many definitions and examples, but most point to a single crippling attack against the internet. Some have even argued that the SQL Slammer (affected ATM machines) and MSBlast (possible contributor to the 2003 north east black out) worms are Pearl Harbor-like events. Both of these examples illustrate the flaws of using the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor as the analogy for a planned internet attack. In both cases, the attack is a single domain event with collateral damage in only one domain. For the purposes of this paper, a domain is defined as a sphere of activity concern or function. Attack domains include traditional air, navy and land based attacks. Target domains include a collection of like targets such as an airfield, power infrastructure, personnel, fixed defensive positions and the like. Domains are also hierarchical. If you are targeting the power infrastructure, you can break it down into sub domains. High tension electrical cables and towers are a sub-domain of power transmission which in turn is a sub domain power distribution, which in turn is a sub domain of a single power plant.

Pearl Harbor was a single domain attack both in its delivery and targeting. There was only one delivery vehicle; aerial bombardment from carrier based planes (Five midget submarines were launched, but their contribution to the overall attack plan was minimal). The targeting was likewise single in its scope; Pearl Harbor with the intent to destroy (even that was single domain as the oil fields, machine shops, dry docks and submarine pens were not harmed). Similarly the SQL Slammer and MSBlast worms were single domain attack/target events. Both were internet worms that only targeted very specific operating systems. Neither was designed to impact the physical world (although some collateral damage occurred). In both cases, the worms and Pearl Harbor, there was no local follow up. The Japanese left Hawaii, the worms were cleaned out. In both cases the damage was repaired and systems returned to mostly normal. In neither case was the damage long lasting or sustainable. Therefore, if we continue in the Digital Pearl Harbor mindset, we will be looking for attacks that while

"Relooking the Cyber Terrorism Threat and Military Support to the National Cyber Warfare Response"

Richard J. Kilroy, Jr., PhD

This paper addresses the U.S. military response to cyber warfare, and assesses whether the organizational and doctrinal changes made to confront the threat (as well as cultural and career force changes which have impacted forces structures, resources, and the warfighting capability of the armed forces) are appropriate in the context of future cyber terrorism threats to homeland security. This paper also addresses the military's role in conducting cyber warfare within the broader Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational (JIIM) environment and possible scenarios for evaluating a national response against a cyber terrorist threat.

In the mid-1990s, the U.S. military recognized a growing threat to its informational architecture, as well as the nation's critical infrastructure from cyber warfare. Since Department of Defense (DoD) installations in the United States were dependent on civilian infrastructure for communications, transportation, energy, water, and the full range of logistical support, the DoD recognized that a threat to any of these critical systems would directly impact the military's ability to deploy forces overseas against foreign threats and actors.

The terrorist attacks against the Pentagon and the World Trade Center in September 2001, provided the impetus for broader DoD organizational changes which impacted the military's ability to prosecute and defend against cyber warfare. The threat posed by Al Qaeda and other international terrorist groups to the U.S. homeland, caused the DoD to create a new joint command, U.S. Northern Command, dedicated to the Homeland Defense mission of the DoD, in support of the nation's overall Homeland Security effort. This change to the Unified Command Plan (UCP), signed by President Bush in May 2002, further eliminated the U.S. Space Command in Colorado Springs, Colorado, moving most of the Space and Information Operations roles of the military to U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) in Omaha, Nebraska. Under STRATCOM, operational control for all aspects of Information Operations, to include Computer Network Attack and Computer Network Defense, were consolidated into new organizational structures and responsibilities. The JTF-CND came under STRATCOM's control, for example. Each of the services transformed existing IO organizations into IO "commands" in order to provide the service components in support of the joint command structure.

