NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT: COMPARISONS AND CONTRASTS

by

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The twenty-fifth anniversary of NATO was commemorated in April 1974, while the twentieth anniversary of the Warsaw Pact will be observed in May 1975. To what extent are the Atlantic and the Warsaw Treaty Organizations (WTO) mirror images of one another? Differently stated, are their similarities more superficial than actual? These questions take on renewed significance as both superpowers and their allies grope toward multilateral talks on European security, consider troop reductions in Europe, and contemplate related problems.

A response to the foregoing questions has been suggested in general terms by the communique issued by the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact after its April 1974 session in Warsaw.[1] More details are provided in essays published by the Institute for World Economics and International Relations (IMEMO in Russian),[2] by Marshal Ivan I. Yakubovsky, Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Treaty nations,[3] and by Dr. C. V. Kochubei in a brochure for the "Znanie" (Knowledge) Society of the Russian Republic.[4] Each of these Soviet studies emphasizes the differences between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, but much of the material they present suggests a more complex picture than the stark black and white image conveyed in their initial arguments.

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BASIC DISTINCTIONS

The basic distinctions between the two alliances are sharply delineated by the IMEMO essay:

> The Atlantic bloc is not only an organization for the preparation of war and subversive action against socialist countries, but also the leading center for interference in the internal affairs of states in the sphere of activity of that bloc and outside of it, an instrument for the preservation and restoration of reactionary regimes and governments.

While NATO is a kind of twentieth century Holy Alliance—"the offspring of contemporary Romanovs, Metternichs, and Talleyrands"—the Warsaw Pact "was and remains the firm defender of all revolutionary achievements, the bulwark of socialism and peace in Europe and in the whole world." The two alliances are different with regard to: (1) social structure—capitalist vs. socialist; (2) goals—imperialist vs. defensive; and (3) activities—reactionary vs. progressive. The origins of the two alliances are also contrasted: NATO came into being for

Marshal Ivan I. Yakubovsky

aggressive purposes; the Warsaw Pact for self-defense, sparked particularly by the entry of West Germany into NATO in 1955.

YAKUBOVSKY'S PROPOSITIONS

Marshal Yakubovsky goes so far as to argue that the Warsaw Treaty Organization "essentially differs from all past coalitions and from military-political blocs presently linking the imperialist countries." He bases this claim to uniqueness on five main propositions—which do not hold up well, however, if examined against other parts of his essay or other data from the historical record.

Proposition I. The WTO is "a voluntary alliance." Even if this were true, it is hardly unique among alliances such as those formed prior to World War I, although there is always an element of "necessity" resulting from the material environment in which states consider whether to ally with other states.

Neither the Warsaw Treaty nor the North Atlantic Treaty provides for withdrawal from the alliance until a fixed term has elapsed—1974-75 for the Pact; 1969-70 for NATO. France, however, withdrew in stages from the military activities and organization of NATO through the 1960's—a point documented by IMEMO—without encountering major opposition from her alliance partners, even though De Gaulle's policies caused them serious economic, logistic, and strategic difficulties. Disputes over base use and other problems aggravated NATO's internal problems during the 1973 Middle East war, setting the stage for many members to go it alone in trying to cope with the oil shortages and price hikes in winter 1973-74. Although France has now resumed some integrated military activities within the NATO framework, Athens—in the 1974 Cyprus confrontation—has declared that Greece will no longer take part in the military organization of NATO, thereby heightening doubts about the legality or desirability of leaving nuclear weapons in Greece or Turkey under joint controls with the United States.

The preferences of the hegemonical alliance power have also been defied by Rumania. While she has not formally withdrawn from the military structure of the Warsaw Pact, Rumania has refused for years to permit WTO maneuvers on her territory and has severely limited her participation in such maneuvers elsewhere. Bucharest has also called for changes in the Pact structure and operations, advocated an end to alliances more vociferously than her WTO partners, and threatened armed resistance to any WTO invasion. As a result of her deviant behavior, Rumania has been subjugated to more threat and pressure from her putative allies than France or Greece for theirs. Considering Soviet willingness to use force where Moscow's vital interests appear to be at stake, it is hardly surprising that Rumania in the mid-1970's is probably more submissive to the Kremlin than France or other NATO members are to the United States.

