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Why Read Military History? "Military History, accompanied by sound criticism, is indeed the true school of war." Jomini Most soldiers who have read much history probably would agree with General Douglas MacArthur when he asserted, over fifty years ago: "More than most professions, the military is forced to depend upon intelligent interpretation of the past for signposts charting the future.... The facts derived from historical analysis he [the soldier] applies to conditions of the present and the proximate future, thus developing a synthesis of appropriate method, organization, and doctrine.... These principles know no limitation of time. Consequently the Army extends its analytical interest to the dust-buried accounts of wars long past as well as to those still reeking with the scent of battle. It is the object of the search that dictates the field for its pursuit." General John R. Galvin while Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, contributed the following essay on why officers should want to read history. Good military leaders understand history. Leadership without a sense of history can only be instinctive, and thereby limited in its scope. The study of history contributes to our knowledge of the human experience so that in the end we are better able to render judgment, and what is leadership but the ability to judge what must be done and how to accomplish it? The late World War II historian and combat journalist Cornelius Ryan told of watching a group of green American lieutenant replacements in Italy moving up to take over platoons that were already in heavy action. A fellow war correspondent at his side commented simply, "I hope they are well read." Ryan found much wisdom in that observation. How else could men so young and new to war hope to lead others? They had little chance to train; they had no experience of war; they were too young to know much of life firsthand. Those with an early acquired sense of history, with a knowledge of human endeavor, would be relatively well off indeed at that moment. As military leaders we are charged to prepare our soldiers and ourselves for war. We go about this in a variety of ways, not least of which is to bring about some understanding of the nature of war. With this in mind we can look back over the Army's recent training programs and activities with some satisfaction that we have been able to emphasize history as a part of them. Our military schools are encouraging more and more historical readings and analyses. Units are visiting battlefields, making terrain walks, taking staff rides, and investigating the decisions and circumstances of the men who fought there. We are requiring our junior officers, and encouraging our more senior ones, to select from recommended lists, to read, and to reflect. More and more of our people are writing, and more and more of their works are being published. Hopefully, we are seeing the development of a trend here. Perhaps we can take some pride in the indicators that history is a more vital part of training than it has been in the recent past. But there are still those who would question whether we really need all this effort. After all, the military is a busy place, the days are long, the work demanding, and the pace exhausting. Can we really devote much time and effort to reading history? Clausewitz answered that question some time ago. In his effort to understand the nature of war, he praised the use of historical example. He approached the use of history from four perspectives: as an explanation, as a demonstration of the application of an idea, as a support for a statement, and as a detailed presentation from which one might deduce doctrine. Each use requires greater degrees of rigor. The first and simplest demand is for accuracy. If we read widely enough, we can develop an ability to discern and a base for comparison that will develop a feel for accuracy. The second and far greater demand is to project ourselves into the moment in time under study, not to force fit it into our own world. Only by understanding the conditions of the era and the perspectives of the people under study can we understand the rationale of their decisions-and make judgments for our own time. The third and fourth are matters of logic and discipline. In sum, the reading of history is a way to gain experience. The reader swelters with Lawrence in the burning Arabian sands and learns the brutality and fluidity of guerrilla warfare. He gasps at Chandler's description of the genius Napoleon arising at midnight to dictate his orders through the night to set the stage for the battle. He hammers at Lee's Army of Northern Virginia with Grant's memoirs; overcomes the terror of the Burmese jungle and turns defeat into victory with Slim; unravels the conceptual threads of battle and maneuver with Delbruck; relates war to nuclear weapons to politics with Brodie; freezes in Korea with Marshall at the river and the gauntlet; and cries out with MacDonald at the inanities of the Kall trail before Schmidt. In the end he emerges as a veteran-more inured to the shock of the unexpected, better prepared to weigh the consequences of critical decisions, and imbued with the human drama breaking upon leaders and led in their march to destiny. He knows the fine line between foolhardiness and courage, between abstinence and conviction, between disgrace and glory. He has had a conversation with the soldiers of all time and has shared their lives and thoughts. His judgment is sharpened, and he is better prepared to lead. As we read history we enter into a conversation together, where a reference to Douhet, an analogy that cites Verdun, or an illustration that notes Trafalgar evokes a much greater understanding of what is meant. Professional exchanges are richer, transmission of ideas more efficient, and misunderstandings fewer. A common historical understanding carries a wealth of meaning for us as leaders. We have done much in our Army recently to heighten our professionalism and our readiness to defend our nation. Not least among our accomplishments has been a restatement of the importance of history in general and military history in particular. No one should become so busy with the course of events that he does not pause and consider how others have dealt with similar circumstances in their own time and place. To immerse oneself in history is to spend time well. * * Originally printed in Center for Military History Journal, September 1989. |