COHESION AND COMPETITION IN THE ATLANTIC COMMUNITY: IMPLICATIONS FOR SECURITY

by

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Two great world wars of the 20th Century have altered dramatically the face of the European continent, while at the same time they have drawn America and Europe into an Atlantic partnership. In the three decades that have elapsed since the close of World War II, two complementary processes have shaped European history and have dramatically affected the United States. In the first place, Europe has ceded its world leadership role to two contending superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. At the same time, the "consolidation of Western Europe into a transnational politico-economic unit (tends) to redress the balance in favor of the older metropolitan center."[1]

These two contending processes, against the background of superpower competition, raise several issues concerning the relationship of Europe with the superpowers themselves. This article will examine the Atlantic community as an aspect of this post-war relationship.

Geopolitical factors played a dominant role in defining political, national security, and economic interests of nations prior to the nuclear era. The post-World War II age defines the international order more in terms of networks of relationships—economic, political, military, and technological—that have grown up in the developed world particularly in the last thirty years. These relationships have been institutionalized through an international system of military alliances and economic arrangements. The oldest and most successful of these systems are found among the nations bordering the North Atlantic Ocean—the Atlantic community. The politico-military manifestation of the Atlantic relationship, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the politico-economic dimension, the European Economic Community (EEC), have developed as vehicles for continuity, cohesion, and competition among the nations involved. NATO has developed as a cohesive and reinforcing tie among its fifteen European and North American members, while the EEC has served as a unifying force among its nine European participants. The focus of the next few pages will be to try to determine the effect of cohesion and competition among the participants of the two regional groupings on the fundamental Atlantic relationship.

US-European relations since World War II have been dominated by these two regional arrangements. The differences between the two relationships have created tensions between them as well as between North America and Europe. In the case of NATO, the United States has been looked upon as a partner in defense, providing the strategic umbrella under which Europe first recovered and then prospered. In this context, Europe has feared its relative weakness in comparison with the superpowers and has accepted

alliance with one to offset the threats of the other. The embrace of a superpower, even a friendly one, is not necessarily pleasurable, even if essential. The United States in supporting a policy of military alliance with Europe has become in a sense dependent upon Europe. The first line of US defense is now in Central Europe rather than somewhere in the Atlantic Ocean. Strategy, tactics, and force development of the past quarter century have been based to a large extent on this relationship. The strategic deterrent itself depends in part on European bases and cooperation.

The other arrangement, coming almost ten years after the inception of NATO, differs from NATO in several essential ways. Unlike the military alliance in which common command and control systems become implemented only at times of extreme tension, the EEC network of decisionmaking committees and councils operates routinely. In terms of membership, the EEC does not include several key European states, and the United Kingdom has only recently become a partner. The US relationship is competitive in the EEC while supportive in NATO. The Soviet Union and its suffragan states are neither threat nor serious competition for the EEC, but provide a lucrative market to be exploited. US-European economic relationships are colored by the existence of the EEC with its common tariff and common economic policies. Competition between two economic giants like the United States and the EEC creates political and economic tensions common to a free economy but often disturbing to statesmen looking for a cohesive alliance system with a common position in face of a perceived threat.

While examining US relations with Western Europe, it is impossible to ignore another dimension in international relations, the superpower relationship itself. It is well beyond the scope of this study to examine the realities of Soviet-American confrontation in the past, present efforts at relaxation of tensions, and the potential for the future. Accepting the reality of Soviet power and the historical confrontation between that nation and the United States since World War II as a background, let us examine the Atlantic relationship.

FORGING ATLANTIC TIES

The vision of European statesmen like Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman, coupled with the practical security needs of the United States, joined together to produce and maintain an Atlantic relationship unique in world history. The relationship has meant different things to different segments of the Atlantic world, and these meanings have shifted over the thirty years of its history. The visionary was replaced by the practical statesman who then gave way to the visionary in response to changing political and economic realities. Arguments and impassioned rhetoric have run the gamut from a plea for a United States of Europe to a serious question in the American Congress about the Atlantic relationship in the first place. This examination of the Atlantic tie might provide a useful framework for future examination of the shape and direction of the relationship.

Military necessity, particularly after the West recognized a threat to itself in Soviet unwillingness to permit self-determination in Central and Eastern Europe, compelled the nations of Western Europe to consult together and with the United States concerning mutual security. These consultations developed in the late 1940's to a full-fledged multilateral defense treaty, bringing the signatories together in a peacetime arrangement unique in world history. The Atlantic Alliance was envisioned not as a peculiarly European arrangement but included from its inception the English-speaking democracies of North America. Although NATO comprises some of the few remaining true democracies in the world, the democratic nature of the alliance has been ambivalent from the beginning. Franco's Spain was excluded, but Salazar's Portugal was included; Greece has had a recent experience with authoritarian rule; the focus, however, has remained firmly on the democratic nature of the Alliance as the acceptable standard.