The April 1974 WTO communique affirms that friendship among Warsaw Pact members offers a model of "a new type of interstate relations, of a truly democratic society, an

example of the socialist way of life." What we know from history, including recent Soviet-sponsored subversive activities in Yugoslavia,* however, suggests a less roseate image. Three other WTO members seem to have considered complete withdrawal from the Soviet system. Hungary was invaded in 1956 by Soviet forces when Nagy proclaimed the country's neutrality. One reason for the WTO intervention against Czechoslovakia in 1968 was that military planners in Prague considered scenarios for nonalignment. Only Albania—separated from other WTO nations by Yugoslavia—has gone her way untouched, proclaiming in 1968 that she had withdrawn from the Warsaw Pact. Her legal right to do so, however, has not been recognized in Moscow. Yakubovsky says only that Albania in 1962 ceased "participation in the work" of the Pact. The IMEMO study puts the date still earlier, saying that Albania "stopped taking part in the activities of the Warsaw Treaty Organization in 1960-61 and virtually withdrew from it."

The Warsaw Pact, in sum, is no more voluntary than other alliances; probably it is less so, given the hegemonic position of the USSR within the alliance. It is difficult or impossible to recall a historical case where the other members of a multilateral alliance were so overshadowed by one hegemonical power. The relative power of the United States in NATO, for example, is less than that of the USSR in the Warsaw Pact. In nuclear weapons, two other NATO powers have their own arsenals, contrasted with Moscow's monopoly in the Pact. Whereas most NATO members have indirect access to US nuclear warheads, there is no evidence that WTO allies have any warheads at their disposal but only delivery systems, such as short-range surface-to-surface missiles. Indeed, some Soviet air defense systems and aircraft have been made available to third world clients (e.g., Syria) before being supplied to Moscow's WTO allies.

Even if a WTO member chose to denounce the Pact in 1974-75 when its terms



All Pact forces have these FROG surface-to-surface missiles.

specifically permit withdrawal, every WTO ally is also bound to the USSR and to other Pact members by a series of bilateral agreements that could be exploited easily by Moscow to achieve a considerable degree of control over the lesser partner. For example, the terms of the Czechoslovak-Soviet Treaty, revised and renewed in 1970, give legal status to the principle of the "Brezhnev doctrine" which asserts that the interests of the socialist commonwealth take precedence over those of "national sovereignty." In the language of the 1970 treaty: "the support, strengthening and defense of the conquests of socialism, achieved at the expense of heroic efforts and selfless labor of each people, is the common international duty of the socialist countries." This provision, according to Kochubei: "reflects as in a mirror the main principle lying at the basis of the military and other forms of collaboration of the countries of socialism—proletarian internationalism."[5]

Proposition II. The WTO is based on "the principle of total equality of participants." Some animals, as George Orwell observed, are "more equal than others." Yakubovsky and IMEMO affirm the leading role of the USSR within the Pact in providing armaments and combat materiel, strategic doctrine, and organizational forms. They could (but do not) also confirm the leading role played by Soviet personnel in commanding the various organs of the Warsaw Treaty. They explicitly cite the historical

*Not a pact member, but a socialist state by its own definition.

precedents for multinational cooperation in the contingents from various East European countries fighting with the Red Army in 1918-21 and again during World War II. According to Yakubovsky, by 1945 the total number of foreign units formed in the USSR "amounted to 557,000 men." He continues:

> The Soviet Army provides its comrades-in-arms with the broad opportunity to adopt everything valuable that it has amassed in theory and practice. The friendly armies naturally regard Soviet military science as the deep Marxist-Leninist theoretical generalization of the experience of creating and improving socialist armies under conditions of the complete victory of socialism and the all-out building of communism.

The motto of the fraternal armies, their Commander-in-Chief writes, is "to learn from the Soviet Army means to learn how to win."

Ironically, the IMEMO study dwells on the "personal union" between the hegemonic power in NATO and the armed forces of its allies, a union personified by the commanding position of American generals and admirals, seconded most often by U. K. officers, at the top of the NATO hierarchy.

