

JOINT FORCES LAND COMPONENT COMMANDER (JFLCC)

PRIMER



**Department of Military Strategy, Planning and Operations (DMSPO)
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Foreword

This Joint Force Land Component Commander (JFLCC) Primer reflects the latest joint doctrine and actual experience. General Eric K. Shinseki, the Chief of Staff of the United States Army, has challenged the Army to face the future.

“One hundred years from now our successors are likely to want to look back to understand how we accommodated the challenges for landpower in a time of rapid change. As long as people live on land---as long as they travel, build homes, draw resources, establish governments and practice their faith on land--- land forces will be not just relevant but strategically indispensable to human existence.”

To adjust the condition of the Army to better meet the requirements of the next century, General Shinseki has articulated the following vision:

“Soldiers on point for the Nation transforming this, the most respected Army in the world, into a strategically responsive force that is dominant across the full spectrum of operations.”

As part of this major transformation the Army will accomplish the following,

“To improve strategic responsiveness, we will enable our Army Service Component Commands to function both as Joint Force Land Component Command (JFLCC) and as Army Force (ARFOR) headquarters.”

Consequently, as military professionals, we must know how best to contribute land forces to the Joint Force Commander’s campaign. We need to keep improving our understanding of land power and its tremendous potential to not only achieve our nation’s objectives, but also to secure them. While the concept of a single ground commander in a theater is not new, the joint doctrinal implementation of the JFLCC is still imprecise. Additionally, both the Army and the Marine Corps provide elements of the Nations total land force and either may provide the JFLCC. This pamphlet covers how best to organize, plan, and execute joint and multinational land operations as part of the emerging JFLCC concept.

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This pamphlet will be revised as necessary.

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“ . . . you may fly over land forever; you may bomb it, atomize it, pulverize it and wipe it clean of life---but if you desire to defend it, protect it, and keep it for civilization; you must do this on the ground, the way the Roman legions did, by putting your young men into the mud.”

T. R. Fehrenbach, *This Kind of War*

I. INTRODUCTION

A. The Operational Environment. Combatant commanders with a geographic Area of Responsibility have the authority to conduct military operations within their theaters. One of their fundamental purposes is to achieve the synchronized employment of all-available land, sea, aerospace, and special forces. Inter- dependent functional component commands may be established in order to orchestrate the capabilities of each service within the same dimension or medium.

B. Land power. Combat on land continues to be a salient feature in the potential range of military operations. Land combat usually involves destroying or dislocating enemy forces or taking land objectives that reduce the enemy's effectiveness or will to fight. Land combat involves the employment of land power.

1. Land power may be defined as: an application of the nation's ground forces to exert decisive and lasting influence on land in support of national interests.

2. Characteristics of land power include:

a. Land power permits joint forces to achieve or secure decisive victory.

b. Land power shapes the peacetime international security environment and responds decisively to the full range of military operations.

c. The destiny of nations is shaped by forces on land making permanent, the otherwise temporary effects of other forces.

d. Land forces symbolize a nation's highest commitment and determination.

e. Land power is employed in the densest of all mediums and land combat is the most affected by terrain, weather, and populations.

C. Joint Forces Land Component Commander.

1. Theater commanders seek synchronized employment of the full range of military capabilities of their assigned forces. During World War II, it became common to exercise theater command through functionally organized sea, air, and land component commanders. However, as most theater commanders were ground officers, many dispensed with separate land component commanders and staffs and chose to exercise land command themselves through their theater staffs. This frequently resulted in split focus by the theater commander and his staff and often delegation of "coordinating land operations" to one of the ground commanders.

2. Unity of effort through centralized command of theater land assets is the most effective way to employ land power. Current joint doctrine recognizes that this principle is true for land as well as air and naval operations. The Joint Force Land Component Commander (JFLCC) provides a Joint Force Commander (JFC) the means to maximize the capabilities of land power in a theater by achieving unity of command and maintaining unity of effort among land forces.

3. Combined structures exist in NATO and Korea, where Land Component Commanders and their staffs such as LANDCENT, LANDSOUTHEAST and Combined Forces Command Ground Component Commander, face contemporary challenges in providing centralized command of large multinational land forces.

II. BACKGROUND

A. DEFINITIONS

1. Joint Pub 1-02 defines the JFLCC as "The commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or a joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of land forces, planning and coordinating land operations, or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The joint force land component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. The joint force land component commander will normally be the commander with the preponderance of land forces and the requisite command and control capabilities."

2. Land Control Operations: The employment of ground forces, supported by naval and air forces, as appropriate, to achieve military objectives in vital land areas. Such operations include destruction of opposing ground forces, securing key terrain, protection of vital landlines of communication, and establishment of local military superiority in areas of land operations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

B. HISTORICAL CONTEXT

1. WORLD WAR II-NORTH AFRICA.

General Eisenhower was the supreme commander for the Allied invasion of North Africa during OPERATION TORCH in November 1942. He utilized three geographic Task Forces to control the initial widely separated landings. Later, Eisenhower utilized air and sea component

commanders, but organized his ground forces along national lines with British, French, and U.S. land commanders reporting directly to him. As the drive toward Tunis bogged down, Eisenhower could not adequately coordinate the ground efforts from his HQ in Algiers. He faced numerous political-military problems dealing with the French and the challenge of keeping both Washington and London informed. After the Allied repulses at Kasserine Pass, due to poor command relationships of all components and inexperience, Eisenhower restructured his command. Not only were all air elements brought under centralized control, but all land forces were also consolidated under General Alexander's 18th Army Group. This structure was the first modern joint and combined organization with co-equal land, sea, and air component commanders under a separate commander-in-chief and significantly contributed to the rapid defeat of the Axis in North Africa by May 1943.




Figure 1 Allied Command Relationships in North Africa and the Mediterranean, March 1943

2. WORLD WAR II-NORTHWEST EUROPE.

For the invasion of France a year later, General Eisenhower exercised command similarly through three functional component commanders: land (General Montgomery), air (Air Marshall Leigh-Mallory), and sea (Admiral Ramsay). However, on 1 August as General Bradley's 12th U. S. Army Group took control of U.S. forces breaking out at St. Lo, General Montgomery became a co-equal commander of the 21st British-Canadian Army Group. General Eisenhower retained overall ground command as well as supreme command, but delegated control through General Montgomery until September 1944. As the campaign progressed, Eisenhower controlled from his SHAPE HQ separate air and sea component commanders as well as three Army Groups. As a "Ground Forces officer" Eisenhower and his staff believed they could perform both theater and ground force HQ duties. However, several times during the campaign, Eisenhower's ability to perform both roles would be questioned, most notably during the battle of the Bulge when General Montgomery was given control of the Northern half of the entire front. Montgomery repeatedly requested unified control of all allied ground forces (under himself) for a 'single decisive thrust'. Eisenhower argued that his retaining ground command eliminated any perceived preferences for either the U.S. or British.

2. WORLD WAR II – PACIFIC.

During the war in the Pacific, the most notable instance of Army/Marine Corps integration was the battle for Okinawa. The operation was commanded by VADM Kelly Turner (TF 51). The

Joint Expeditionary Force was commanded by Lieutenant General Simon Bolivar Buckner (TF 56, CG Tenth Army). Tenth Army consisted of an Army Corps (XXIV Corps-7th and 96th Divisions) and III Amphibious Corps (1st and 6th Marine Divisions) commanded by Major General Geiger and three divisions in reserve (27th, 77th Infantry, and 2d Marine). The Tactical Air Forces consisted of the 2d Marine Air Wing and Army Air Force Elements under Major General Mulcahy, USMC.




Figure 2. Organization of Expeditionary Troops for the Ryukyus Campaign, January 1945

General Buckner requested a joint staff and was augmented by 60 Navy and Marine personnel and a Marine Chief of Staff. During planning for the operation, Tenth Army found it necessary to enlarge the troop list by 70,000 Army troops to include greater numbers of supporting combat elements and service units. General Buckner also made known that he felt that General Geiger was capable of handling a field Army. During the final push when General Buckner was killed, Admiral Turner gave command of Tenth Army to General Geiger until General Stilwell's arrival four days later.

4. KOREA

General MacArthur as CinC Far East in Tokyo exercised command in Korea through air (FEAF), naval (NAVFE) and ground (8th Army) components. However, for the landings at Inchon, General MacArthur created X Corps out of GHQ troops: 1st Marine Division and the 7th Infantry Division. Even after being firmly established ashore, X Corps remained under MacArthur's direct control with his chief of staff as commander, while MacArthur gave the 8th Army commander the responsibility of providing logistical support to the X Corps. This created a gap in land focus between the two commands that was to be exploited by the Chinese in their winter 1950 offensive. Tenth Corps only joined 8th Army on 26 December 1950 after being evacuated under pressure from ports in northern Korea.

5. LEBANON AND DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

a. In 1958, an example of Army and Marine Forces ashore under a single land command took place. The President directed that U.S. Forces deploy to Lebanon to support the Lebanese government in maintaining internal control. Commander in Chief, naval Forces Eastern Atlantic

and Mediterranean (CINCNELM) was made responsible for the Lebanon operation. The first units to arrive were U.S. Marines of the Sixth Fleet and then Army units from throughout Europe. Ultimately 6000 Marines and 8500 soldiers were on the ground. In view of the size and complexity of the Lebanon operation, CINCNELM requested that a Major General or Lieutenant General, Marine or Army, be assigned to command the land forces as Commander, Army Marine Land Forces (COMAMLANFOR). The request was approved and MG Paul Adams, USA with a joint staff of Army and Marine personnel was charged with all joint aspects of land force operations and support planning in the middle east area and with assisting CINCNELM in maintaining liaison with Lebanese commanders.

b. In 1965 another contingency resulted in a single land command of Army and Marine forces. The President ordered U.S. forces to the Dominican Republic in response to a deteriorating political situation. Marines from the Caribbean Ready Amphibious Group were first to arrive in April 1965 followed by units of the 82nd Airborne Division. On 4 May LTG Bruce Palmer, CG XVIII Airborne Corps assumed command of Land Forces, Dominican Republic, consisting of the 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade commanded by a USMC Brigadier General and the 82nd Airborne Division commanded by an Army Major General.

6. VIETNAM

General Westmoreland was the Commander of the sub-unified Military Assistance Command Vietnam under CinCPAC and also Commander, U.S. Army Vietnam. He resisted forming a separate army component headquarters equivalent to the air and naval components present in Vietnam, because he wanted to parallel the Vietnamese structure, which combined their joint, and army chiefs and staffs. This arrangement seriously overloaded Westmoreland's staff with direct control of all U.S. operations, direct command of all U.S. Army elements, management of the advisory and assistance efforts, and politico-military functions of a combined theater command. The Army Chief of Staff favored forming a separate field army command to control the seven plus divisions in Vietnam by 1967, but Westmoreland's desires to retain ground command prevailed. While not having a separate ground commander in Vietnam may not have been one of the US's worst mistakes in that conflict, it contributed to the lack of unity of effort and diffused focus that affected the results.