The politico-economic cohesion of Western

Europe has proceeded along different lines and with structures different from those of the military alliance. In the late 1940's, European powers were client states of the United States in most economic aspects. They were dependent upon the United States for economic assistance, while political instability in France and Italy, to name only two states, reduced the ability of European powers to deal with postwar matters without the stabilizing involvement of the United States. The lingering animosities among the victorious allies, stemming from the fall of France and the Low Countries in 1940 and the role of Italy as an Axis partner until 1943, did little to render cooperation any easier. The status of the Western-occupied portion of Germany itself, Spain's authoritarian regime and its history of support for the Axis in the early years of World War II, the position of the neutral states of Sweden and Switzerland, and the anomaly of quasi-enemies like Austria and Finland further complicated political relationships. Territorial disputes of long standing over the German-speaking areas of the South Tyrol and the confrontation between Yugoslavia and Italy over Trieste contributed to the social as well as political conflict.

The states of Europe were driven to cooperation by events in the immediate postwar era reinforced by the active cooperation of the United States. Monnet, whom some have styled the first statesman of the Atlantic community, charted the first cooperative course for the redevelopment of prostrate Europe in 1945.[2] The Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) brought together European states to cooperate in the Marshall Plan, but the OEEC quickly outlived its usefulness in the context of a recovering Europe. Its successor, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), became a broader-based vehicle for economic cooperation than Europe alone; its emergence "signified a change in setting and plot" and introduced non-Atlantic states into a broader free world matrix.[3]

The Atlantic relationship was the core around which the capitalist world rebuilt its international economic system, and so it remains today. International economic diffusion caused by the emergence of Japan as a major actor in the system by the 1960's, together with competition—on a greatly reduced scale, of course—by other Asian states like the Republic of Korea and Taiwan, has reduced the influence of specific European states, but not necessarily Europe as an economic entity.

The foregoing description of various aspects of the Atlantic relationship permits us to draw four broad conclusions. First, the relationship is not a monolithic structure but a bundle of ties that are flexible and varied. We have seen how NATO drew Europe and America together under US tutelage in the early 1950's; by the late 1950's some of the same European states had banded together themselves in direct economic competition with the United States. The French view of the North Atlantic Treaty and its organizational structure is vastly different from that of the Federal Republic of Germany or the United Kingdom. The relationship has not prevented conflict of an economic and even military nature within the community from time to time, but the threat of intraregional war has died in the central region and has been mitigated on the flanks.

The second conclusion lies in the varying degrees of cohesion exhibited by European

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states in the different organizational manifestations of Atlantic unity. The "Europe of the Nine" exhibits an economic cohesion which differs from the cohesion of the "Europe of the Fifteen" in NATO. The EEC, on the one hand, is developing rudimentary political structures with a general objective to achieve an elective parliament of Europe by 1980 and is transforming itself into a "European Community" with interests much wider than economic. NATO, on the other hand, is showing signs of disrepair. On the North Atlantic flank, the "Cod War" between the United Kingdom and Iceland threatens to permit national economic considerations to undermine an important strategic position in the military alliance. Two years ago, the Cyprus issue created tensions within NATO that still threaten to cause irreparable harm to the defense structure of Western Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean area. While cultural and social divisions seem to have become less important in some parts of Western Europe, old hostilities between Greeks and Turks appear ready to undermine hard-won agreement on common interests.

The third conclusion involves the United States and its relationship to other nations in the Atlantic community. North America, particularly the United States, has interests in the community that differ from its European partners. The United States and Canada are full and participating members in NATO, but both are completely outside the European Community. In the first instance, the relationship is supportive and necessary from the point of view of European security. In the second, the relationship is necessary but also competitive. Frictions develop in the military relationship when perceptions differ over the purpose of the nuclear deterrent, the degree to which participating states support the military force structure of the Alliance, and in the decisionmaking apparatus set up to plan in peacetime and handle contingencies in time of increased tension. These frictions are signs of weakness, disorder, or loss of purpose to many and are causes of concern within the Alliance. Competition in this sense, within NATO, is disruptive.