To provide operational control over the diverse components of Information Operations, STRATCOM developed various joint functional component commands. The Joint Functional Component Command (JFCC) for Space and Global Strike includes the Joint Information Operations Center (JIOC), located at Lackland Air Force Base in San Antonio, Texas. The JIOC was previously under the Joint Forces

Addressing the Curse of the 21st Century:
Considerations and Updates to National Strategy for Victory in Iraq (NSVI)

Major Kathleen M. Meilahn

This paper addresses tribes and culture in Iraq, history, problems, implications, opportunities and Islamic conflict management which would be taken into account by U.S. Government agencies if the NSVI included a Strategic Influence Track. General John Abizaid has said, "The curse of the 21st century is undoubtedly going to be getting diverse people of diverse religions to live together," but the problem expands beyond religion. U.S. Government leaders must understand the broader cultural context in which they find themselves operating in order to communicate effectively and appropriately plan for operations. A "Strategic Influence Track" should be added to the NSVI (in addition to Security, Economic and Political) which includes counter-insurgency enablers: Strategic Insight, Influence and Ideology Management (SIIIM). The U.S. Department of Defense could lead the way by integrating this concept into its own strategic policy, increasing operational effectiveness and providing an example for other U.S. Government agencies.

Proteus Insights and the Future of Global Jihadism

Proteus Insights and the Future of Global Jihadism

Shawn Brimley and Aidan Kirby

This paper addresses how Proteus Insights can help guide analytical thinking about the current state and future of transnational jihadist terrorism. Strategic thinking and planning aimed to confront this international security challenge is currently hampered by reliance on paradigms that are becoming rapidly inaccurate. The Proteus insights provide an effective framework for assessing the changes that radical Islamic terrorism as undergone in recent years and for reasonably predicting the core lines along which its evolution is likely to proceed in the coming years.

While all the Proteus insights offer some value to understanding the changing nature of the global jihadist movement, six insights are particularly useful. This paper that will use the following six insights as analytical lenses that will bring into focus current trends in transnational jihadist terrorism, and use them to map out potential futures.

Starlight: Much of the War on Terror has been characterized by retrospective insights. The introduction of new policies and the efforts to reorganize the government over the last several years have largely been guided by a desire to prevent a reoccurrence of a 9/11-style attack. Key examples of this pattern include the various efforts made to strengthen airline security and the bureaucratic reshuffling of the intelligence community in 2004. Furthermore, the understanding of the nature of the threat often reflects a 'snap-shot' of al Qaeda taken almost 5 years ago. Measurements of progress in this war have too often been defined by the capture of 'key' individuals. This approach does not adequately take into account the dynamic and fluid nature of the radical Islamic threat. Through the spectrum of *starlight* one can better distinguish between retrospective insights and strategic foresight.

Sanctuary: While al Qaeda proved its spectacular capability on September 11th 2001, it displayed its truly *revolutionary* nature by virtue of its survival following the loss of Afghanistan as a secure state sanctuary. Analysts need to re-consider the definition of sanctuary as it applies to the future of transnational terrorism. An examination of al Qaeda's relatively secure presence in Europe and Asia as well as its presence in Afghanistan and Iraq defies the current operating paradigm that sees the Bin Laden and his followers as perpetually on the defensive. Moreover, the movements of jihadists need to be more closely examined, as analysis based solely on origin and destination miss an important dimension of counterterrorism. *Sanctuary* will have new meaning in the decades ahead, and this lens is critical in examining the current and future dynamics of the jihadist movement.

An Unmanned Systems Vision; A Humanity-Centered View

CAPT Rand D. LeBouvier, USN

This paper addresses the possibility of “brilliant” unmanned systems that can detect, classify, and engage threats and targets in dense urban settings without human intervention. This system could be in the air, but it could just as easily be undersea, on the surface, or on the ground depending on the mission. While such scenarios are achievable, such visions cannot be achieved without an overarching plan to bring them to fruition. Any approach to unmanned systems must include a systemic consideration of command and control, propulsion systems and fuel, power systems, navigation challenges, sensors and payloads, data transmission and display, manning and training (yes, unmanned systems will still require people!), and combined concepts of operations where multiple vehicles and types of vehicles are operating in the same battle space.