7. PERSIAN GULF

General Schwarzkopf followed the precedence discussed above by serving not only as the CinC but also as the ground commander. While he had an Army Component in 3d Army, he declined to place either the Marines or the Arab Coalition forces under it. General Schwarzkopf's main reason for retaining ground command to himself was to avoid offending either Arab or Marine sensitivities by having three star equivalents working for another three-star. Additionally, he wanted to avoid creating another four-star headquarters to control 3d Army/ARCENT, the Marines and possibly the Arab forces. Schwarzkopf did task the 3d Army staff with the

responsibility of developing the overall ground operations plan in conjunction with the Marines and our Arab Coalition partners; and used his Deputy Commander, LTG Cal Waller, as his primary assistant for ground combat issues. This rather convoluted arrangement certainly violated the principles of simplicity and unity of command and created numerous challenges and difficulties in the coordinated application of air and land power. See figure 3.




Figure 3. CENTCOM Command and Control for Desert Storm.

8. KOSOVO

In March 1999, due to the political restrictions and the “short war syndrome”, neither a combined nor a joint forces land component commander was established for the NATO Operation ALLIED FORCE, nor its associated US operation. Admiral Ellis, NATO Commander of AFSOUTH responsible for ALLIED FORCE and US Commander JTF Noble Anvil, stated after the operation that ruling out a ground operation probably prolonged the air operation. He also believed that the lack of a ground component commander to coordinate NATO actions in Albania, Macedonia, and Kosovo was a mistake. Consequently, GEN Clark as SACEUR gave instructions to the US and NATO commanders of AFOR, KFOR and TF Hawk separately. See Figure 4 for the command and control relationships used.




Figure 4. Command Relationships Operation Allied Force (1 JUN 99)

9. SUMMARY

Since the successful organization for combat in North Africa in 1943 with co-equal component commanders, various joint or combined operations have been conducted involving land forces. Frequently, Army officers serving as theater commanders have attempted with varying degrees of success to serve as both CinC and Land Component Commander. While the initial defeats of Kasserine Pass in 1943, the Battle of the Bulge in 1944, at the Yalu in late 1950, and Vietnam were not totally caused by the lack of a single ground component, the failure to effectively control land combat operations contributed. Likewise, the difficulties in the closing days of the Persian Gulf War and in Kosovo were perhaps beyond the expectation of a single ground commander to resolve. But during land operations in Tunisia, Normandy, Okinawa, Lebanon, and the Caribbean, separate Land Component HQs successfully ensured proper coordination with other components, reduced the Joint Force Commander's span of control, and allowed the JFC to focus at the strategic level.

III. Joint Force Land Component Commander

A. JFLCC AUTHORITY

1. The "Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)" or Joint Pub 0-2 allows a Joint Force Commander (JFC) to organize forces in several different manners. Service Component

Commanders may be used to direct operations but functional component commands may also be established. Joint Pub 3-0 states that "JFCs may establish functional components to provide centralized direction and control of certain functions and types of operations when it is feasible and necessary to fix responsibility for certain normal, continuing functions, or when it is desirable to establish the authority and responsibility of a subordinate commander. These conditions apply when the scope of operations requires that the similar capabilities and functions of forces from more than one Service be directed toward closely related objectives and unity of command and effort are primary considerations." The JFC establishes the specific command authority, i.e., assigned OPCON or TACON to the JFLCC of the forces provided by the service components or national elements.




Figure 5. Joint Force Organized Using Functional Components

2. The current Joint Pub 1-02 provides definitions for the different types of authority such as: OPCON or TACON. Additionally, Joint Pubs 0-2 and 3-0 define specific types of supporting relationships as:

1. Mutual Support-- action that units render each other against a common enemy because of their assigned tasks, their position relative to each other and to the enemy, and their inherent capability.

2. General Support-- action given as a whole to the supported force rather than to a particular subdivision.

3. Direct Support--a mission authorizing a force to answer directly to the request of the supported force for assistance.

4. Close Support-- action against targets or objectives sufficiently near the supported force as to require detailed integration or coordination of the supporting action.

B. JFLCC SELECTION AND COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

1. When required, JFCs will designate a JFLCC and establish this commander's authority and responsibilities. The designation of a JFLCC may occur when major land forces of more than one Service component will participate in a major land operation and the JFC ascertains that this will

assist in achieving unity of command and maintaining unity of effort among land forces. The following factors should be considered when deciding upon the formation of a JFLCC:

- a. Availability of ports of debarkation.
- b. Amount of mutual support possible between land forces.
- c. Duration of the mission.
- d. Requirement for simultaneous or sequential land force operations.
- e. Likelihood of land force operations adjacent to each other.
- f. Requirements for special capabilities resident in one land force being required for use by the other.
- g. Amount, level of intensity, and requirement for coordination of other component support to land forces.

2. The type of command relationship given the JFLCC will be based upon the JFC's concept of operations and political guidance. These typically include exercising OPCON over assigned or attached forces and TACON over other military capabilities/forces made available for tasking. The JFC may also establish supporting and supported relationships between components to facilitate operations. Using a JFLCC eases the burden on the theater staff, frees the JFC to focus more on the strategic aspects of the campaign, and provides a single ground headquarters for coordination with the other components. As a norm, the service commander with the predominant number of ground forces and the requisite command and control capabilities is tasked to provide the JFLCC HQ.

3. The primary purpose of a JFLCC is to provide unity of command for employing land power for the benefit of the joint force as a whole and to give the JFC a workable span of control. The JFLCC must shape the battlespace for subordinate units by focusing on operations by purpose (decisive, shaping, and sustaining), in space (deep, close, and rear areas), as well as in time (normally more than 96 hours out).

4. While Marines are often best employed in Naval Campaigns or as independent formations, they may operate effectively under the operational or tactical control of a JFLCC. This normally would include only Marines ashore for sustained operations and not any Marines embarked or afloat. The Marine Corps Component Commander would remain responsible to the JFC to train, equip, and sustain all assigned Marines.(MCDP 3)

5. When coalition elements are included, they frequently will not include the total ground forces of the host nation, as some forces will probably be retained for internal security, but will normally include all deployed allies.

6. During Desert Thunder in early 1998, ARCENT/3d Army served as the Army Service Component, the JFLCC, and as the Combined Task Force headquarters in Kuwait. In addition to the Kuwaiti and other coalition forces, the U.S. element of CTF-K was organized with a "maneuver" element composed of the 3d Infantry Division(-) and a MEU (when ashore), a "support" element composed of the 24th CSG, and a "protection" element consisting of the 32d AAMDC. This headquarters has now been retitled as Combined/Joint Task Force Kuwait with commanders rotating among US Army and USMC generals. See figure 6.




Figure 6. Command and Control for Operation Desert Thunder

7. The major conceptual elements of a Joint Force Land Component may then be viewed as maneuver, support, and protection with the requisite command elements as shown below.

JFLCC- MI, SIG, IO CMD/BDEs

<u>MANEUVER</u>		<u>SUPPORT</u>	<u>PROTECTION</u>
<u>U.S.ARMY</u>	<u>USMC</u>		
CORPS	MEFs	LOG SPT	ADA CMD/BDE
DIVs	MEBs	ENGR CMD	CML BDEs
SEP BDEs	MEUs	CA CMD	MP CMD/BDE
FA/AVN BDEs		MED CMD	

C. JFLCC STAFF ORGANIZATION

1. The staff should be representative of the total land force that comprises the joint land force component command. The JFLCC may build his organization from the "core" of an existing Service component structure and with augmentees from the other services or multinational forces to provide the necessary expertise and to be representative of the total land force. If provided by

the Army, the Army Service Component Commander (ASCC) retains responsibilities for internal Army support. (See Appendix A for a Notional JFLCC staff)

2. Potential headquarters to be used as a JFLCC “core” are Army corps, Marine Expeditionary Forces, Marine Force HQs, Army Service Component Commands (ASCC) or, when separately constituted, numbered armies. TRADOC has recently designed a robust standard ASCC TOE (51001A000) with 903 spaces that can serve as a JFLCC, JTF, or Combined Task Force (CTF) headquarters as well as the army component headquarters for a CINC. It is composed of five command and control nodes (early entry, OPS/INTEL, main, sustainment, and sanctuary) that can be separately deployed.

D. JFLCC RESPONSIBILITIES

1. The responsibilities of the JFLCC are assigned by the JFC. These include, but are not limited to:

a. Advising the JFC on the proper employment of all land forces under the control of the JFLCC (including other nations' forces as appropriate).

b. Developing a joint/combined land operations plan that supports the operational objectives of the JFC and optimizes the task organization of the land forces. The JFLCC will issue planning guidance to all subordinate and supporting elements and analyze proposed courses of action. The goal is to concentrate the effects of combat power at critical times and places to achieve positional advantages over the enemy to accomplish operational or strategic goals. To do this the JFLCC may group joint and combined forces into operational formations, which complement one another. These may be non-standard task organizations with service and allied forces combined for maximum effectiveness.

c. Directing the execution of the land operations plan as specified by the JFC, to include making timely adjustments to the tasking of available joint forces. The JFLCC will notify any affected component commanders of changes as appropriate.

d. Coordinating the planning and execution of land operations with the other component and joint task force commanders. Within the possible theater geometry (Figure 7) , the JFLCC will establish an operational framework for the land AO that assigns responsibilities to subordinate land commanders and provides a way to visualize their battlespace. A key Fire Support Coordination Measure to delineate responsibilities is the Fire Support Coordination Line (FSCL). The FSCL is established and adjusted by the JFLCC within its boundary, in consultation with superior, subordinate, supporting, and affected commanders. Normally major subordinate land commands will control operations out to the FSCL and nominate targets beyond it. As the supported commander, the JFLCC will be responsible for operational fires between the forward boundary of his major subordinate commands and his own forward boundary , but will normally coordinate these attacks with the JFACC to prevent fratricide and duplication. The JFLCC nominates targets outside its AO to the JFC for attack by the JFACC.




Figure 7. Possible Theater Geometry

e. Evaluating the results of land operations and the effectiveness of interdiction operations within the LCC AO and forwarding these results to the JFC to support his overall combat assessment effort.

f. Serving as a member of the JFC's JTCCB (if formed).

g. Functioning as the supported commander for:

(1) Synchronization of maneuver, fires, and interdiction within the land area of operations. To facilitate this synchronization, the JFLCC designates the target priorities, effects, and timing of interdiction operations within his AO. (JP 3-0, IV-15, and JP 3-09, I-3).