The politico-economic relationship, however, must be competitive if an international economic system is to thrive. Government-to-government agreements to reduce economic tensions in the form of protectionist barriers to trade simply increase international economic competition. The struggle to gain a better deal, to secure or expand markets, or to create a surplus in trade or payments balances means that the someone else in the community will lose a market, have an adverse balance, or suffer other undesirable economic consequences. Comparative advantage argues, of course, the ultimate well-being of all participants, but the process itself can be grueling and unpleasant at any specific moment.

The final conclusion is based on the different ways in which the United States and Europe view the world environment. Since World War II, or shortly thereafter, European nations lost their global mission and view. As colonial empire faded and the political realities of the postwar world were manifest, the states of Europe and the joint associations they developed were regional in orientation. The United States and the Soviet Union, on the other hand, retained global interests and a sense of global mission in the postwar era. These different perspectives have created an alliance structure that is self-limiting to Europe and the Atlantic area. This regionalism has prevented NATO from becoming an instrument of global US policy, but it has also permitted Europe to remain aloof from many nonregional conflicts. The interplay between the global responsibilities of the United States and the regional concerns of Europe in the past decade has created tension in the Alliance. The very tensions themselves have created an atmosphere of realism that may have kept NATO goals limited to the capacity of the existing organization rather than a nonexistent ideal. We might ponder, for example, the effect on NATO of the fall of the South Vietnamese Government in 1975 if the Atlantic Alliance had stood foursquare

behind US involvement in the Indochinese Peninsula.

ALLIED MISPERCEPTIONS

These contending forces at work within the Atlantic community create a difficult environment in which statesmen must work. This is particularly true when political leaders must articulate the complex relationship to the electorates of the member nations. How can the United States spend billions of dollars to defend Europe each year and suffer "unfair" competition when its goods are excluded from European markets by common tariffs? After all these years of assistance, why is the currency of the Federal Republic of Germany or Switzerland stronger than the American dollar? Why won't our "allies" in Europe agree with us over issues concerning other "allies" like Vietnam and Israel?

These misperceptions of intention and fact arise from a confused appreciation of the objectives of the military and the economic aspects of these relationships. It might be well to examine these aspects and misperceptions more thoroughly.

The Atlantic community has become a symbiotic relationship wherein two like political creatures in the international political environment have found a mutuality of interests which override many differences. The differences have not evaporated in the heady climate of cooperation, but what were international quarrels among self-protective nation-states have been reduced to family spats. In this relationship the nationalistic tendencies of the different peoples of Europe have begun to be sublimated into a European consciousness and a European identity. Sovereignty has, in a real sense, been quietly eroded among the European partners. This process has not been without its tensions and its failures, but the long-term trend has been toward a real interdependence. As Roger Hilsman has pointed out rather succinctly about Western Europe, "nationalism is no longer a force for changing the status quo but is the status quo itself."[4]

While nationalism as a divisive element is no longer a serious challenge to the community as a whole, misperceptions and confusion about the nature, viability, and goals of the military alliance tend to disturb the relationship. The fundamental issue is the nature of NATO itself. Some might argue that it is a device for the maintenance of American suzerainty over Europe. Raymond Aron states, however, that NATO was created at the instigation of Europeans, American participation was at the urging of Europeans, and the "American protectorate" has continued for a quarter of a century simply because the Europeans prefer it that way.[5]

Others argue that NATO was a useful weapon of the Cold War. Now that the Cold War is over and we have embarked on an era of detente with the Soviet Union, the military structure of the North Atlantic Alliance is less necessary. It could even be a stumbling block to further relaxations of tensions between the United States and the USSR in the future. Ronald Steel has suggested that "the situation has changed so radically that the NATO response is no longer the proper one. A revitalized Europe, a chastened Russia, a vulnerable America—these are not the conditions to which NATO is appropriate."[6]

We can also find those who hold that NATO should have been enlarged to accommodate the wider needs of security of the member states. It is true that the original conception of a North Atlantic alliance system encompassed defense of overseas possessions at least as far as then-French North Africa. We find even today questions raised about the "NATO response" to the troubles in Angola, the internal affairs of Chile, or the Vietnam experience. It was determined at least as early as 1956, in the Suez Crisis, that NATO is an operational alliance in a restricted sense of the term: to preserve the security of Western Europe and the Atlantic area, not overseas possessions or interests outside of the European and North American boundaries of member states.

From this we can conclude that NATO exists to serve two limited objectives: first, to deter any Soviet attempt to gain mastery of Western Europe and North America by force of arms, and to prevent serious Warsaw Pact

speculation that such an attempt might succeed; second, to provide a relatively inexpensive shield behind which the European Economic Community can develop to satsify the economic and social needs of the Europeans.