Holding It All Together:
Present and Future National Cohesion in Saudi Arabia

Dr. Joshua Teitelbaum

This paper will first examine the Saudi system in detail, and then present the various centrifugal forces that are operating in Saudi Arabia today: religious, regional, and tribal, some of which have developed into an insurgency. In the past the Saudis have controlled the public space. At one time, it controlled the air waves, including satellite television. Today it no longer controls satellite television, and despite valiant and expensive attempts at filtering, it cannot control the Internet either. These developments have the potential to undermine national cohesion. This paper will also assess their potential future trajectories, and the Saudis' ability to address them.

As we look back from the 21st century, Saudi Arabia seems to be tremendous success story. Awash in oil selling today at over $60 a barrel, Saudi Arabia is expected to earn about $154 billion in oil revenues in 2006. Each year, it runs perhaps the largest social gathering in the world, the Muslim pilgrimage (*hajj*), playing host to around two million pilgrims. Foreign companies vie with each other for Saudi contracts. For 2005, the government reported a thirty-fold increase in foreign investment, to the tune of SR200 billion. Mighty nations try to curry favor with it; even the United States, which suffered tremendously at the hands of Saudi citizens in the attacks of September 11, 2001, does little to anger the oil giant. Relations remain good, if slightly strained.

With all its money, it is spending more on education and development, paying down its public debt, increasing security expenditures as a response to domestic terrorism, increasing salaries to the military and the government bureaucracy, and raising payments to the population at large through subsidies for health care, welfare, education, and housing.

Yet the Saudi state was established over a diverse people that had no historical memory or much else in common. Over the years, the Saudi royal family has developed a common historical narrative that it has inculcated over the years through the mosque network, the media, and education, which conflates the royal family and Islam throughout history and up to the present. They become one and the same, mutually reinforcing one another. Over time, this has become a kind of cohesive glue that has kept society together.

To further bind the people to the state, as personified by the Saudi royal family, an elaborate, cradle-to-grave welfare system was developed. Oil resources were distributed to the populace, in exchange for opting out of political representation. There was no taxation, but neither was there representation.

Failed States and Intelligence Collection Missions

Ely Karmon

This paper deals with a situation where the state failure has already happened, it has created an ungovernable country or territory and there is the need to evaluate and constantly monitor the threat such a situation represents for the US and the Western democratic world. The paper analyzes the intelligence requirements, methods and resources needed to cover the threats from potential targets: the terrorist and guerrilla organizations; organized crime and narco-terrorism; proliferation of small weapons; proliferation of chemical biological, radiological and nuclear agents and weapons to terrorist groups. Lastly, the paper details the ideological, geo-political, strategic and structural environment; the transnational and international relationships between the various actors, including states, NGOs and international agencies; and will present some proposals for improvements in the field of intelligence collection and analysis.

Background

The question of failed or weak states has been studied by researchers and by the US administrations mainly in the attempt to understand the causes of the falling apart of states and the necessity to prevent or the least to have early warning on what has been defined as "state failure."

The CIA's "Worldwide Threat 2001: National Security in a Changing World" asked the international community to help "tame the disintegrative forces spawned by an era of change" and "the growing in potential for state fragmentation and failure." Analyzing the impact of globalization and the emerging security paradigms that resulted from the end of the Cold War, the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century identified failed and weak states as specific challenges the United States will face with increasing regularity in the next twenty-five years.

According to Susan Woodward, while the culprit for both poverty and violations of human rights since the early 1980s had been the strong state, the problem by the 1990s had become the weak state. She sees a remarkable international consensus in the past two years that all "concrete threats to security, including terrorism, nuclear proliferation, mass violations of human rights, poverty, armed conflict, and refugees, are viewed as the responsibility of states and the consequence of state weakness."

Before the September 11 attacks, US policymakers viewed states with sovereignty deficits as of little strategic significance. After the attacks, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice declared that nations incapable of exercising "responsible sovereignty" have a "spillover effect" in the form of terrorism, weapons proliferation, and other dangers. Al Qaeda's ability to act with impunity from Afghanistan convinced

The Sword and the Network: Combining Body-Mind-Spirit Technology

Tim Rosenberg, JD

This paper will discuss how to bring Computer Network Attack (CAN) and Computer Network Defense (CND) into a martial training and operational setting. Furthermore, once the martial CNA/CND foundation is complete, the traditional aspects of Body Mind Spirit (BMS) training will be added into the CNA/CND space for complete integration.