(2) Close air support operations within its AO.

h. Functioning as a supporting commander to the JFACC for counterair operations, strategic attack operations, theater airborne reconnaissance and surveillance, and the JFC's overall interdiction effort.

i. Serving as the Joint Rear Area Coordinator (if so designated) responsible for overall security and protection of the Joint Rear Area.

j. Providing the Deputy Area Air Defense Commander (DAADC) over the land area when designated by the JFC. The DAADC may also be the Theater Army Air and Missile Defense

Coordinator (TAAMDCOORD). This may be provided by an Army Air and Missile Defense Command (AAMDC). (FM 44-94, AAMDC Operations, Final Draft, Sept 1999).

k. Regardless of the organizational and command arrangements within joint commands, Service Component commanders retain responsibility for Title 10 and Executive Agent Responsibilities as well as other matters affecting their forces, including internal administration, training, logistics, and Service intelligence operations (JP 3-0, P. II-14).

l. The JFLCC is responsible to coordinate, plan, and execute the land portion of Information Operations in support of the JFC's concept of the operation, or to request specific IO support from the JFC. JFLCC assets used for IO include Land Information Warfare Agency teams, EAC MI Brigades, Marine ISR elements (when subordinate to the JFLCC), PSYOP Groups, COMBAT CAMERA teams, and Public Affairs/Media teams. (JP 3-13 and FM 100-6)).

m. The JFLCC will also normally be responsible to provide robust liaison to allied or coalition land forces. At brigade and below, this requirement may be met by U.S. Special Forces Coalition Support Teams. At division or higher, this will require a robust Mobile Liaison Teams with adequate senior staff representation and communications to provide interface with these headquarters.

D. OPERATIONAL FUNCTIONS. In executing major land operations as part of the joint campaign, the JFLCC will normally focus on the operational-level tasks described in the UJTL. The JFLCC should consider the following functions:

1. **Conduct Operational Movement and Maneuver.** The JFLCC plans, coordinates, and directs movement and maneuver so as to gain positional advantage or a mobility differential over the enemy. The JFLCC prioritizes deployment, reception, and onward movement of the land forces into theater. Through decisive maneuver, land forces exert a decisive impact on the conduct of the campaign by directly engaging the enemy center of gravity or by striking decisive points, that pressure the COG. Decisive maneuver may be conducted in contiguous or non-contiguous areas. In non-contiguous areas, units conduct operations in a simultaneous, nonlinear fashion without positional reference to each other, which requires information superiority. In contiguous areas, units adapt their position and tempo to each other. This may occur when the maneuver forces lack compatible systems. Throughout the depth of his AO, the JFLCC integrates operational maneuver of land forces with fires.

2. **Employ Operational Firepower.** The JFLCC coordinates firepower provided by other components as well as from within the ground forces. As the supported commander of fires planned or requested from other components, the JFLCC designates target priority, effects, and timing. The JFLCC allocates organic land force firepower means (such as MLRS, ATACMS, EW, and Attack Helicopters) as well as firepower apportioned in support of land operations. The JFLCC will normally retain approval authority to fire Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS). In consultation with superior, subordinate, supporting, and affected commanders, the JFLCC establishes fire control measures, coordinating procedures, and targeting priorities to include the location of the FSCL. The JFLCC also defines interdiction objectives, targets, and

priorities to the supporting components. The JFLCC will normally establish a Deep Operations Coordination Cell (DOCC) with joint representation to coordinate this function in conjunction with a Battlefield Coordination Detachment co-located with the JFACC.

3. Provide Operational Protection. The JFLCC is responsible for preserving the combat potential of all land forces and contributing to the overall force conservation. This includes providing forces for air and missile defense, establishing NBC defense, conducting defensive information operations (including information assurance, deception and OPSEC), conducting rear area operations (to include combating terrorism), and conducting risk assessments. The JFLCC will often be designated the Joint Rear Area Coordinator (JRAC) and be responsible to the JFC for that function. A Rear Tactical Operations Center (RTOC) will need augmentation from all other components.

4. Provide Operational Command and Control. The JFLCC is the focal point for planning and executing the land operations portion of the JFC's campaign plan. The JFLCC prepares a supporting joint land operations plan that provides the intent, concept of operations, and the supporting details to achieve land force unity of effort. The JFLCC directs current land operations while continuing to plan and prepare for future land operations with the JFC and other component commanders.

5. Provide Operational Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance. The JFLCC drives the operational-level intelligence effort by ensuring that organic intelligence systems provide unity of intelligence effort in support of land force requirements. Land force intelligence efforts must be synchronized with the efforts of the other components and the strategic collection systems.

6. Provide Operational Logistics and Personnel Support. The JFLCC must ensure the most effective and efficient distribution of material, supplies and services consistent with the ground concept of operations to sustain the land forces throughout the campaign. While the logistical support of other services and multinational units is normally a service or national responsibility, the JFLCC may be tasked with providing certain common user support within the land AO, subject to appropriate coordination and agreements. The Theater Support Command of the Army may be tasked to coordinate this support as well as provide Army Support to Other Services (ASOS).

A graphic presentation of the synchronization of these functions is at figure 8.





Figure 8 Functional Synchronization

E. JFLCC INTERRELATIONSHIPS: LAND-SEA-AIR

1. The following diagrams depict several of the most important roles of the JFLCC in respect to his relationships to air and sea forces.


2. The first shows the symmetrical relationship of land forces primary task of seeking land control from opposing enemy land forces while the air and sea forces perform the same symmetrical function in their respective regimes. This has been the traditional view of warfare from service perspectives and has been exemplified by classic land battles such as between Grant and Lee in the American Civil War or by classic naval and air battles such as the Battles of Jutland (1916) and Britain (1940).

Figure 9. SYMMETRICAL RELATIONSHIPS




3. The second depicts the primary mutual support relationships requiring close coordination whereby the JFLCC provides suppression of enemy air defenses (such as by AH-64 or ATACMS in Desert Storm) as well as seizing and holding ports and airbases for friendly air and sea forces (such as in Just Cause). Likewise, the JFLCC can expect to receive closely coordinated tactical air support (to include airlift and CAS) from the air component and power projection support (to include Naval Air, Naval Gunfire, and Sea Lines of Communication force deployment and Sustainment) from the naval component.

Figure 10. MUTUAL SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS



4. Finally, the JFLCC can be tasked to conduct asymmetrical operations not requiring close coordination. These may be against enemy ports and airbases directly (as with the elimination of German submarine and V-1/2 bases in France in 1944). Land based elements may conduct air/missile defense operations to deny or reduce the enemy's air effects (as performed by Patriot batteries in Saudi Arabia and Israel in Desert Storm). Similarly, the JFLCC can request from the JFC air interdiction and naval deep strike operations (TLAM, carrier air, etc.) to asymmetrically attack or isolate enemy land forces deep.

Figure 11. ASSYMETRICAL RELATIONSHIPS



IV. LAND OPERATIONAL PLANNING (JP 5-0)

A. DELIBERATE: In accordance with the Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES), deliberate planning is accomplished in five major phases: initiation, concept development, plan development, plan review, and supporting planning.

1. INITIATION: The Combatant Commander receives strategic guidance from higher national or multinational authority by means such as the JSCP or other initiating documents and begins the planning process. Major “operating forces” apportioned to this plan are also identified. For land forces, this includes only army or corps level headquarters, divisions and separate brigades or regiments.

2. CONCEPT DEVELOPMENT:

a. Mission Analysis: The combatant commander and select members of his staff then analyze assigned and implied tasks and derive the mission statement.

b. Planning Guidance: A planning directive is then issued to the combatant command staff and to subordinate/ component and supporting staffs. Sufficient preliminary guidance is provided to allow work on staff estimates and for subordinate commands to conduct their own mission analysis. Representative information in addition to the mission and major forces might include: characteristics of the AO, enemy capabilities, assumptions, constraints or limiting factors, tentative courses of action suggested by the commander or the J-5, and a planning schedule. (Sample Planning Directive in CJCSM 3122.03) Subordinate/component commanders will also develop and issue their own planning guidance by means of a directive or a planning conference to major subordinate forces apportioned to this plan.

c. Staff estimates of supportability of the tentative COAs are conducted at both the combatant command and subordinate/component command levels. The Army Service component commander in the absence of a JFLCC will provide input to the appropriate combatant commanders' staff estimates as to the supportability and feasibility of the COAs from a land perspective. (See CJCSM 3500.05 JTF HQ MTG).

d. Commander's Estimate: While the entire process described in a through c above are part of the overall estimate process, this step consists of the commander's formal comparison of the proposed COAs in accordance with the model in Appendix D, Joint Pub 5-00.1. Opposing courses of action are analyzed or wargamed and compared with your own COAs. Each COA is evaluated with respect to advantages and disadvantages and then compared by means of governing factors. These may be common standards such as the Principles of War, joint warfighting principles or elements of operational art; or other plan unique factors such as political guidance, public support or risks. If possible, elements of different courses of action are merged into one refined COA to be considered as the CinC's decision. Consider using one of the other courses of action as part of the theater deception plan.

e. Strategic Concept: The CinC's staff then expand the selected COA into the CinC's Strategic Concept that is submitted to the CJCS for review and approval, as well as to subordinate and supporting commanders for continued parallel planning.

3. PLAN DEVELOPMENT

a. Force Planning will have begun prior to the approval of the Strategic Concept. As soon as possible after initiation of the planning process, the Combatant Commander will publish a Letter of Instruction (LOI) to coordinate the activities of everyone involved. This LOI provides TPFDD development guidance to include transportation priorities and APODs/SPODS as well as milestones (Sample at CJCSM 3122.03). Although this phase generally follows eight sequential steps described in JOPES, these steps may overlap, be simultaneous, or be iterative with

component commanders. Additionally, shortfall identification is performed throughout the process.

(1) The purpose of force planning is to identify all the forces needed to accomplish the CinC's Strategic Concept. Force planning is ultimately the responsibility of the supported commander, but the components do most of the work. Planners on the staffs of the component commanders begin developing the total package of forces required for the operation as early as possible. They start with the major combat forces selected from those apportioned for planning in the originating documents and included in the CinC's Strategic Concept as "above the line" or "operating" forces. Additionally, service planning documents such as the Army Mobilization Operations Planning and Execution System (AMOPES) describe the "below the line" or "generating" forces. Force tailoring is another term used to describe this process of determining the right mix and sequencing of military capabilities to accomplish a mission. (See Appendix B)

(2) The ASCC will also put out an LOI to all Army/Land forces involved in the plan for their input. This LOI will also coordinate a forces conference to be held by the Army/Land component commander. Corps level combat units, CS, CSS and theater protection and support forces are determined at this conference. This force list is developed with the full coordination of the CinC's staff. The force list can be built by adding the CS/CSS forces to the apportioned combat forces or by use of force modules. Notional type or generic units are used at this point of the process to determine the movement requirements in terms of personnel, equipment, and supplies to be moved. The land planners must also determine the phasing required to meet the operational requirements of the combat force and the constraints of the available lift. The end product of the ASCC/JFLCC forces conference is a requirements TPFDD.