Yakubovsky stresses the "latitude for broad initiative and creativity of all [WTO] participants. . . ." But he also notes that the plans for closer economic integration, adopted by the special session of the Council on Mutual Economic Assistance in April 1969, will contribute greatly to the military as well as to the economic power of the alliance. While Yakubovsky is probably correct in assuming that closer economic integration among WTO allies would strengthen their military as well as their economic power, it seems certain that such a tendency would reduce the latitude by any one member. Rumania, for her part, has fought against such integration since the early 1960's. In the wake of the Czechoslovak events of 1968-69, however, the Kremlin mounted another strong effort to integrate economic and scientific work, directed by various institutes in Moscow.

Proposition III. The "alliance of the socialist countries is a genuinely defensive organization," whereas the "military blocs of the imperialists serve aggressive aims and are directed against the socialist countries and against all freedom-loving peoples. . . ." Yakubovsky immediately qualifies the word "defensive," however, by saying that the Pact "pursues no aims other than the defense of its revolutionary attainments and the cause of peace." He confirms also the Pact's willingness to give "fraternal assistance" to its members and to other fraternal countries such as Egypt.

> Such was the case in 1956-58 when the resolve of the socialist countries to defend the peace halted the aggression against Egypt, Syria and Iraq. In 1956, the Soviet Union rendered fraternal assistance to the Hungarian people in putting down the counterrevolutionary uprising that was launched by internal reactionary forces with the direct participation of the West. In 1961, an imperialist provocation against the GDR was averted and in the following year support was rendered to revolutionary Cuba. In 1967, the fraternal socialist countries resolutely supported the Arab nations that were subjected to Israeli aggression. The assistance rendered in 1968 by five socialist countries to the fraternal people of Czechoslovakia in

Budapest, November 1956.

> defending the attainments of socialism which were menaced by internal counterrevolutionary and international reactionary forces was a clear demonstration of the power of proletarian internationalism.

Without debating Marshal Yakubovsky on the particular events that he cites, it seems clear that many observers—and many participants in these events—would question whether those WTO actions were "defensive." Indeed, the very cases that Yakubovsky mentions could be used to contradict his further assertion that the WTO participants "threaten no one, claim no foreign territory, and do not intervene in the internal affairs of other countries." One might recall also the Soviet argument that the MRBM's installed in Cuba in 1962 were "defensive weapons." To be sure, the policies of certain NATO powers in the third world over the past two decades can be called "defensive" only by stretching the meaning of the term quite broadly. They cannot, however, be attributed to some decision by "NATO," since the *casus foederis* clauses of the NATO charter apply only to an attack in Europe, in America, and in the Atlantic Ocean north of the Tropic of Cancer.

According to Yakubovsky, the aggressive forces of the United States and her allies are engaged in heavy defense expenditures, plans to increase tensions, and preparations for war with the socialist countries. Yakubovsky enumerates US nuclear forces—land and sea-based missiles, bombers, warheads deployed in Europe—and asserts that they have been "designated to deliver a *surprise nuclear strike* against the socialist countries [emphasis supplied]." On the other hand, Yakubovsky says of Warsaw Pact strategy:

> Collective defense in Europe, based on the joint action or the Unified Armed Forces that are prepared *not only to ward off any attack by the aggressor but also to crush him outright,* is the military-strategic basis of the military alliance of the fraternal peoples and their armies [emphasis supplied].

While we should not rely on Yakubovsky for an authoritative assessment of US or NATO strategy, his statement on WTO plans might well indicate genuine Soviet aspirations, if not current planning. His formulation resembles that of former Defense Minister Malinovsky and other Soviet marshals who have dealt in circumlocutions, such as a "timely blow," to convey what Western strategists speak of as a pre-emptive strike.

Pre-emption, of course, could be thought of as a defensive or as an offensive strategy. Soviet deployment of powerful SS-9 missiles or US deployment of MIRV could be interpreted as part of such a strategy, the aim of which could be to neutralize the enemy's second-strike response capability. Given the variety and quantity of strategic forces possessed by each superpower, it seems quite doubtful that either could be deprived of an assured-destruction, second-strike capability. To use the language of pre-emption, nonetheless, is to inflame the very tensions which Yakubovsky accuses NATO alone of kindling. Subsequent WTO pronouncements have roundly denounced 1974 US statements on the need for a more selective nuclear strategy, similar to criticisms in the 1950's-1960's of US limited, nuclear-war options.