There is much published literature on the benefits of Somatic Training and the blending of body, mind and spirit into a 'fully integrated individual who embodies athletic prowess, emotional maturity, and a spiritual sensibility.' (Somatics and Cyberspace, pg 3, Strozzi-Heckler, 2001) There are several avenues that one may take to learn how to live an integrated life. The one this author is most familiar with is the martial arts. Besides teaching you how to work body-mind-spirit into one, the martial arts also impart useful skills, especially to those in the military. It is against this backdrop; the integrated individual, the high stress, varied mission world of the military and the martial arts that we now add a new tool; technology.

Technology means different things to different people. To some, it is a way to get their email while hiking, to others, it is precision guided munitions. For the purposes of this paper, the focus is on technology that supports computer network attack and defense. In this sense, technology is the tool or weapon that is used to engage an opponent's technology. It is key to note that this is a unique battle space in that it is matched by the same basic technologies on both sides. Tactical air support or strategic missile strikes pit unmatched technologies (e.g. missile versus building and not missile versus missile). As will be shown later, this is akin to sword fighting in that each opponent has the same weapon, the sword. This match has significant impact on the training and operational characteristics of the battle space. One of the axioms out of the Samurai sword culture is to 'fight the person, not the sword'. This is important to understand as it brings to bear the truth that cultures fight wars, not swords. Technology (in the CNA/CND context) is a tool for waging war, much like the sword. Understanding the sword culture (yours and your opponents) is imperative if you are planning on meeting it on the battlefield with like weapons; CNA/CND is no different. To effectively employ technology against like technology, you must understand its place in the cultures engaged in the conflict. After all computers do not surrender, people do.

Over-reliance on technology as a culture places the body-mind-spirit balance at great risk. Technology permeates every aspect of our life. We use it to communicate, pay bills, play and relax, plan and execute our days, missions and more. When technology fails, it easily upsets our balance because it removes so many pieces of our lives. Given the West's over-dependence on technology (civilian and military), it is crucial that we provide a framework to add technology to the body-mind-spirit triangle

PROFILING INTERNATIONAL CHANGE PROCESSES:
A holistic, integrative, and socio-psychologically grounded approach to emerging trends prediction

Guntram Werther, Ph.D.

This paper introduces and discusses core parameters of an approach to predicting emerging trends, styles, and patterns of acting with respect to international change, and hence of predicting emerging societal, country, and regional "futures." The paper argues that mathematical modeling, any accretive, parsing, and other externally oriented comprehensive data gathering approaches, and any "rational actor" approaches (including those using biological, chemical, and physical system templates) are fundamentally misdirected as to their predictive orientation if they fail to centrally place a "thinking within bias" focus as their grounding.

Bias is, of course, one way of describing how humans act. Consequently, without centrally and integrally accounting for diverse human, and societally definitive, elements of change, no reliable solution is possible when attempting to predict emerging international futures, or methods of moving toward them for either societies, countries, or regions.

"Change profiling", by contrast, can better accomplish this predictive task because it is, in essence, a study of conflicting harmonies; it is from the beginning centrally focused upon how humans and societies variously act. This paper focuses on the "change process" as a dynamically fluid, contextually nuanced "dance" involving internally integrated actors (each acts according to their natures) within their "environment". The metaphor - if one is useful - is music (as to intentional harmonies; the "song they sing") and dance (with respect to mutual actions) more than math. The latter particularly, is endlessly recursive with respect to the expected future actions of the other.

If the above is understood, then a "profiling change processes" analytic is to be viewed as a holistically integrative study of change; not of states. It begins with an inquiry into the socio-psychological nature of things as to their "character" and "species" [their holistically integrated approach, style, and habitual method of achieving goals within their environment] - if you will - moving thus from this understanding holistically and integratively again toward expected solutions. It may be better to say that one studies and profiles expected patterns and paths of change; endlessly. Another way to view this is as moving from kernel (character, species, nature) toward expanded layers of understanding with respect to projected actions.