(3) The ASCC/JFLCC then submits this requirements TPFDD through two channels simultaneously. The time-phased force list is submitted to the CinC's staff for review and approval. By submitting the land component force list, the land commander indicates full understanding of the strategic concept and either the assurance that the forces will support the concept or what limitations still exist. The CinC's staff merges the component force lists and analyzes the consolidated list in accordance with lift constraints to confirm that it can perform the mission within the conceived phasing. At the same time, the ASCC submits the force list through Army channels to Department of the Army. DA will validate below the line forces by assessing the impact of deploying these forces on worldwide Army requirements and pass the force list on to FORSCOM or other MACOMs for sourcing. (See Joint Force Provider Process at Appendix D)

(4) FORSCOM sources the requirements TPFDD by assigning actual units, active or reserve component, against the requirements. The result is a sourced TPFDD with actual unit data and origins. The sourced TPFDD is then submitted to the CinC for merger with those of the other components. This integrated TPFDD is then refined throughout the remainder of the plan development phase. CJCSM 3122.03 requires a Reserve Component Requirement Summary to be included as part of Annex A. This requirement is described in JP 4-05.1, *JTTP for Manpower Mobilization and Demobilization Operations: Reserve Callup*. (See Appendix E)

(5) After merger of the TPFDDs, the CinC reviews the Strategic Concept for any changes necessitated by service sourcing. A forces or plan development conference may be held by the CinC to resolve any problems and to develop initial closure profiles. Here the CinC and component planners consider shortfalls, explore solutions, and assess risks. A draft plan can be produced at this point if not before by the CinC staff. The ASCC/JFLCC staff provides input to the development of the draft plan. Coordination with the other components is essential to ensure the plan optimizes and synchronizes the interrelationships between the components in terms of mutual support and asymmetries. The synchronization of operational functions (movement, firepower, protection, intelligence, command & control, and logistics) among the services must also be considered to eliminate any redundancy. (See FM 100-7, Chapter 5 for a discussion of operational-level operating systems or see Universal Joint Task List, CJCSM 3500.04B).

b. Support Planning. This step determines the quantities of supplies by broad categories and converts this to lift requirements to be moved.

(1) Sustainment planning is a function of Service guidance, CinC guidance, inter-Service and interallied support. Services develop their own requirements. But support requirements also include Service Title 10 responsibilities to other services. For the Army these include civil engineering, medical, EPW, Civil Affairs and provision of theater logistics command and control. Total Army Analysis 2005 has identified some 57,447 spaces for Army Logistical Support to Other services (ALSOS) (see table below). For example a 1 July 1997 Conference identified the following Chemical Defensive Requirements to be provided by the Army:

Air bases - (1) SMK/Decon Co.

APOD - (1) SMK/Decon Co.

SPOD - (1) SMK/Decon Co.

MARFOR - EAD like Army Corps Structure (Chemical Brigade)

BRANCH	No. of Pers	BRANCH	No. of Pers
AV	0	MD	1,468
CM	12,903	OD	5,529
EN	2493	QM	12,211
FA	0	AG	827
SC	18	FI	297
MP	2,517	CH	0
PO	0	MH	0
MI	0	JA	179
CA	282	PA	0
AD	0	TC	18,251
HQ	0	CS	472
CS	18,213	CSS	39,234

A logistics conference may be conducted by the CinC J-4 to resolve any shortfalls. The next table lists some of the types of logistics support to other services that the Army may provide.

<i>Tasking Document</i>	<i>Support Responsibility</i>
AR 40-905	Veterinary Support
DSD Memo	Mortuary Affairs
DODD 1315.06	Troop Construction Support to OCONUS USAF
DODD 2310	Executive Agent for DoD Enemy Prisoner of War Detainee Program
DODD 4500.09	Common-User Land Transportation in Overseas Areas
DODD 4500.09	Intermodal Container Management
DODD 4500.09	Overseas Ocean Terminal Operations
DODD 4525.06	Management of Military Postal Services
DODD 4705.01	Executive Agent for Land-Based Water Resources
DODD 5030.49	Executive Agent for the DoD Customs Inspection Program
DODDs 5160.65 and 5160.68	Management of Conventional Ammunition
DODI 4140.50	Locomotive Management
JP 4-01.5	Single Manager for Military Traffic Management
JP 4-02	Food Safety Service
JP 4-02.1	Single Integrated Medical Logistics Management
JP 4-03	Overland Petroleum Support Management
JP 4-06	Executive Agent for the Joint Mortuary Affairs Program

Figure 12. Army Responsibilities for Army Logistical Support to Other Services

(2) If not already initiated, a draft Land Operations Plan (LOP) is prepared at this point by the JFLCC if designated, or by the senior Army operational HQ (See Appendix C, for a format from FM 100-7). If the ASCC is not the JFLCC, then the ASCC must also prepare a Army service support plan to logistically prepare the theater and provide Title 10 support (See FM 100-16, Appendix B).

c. Transportation Planning. This is an iterative process in which the CinC J-4 staff works closely with TRANSCOM and the Components to produce a transportation feasible TPFDD that still meets the CinC's Strategic Concept. The CinC staff will hold a series of conferences, normally at TRANSCOM, to perform this task. Forces refinement is conducted as part of this process with the supporting commanders, the Services, and the Joint Staff. This confirms that the forces are sourced and tailored within the JSCP and to assess the adequacy of the CS and CSS sourced by the Services. Following TPFDD refinement the CinC finalizes the plan and distributes the plan to the CJCS for review and to subordinate and supporting commands for completion of their supporting plans. As part of the submission, the CinC prepares a plan summary (sample format on page III-17, Joint Pub 5-03.2) that provides a consolidated listing of

any force or support shortfalls and an impact assessment of those shortfalls. Additional forces, including CS and CSS, recommended by the supported commander to reduce risk, but not allocated by the Services is to be addressed.

4. **PLAN REVIEW:** This is a formal process that evaluates the entire plan with emphasis on any critical unresolved shortfalls that may impact on accomplishment of assigned tasks.

5. **SUPPORTING PLANS:** During this final phase of the process, the supporting plans that have been concurrently developed are finalized and submitted to the CinC for approval.

B. CRISIS ACTION PLANNING

1. **Predeployment Activities.** Once a crisis or incident initiates the process, the ASCC recommends to the CINC the size and composition of the ARFOR required to support the mission, including forces that support assembly and deployment of the force. Additionally, the ASCC identifies the lift requirements to move the ARFOR and requirements for reception and onward movement upon arrival in the theater of operations. (FM 100-7, P.6-15)

2. After approval of the concept, planners on the staff of the ASCC begin to develop the total package of Army forces required for the operation. They start with the major combat forces apportioned for planning in the original task-assigning document and included in the CinC's concept of operations. Working closely with the staffs of Service Headquarters, other supporting commands, and DOD agencies, they identify requirements for support forces and sustainment. If a deliberate plan exists for this contingency, it may be modified with the current threat and situation and provide the basis for an OPORD. If no plan exists, the planning process will be similar to that described under deliberate planning, but more compressed. Crisis action planning follows the six phases described in JP 5-03.

C. CAMPAIGN PLANNING

1. Campaign planning is the process by which a CinC develops his plan for the conduct of a campaign in his Theater. Campaign planning is a primary means by which combatant commanders arrange for strategic unity of effort and through which they guide the planning of joint operations within their theater. It communicates the commander's purpose, requirements, objectives, and concept to subordinate components and joint forces, as well as to supporting commands and Services, so that they may make necessary preparations. It orients on the enemy's centers of gravity; achieves simultaneous and synchronized employment of all available land, sea, air, space-based, and special operations forces; clearly defines an end state that constitutes success; and serves as the basis for subordinate planning. In addition, by means of a campaign plan, combatant commanders give the NCA and the CJCS information needed for intertheater coordination at the national level.

2. Theater campaigns are conducted by joint forces. They may follow more than one line of operation. Theater campaigns synthesize mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, and their subordinate operations into a coherent whole.

3. Campaign planning is a flexible process that combines aspects of deliberate and crisis action planning. Campaign planning can begin before or during deliberate planning but is not normally completed until crisis action planning when the threat is clearly evident. Unlike deliberate planning, it does not necessarily follow a specific time schedule, but like crisis action planning may be responsive to unfolding events. Component commanders are responsible for contributing to as well as complying with theater campaign plans. This iterative process follows the military planning model and is described in Joint Pub 5-00.1. The following diagram depicts the flow of the major steps required.




Figure 13, Theater Planning Actions

V. ARMY ISSUES

A. TARGETING AND BDA PROCESS

The ARFOR/JFLCC needs to be able to request additionally fire support from other components to support the conduct of land operations in accordance with the JFC's overall guidance. A Joint Fires Element (JFE) as part of the J3 can provide staff coordination. Additionally, the JFLCC needs to have access to Battlefield Damage Assessment (BDA) assets in order to make targeting recommendations. As many of these ISR platforms belong to other components, the JFLCC needs a BDA request system. A Joint Targeting Coordination Board (JTCB), preferably under the DCinC, with authority to recommend targeting priorities at the macro level is a method of providing that support. (See JP 3-09 and JP 3-60.)

B. JFLCC INTEGRATION OF ASSETS

A Joint Forces Land Component Commander (JFLCC) should be established to exercise control of all ground forces and their doctrinal direct support assets (to include Army rotary wing aircraft and ATACMS or USMC Aviation) when employed for sustained land operations. Marines ashore for sustained periods should be placed OPCON or TACON to the JFLCC. Marines embarked should remain under the control of the Maritime Component. Likewise the JFLCC should command all ground based air/missile defense assets for the JFC. For a major conflict, a MEF operating as part of a JFLCC will require augmenting Army MLRS or SP cannon artillery. The Marines can provide a Force Artillery HQ to control these assets. On a task basis, the JFLCC may be required to relinquish control of some of these assets to support another component, but they revert back as the task is completed. Marine Air will always remain under the command of the MAGTF Commander for direct support air sorties. Any sorties in excess of MAGTF direct support requirements will be provided to the joint force commander for re-tasking by the JFACC.

C. DEEP FIRES

The JFLCC needs to have a forward boundary sufficiently far in front of the FLOT to enable the JFLCC to shape and influence the ground battle. Additionally, it should not be too far forward to unduly constrain the JFACC's overall interdiction effort. The JFC establishes the forward boundaries of surface components to support the overall theater plan. Within his AO, the JFLCC is the supported commander and designates the target priorities, effects, and timing. Forward of the FSCL, but short of the forward boundary, the JFACC may be the Coordinating Authority for deep fires due to the assets he controls. The JFLCC may establish a Deep Operations Coordination Cell (DOCC) to plan and monitor deep operations. 8th Army has a Deep Fires Section formed under its aviation officer, while 3d Army has a similar structure. (JP 3-09, FM 100-7, 3d U. S. Army/ARCENT Deep Operations SOP).

D. AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE

Theater Missile Defense is similar but distinct from Air Defense. Operations to protect the force from missile threats are fundamentally different from those taken to defend from the counterair threat. TMD threats require unique and highly responsive command and control structures that are separate from the TACS. The Army seeks to integrate with the other components in TMD, but not to be degraded through subordination by forming an Army Air and Missile Defense Command. While an Army organization, its functions support the joint force. These functions include establishing an AAMDC LNO at the JFACC's Air Ops Center that will assist in integrating land-based TMD, advising on use of land-based air defense, and providing planning assistance. Recently, the 32d AAMDC operated in this manner as part of Desert Thunder (FM 100-12 Final Draft).

E. JOINT REAR AREA COMMANDER

As the JFLCC normally commands the most personnel in the Joint Rear Area, the JFC may designate the JFLCC or one of his subordinates as the JRAC. Since, the Theater Support Command is usually the largest activity in the JRA, its commander may become the JRAC. The JRAC is responsible for the multi-dimensional protection of all forces in the JRA and may require dedicated security forces for this function. A joint security force may be formed from army MPs, air force security forces, Marine Rear Operations Group (MROG) security units, and naval coastal warfare elements. (JP 3-10)

F. JOINT LOGISTICS

The Army's logistical concepts for EAC are evolving to a Theater Support Command (TSC) that may also be tasked as the joint theater-level support organization. The TSC will be a modular headquarters that will serve as the ASCC or the JFLCC's single point of contact for the execution of theater-level support functions of personnel, health service, transportation, finance, and engineer support. The other service components can be expected to contribute appropriate CSS forces. Examples could be Navy Const Bns (SEABEES) or Fleet Hospitals ashore as well as Air Force Engineering Units. In addition, a Marine Logistics Command, if formed, will coordinate for logistical support of employed Marine Forces (FM 63-4, Theater Support Command, 1st Draft, 5 Mar 1999).

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
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APPENDIX A
Notional JFLCC Staff



Appendix B

TAILORING AND TASK ORGANIZATION

Tailoring is the allocation and sequencing of military capabilities to a mission; *task organization* is the organization of available forces to accomplish a task or mission. Tailoring focuses on the vertical integration of the force, ensuring that capabilities are matched in the proper combinations and sequence at the various echelons of command. Task organization addresses horizontal integration, distributing the combined arms engagement and integrating capabilities to the components of a force.

Generally a commander tailors a subordinate force, and task organizes his own. A corps commander may tailor a deploying division by augmenting its organic assets with a light infantry brigade and a corps artillery brigade; the division commander task organizes by distributing those available assets within his division organization.

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FORCE TAILORING

The factors of METT-TC drive the initial tailoring of the force. The purpose of force tailoring is to generate effective, timely capability given mission requirements and lift constraints. Key tailoring considerations include:

- Mission
 - Joint force mission and the land component's tasks
 - Planning assumptions
 - Joint commander's concept of the operation, to include considerations for fire support (all services), communications, intelligence, psychological operations, and unconventional warfare.
 - Political-diplomatic constraints
- Enemy
 - Enemy capabilities for ground, air, naval, informational, SOF, and WMD operations
 - Enemy capability for unconventional and psychological operations
- Terrain
 - Geography
 - Weather
- Time
 - Deadline for mission accomplishment
 - Phasing of related diplomatic activities
- Troops Available
 - The composition and size of the joint force and any allied force.
 - Echelon of commitment of land forces (Field Army, Corps, Division)
 - Command relationships within the joint and multinational force.
 - Joint support requirements
 - HNS offsets
 - Logistic factors of *operational reach*
- Civilian Considerations
 - In-country facilities.
 - LOC distances and configuration
 - Storage requirements

- Construction requirements
- NGO capabilities
- PVO capabilities

The force tailoring process links the proper combination of capabilities across the vertical echelons of command.

Force Allocation

The first question to ask in tailoring a force is: “*What basic force capabilities, numbers, and command and control echelons should be allocated to the operation?*” This process begins with the allocation of basic force capabilities to the unified combatant commander. Normally, the basic force capability is an “above the line” combat unit -- a division, armored cavalry regiment, SF group or separate brigade. In stability or support operations, however, the basic force to be employed may be a CS or CSS unit such as an MP battalion or a water purification unit.

Force capabilities and quantities are ultimately a matter of judgment that take into account all the factors of METT-TC. Planners must pay particular attention to the size and capabilities of the threat, the size of the area of operations, and the time available for mission accomplishment. If time is critical, Army light and SOF units may be the best early entry forces. Light-armored, cavalry, and selected aviation units can deploy more quickly than heavier armored units and enhance the firepower and flexibility of early deploying forces.

FORCE TAILORING PROCESS

- Allocate basic capabilities and C2 echelons
- Allocate normal augmenting capabilities
- Refine force allocation

The decision regarding deployment of command and control headquarters is more than simply designating a headquarters with an appropriate span of control. The capabilities of headquarters across various echelons of command vary not just in span of control but also in scope. A corps headquarters, for example, is more suited than a division to evolve to a JTF headquarters, link to national intelligence and logistic assets, or plan and execute at the operational level of war. A corps headquarters, in turn, may require significant augmentation if it is to simultaneously perform tactical functions and also address ARFOR Title 10 responsibilities. The determination of the appropriate command and control echelon must consider not only the required span of control, but the unique requirements posed by joint, multinational, and interagency operations.

Force Augmentation

The next question to ask in tailoring a force is “*What higher echelon capabilities normally augment the basic force?*” Army force structure is designed so that at each echelon of command there is a set of capabilities that generally augment it from the next higher echelon. “Above-the-line” forces have associated “below-the-line” CS and CSS augmentation requirements. FIG B-1 illustrates some representative echelon-above-division (EAD) augmentations for a deploying heavy division. These capabilities augment the organic capabilities of the basic force. They are not normally assigned to the division, although they may be placed OPCON, DS or GS to the division during the course of the operation. Augmentation “rules of thumb” reflect general experience and practice in the vertical reinforcement of the engagement and integrating operating systems. Because of the immense diversity and complexity of the relationships between over 400 types of “below-the-line” Army units, subject matter experts throughout the staff participate in this process.




Figure B-1
Force Refinement

The basic force and its general augmentation must now be refined to reflect the multiple constraints of the projected operation. Force refinement is an iterative, continuous process that includes a wide range of participants throughout the Total Force and the joint community.

METT-TC Adjustment.

The basic force and its general augmentation must now be subjected to a METT-TC analysis to determine how it must change to account for the realities of the projected operation. The rules of thumb applied in step 2 of the tailoring process will rarely be an exact fit. Many factors such as those illustrated in Fig B-2 will cause us to refine the tailored force. The factors of METT-TC are also applied to the organic unit organizations, adjusting its components as necessary.




Figure B-2

Force Sequence.

Commanders must next balance the factors of METT-TC against available lift to determine the appropriate sequence of a deploying force. Finding the proper balance between projecting force rapidly and projecting the right mix of combat power and resources for the ultimate mission is critical. The commander must seek a balance that provides protection, efficient deployment, and a range of response options to enemy activity. Lift availability is always a constraining factor, so difficult trade-off decisions are routine. Commanders and staffs must keep in mind not only the priority for each capability's arrival, but also its relationship to other capabilities. These vertical relationships are key, for if a capability is rescheduled in the deployment flow, then its associated capabilities should shift as well.

Force Refinement Participants.

Force refinement is a Total Army process that includes Army representatives at the DA staff, ASCCs, and ARFOR. While every situation is unique, the general participants are as shown at FIG B-3.




Figure B-3

Staff Tailoring

Commanders not only tailor units, they also tailor staffs. The standard peacetime staff may undergo significant changes -- both in size and organization -- to meet the METT-TC conditions of a contingency. The staff and headquarters of the 1st Armored Division, for example, underwent a dramatic evolution upon its commitment as the headquarters for Task Force EAGLE, Operation Joint Endeavor in Bosnia, Former Republic of Yugoslavia (FIG B-4)




Figure B-4

TASK ORGANIZATION

Force tailoring allocates and sequences capabilities for a mission. At each command and control echelon, *task organization* organizes those available capabilities. The commander's purpose in task organization is to maximize subordinate commanders' abilities to generate a combined arms effect consistent with the concept of operation. Commanders and staffs work to ensure that the appropriate *engagement* and *integrating* operating system capabilities are distributed to the appropriate components of the force, weighting the main effort. The relationship between units within a task force is described in terms of *command* and *support* relationships. Command relationships define command responsibility and authority. Support relationships define the purpose, scope, and effect desired when one capability supports another. A wide range of joint and Army command and support relationships are available to orchestrate the cooperation between capabilities. (FIG B-5)