Misconceptions about the economic aspect of the Atlantic relationship might better be called "preconceptions," and American preconceptions at that. Europeans seem to understand rather well what the Economic Community is determined to do. After the destructive international economic policies of the 1930's when "beggar my neighbor" seemed to have been the watchword, economic cooperation and collaboration became the accepted program of the postwar era. The futility of going it alone and the active and purposeful cooperation of the United States provided support for collective effort.[7]

European unity has been a major foreign policy objective of the United States since the beginning of the postwar era. The American version of unity, however, often failed to recognize that the American constitutional model was not necessarily the only one. A European federation in partnership with the American federal union is a neat and tidy international political model, but, as Stanley Hoffman has pointed out, "there is reason to suspect that the kind of integration they believe can alone meet the conditions for 'equal partnership' is unlikely to emerge. If it should, the partner's policies might not satisfy American expectations. . . ."[8]

ASYMMETRIES: NATO VERSUS EEC

The asymmetry between the military and economic elements of the Atlantic relationship seems to be at the bottom of misconceptions concerning roles, attitudes, and activities. The Europe of NATO and the Europe of the EEC are overlapping arrangements, but remain essentially separate in both structure and function. The North Atlantic Treaty does make mention of economic cooperation, but this element of the military alliance has been thoroughly overshadowed by the EEC. From the United States point of view, howver, we often have difficulty seeing the distinction between the "Europe of the Fifteen" and the "Europe of the Nine."

Obviously, trade across the Atlantic will not stop if there is a disruption in the EEC, but the existence of the EEC provides a competitive partner similar to that of the US economy and creates an atmosphere in which economies of scale become possible. Europe gains by facing the United States in an economic sense with one voice and a unified trading position. America gains by trading with a partner rather than with a number of weaker and perhaps client states of limited capacity and potential. Equality in economic relationships promotes competition.

But the competitive nature of the US-EEC relationship can be seen through American eyes as a kind of disloyalty to the "principles of NATO." This competitive aspect is further highlighted when the United States is viewed as quasi-European through NATO eyes but as a foreign, extracontinental nation in the EEC's view.

The asymmetry applies also to the NATO aspect of the relationship. The United States and Canada are deeply committed to the principles of NATO, but their troops are foreigners on European soil. American soldiers have become a major if not dominant element in the ground forces deployed to halt aggressive tendencies from the East. American officers participate fully in joint European command arrangements. Tactical nuclear weapons serve as essential elements of non-US military formations, but remain under American control. The entire defense strategy of Europe depends on the availability, utility, and deterrent effect of the retaliatory strategic nuclear forces under the control of the American President. The NATO military structure has become so familiar and United States participation so expected and assumed that a growing tendency among at least the smaller European states has been to reduce their already limited military forces.

Even so, Europe realizes that American

interests are not centered solely on Europe. Laying aside the obvious example of Vietnam, Europe recognizes that less than a quarter of the almost $100 billion budgeted for defense by the United States is directly concerned with European defense. The United States has worldwide interests that European states no longer share. Even as these interests may be declining, Europe is aware that the Congress and the American people are unwilling, short of an emergency, to devote a higher percentage of resources to the defense of Europe. Even though the US defense budget is the largest of NATO members at this time, European realists know that US support is at best a fixed and possibly a declining asset.

Karl Deutsch has argued that two modes of existence are possible in the creation of international community: an "amalgamated security community" and a "pluralistic security community."[9] He suggests in this argument that an amalgamated security community, a single new superstate combining former nation-states, is not necessarily essential to the establishment of politico-economic harmony among peoples—a no-war community. A pluralistic security community, a relationship among states which offers opportunities for contact and communication on many levels without a supranational government, creates an atmosphere of shared goals and interests in which war is unthinkable. If NATO and the EEC do not describe a homogeneous supranational entity, they do form a larger community that has withstood severe pressures during the past quarter century. We have seen that North America and Europe are drawn together by these two separate but interactive organizations and that tensions remain in abundance. Perhaps a closer examination of this dual relationship can provide a basis for speculation about the future of the community.