Proposition IV. "Unlike NATO, the Warsaw Pact is not a narrow, closed military organization. The Treaty is open to other nations irrespective of their social and government system. . . . The only prerequisite of membership is the willingness to promote the unification of the efforts of peace-loving peoples in the interest of peace and the security of peoples."

This proposition is contradicted by Yakubovsky's further assertion that the Pact rests upon "firm political, economic, ideological, and military-strategic foundations," including a "common social and government structure."

He continues:

> Common political ground is the basis for socialist international relations between friendly nations in all areas, including the military area, since all socialist countries now have a common enemy—imperialism,

and the threat of imperialist aggression is a threat to all socialist countries.

Indeed, throughout the essay Yakubovsky states that the Warsaw Pact consists of "socialist countries." As Czechoslovakia experienced in 1968, however, deviation from the Soviet definition of "socialism" could trigger WTO intervention. And Moscow has sustained a diplomatic effort over several years to persuade its WTO allies to declare their readiness to take part in "defensive actions" against another putatively socialist state—China.

An even deeper pressure for conformity among the members of the Warsaw Pact is that the character of each country's policies—economic, military, political—is determined by their Communist Parties. As Yakubovsky puts it: "The fact that Communist and Workers' Parties manage all the defenses of socialist countries is of paramount importance to the development and strengthening of the military alliance of these countries." These parties and their governments act as a "united front," and their governments act as a "united front in the international arena." The heads of the parties and of the government take part in the work of the Political Consultative Committee (PCC), which heads the Warsaw Pact, and to which foreign ministers, defense ministers, and military commanders are also "summoned" to participate.

Given its underlying characteristics, the Warsaw Pact seems to be much more "closed" than NATO. Member states of the Atlantic alliance are more diverse, ranging along a wide economic spectrum from public to private ownership and control, and from highly democratic to highly authoritarian political and social systems. NATO has expanded its ranks twice, in 1952 and 1955, whereas the Warsaw Pact has not expanded its original membership. Indeed, Albania has declared her withdrawal and no other socialist states have joined, although some, notably Outer Mongolia and China, have had bilateral alliances with Moscow.

Finally, Yakubovsky uses the term "narrow" to contrast strictly military alliances with the Warsaw Pact, the latter being engaged also in the promotion of economic and other forms of cooperation. In fact, however, both alliances have expressed their interest in promoting non-military cooperation *inter se* and with each other. Both alliances, for example, have addressed themselves to pan-European security and, since the late 1960's, to ecological planning and controls.

Proposition V. "*Unlike NATO,*" Yakubovsky writes, "*troops of the Warsaw Pact continue to be directly subordinate to the national commands, another fact attesting to the mutual respect for the sovereignty of allied nations.*" At the same time, he continues: ". . . the creation of the United [or Combined] Armed Forces has immeasurably increased the defensive might of socialist countries since the best trained troops with a high degree of combat readiness were assigned for these purposes."

These remarks of Yakubovsky and similar statements in the IMEMO study are of interest—not only for comparisons with NATO—but because they terminate speculations by some Western observers about the meaning of "the new statutes of the Unified Armed Forces and the Joint Command," approved by the Budapest meeting of the PCC in March 1969. Some observers concluded that tighter integration of Pact forces had been accomplished, units from each army being earmarked for subjugation to direct orders from a Soviet officer in time of an emergency. From these two authoritative Soviet essays, however, it appears that the various national armies remain physically distinct from Soviet forces, and that they remain directly subordinate to their own national authorities. In the words of the IMEMO report: the Unified Forces are controlled by the Commander-in-Chief "*through* his deputies, *who are representatives of the national commands* [emphasis added]."

The degree of Pact coordination has also been stressed by Yakubovsky on the basis of large-scale maneuvers, such as the

"Comrades-in-Arms" exercise held in the German Democratic Republic and in the Baltic Sea in 1970. "In terms of its military-political significance, scope, and results it was the most significant of all the years of existence of the Warsaw Treaty Organization." The exercise included the troops of "all seven armies and the forces of three fleets." (The first WTO exercise involving more than one fleet seems to have occurred in 1969, when Bulgarian and Soviet fleets participated. According to Bulgarian sources, however, Rumania did not participate, although it would have been logical for her to do so.)