Inherent Responsibilities																					
C O M M A N D	RELATION SHIPS-	HAS COMMAN RELATION SHIPS	MAY ORGANIZED BY: FROM	BE CATIONS	RECEIVES SUPPORT	IS BY: COMM	PROVIDES UNI-EST	ESTABLISHES MAINTAINS	SHAS PRIORITIES	GAINING FUTHER	UNIT IMPOSE									SHIPS OF:	
	ATTACHED	GAINING UNIT	GAINING UNIT	GAINING UNIT	GAINING UNIT	GAINING BY UNIT	GAINING BY UNIT	GAINING BY UNIT	AS REQU' DUNIT	DAS REQU' DUNIT	GAING ATTACHED.									TO WHICH ATTACHED	
	OPCON	GAINING UNIT	GAINING UNIT	GAINING UNIT	GAINING UNIT	GAINING BY UNIT	GAINING BY UNIT	GAINING BY UNIT	AS REQU' DUNIT	DAS REQU' DUNIT	GAING TACON. GS.										UNIT GSR. R.S
	TACON	GAINING UNIT	PARENT UNIT	PARENT UNIT	PARENT UNIT	PARENT UNIT	PARENT BY UNIT	PARENT BY UNIT	AS REQU' DUNIT	DAS REQU' DUNIT	GAING TACON. GS.										UNIT
	ASSIGNED	PARENT TOE	PARENT UNIT	PARENT UNIT	PARENT UNIT	PARENT UNIT	PARENT BY UNIT	PARENT BY UNIT	AS REQU' DUNIT	DAS REQU' DUNIT	GAING TACON. GS.										UNIT
	COCOM (COMBATANT COMMAND CinC level only)	GAINING CINCC	GAINING CINCC	GAINING CINCC	GAINING CINCC	GAINING CINCC	GAINING CINCC	GAINING CINCC	GAINING CINCC	GAINING CINCC	GAINING CINCC	GAINING CINCC	GAINING CINCC	GAINING CINCC	GAINING CINCC	GAINING CINCC	GAINING CINCC	GAINING CINCC	GAINING CINCC	GAINING CINCC	GAINING CINCC
S U P P O R T	GS	PARENT UNIT	PARENT UNIT	PARENT UNIT	PARENT UNIT	PARENT UNIT	PARENT UNIT	PARENT UNIT	PARENT UNIT	PARENT UNIT	PARENT UNIT	PARENT UNIT	PARENT UNIT	PARENT UNIT	PARENT UNIT	PARENT UNIT	PARENT UNIT	PARENT UNIT	PARENT UNIT	PARENT UNIT	
	GSR	PARENT UNIT	PARENT UNIT	PARENT UNIT	PARENT UNIT	PARENT UNIT	PARENT UNIT	PARENT UNIT	PARENT UNIT	PARENT UNIT	PARENT UNIT	PARENT UNIT	PARENT UNIT	PARENT UNIT	PARENT UNIT	PARENT UNIT	PARENT UNIT	PARENT UNIT	PARENT UNIT	PARENT UNIT	
	R	PARENT UNIT	PARENT UNIT	PARENT UNIT	PARENT UNIT	PARENT UNIT	PARENT UNIT	PARENT UNIT	PARENT UNIT	PARENT UNIT	PARENT UNIT	PARENT UNIT	PARENT UNIT	PARENT UNIT	PARENT UNIT	PARENT UNIT	PARENT UNIT	PARENT UNIT	PARENT UNIT	PARENT UNIT	
	DS	PARENT UNIT	PARENT UNIT	PARENT UNIT	PARENT UNIT	PARENT UNIT	PARENT UNIT	PARENT UNIT	PARENT UNIT	PARENT UNIT	PARENT UNIT	PARENT UNIT	PARENT UNIT	PARENT UNIT	PARENT UNIT	PARENT UNIT	PARENT UNIT	PARENT UNIT	PARENT UNIT	PARENT UNIT	

Figure B-5 Command and support relationships and inherent responsibilities

Army Service Component Command

The organization of an Army service component command (ASCC) varies between theaters according to the size of the US Army component in a force and with the factors of METT-TC. The ASCC is the basis of the Army's deployable, sustained combat power. A representative, relatively mature organization for a mature ASCC is shown in the FIG B-6.




Figure B-6

Other levels of command can perform the ASCC Title 10 functions on a temporary basis. For example, a corps staff --suitably augmented -- could perform those functions if only a single corps were committed to a contingency area. But when a corps or division is fully engaged at the tactical level, it cannot be expected to assume responsibility for the additional functions and command responsibilities that correspond to the operational level of war. A larger, separate staff may be necessary to handle the administrative, legal, logistical, personnel, intelligence, operations, and communications tasks of a large force deployed overseas.

Corps

There is no standard organizational structure for a corps, although every corps typically has the components in FIG B-7.




Figure B-7 Example Corps

Corps are normally tailored to consist of two to five divisions of any type and combination required by the theater and the mission. They possess organic support commands and are assigned combat and combat support organizations based on their needs for a specific operation. Armored cavalry regiments, FA brigades, engineer brigades, ADA brigades, and aviation brigades are the nondivisional units commonly available to the corps to weight its main effort and to perform special combat functions. Separate infantry or armor brigades may also be assigned to corps. Signal brigades, chemical brigades, MI brigades, and MP brigades are the usual combat support organizations present in a corps.

Division Task Force

Divisions possess great flexibility. They tailor their own brigades and attached forces for specific combat missions. Their combat support and CSS battalions and separate companies may be flexibly be attached to or placed in support of brigades for particular missions.




Figure B-8 Example Division

Brigade Combat Team

While separate brigades and armored cavalry regiments have a fixed organization, division commanders adjust the organization of their brigades and change their organizations as frequently as necessary. Separate brigades of infantry, armor, FA, ADA, engineer, aviation, and armored cavalry regiments can be used to reinforce corps or division and can be shifted from unit to unit to tailor forces for combat. Separate brigades and regiments are usually employed as units when attached to corps or division.




Figure B-9 Example

Battalion Task Forces

Maneuver battalions can be reinforced with other combat and combat support companies to form task forces for special missions. Task organization increases the capability of maneuver battalions; based on his estimate of the situation, for example, a brigade commander may task organize tank and mechanized infantry battalions by cross-attaching companies between these units. FA battalions can be reinforced with batteries of any kind to form artillery task forces. Engineer battalions can be reinforced with the same or different types of engineer companies and platoons to form engineer task forces.




Figure B-10 Example Battalion Task

Company Teams

Company-sized close combat units are capable of fighting without additional reinforcements. Ordinarily, however, companies or troops are augmented for operations with SHORAD units and ground surveillance radar teams. They may also be reinforced with maneuver platoons of the same or different types and with combat support squads or platoons to form teams. Company teams are task organized for a specific mission. Such task organization matches forces to missions with greater precision but often disrupts teamwork within the company. Company teams should, therefore, be formed only after careful consideration. Whenever possible, they should train together before they are committed.

APPENDIX C

Major Land Operations Plan Model ¹

Copy No. _____
Issuing Headquarters
Place of Issue
Date/Time Group of Signature

MAJOR OPERATION PLAN: (Number or code name)

References: Maps, charts, and other documents

TASK ORGANIZATION/COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS: Briefly describe the organization of the Army/Land forces in theater to support the commander in chief's (CINC's) long-range strategy and campaign plan, specifically identifying the command conducting the operation. In a plan for a major operation composed of several phases, put the task organization in a separate annex ([Annex A](#)) that also outlines command relationships and their changes, if any, as the operation progresses from one phase to the next. Include task organizations for Army component support to contingencies in the annexes referring to the plans for those operations. The structure of Annex A deals with the following factors:

- a. **Civil-Political Relationships.** Embassies, country teams, non-Department of Defense (DOD) U.S. Government agencies (Central Intelligence Agency [CIA], Drug Enforcement Agency [DEA], Agency for International Development [AID]).
- b. **Multinational Force Relationships.** Host nations, allies, forces from regional/treaty organizations.
- c. **Joint Relationships.** DOD agencies (Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, National Imagery and Mapping Agency, etc.), unified and specified commands (subunified commands and joint task forces (JTFs) when appropriate), other services in uniservice roles.
- d. **Relationships with Other Army Commands.** Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), U.S. Army Materiel Command (USAMC), U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), other continental United States (CONUS) major Army commands (MACOMs), and their stovepipe organizations in the theater and Army components of other unified commands.
- e. **Army/Marine in Theater Relationships.** The structure that reflects unity of command within the Army service component commander (ASCC) or Army forces (ARFOR), the Marine forces (MARFOR) and the Joint Force Land Component Commander (JFLCC) if applicable.
 - (1) Army components of unified commands, subunified commands, and JTFs.
 - (2) Marine components of unified commands, subunified commands, and JTFs.

- (3) Functional commands (JFLCC).
- (4) Area commands and Major combat and combat support organizations directly under ASCC command in peacetime (Theater Support Commands (TSC).
- (5) Army organizations providing operational-level support such as battlefield coordination detachments (BCD), Multinational Liaison Teams, and analysis and control elements (ACEs).
- (6) Army special operations forces (ARSOF), especially the theater Army special operations support elements.

1. **Situation.** Thoroughly describe the operational environment as well as appropriate aspects of the strategic environment in which the major operation will be conducted. Include tactical information for the early phases of the operation. Refer to command and staff estimates, country studies, or operations plans (OPLANs). Designate the *trigger event* that signals execution of the operations order (OPORD).

a. **Intelligence.** Use this subparagraph to refer to a separate intelligence annex ([Annex B](#)) or the intelligence estimate. The two main components include the following:

(1) A summary of information concerning the area of operations, which consists of—

(a) A strategic overview of the area, to include its climate, politics, geography, topography, demography, economics, and social/cultural factors.

(b) Specific, localized information about conditions affecting the early phases of the operation, especially if a forced entry is anticipated. Include weather, key terrain, observation, cover and concealment, obstacles, avenues of approach, drop zones, landing zones, and beach and hydrographic data.

(2) A description of the enemy, which consists of--

(a) Strategic and operational factors such as the political roots and objectives of enemy activity, personalities, outside support, sanctuaries, logistics capabilities, levels of training and combat experience, morale, strategic and operational centers of gravity, and vulnerabilities to psychological operations (PSYOP).

(b) Factors of immediate concern during the early phases of the operation such as locations, strengths, weapons systems, tactical capabilities, reserves, mobility.

(c) Information about the military strengths of nations not allied or affiliated with U.S. forces. Include order-of-battle information, numbers of major weapons systems, personalities of leaders, levels of training, or combat experience and affiliation with major hostile powers.

- b. **Friendly Forces.** Provide information on friendly forces that may affect the execution of the plan being put forth. These effects may impact directly on the command or on the organizations subordinate to that command.
- (1) Task organizations/command relationships. State the mission and applicable parts of the concept of operation of the joint or multinational command to which the ARFOR is subordinate. They will normally be as stated in the theater campaign plan. Provide sufficient detail so that key individuals know and understand the higher, joint, or multinational commander's intent, the *end state* desired at the conclusion of the campaign, and how their actions mesh to attain joint or multinational goals.
 - (2) Higher headquarters. Include the mission, concept, and intent of the unified/joint theater CINC. His charter is to further U.S. in the theater and should be stated so that the ASCC/ARFOR, his staff, and subordinates know and understand the part they play in achieving the CINC's strategic aim.
 - (3) HQDA. Describe the missions, concepts, and intents of HQDA as they pertain to the theater. In peacetime, the ASCC is a MACOM responding to CINC direction as well as to HQDA for Title 10 responsibilities. Include references to Army regulations or other service authorities.
 - (4) Other service components. Highlight the roles of the Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps components of the unified command.
 - (5) Joint, unified, and specified commands and DOD agencies. Highlight the roles of other commands that affect the operations in this theater.
 - (6) Multinational forces. Highlight the organization, capabilities, and activities of friendly nations in the theater, with emphasis on their military forces. State their roles and missions in support of the CINC's objectives to further U.S. policies.
 - (7) Special operations forces. Describe the activities of special operations forces (SOF) in the region that affect the operation.
 - (8) U.S. Coast Guard. Describe the role of the Coast Guard in the theater, especially its counternarcotics role.
 - (9) Department of State. Highlight the contributions of U.S. embassies and country teams in the theater as they affect and interface with elements of the ASCC/ARFOR.
 - (10) Other non-DOD U.S. agencies. Describe the activities of U.S. Government agencies not included in country teams, such as DEA and AID, as they affect Army operations.

c. **Attachments and Detachments.** Highlight critical elements of the Task Organization/Command Relationship section ([Annex A](#)).

c. **Assumptions.** Provide a summary of the conditions and situations that must exist when the OPLAN becomes an OPORD. They include predictions and presumptions concerning the following:

- (1) Conditions within host countries and other nations in the region.
- (2) Consistency of U.S. policy for the region such as the application of the *War Powers Act*.
- (3) Involvement by hostile powers, both from outside and within the region, in the internal affairs of nations in the theater.
- (4) Effects of U.S. actions in the theater on relations with nations outside the theater.
- (5) Adequacy of interagency support.
- (6) Bilateral and multilateral consensus on the degree or extent of common threats, for example, the narcotics trade, and required actions.
- (7) Availability of resources.
- (8) Warning times.
- (9) Times and locations of anticipated hostile actions.
- (10) Anticipated political situations in the host nation and neighboring nations.
- (11) The timing of political decisions in friendly nations.
- (12) The timing of the release of the use of special weapons.