In an analysis of Deutsch's argument, Roger Hilsman suggests five reasons for a commonality of interests across the Atlantic, using the pluralistic security community as a model.[10] *Shared values* are paramount in this kind of international organization. Compatibility is high in the Atlantic community because the commonly held belief in a democratic system, constitutionalism, the rule of law, and a role in the economic system for the free market is fundamental in all members. This common belief is founded on the bedrock of Western European political and economic thought. *Mutual responsiveness* recognizes that Europe has reacted to perceived threats and opportunities both political and economic. Europe and America share a *distinctive way of life* almost unique in the world. With the possible exception of Australia and New Zealand, the Atlantic community comprises the bulk of the developed, free world. A distinctive cultural and political heritage is shared, and most nations of the community are moving rapidly to a completely industrialized way of life—Bell's post-industrial society. *Superior rates of economic growth and the mobility of persons* are conditions found throughout the Atlantic community. Acceptance of common rules for the exchange of goods and people preceded a trend to the abolition of all barriers. Levels of economic growth in Germany and France are now being duplicated by Italy. Dependent upon the level of political stability in Portugal and Spain, high growth rates can be expected there also. If Britain is capable of capitalizing on North Sea oil deposits in the next four or five years, it, too, may see an economic resurgence. In the last 15 years, national workforces have achieved amazing mobility; Italians, Greeks, and Turks are found in areas of high labor demand without reference to natural boundaries. This mobility is duplicated in the free passage of people across the Canadian-US border. Allied to this is the final reason, according to Hilsman: *broadening of elites and links of social communication*. Patterns of integration, interest groups unfettered by international borders, and the Parliament of Europe itself are witness to this phenomenon. In the summer of 1975, European papers were filled with stories concerning the potential for truly representative institutions. Recent announcements that the European Parliament will cease to be representative of national parliaments in the next five years and

become an elective body representing the national electorates herald developments which will lead to greater linkages if not political union. Hilsman concludes that Europe, at least the Europe of the EEC, had already become a pluralistic security community by 1970. If he is correct, then a sixth determinant must be added to his typology. If Western Europe is secure today, it is secure in large measure because its peace has not been seriously disturbed from without nor from within. NATO, at least in a negative way, has provided this security by coping with the European and American perception of a threat from the Soviet Union and its satellites. NATO's success is simply that it has not failed.

Obviously, NATO has been useful over its first quarter century of existence. Utility of defensive alliances must be measured in negative terms. No wars have been fought with external enemies. No external threat has forced political accommodation upon a member state. Many of NATO's trials have been self-imposed, and its injuries have been self-inflicted. If we were to describe NATO, four adjectives might suffice. NATO has been effective and defensive, yet undisciplined and reactive. Its effectiveness we have already noted, and its characteristic as a defensive alliance has not only been obvious but sufficient to deter external aggression. The last two categorizations might profit from additional analysis.

The Alliance has failed to achieve many of its internal goals, its membership reacting like the nation-states that they are rather than like a supranational state that NATO is not. NATO has as yet failed to achieve even minimum standardization of equipment and weaponry. DeGaulle's withdrawal of France from full participation in NATO pointed up the fundamental argument concerning European or Atlantic orientation. Attempts at multilateral organization of tactical elements, mixed-manned surface warships, and other jointly operated elements have foundered. Internal squabbles between Greece and Turkey have brought these member states to the brink of war and have caused their unilateral withdrawal from some of the established command and control relationships. Iceland has conducted a perennial debate over its own participation in the Alliance, exacerbated from time to time by the dispute over fishing rights and territorial waters with the United Kingdom. The Portuguese have attempted to modify an authoritarian form of government with some success but in an atmosphere of unstable economic conditions and questionable future political orientation. This state of affairs has led to concern over Communist representation in Portugal's government and its effect on NATO security.

European memories of Spain in the 1930's and 1940's die hard, and the obvious military advantages of Spanish membership must wait until time softens feelings and the European head can win out over the European heart. Even so, recent discussions at the highest levels and the visit of senior Spanish representatives to NATO indicate some future reintegration of Iberia with the rest of Western Europe.

It has already been pointed out that an alliance system is not a supranational state, and it is unrealistic to expect a national discipline among European allies. Trends in recent years seem to indicate that indiscipline is increasing rather than decreasing; while the difficulties created by indiscipline remain generally peripheral, they bode ill for the future.

Consider also the issue of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. Underlying NATO defensive strategy is the possession and putative use of strategic nuclear weapons by the United States in defense of Western Europe. These weapons systems, totally under the control of the American President, will be used as a final recourse in the event of Warsaw Pact aggressions. The original argument ran that European states need not develop a strategic arsenal. Even so, a capability to employ national nuclear weapons has been developed and retained in two member states. Aron argues that states secure in their territories only because they have a powerful ally have a psychological problem. If it is the

responsibility of the United States to defend Europe, and Europe is a political and economic power vacuum as it was in the late 1940's, then no conflict occurs. But if Europe is militarily dependent yet economically powerful, difficulties arise as Europe tries to define its role and the ways it can exercise its power.[11] A case in point is the European reaction to US policy in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War where European sympathies were not those of the United States. This disproportion in political and economic objectives among the Atlantic Allies became stark as the European need for Arab oil was pitted against the American policy of support for Israel.