Yakubovsky also notes that the Committee of Defense Ministers organized at the March 1969 PCC meeting "has been established and is now functioning." Since 1969, "The functions of headquarters and other organs of control of the Unified Armed Forces have been expanded."

On these points of the Yakubovsky and IMEMO studies, little qualification seems necessary. The main question to be posed is whether the degree of integration achieved is that which Moscow wanted. It is more likely that the USSR sought greater centralization of WTO forces at the March 1969 meeting of the PCC, but that this was successfully blocked by Rumania and perhaps by Czechoslovakia, represented in Budapest at that time by Dubcek. Indeed, for months after the PCC session in Budapest, rumors circulated all over Europe that the conference almost broke down over Soviet efforts to induce other Pact members to cooperate actively with the USSR in her struggle with China.

Since the 1969 reorganization, according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), the Soviet and non-Soviet defense ministers have served on a Council of Defense Ministers, the highest military body of the Pact. A second military body, the Joint High Command, consists of the Commander-in-Chief (currently, Marshal Yakubovsky) and a Military Council, which includes the Chief of Staff (another Soviet officer) and permanent military representatives from each WTO ally. This Council seems to be the main channel through which the Pact's orders are transmitted to the allies in peacetime, and through which the East European forces can convey their viewpoints to the Commander-in-Chief. In time of war, however, the IISS posits that the forces of other Pact members would be operationally subordinate to the Soviet High Command.[6]

For better or worse, the IMEMO study is probably correct in asserting that:

> The decisive material force in the Warsaw Treaty Organization is the USSR. To her falls the main share of military expenditures. The armed forces of the USSR and their technical equipment occupy the predominant position, both in quantity and in quality.

The essay goes on to affirm that the nuclear-rocket potential of the USSR "protects not only the state interests of the USSR but also the state interests of other countries of the Warsaw Pact, all socialist countries, guarantees them from aggression, and ensures their development on the communist route chosen by them." Soviet predominance is manifested by the fact that command of the air defense system covering the entire Warsaw Pact area is now centralized in Moscow and directed by the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Air Defense Forces.

Once again, the paradox is evident that the Warsaw Pact forces are less integrated in a technical, military sense than those of NATO, but more dependent upon the hegemonical power within the alliance. In NATO, by contrast, some national forces are subject to the Supreme Commander of NATO, while some remain under national command, except for West German forces all of which are NATO-committed. At the same time, there are other possibilities in NATO for bilateral or multilateral coordination among subsets of the entire membership, e.g., on nuclear operations and strategy, to which there is no analogue in the Warsaw Pact.

The more open-ended character of NATO may permit it to adjust to changing

circumstances with greater flexibility than the Warsaw Pact. This character creates dangers as well as opportunities. In the past, it permitted Washington to push for a miltilateral nuclear force (MLF), which generated tensions within NATO as well as between the alliances. In the future, we might still see the formation of a European nuclear force within NATO, joining the nuclear forces of Britain and France. If supranational cooperation progressed still further in Europe, it is at least conceivable—but not at all likely—that West Germany might participate in a European nuclear force in ways that skirted the original intent of the West European Union and the Nonproliferation Treaty.

SYMMETRIES AND ASYMMETRIES

Analysis of the key propositions in the Soviet argument suggests that the Warsaw Pact is not so unique as Moscow claims. In some ways it resembles NATO and in some respects it differs. Let us now examine more analytically the symmetries and asymmetries between the two alliances.

Origins. Both alliances claim to be a response to aggressive action from the other side. NATO, for its part, claimed to be a response to Sovietization in Eastern Europe and to fears of Soviet pressures against Western Europe as well. The Warsaw Pact, however, was created in May 1955 when international tensions were easing due to changes in Soviet policy toward Austria, Finland, Yugoslavia, and arms control. The main Western event to which the WTO responded was West Germany's entry into NATO under the terms of the London-Paris accords for the West European Union, which were signed in late 1954 and ratified in the spring of 1955. The fact that little military coordination took place among WTO allies until the early 1960's suggests that the Pact may have been formed more for political and diplomatic purposes than for defensive (or offensive) military ones. Moscow already had a network of bilateral alliances in Eastern Europe prior to and after the creation of the WTO, making a multilateral alliance superfluous unless it promoted coordination or interpretation more than the bilateral treaties.