Homeland Security Futures Case Study: Agroterrorism

LTC Shawn Cupp

This paper uses a case study methodology to improve the understanding of a Homeland Security domestic incident during the conduct of consequence management. The paper presents a future incident that takes place within the USNORTHCOM as participants are part of a standing Interagency Operational Planning Team (IOPT) within the Joint Task Force-Civil Support (JTF-CS). The participants represent Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Department of Justice (DOJ), Department of Agriculture (USDA), Department of the Interior (DOI), Department of Transportation (DOT), Department of Defense, and Department of Commerce (DOC) action officers. This case study is conducted within the joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) environment.

The consequence management case study involves an incident affecting US agriculture. There are several ideas within the case study that have direct connection to the Proteus insights across the planes of influence. These include:

1. Starlight-- insight exaggerating the psychological plane of influence. Leaders must know that managing the information surrounding an agricultural incident would significantly influence the world's view of the US.
2. Sanctuary -- insight across the terrestrial, and especially the psychological planes of influence. The threshold of repercussions is low for committing an agroterrorist act.
3. Veracity -- insight across the terrestrial, and most definitely the psychological planes of influence. Natural outbreaks mimic actual possible attacks. The simple act of confirming or denying that an incident impacting the food chain would be an emotionally filled and high stakes decision.
4. Herds -- insights across the terrestrial, virtual, and psychological planes of influence. People will sympathize more because citizens will not necessarily die in this incident. This reflects the fickle nature of public opinion and how a certain terrorist act may actually cause support or at least tacit acceptance of the attackers.
5. Wealth - insight, it's about the economy, not cows. A safe, cheap supply of meat in the US will not be cheap anymore. The impact on the economy also travels across the terrestrial, virtual, and psychological planes of influence. An accidental or purposeful interdiction of the US food supply of a substantial size would create significant and lasting economic impacts.

This case study takes place in the not so distant future. Although it takes place in the future, the case study elements are all based on fact. Actual places, events that could happen, and the impact of the incident are all possible. All aspects of the US agricultural system including exports, transportation, genetically modified foods, imports, production, and policies are detailed. Students are given enough information to conduct

New Frontiers in Tactical Terrorism Analysis: An Evaluation of Machine Learning Techniques to Support Counterterrorism Analyst Decision Making for Predicting Culpability in Terrorist Bombing Attacks in Iraq

John M. Miller, PhD, Daniel J. Mabrey, and W. Christopher Hale, PhD

This paper proposes and evaluates structured analytical models built by applying machine learning classification techniques, specifically *decision trees* and *support vector machines*, to tactical data on terrorist/insurgent operations in Iraq from March 2003 – April 2006. One of the most basic responsibilities of a counterterrorism analyst is to provide policymakers with information about suspected terrorist groups in the immediate aftermath of a terrorist attack. This process of predicting culpability for terrorist attacks is the product of analytical tradecraft that combines analyst intuition with structured analytical technique, although not in equal parts. In reality, most culpability predictions are based largely on analyst intuition because of the lack of sophisticated structured analytical techniques in this area. Iraq was selected for this study because of the high volume of terrorist/insurgent operations that occur there and the fact that there are numerous identifiable groups committing actions there. Seven model scenarios were constructed for building the analytical models and the performance of each structured analytical technique was evaluated. The findings of the evaluation are discussed and potential applications for these techniques are presented in this paper.

The proposed structured analytical models make two significant contributions to counterterrorism analysis:

1) The models quantify the probability that a terrorist group committed a terrorist attack, and provide a reliability estimate for the quality of the prediction (cross-validation), and

2) The classification rules derived during the modeling process act as a feedback loop for the analysts to identify weaknesses in his/her intuition-based decision making process.

The data for this study was provided by the Institute for the Study of Violent Groups at Sam Houston State University from a relational database built through a grant from the Bureau of Justice Assistance at the US Department of Justice.