2. **Mission.** Provide a clear, concise statement of the what is to be achieved, where, when, and by who for the overall operation.. If for a military operations other than war (MOOTW), provide a clear statement of the long-range, continuing aim of the Army Force (ARFOR). Summarize essential tasks assigned by the CINC, tasks directed by HQDA, and tasks derived from the commander's analysis of the environment and his understanding of his superiors' intent. Unlike the single-paragraph narrative common to the mission statement for a wartime operation, the MOOTW mission statement is usually a list of tasks. These tasks may include the following:

- a. Plan and organize for transition to war.
- b. Support and sustain ARFOR and other designated forces.
- c. Protect the force.

- d. Train ARFOR to maintain readiness.
- e. Participate in stability or support operations.
- f. Conduct Army intelligence activities in conjunction with joint and multinational intelligence efforts.
- g. Plan for, rehearse, and participate in contingency operations and responses to crises. Plans for such operations may be included as annexes and generally conform to the format for an OPORD for an ARFOR in a conflict situation. Such peacetime stability operations include the following:
 - (1) Security assistance.
 - (2) Nation assistance.
 - (3) Search and rescue.
 - (4) Humanitarian assistance.
 - (5) Civil affairs (CA).
 - (6) Noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO).
 - (7) Peacekeeping.
 - (7) Show of force.

3. Execution.

a. **Commander's Intent.** Provide a statement, in general terms, of the commander's visualization of the purpose and end state of his command. Examples are restoration of an international boundary, defeat of enemy armed forces, or clearing of hostile armed forces from a given geographical area. This subparagraph links the mission to the concept of operations. It binds all subordinate activities to the overall objective.

b. **Concept of Operations.** Describe the commander's visualization of how the mission will be accomplished, to include his intent for the employment of the command as a whole. At the operational level, divide the concept into phases; the commander will specify the *end state* for each phase so that subordinates know his intent for each phase. The *trigger event* for the transition between phases is the achievement of some intermediate goal. This knowledge will permit subordinates to plan *branches* within their own plans. The subordinate commanders are empowered to demonstrate initiative in supporting the achievement of the commander's stated end state. The commander and his subordinates can also execute *sequels* within and at the conclusion of phases, depending on the outcome of battles and engagements. Include an operations overlay ([Annex C](#)) and the deception plan ([Annex D](#)) in the concept.

- (1) Phase I. The first operational phase of a contingency is usually the detailed preparation of the command to execute the operation. In a highly charged, time-sensitive environment characterized by political maneuvers from a diplomatic posture, the commander prepares his concept by--
 - (a) Organizing his staff to conduct the proposed operation and integrating those augmentation cells from other components and agencies and subordinate Army units.
 - (b) Establishing liaison with the host nation, with the unified command responsible for the target area, with other unified and specified commands

(especially those involved in deployment), with SOF already in the target area, and with appropriate U.S. Government agencies.

(c) Negotiating status of forces agreements, constraints ([Annex E](#)), and rules of engagement (ROE) ([Annex F](#)) for the proposed operation with the host nation, in coordination with Department of State (DOS) and appropriate embassies and country teams.

(d) Establishing or preparing to establish intermediate staging bases in the target region and directing the repositioning of supplies and equipment.

(e) Conducting necessary operations to support political and diplomatic initiatives or to rehearse for the planned major operation.

(f) Ordering his subordinate organizations to prepare to execute the operation.

(g) Stating the commander's concept to attain the end state for this phase by the command as a whole.

(h) Setting forth the commander's scheme of operational maneuver, including decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations when appropriate.

(i) Describing how operational fires will be employed. Include a phased fire support annex ([Annex G](#)) to show complex arrangements for fire support, including priorities of fires and targeting. Augment the annex with appendixes for air support, field artillery support, and naval gunfire support.

(j) Including air defense ([Annex H](#)), electronic warfare ([Annex I](#)), engineer support ([Annex J](#)), and PSYOP ([Annex K](#)), rear operations ([Annex L](#)), protection of forces and means ([Annex M](#)), provost marshal functions ([Annex N](#)), public affairs ([Annex O](#)), and space operations ([Annex P](#)).

(k) Using the subsequent subparagraphs to direct tasks for subordinate units not already covered in the concept for this phase.

(l) Stating the initial location and tasks for the reserve. Propose the employment of the reserve in taking advantage of branches and sequels.

(m) Providing coordinating instructions applicable to two or more subordinate elements. If reinforcements from outside the theater will impact on operations, include that impact here. Also include instructions for linkups with SOF or ground units involved in the deep battle.

(2) Phase II. The second operational phase is the execution of the operation itself. It can be composed of several phases (deployment, force entry, force buildup and combat operations, decisive combat operations and achievement of end state). In this phase, the commander--

(a) States his concept in detail to attain the phase's end state by the command as a whole. In his narration of the step-by-step execution of the phase, he specifies exactly which subordinate and supporting units will accomplish each operational or tactical task.

(b) Sets forth the scheme of maneuver, as well as the deployment scheme, to attain initial objectives. Where appropriate, the scheme should include the forcible insertion of combat elements and necessary command and control (C²) elements and their accompanying support.

1. Changes in the form of maneuver.

2. Changes in the nature of the operation.

3. Major regrouping of forces.
 4. Significant changes in enemy capabilities.
- (c) Prescribes the employment of fires necessary to attain initial objectives according to the fire support Annex ([Annex G](#)). The annex includes targeting priorities and priorities of fire and may be augmented by appendixes for air support, field artillery support, and naval gunfire support. In this subparagraph or its annex, also include joint interfaces such as the joint targeting coordination board (JTB) and the BCD.
- (d) Includes provisions for air defense ([Annex H](#)), electronic warfare ([Annex I](#)), engineer support ([Annex J](#)), PSYOP ([Annex K](#)), rear operations ([Annex L](#)), protection of forces and means ([Annex M](#)), provost marshal functions ([Annex N](#)), public affairs ([Annex O](#)), and space operations ([Annex P](#)).
- (e) In subparagraphs subsequent to (d) above, includes direct tasks for subordinate units not already covered in the phase concept.
- (f) If appropriate, states the location and tasks for the reserve. This subparagraph proposes the employment of the reserve in taking of *branches* and *sequels*.
- (g) Includes coordinating instructions that apply to two or more elements. Also includes link-up procedures between the force and forces already in the operation, if appropriate.
- (3) Phase III. The third operational phase is the consolidation of the results of a successful end state for this phase. It does not contain the detail of the preceding phases. In this phase, the commander includes instructions for the--
- (a) Redeployment of combat forces to their original locations.
 - (b) Deployment of CA, military police (MP), engineer, medical, or other types of units necessary to restore peacetime stability to the target region in case a continuing U.S. military presence is required.
 - (c) Modification of the residual force's relations with U.S. Government agencies and the host nation to aid in the transition to peacetime stability.
- c. **Tasks for Major Subordinate Commands.** Set forth tasks that encompass two or more phases of the major operation in a subparagraph for each major subordinate command.
- d. **Coordinating Instructions.** Provide instructions appropriate to two or more phases of the operation. Coordinating instructions may include--
- (1) Airspace management procedures. Include the formation of an Army airspace command and control (A²C²) cell and its relation with the theater airspace control authority.
 - (2) Operational fires planning guidance. Refer to a separate annex ([Annex G](#)).
 - (3) Force-protection guidance. Refer to a separate annex ([Annex M](#)). Include the mission-oriented protection posture (MOPP) levels.
 - (4) Times, events, or situations that signal the transition between phases.
 - (5) Limiting Factors ([Annex E](#)). Operations in situations short of general war are usually constrained significantly by factors other than military ones. Describe such limitations on military actions in an annex detailing the provisions of treaties,

agreements, and conventions governing the political, humanitarian, and informational limits on the military effort.

(6) Rules of engagement ([Annex F](#)). ROE provide authoritative guidance on the application of force for mission accomplishment and the exercise of the inherent right and obligation of self-defense. Commanders at every echelon are responsible for establishing ROE for mission accomplishment that comply with the ROE of senior commanders and the JCS Standing Rules of Engagement, CJCS 3121.01A.

(7) Times, events, or situations that signal the transition between phases.

(8) Resource management guidance.

(9) Training guidance. Refer to a separate annex ([Annex Q](#)).

(10) Operational planning guidance.

(11) Space operations planning guidance ([Annex P](#)).

(12) Public affairs operations ([Annex O](#)).

4. **Support.** Provide operational support instructions that are of primary interest to the elements being supported. An ARFOR without its own inherent logistical organization will refer to the administrative/logistical plan of the ASCC for detailed procedures on how operational-level support elements and other subordinate elements may receive support from operational-level support organizations. In this paragraph or in a support annex ([Annex R](#)), the ARFOR commander describes those support matters necessary to accomplish the combat mission of his force. He must ensure that support plan phases coincide with OPLAN phases.

a. Even without an integral support organization, the ARFOR commander may choose to include the following subjects in his plan's support paragraph or annex.

(1) Priorities of supply and maintenance.

(2) Submission of materiel status reports.

(3) Controlled supply rate for Class V.

(4) Designations of lines of communication (LOCs).

(5) Labor policies (use of enemy prisoner of war (EPW), civilian labor).

(6) Medical evacuation policies.

(7) Personnel strength reports.

(8) Replacement policies and priorities.

(9) Reconstitution.

(10) Reception and onward movement of reinforcements.

(11) NEO.

(12) CA.

(13) Host nation considerations.

(14) Public affairs.

b. If a support organization such as a TSC is placed under command of an ARFOR, include the detailed information normally found in the ASCC plan.

c. Identify support, such as labor, transportation, and facilities from host nations and friendly third countries. Set forth in detail the procedures for making use of these resources.

d. Include procedures for ASCC support of contingency forces from CONUS or other theaters.

e. Highlight routine daily force sustainment, to include the operation of installations and military communities.