Structure. The military capabilities of both alliance systems overlap in many ways, but there are also many asymmetries—a fact of life which makes it more difficult to reach any negotiated accord on a formula for "mutual and balanced force reductions." Thus, NATO forces are strong in aircraft capable of deep penetration and bombing missions into Soviet territory, as well as tactical support of ground combat units. Soviet aircraft are more numerous, but are geared more to an interceptor role than NATO's fighter-bombers.

Except for France, however, no NATO member possesses IRBM's, while the USSR continues to deploy about 600 IRBM and MRBM forces against European targets. While the Pact outnumbers NATO in tanks, the Western alliance is strong (and becoming stronger) in anti-tank weapons. NATO, it is believed, may have twice the number of tactical nuclear weapons at its disposal in Europe as the Warsaw Pact. All these and other asymmetries make it difficult even to state which alliance has the greater potential for offensive missions. The fact that NATO divisions contain many more men per unit than the WTO divisions leads Western pessimists to count division strength, while their WTO counterparts prefer to emphasize numbers of troops. Although Western pessimists can point out the short distances that Soviet troops have to move to reach Central Europe, WTO pessimists can count the US forces deployed in North America and the commercial and military aircraft that could lift them to Europe in a crisis. Generally, while NATO pessimists emphasize gross, quantitative discrepancies, their eastern counterparts worry more about the quality of Western forces and technology.

The European balance responds likewise to the overall strategic equations between the USSR and the United States, which are also complicated by great asymmetries. But, while the Soviet Union leads in some dimensions of strategic weaponry, the United States still enjoys a commanding advantage not only in numbers of warheads, but also in most qualitative aspects of the strategic arms race, e.g., accuracy.

Functioning. Both alliances profess to have

a basically defensive character, but the WTO has been used primarily to enforce Soviet policy preferences regarding the internal affairs of member states, e.g., Hungary and Czechoslovakia. France and Greece, by contrast, have formally left the military organization of NATO, and could have denounced the treaty as well, without suffering major pressures from other NATO members.

NATO is cemented by a common Western heritage shared by most of its members, and providing an informal consensus that runs deeper than enforced ideological conformity. Indeed, the sacerdotal character of Communist ideology probably aggravates disputes among WTO members on matters affecting their particular interests. In terms of power relationships, the Organization of American States is more similar to the WTO than is NATO. And Washington's willingness to enforce its will has been much greater in Latin America—Guatemala, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Chile—than in Europe. In short, the domain covered by the Monroe Doctrine is much more analogous to that regulated by the Brezhnev Doctrine than is NATO.

While the United States is more physically remote from her alliance partners in Europe, it shares more culturally with them than does the USSR with many members of the Warsaw Pact. Czechoslovakia, for example, is strongly linked with Western culture, while Russia has experienced strong Byzantine as well as Asian influences.

Soviet security has been directly affected by the buffer area of Eastern Europe, while *Realpolitik* dictates that US security is less directly affected by the fortunes of Western Europe. This means that the internal affairs of the other WTO members are of much greater importance to Moscow than are those of other NATO partners to the United States. By the same token, however, America's remoteness from Europe also creates greater doubt in European chancelleries about the extent to which there would be an automatic US response to aggression against Washington's NATO allies. A reduction in US forces stationed in Europe would aggravate doubts about the American commitment much more than a reduction, or even a complete withdrawal, of Soviet forces would have upon European perceptions of Moscow's interests in Europe.

Taken together, the members of NATO are more advanced economically than most countries of the Warsaw Pact. The economic and demographic resources of Western Europe approach those of either superpower. Eastern Europe's resources by contrast, do not match even those of the USSR. The West European members of NATO also have a much longer and more positive experience in transnational and supranational cooperation than have the East European members of the WTO.

While nationalism gains freer expression in the West than in the East, reflected even in military deployments of Greece against Turkey and Iceland against Britain, it remains a potent divisive force in Eastern Europe as well—not just in boundary and minority problems that continue to simmer, but in deep fears and resentments against economic integration that has produced and could again result in exploitative arrangements.