It could be argued that the nuclear arsenals maintained by both the United Kingdom and France, at great cost to themselves, serve only to try to redress this psychological imbalance. In the process, these armaments create a dysfunctional offensive threat in a clearly defined defensive alliance. Arguments by non-hard-line decisionmakers in the Kremlin that NATO is a defensive Western alliance with little offensive threat can be undermined by this psychological reaction of two former great powers.

AMERICA'S CONTINUING ROLE IN EUROPE

Not only can Europe contribute unfavorably to the development of sound Atlantic ties and a defense community of the Atlantic states, but the United States, by its very presence in the Alliance, can do so also. Since the United States is integrated militarily but not economically in the community, the Atlantic relationship itself prevents a comfortable and orderly European integration of military, economic, and political policy. Yet, it is impossible for either the military or the economic associations to remain vital without the United States. This paradox creates a demand for a continuing role for the United States in Europe's defense as a partner and a role in Europe's economic growth as a competitor. If the Common Market, as British Member of Parliament Julian Critchley recently observed, is only a "customs union with a clumsy farm price support policy attached," US competition could be muted by inclusion of the United States in the economic arrangements.[12] However, developments within and associated with the EEC seem to be well beyond the customs union stage. The United States, exercising global strategic condominium with the Soviet Union, could not enter into closer political or economic ties without gravely upsetting the strategic balance.

In an economic sense, a high level of involvement has been maintained throughout the postwar period. World trade figures for 1974 show that US exports to the EEC and Canada totalled 43 percent of all US exports and that imports from these areas amounted to 41 percent of total US imports. In 1974 dollars, this equated to $44 billion in exports alone.[13] This competitive involvement insures mutual markets and provides the basis for joint economic activity. The economies of the Atlantic community are further integrated by the ties forged in the past two decades by international firms that maintain much of their operations within the Atlantic community.

The foregoing discussion should have indicated that the Atlantic community consists of two basic, complicated, and intertwined relationships. Critchley argues that Europe will only be "frightened into unity" and this fright can come either from the Soviet Union or the United States.[14] Soviet adventurism or US withdrawal might be the only kind of fright that will draw Europe into closer union, not closer politico-economic ties, with the United States. If Europe wishes to become a unified, supranational power—and evidence is sparse today that it does—it will have to be shocked into it. If the shock comes from abrupt US withdrawal or Soviet adventurism, the price to both Europe and the United States might be too high. A unified Europe without a US deterrent must develop its own defenses or become unified under Soviet tutelage. The price to be paid for continued association, however, is continuation of the US deterrent on the part of America, continued dependence on the deterrent by Europe in an atmosphere of economic competition. If the

choices are to retain and mature the Atlantic relationship; to create an independent, credible European deterrent; or to accept peace on Soviet terms, the cheapest, most reasonable, and perhaps only decision left for Europe and the United States is the first.

This is not to argue that the Soviet Union will invade Western Europe if the United States pulls out. The Soviet Union need not adopt such a crude policy, since Europe without the United States would be forced to face up to a sharply modified international situation and act accordingly. Morton Halperin put it another way recently when he said that the United States must stay in Europe "just as long as we want these countries to continue behaving as they have behaved over the last 27 years."[15]

DETENTE AND THE SOVIET THREAT

The Soviet threat, long with us and a little tattered and worn, becomes increasingly difficult to articulate. It reminds one of the boy who cried, "Wolf," once too often. The increase in Soviet military power on land and sea, the apparent development of a new generation of strategic missiles, and the continuing support of wars of national liberation in places like Angola create concerns about Soviet intentions. Yet an avowed policy of detente between the superpowers, reinforced by the recent Helsinki accords and US-USSR trade agreements, lends credence to the belief that an overt threat to the Atlantic community is waning.

It seems unwise to assume the best about Soviet intentions at this time. Changes in Soviet leadership are always possible, particularly considering the aging members of the Politburo. These changes could bring about fundamental Soviet policy adjustments toward either or both the United States and China. Any change will have a crucial effect on the Atlantic relationship if it disturbs the delicate framework of detente. Therefore, the Western alliance must maintain its guard and its vigilance in the future under conditions less susceptible to a clear exposition of a threat. And this must be done under conditions on both sides of the Atlantic that support calls for a rendering of priorities within the member states.