5. Command and Signal.

- a. **Command.** Provide information concerning command post locations, succession of command, and liaison requirements.
- b. **Signal.** In this subparagraph or its supporting annex ([Annex S](#)), describe communications procedures and priorities such as radio silence, CEOI, codes, and interface with joint or multinational communications nets.

(Signed) _____
(Commander)

ANNEXES:

Annex A - Task Organization/Command Relationships. This annex is presented in phases. For each phase, list commands directly subordinate to the headquarters issuing the OPLAN as major headings. Indent, under the title of each direct subordinate command, the direct subordinates of that command in the order prescribed in FM 101-5, Appendix G. In a numbered Army, include corps and maneuver organizations smaller than corps directly under Army control, Army field artillery air defense units, and other echelons above corps (EAC) organizations. Additionally, this annex--

- Describes the relationships of the headquarters issuing the order with its higher headquarters/authority and its special relationships with non-DOD U.S. Government agencies (embassies, country teams, DEA, CIA).
- Describes relationships with host nations and with forces from regional/treaty organizations, to include their integration into the overall force structure.
- Unambiguously sets forth the relationships discussed in FM 100-7. The commander issuing this order may be the joint force commander (JFC) whose existing Army headquarters is the nucleus of the headquarters of the JTF. The commander may be the commander of ARFOR as discussed in [Chapters 2](#) and 6 of FM 100-7, with the responsibility for the operational and tactical employment of ground forces. The commander may be the commander of the joint task force's (CJTF's) Army component commander, with command less operational control (OPCON) of ARFOR. Separate headquarters may be designated to perform each of the three functions, or a single headquarters may perform two, or even all three, functions: JTF headquarters, JFLCC, ARFOR headquarters, and Army component headquarters.

Annex B - Intelligence. This annex includes the following information:

- Analysis of the area of operations (AO). Climate, geography, political matters, aspects of economics, and social/cultural affairs affecting the operation.
 - ..Strategic factors.
 - ..Operational/tactical factors.
- Enemy situation. Strengths, vulnerabilities, capabilities, dispositions, personalities.
 - ..Strategic factors.
 - ..Operational/tactical factors.
- Essential elements of information.
- Intelligence-preparation-of-the-battlefield (IPB), to include acquisition tasks.
- Counterintelligence.
- Intelligence administration. Handling of prisoners of war, documents, materiel, and intelligence reports.

- Joint/multinational intelligence links. Interface with the ASCC's ACE to provide for the collection, analysis, and dissemination of information by allies, U.S. strategic means, and joint sources.

Annex C - Operations Overlay. A graphic representation of the concept of operations.

Annex D - Deception. This annex includes a description of the deception objective, the deception story, resources available, excerpts of higher headquarters deception plans, and the active and passive deception measures to be taken by subordinate organizations.

Annex E – Limiting Factors. This annex contains those political, humanitarian, economic and social/cultural limitations on the application of military power during the operation. It references U.S. laws and treaties, conventions, and international agreements. This annex includes restraints on the use of certain weapons, on tactical methods, or entry into certain areas. It may prescribe constraints such as the seizure and retention of certain objectives for political and psychological reasons or the mandatory use of allied or multinational forces in certain situations. This annex includes policies of nations in or near the target area that may inhibit military actions.

Annex F - Rules of Engagement (ROE) provide authoritative guidance on the application of force for mission accomplishment and the exercise of the inherent right and obligation of self-defense. Commanders at every echelon are responsible for establishing ROE for mission accomplishment that comply with the ROE of senior commanders and the JCS Standing Rules of Engagement. The ASCC should request and authorize supplemental ROE measures according to message format in CJCS 3121.01A. Supplemental measures that have already been approved should be published in this annex.

Annex G - Fire Support. This annex describes the concept for synchronizing operational fires with operational movement and maneuver. It includes priorities of fires, targeting considerations, and control measures. Its phases coincide with those of the OPLAN. It is augmented by appendixes.

- Air Support. This appendix outlines the major roles and tasks to be carried out by air elements, priorities of allocations for close air support (CAS) and battlefield air interdiction, specific control arrangements, and procedures for the operational suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD).
- Field Artillery. This appendix describes the organization for combat, missions for field artillery formations providing operational fires, and timing of attachments and detachments or changes in artillery unit missions.
- Naval Gunfire. This appendix describes the concept for employment of naval gunfire, allocation of observers or spotters, allocations or missions of ships, and limitations and control measures peculiar to naval gunfire.
- Nuclear Support. This appendix includes the concept of employment for nonstrategic nuclear weapons (NSNW), to include coordinating instructions for nominating NSNW targets, controls, and constraints; preclusion data for collateral damage and troop safety; arrangements for the initiation of nuclear operations; and procedures for integrating conventional weapons with NSNW.

Annex H - Air Defense. This annex includes the joint or multinational air defense organization, organic and supporting air defense capabilities, ROE, weapons control procedures, and enemy air capabilities.

Annex I - Electronic Warfare. This annex includes the electronic warfare (EW) mission, enemy EW capabilities, defensive and offensive EW measures, and coordination with other parts of the OPLAN (deception, communications, PSYOP, operational fires).

Annex J - Engineer. This annex includes priorities of engineer work to mobility, countermobility, and survival tasks. It also includes planning and execution of operational obstacles and barriers, engineer organization for combat, and engineer tasks for subordinate organizations.

Annex K - Psychological Operations. This annex refers to the intelligence annex, designates PSYOP targets, and describes the PSYOP plan, to include its integration into higher headquarters plans and deception plan operations or related tasks for subordinate units.

Annex L - Rear Operations. This annex contains instructions for the protection of the designated rear area in the host country and neighboring friendly countries from all levels of threats. It designates a joint/multinational rear area coordinator (JRAC), usually the ASCC, and outlines provisions for the defense of bases, base clusters, and other facilities, using assigned and attached units, host country resources, and, if necessary, tactical combat forces.

Annex M - Protection. This annex contains instructions for the protection of bases, installations, military personnel, family members, and other U.S. nationals in the theater from terrorism, natural disasters, and other dangers.

Annex N - Provost Marshal. This annex prioritizes the four MP battlefield missions for employed MP forces: area security, battlefield circulation control, EPW operations, and law enforcement. It should correlate with [Annex M \(Protection\)](#) and [Annex F \(Rules of Engagement\)](#).

Annex O - Public Affairs. This annex contains guidance for facilitating the media effort to cover the operation and for supporting the information needs of the soldiers and their families.

Annex P - Space Operations. This annex describes planned and available space support to the OPLAN. It explains how to obtain and coordinate space support, in addition to listing operational constraints and shortfalls.

Annex Q - Training. This annex contains guidance for the multinational, joint, and service training of individuals and units assigned or attached to the theater Army.

Annex R - Support. This annex spells out in detail the necessary support for subordinate formations to accomplish their missions. The information is keyed to the phases of the OPORD when appropriate. The annex prescribes priorities of supply and maintenance, requirements for submission of reports, and sources of support (units in the force itself, the host nation, or the Army component of the unified command in the region). This annex is organized in categories and may be presented in separate appendixes if necessary.

- Supply. Levels for each class of supply at organizational, direct support, and general support echelons. Location of materiel management center (MMC), map, and water supply.

- Transportation and Movements.

..Strategic movements. Coordination with United States Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) and other services for airlift and sealift.

..Establishment of intermediate staging bases.

..Movements in operational area. Ports, airfields, railroads, airlift, LOCs.

..Location and functions of the movement control center (MCC).

- Services.

- ..Construction.
- ..Graves registration.
- ..Field services.
- ..Explosive ordnance disposal.
- ..Local procurement and contracting.
- ..Postal.
 - Labor.
 - Maintenance.
 - Medical evacuation and hospitalization. Evacuation policies.
 - Personnel Service Support.
- ..Strengths. Casualty reports and replacement policies.
- ..Morale, welfare, and recreation.
- ...Finance.
- ..Religious support.
- ..Discipline, law, and order.
 - CA.
 - Reconstitution.
 - NEO.
 - EPW.
 - Legal support

Annex S - Communications-Electronics. This annex includes items contained in [subparagraph 5b](#) when its contents are too voluminous to put in the body of the OPLAN. It describes the link provided by the force headquarters between the Army tactical command and control system, which exists among its subordinate units, and the joint and multinational C² systems, as well as those of the sustaining base. A joint communications support element can be attached to the force headquarters to provide joint interface.

- This annex provides for employment of three communications conduits: area common user (ACU), data distribution system (DDS), and combat net radio (CNR). These systems are automated, with provisions for parts of the force (allies, other services, reserve components) not possessing the degree of automation capability possessed by the bulk of the force.
- This annex describes dealing with the possible degradation of communications, with provisions for redundancy, electronic countermeasures, operations security (OPSEC), and hardening and the use of radio silence and messengers.

DISTRIBUTION:

(SECURITY CLASSIFICATION)

1. This OPLAN format conforms to the format delineated in Joint Pub 5-03.2, as amended by CJCS Instruction 3122.03 JOPES, Volumes I and II (draft) and FM 101-5.

Appendix E

CJCSM 3122.03

1 June 1996

(Format, Reserve Components (RC) Requirements Summary)

CLASSIFICATION

HEADQUARTERS, US EUROPEAN COMMAND

APO AE 09218

28 FEBRUARY 1992

TAB A TO APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX A TO USCINCEUR OPLAN 4999-92 ()

RESERVE COMPONENTS (RC) REQUIREMENTS SUMMARY

RESERVE COMPONENTS (RC) REQUIREMENTS SUMMARY

OPLAN _____ FDO(s) _____ PLAN EXECUTION

S V C	RC IN AOR ¹	MOVE THE ² FORCE	ASSIST MOB/ DEPLOY/SUSTAIN ³		BACKFILL ⁴		TOTAL RC PERSONNEL BY SERVICE
			IMA	OTHER	CONUS	OCONUS	
A	74,300	550	2,350	5,300	1,100	1,350	84,950
N	21,400	3,200	83	2,200	6,200	1,220	34,303
AF	5,300	31,300	840	1,550	990	205	40,185
M	11,600	5	120	210	770	3,150	15,855
G	1,430	180	0	25	0	0	1,635
TOTALS	114,030	35,235	3,393	9,285	9,060	5,925	176,928

C-57 7 Enclosure C

The Force Augmentation Planning and Execution System (FAPES) is the preferred method of entering and transmitting this summary. If FAPES is not available, the summary must be prepared manually.

1. **RC in AOR.** Enter the numbers of Reservists in units deploying to the AOR in the TPFDD. FAPES will pull these numbers from the TPFDD automatically. Also estimate and enter RC portion of TPFDD non-unit personnel (fillers and replacements).

A-5-A-1

CLASSIFICATION