West European union has been supported by the United States—at least until economic developments of recent years compelled all parties to commence a reappraisal—while Moscow has sought to force integration of the East European economies with that of the Soviet Union. The East European governments tend to remain heavily dependent upon the Soviet Union not only militarily but also economically and politically.

Future Prospects. The mutual force reduction negotiations and multilateral talks on European security add great strains to the cohesion of both alliance systems.[7] Within each bloc, governments are weighing the pros and cons of three basic approaches:

– preserving bloc to bloc relationships, whether for confrontation or negotiation or both.

– pursuing bilateral relations with nations of the opposite bloc, regardless of inter-alliance developments, in such areas as trade, arms control, and war prevention.

– seeking to transcend the long-familiar

bloc structures to develop new forms of cooperation—international, transnational, supranational.

Thus, the April 1974 PCC communique from Warsaw reaffirmed the "invariable" readiness of all Pact members "to disband the Warsaw Treaty Organization simultaneously with the disbanding of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or, as an initial step, liquidation of their military organizations." Though the communique pledged WTO efforts in behalf of "equal cooperation" with all European states, the Pact countries nevertheless promised to strengthen their defenses and to develop close participation so long as the blocs remain and disarmament measures have not been implemented.

The tighter reins that Moscow imposes on its alliance partners, compared with Washington's, should help sustain the solidarity of the Warsaw Pact, at least in the short run. In the longer term, however, resentments at these controls will continue to fester in Eastern Europe, as they have in the past. This produces a situation that tends to *appear* more stable than NATO, where disagreements are often more open. But externally-imposed discipline is less viable over time than restraints that are self-chosen.[8] In a crisis situation, the Warsaw Pact forces and populations would probably be less reliable than those of NATO. Were Communist Parties to gain greater weight in the governments of Portugal, Italy, or other NATO countries, however, the reliability and coherence of the Western alliance would become much more dubious than it has been for some twenty-five years. While less monolithic for political bargaining purposes, the Western alliance may have more staying power and flexibility to accommodate changing times and new problems. Such are the liabilities and advantages of a freer association.

Mutual Anachronism. The most important common feature shared by the two alliance systems is their anachronistic existence beyond the early years of the cold war. Both alliance systems, concentrating the largest forces amassed in history, are directed against security problems of the past rather than those of the future. The greatest threats facing members of both alliances are probably ecological, as environmental and economic pressures rise that could engulf both sides, tearing at them alone or together. If this assessment is correct, both sides should curtail their cold war disputation and commence joint action to reduce deployments and enhance mutual trust. Security, in the long run, may lie more in the formation of pan-European electric grids and fuel line networks than in deterrence and early warning systems.

NOTES

1. Text reprinted in *Survival* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies), XVI, No. 4 (July/August 1974), pp. 198-200.

2. *Sovremennye problemy razoruzheniia* (Moscow: Mysl', 1970), published for the Institute of World Economics and International Relations. Chapter XI is entitled "The North Atlantic Alliance, the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the Problem of Their Dissolution /rospusk/," pp. 262-90. This chapter is authored by I. A. Koloshov. Another relevant chapter is VIII: "Nuclear-Free Zones," by M. P. Shelepin, pp. 166-97.

3. Marshal I. Yakubovsky, Commander-in-Chief of Joint Armed Forces of Warsaw Treaty Nations, "Bastion of Peace and National Security," *Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal,* No. 3 (March 1971), pp. 20-31. See also A. S. Bakhov, *Organizatsiia Varshavskogo Dogovora (pravovye aspekty)* (Moscow: Nauka, 1971).

4. S. V. Kochubei, *NATO i voprosy evropeiskoi bezopasnosti* (Leningrad: Obshchestvo "Znanie" RSFSR, Leningradskaia Organizatsiia, 1974).

5. *Ibid.,* pp. 25-26.

6. *The Military Balance, 1974-1975* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1974), p. 11.

7. For a summary of the divergent positions on the eve of resumed talks by the European security conference, see "European Security Parley Resumes; East-West Differences Still Wide," *The New York Times,* September 10, 1974, p. 4.

8. A major work on the Warsaw Pact points to greater flexibility and consultation among Pact members in the crises of 1968-70 than in those, say, of 1956-60. See Robin Allison Remington, *The Warsaw Pact: Case Studies in Communist Conflict Resolution* (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1971).