“THE U.S. Military’s Future Challenge:
Understanding Cultural Diversity”

Major Remi Hajjar

This paper calls for the US military's rejuvenated focus on the fundamental skills needed to effectively process cultural diversity. These skills include a sufficient understanding of the concept of culture, a person's own cultural memberships and how the most important cultural memberships can cause mental impediments or biases, the need for genuine open-mindedness or cultural relativism while in a professional capacity, and a thirst to appreciate and value diverse others, especially during the conduct of the mission. The paper examines three concerns within the ranks of the US military to illustrate the importance of the aforementioned fundamentals: spiritual tolerance; women membership; and anti-homosexual attitudes/conduct. Finally, the paper argues that building the fundamental skills to effectively process cultural diversity helps the military in all of its missions and situations, not just in enhancing in-ranks' cohesion. Insofar as modern operations require increased emphasis on multinational, interagency, and joint campaigns, and as they highlight the crucial nature of effective interaction with populations (abroad and, as Katrina has shown, at home), these fundamental skills will prove most significant. And the US military has an opportunity to bolster these cultural processing skills by addressing some of the internal issues of the force. So, in essence, those in-ranks concerns provide another way to address the transformational cultural awareness initiative of the US military.

The Application of Strategic Stress Management in Winning the Peace

Colonel Brian M. Rees, M.D.
(Paper is currently unavailable)

This paper addresses the application of Strategic Stress Management (SSM). SSM, in the form of groups of persons practicing a meditative technique called the TM-Sidhi Program, can be applied to reduce hostilities in targeted populations. The underlying hypothesis is that consciousness is a field, and that effects generated in the field of consciousness can affect the brain chemistry, the thinking and the subsequent behavior of potential belligerents who are not engaged in the practice. Initial research on Transcendental Meditation (TM) focused on physiological and psychological effects. Subsequent research identified beneficial effects in cities where 1% of the population practiced TM. More recent prospective studies of an advanced form of the procedure have documented reductions in combat deaths, crime, and terrorist acts related to the size of the groups practicing the intervention. This approach is suitable, and should have salutary second and third order effects. Data indicate its application as a counterinsurgency tool is feasible, and it is readily distinguishable from other possible courses of action available in the prosecution of the Global War on Terror. The acceptability of an approach with such an extraordinary theoretical underpinning, and with advocates with atypical world views, is an open question.

Ahmadinejad and Islamic Just War

Professor Cynthia E. Ayers

This paper will discuss implications of the new Iranian president's public overtures and the potential impact of his bellicosity on the global community. Displaying an ability to skillfully manipulate the concerns of Western diplomats and politicians utilizing culturally inspired hatred and "true belief," the president appears to be attempting to mobilize the Muslim world for the onset of an apocalyptic "Islamic just war." Will he succeed or will he be ushered into obscurity? History may show that the impact of one empowered actor can change the course of the world and threaten the peace of future generations.

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has made no secret of his hatred for Israel, the United States, and the West in general. He has accused the United States and Great Britain of sponsoring covert attacks within his country, while senior officers in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp openly recruit Iranian youths as potential suicide bombers for operations against Israel and the West. He has overtly met with and supported leaders of terrorist organizations who publicly proclaim and act on their intention to destroy Israel. The Iranian government continues the process of uranium enrichment while Ahmadinejad remains defiantly noncompliant, in spite of diplomatic requests, offers of incentives, and a new United Nations Security Council resolution. He has crafted strategic alliances based on common enmity and has made no attempt to hide his apocalyptic vision of the future from the world.

Seen by many as belligerent and irrational, Ahmadinejad has been dismissed by Western media and political pundits as a "madman," yet cautiously compared to Adolph Hitler in regard to his potential global impact. His statements and actions to this point appear as unmistakable provocations to some; yet there are Western analysts who believe that neither the general Iranian population nor the clerical leadership agree with their president's fanatical views—thus, they believe he will soon fall from his current position of power. But like Hitler, Ahmadinejad's talent rests in his ability to seduce individuals and the masses, friend and foe. As Hitler proved to the world, extreme hatred—when combined with "true belief"—can be a powerful tool. The key to the realization of Ahmadinejad's apocalyptic vision may lie in his ability to manipulate the world using extreme hatred, "true belief," and traditional Islamic concepts of "just war."