Strategic vulnerabilities that existed from the inception of the Atlantic Alliance have become more evident and more important with the increasing presence of the Soviet fleet on the high seas. The Soviet navy, until the 1960's a relatively insignificant element of Russian combat power, has become a new and potentially dangerous threat to the Atlantic community. Since the decline of the Royal Navy was formalized in recent withdrawals from Singapore and the Mediterranean, the United States fleet remains the only serious obstacle to Soviet naval domination in Atlantic and Mediterranean waters.

Norman Polmar, a distinguished observer of modern seapower, has noted that the relative combat capabilities of the US and Soviet navies are hard to compare. While the Soviets have a superiority in surface-to-surface seaborne missiles and in numbers of submarines, the US Navy maintains superiority in naval aviation. A precedent has been established, however, in the Middle Eastern crisis of 1973: probably for the first time, the Soviet Union was capable of massing a significantly larger naval force in the region than the United States.[16]

The existence of a significant Soviet surface and subsurface capability to mass naval power superior to that of the United States in a crisis area is important in an era of detente and low-level violence. Polmar quotes an essayist on the political applications of naval power:

> In time of peace, a superior warship on the spot can achieve results not obtainable in other ways and without regard to the purpose for which the ship was built. What counts is the existence of the Soviet Navy, not the original motives of the builders. To be precise, what counts is the existence of ocean-going surface ships . . . when the object is to threaten force rather than use it and, if you have to employ violence, to do it at a level which will not provoke (nuclear) war.[17]

The Atlantic, for twenty-five years a means of relatively safe and easy communication and transportation between the members of the Atlantic community, has become a vulnerable lifeline. While the Soviet Union may have no intention of "colonizing" Angola and may have no vital need of a naval installation along its coast or on the horn of Africa, the availability of base rights will provide the Soviet navy with an ease of operation and concentration capability in the South Atlantic heretofore unavailable. Athwart the supertanker route from the Middle East to Europe, the Soviet Union will have the warships on the spot in a future period of increased tension.

If Iceland should sever its ties with NATO as she has threatened, a vital link in the seaward defense on the northern flank is broken. Recent agreements between Turkey and the Soviet Union may be only cosmetic, but they might also be a sign of weakening Turkish links with NATO. Portugal, apparently weathering the first trying years of popular democracy, still is a prime target for Soviet subversion and pressure if that be a Soviet intention. The Atlantic region of NATO—actually, the new central region—may have become the most vulnerable and most dangerous geopolitical aspect, where just a few years ago the northern and southern flanks were under scrutiny. What has occurred, however, is that the northern and southern flanks have been turned, and Soviet naval penetration is gradually developing a capability to, if it chooses, split the Atlantic Alliance in the Atlantic itself.

The decline in capability of the US Navy, the continuing reductions in strength in the Royal Navy, and the limited ability of other NATO surface and subsurface naval elements are not favorable to Atlantic security. The presence of a Soviet fleet in the Atlantic in peacetime cannot be judged to be a dire threat, however. In wartime, it is another matter, of course. The Soviet fleet would be hard pressed short of war to do anything about the supply of oil passing around the Cape of Good Hope into the South Atlantic on its way to Europe. It is not a hostile act to navigate one's naval forces on the high seas. What the United States accomplished with a show of naval and air strength, combined with the will to use that power, in the Cuban Missile Crisis could be replicated by the Soviet Union at any time in a new scenario. What kind of threat would be posed, for instance, in a renewed Middle Eastern war if the Soviet Union used naval and air units to "quarantine" the Azores?

The Atlantic Ocean, an Anglo-American lake for two centuries, has been open to the public, and NATO's Atlantic flank has been penetrated by the Soviet Union for reasons that are cloudy at best. We can hope for Russian heavy-handedness, a clumsy attempt to subvert, or raw use of newly developed naval power in a situation that will unite the West and scare the less-developed world. We have not been disappointed in the past by some serious Soviet mistakes, but we do not dare to base a strategy merely on hope.

THE ECONOMIC THREAT

A second and more subtle challenge to Atlantic security is in the economic dimension. The Atlantic community is the primary bastion of a capitalist system under severe economic attack. The oil embargo of 1973 was only a major battle in the economic war between the "haves" and the "have nots" of this world. The Soviet Union stands to gain by any conflict, but it stands aloof. To the USSR, present economic difficulties for capitalism are a proof of Marxist argument and no fault of the socialist states.

We need not argue whether the present high cost of critical raw materials like oil is a result of past European colonial policies or not. The less developed world is determined to recoup losses suffered because of real or imagined exploitation in the past, and the developed world will suffer because of this determination. The question then is: how will the suffering be apportioned? Can the Atlantic community, representing the developed world, arrange a common program for meeting the economic threats—and the economic needs—of the raw materials producers? Although the recent negotiations

have made some attempts in this direction, the uneven way in which shortages affect developed states and development takes place in the less developed world paves the way for disagreement and divisiveness. In oil, for instance, what some authors call "the growing myth of potential self-sufficiency"[18] beclouds the argument in the United States and the United Kingdom. *If* the North Sea oil is developed expeditiously and *if* the United States can agree on a domestic energy policy, a potential for national self-sufficiency exists. How this self-sufficiency will be utilized—selfishly or on behalf of the community—is a questionable area in the minds of many of the less fortunate European states. These doubts cannot help but raise more fundamental questions concerning other economic and security arrangements.

Challenges to the security of the Atlantic community come less from formal, overt military threats than from more insidious political and economic problems. After thirty years of effort toward unity, Europe remains separated by fundamental issues. In the past, these issues have been ameliorated by a common understanding of the necessity for unity. At the present time, the threat that created unity is less distinct if no less real, and the frictions of economic cooperation and competition are beginning to wear the binding ties of alliance and community rather thin.

These factors have created vulnerabilities in the Atlantic community. The apparent malaise in the capitalist economic system bodes ill for its defenders. The rather rapid swing to the left in Portugal in the past two years and recent Italian regional elections showed that many Europeans, and perhaps Americans, too, consider a "moderate" government to be well to the left of center. The demise of both Franco and Salazar and the emotional rhetoric surrounding these events, together with the rise on all sides of military dictatorships in the less developed world, have placed the forces of the right into at least temporary eclipse. It seems that the majority of the world's peoples—or perhaps more correctly their spokesmen—consider socialism to be the only viable economic system for the future. The real problems that capitalism has had in adjusting to a new international economic order of rising expectations and diminishing resources and the current Western European antipathy toward the right make it implausible that the trend will be reversed in the near future. How will the United States react if this trend continues? Socialism remains a term of political derision and scorn in North America even as the welfare state and government controls extend a pervasive influence. Can the United States remain the defensive mainstay of a non-capitalist but non-Communist Europe?

The continuing spiral of defense costs burdens the economic argument still more. Although all of the European members of NATO plus Canada spend far less on defense as a proportion of their GNP than does the United States, each nation has its own arguments for further reductions in the face of increasing demands for social and economic improvements in the quality of domestic life. If the welfare state should become the model for domestic organization in the Atlantic community of the future, competition for public revenues will become keener and the defense and security categories of expenditure will inevitably decline.[19]

CONCLUSIONS

The Atlantic community in a sense has become an Atlantic dilemma. The success of the two organizations supporting an Atlantic community, NATO and EEC, has created a situation in which political stability and economic growth have been phenomenal for the North Atlantic powers. This very success makes the peoples of the Atlantic community less willing to sacrifice in any particular area—economic or military—to achieve specific goals. Short of a brazen attempt by the Soviet Union to gain territory or peoples in Europe, a very unlikely event, NATO will probably be required to continue to muddle through. Short of a major change in the domestic policies and short of a cataclysmic change in the political orientation of the

United States, economic competition, albeit healthy competition, will remain a vital force in the Atlantic relationship. Resources available for defensive purposes will probably continue to decline as greater pressures for social and economic welfare at home and economic assistance abroad mount higher. Leadership in the West will be tested to the fullest in the years ahead.

The United States, if it is to remain a useful partner, must avoid being the object of blame for what are essentially European weaknesses and limitations–failure to shoulder more of its own defense costs, failure to develop European unity, and inability to do the impossible: compete as an equal economically while at the same time remain a client area militarily. Europe has demonstrated progress of late in these areas. Recent overtures to Spain and Portugal, offering economic incentives for political stability, indicate a hope for continued European maturity and continental cohesion with America as a complementary competitor.

Perhaps we are entirely too technical in our approach and do not see the intangibles in the Atlantic community, a relationship which is itself largely intangible. How much do shared democratic values weigh in the balance? Does the great tradition of the rule of law, the liberal tradition, count for much? The recent Nobel prize-winning philosopher-economist, Friedrich August von Hayek, summed it up when he said:

> The conception of the common welfare or of the public good of a free society can therefore never be defined as a sum of known particular results to be achieved, but only as an abstract order which as a whole is not oriented on any particular concrete ends but provides merely the best chance for any member selected at random successfully to use his knowledge for his purposes.[20]

If Hayek's analysis is correct, the lack of concreteness and clearly articulated and achieved goals may be the greatest asset and principal advantage to the hundreds of millions of people who make up the Atlantic community.

NOTES

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