DEFENSE PLANNING: A TIME FOR BREADTH

by

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Contemporary defense planning is dominated by a narrow, rational frame of reference. Present planning concentrates too heavily on developing warfighting capabilities for specific, rigid scenarios. It disregards the other missions which military forces fulfill in support of national policy objectives. The rigor and focus of the current analytical methods have provided objectivity in many areas where service parochialism formerly reigned supreme. For all its merit, however, the present system has led defense planners to adopt a view of the world which is too rigid and narrow. If this trend persists, the flexibility of future forces to support policy will be seriously jeopardized.

THE EMERGENCE OF LINEAR DEFENSE ANALYSIS

In the not-too-distant past, military force planning in the United States was almost exclusively the province of military professionals. Civilian participation was directed primarily to the setting of budgetary limits. The forum for debates on tactics and force structure was restricted to the armed services, the war colleges, and the professional journals. The debates were heated, but there was an unofficial taboo against "going public." For example, Lieutenant (later Admiral) William S. Sims, during his fight to improve naval guns, remarked: "I want scalps or nothing, and if I can't have 'em, I won't play."[1] Yet Sims wrangled with the Bureau of Ordnance for almost two years before he wrote the letter to President Theodore Roosevelt which resulted in his transfer to Washington to be Inspector of Target Practice. Likewise, Brigadier General Billy Mitchell fought for his concepts of air warfare within the Army for eight years before issuing a press statement condemning "the incompetency, the criminal negligence, and almost treasonable administration of our national defense by the Navy and War Departments."[2] For this he was court-martialed.

Parochialism ran high, as well. In 1921, Major Dwight D. Eisenhower published an

article in the *Infantry Journal* in which he urged that tanks be improved and included in the infantry division. He was told to keep his silence by the infantry—and did so, even when the Tank Corps was disbanded.[3] By and large, these internal arguments resembled fires in tree stumps: They might burn for years while going unnoticed by the world.

In the interval between 1945 and the present, barely the span of one career, there have been marked changes in both the basis for military planning and the forum in which these thoughts are aired. The "Old Guard" of military theorists, who studied history to seek principles which could be applied to future wars, has been joined by a company of newer authorities, most of whom are civilians, who seek inspiration in the social and applied sciences. The emphasis is on function. Ships and aircraft are "platforms." Weapons, sensors, and the crews who operate them are "systems." Studies deal with the acquisition and employment of these platforms and systems, and attempt to define measurable objectives, rather than abstract principles of war. The economist has joined the strategist in the Temple of Mars, and cost-effectiveness in peacetime is sought as avidly as success in battle.

The leaders among the new theorists trace their professional lineage from ad hoc groups of civilian scholars and scientists formed in World War II to assist in applying a rapidly-expanding base of knowledge and technology to combat a sophisticated enemy. After the war, the continued growth of technology and the sudden emergence of the United States as a world power insured the demand for specialists on a scale not found within the military services. Planners were well aware that the Allied victory had arrived barely in time to prevent Germany from perfecting sophisticated missiles, jet aircraft, and perhaps even atomic weapons. This stimulated the demand that the United States remain at the forefront of technology in weapons development and application. Therefore, the services themselves retained groups of civilian researchers to continue the fruitful partnership. Project RAND (Air Force), the Operations Research Office (Army), the Center for Naval Analysis, and a host of successor organizations continued to specialize in research on weapons and strategy.

The barriers between military and civilian planners in defense matters were further eroded by the nation's new role of superpower. Possession of the atomic bomb, itself the product of the largely civilian Manhattan Project, catapulted the United States into world leadership. The rich "country cousin," who joined in international disputes only by consent, became the leader of the free world in a cold war against the spread of Communism. In the public debate over how this new responsibility should be discharged without actual recourse to thermonuclear war, both the technical and the strategic expertise were furnished primarily by civilian scientists; the military professionals were perceived primarily as the custodians and potential operators of the weaponry.

As national responsibilities increased, the cost of the federal government—and particularly that of the Defense Establishment—grew apace. Civilian operational research into weapons and weapons employment was expanded to include research into how these new national and international security responsibilities should be discharged, and how the expense of increased military participation in world affairs should be managed.[4] Social scientists, economists, and business consultants emerged from universities, research institutions, and industry to direct strategy and force structure analysis. Operational research evolved into something called systems analysis, a rational framework designed to compare choices on the basis of resource costs and effectiveness.

The essence of systems analysis is its reliance on rational, linear logic. It insists on explicit, linear relationships between objectives and preferred choices. To

eliminate unnecessary or redundant alternatives, linear logic seeks correlations in the form of "if X, then not Y" or "if A, then B." This framework has dominated the analysis of defense and national security matters since the early 1960's. Its insistence on rigor and focus on resource costs in that analysis has much diminished the aura of the elder statesmen and flag officers who formerly held sway in defense and national security planning. The old bureaucratic communities which traditionally controlled military force planning—the services themselves and the various congressional committees who oversee defense budgeting—have been joined by a new community of professional analysts whose members move between positions in government, universities, nonprofit research firms, and industry.

The worth of systems analysis as a management tool for weapons acquisition and resource management within the Defense Establishment has by now been proven many times, and the increased participation of civilians, both in and out of government, in defense planning is no longer seriously resisted, even within the uniformed services. Both of these phenomena have had a wholesome effect on the search for objective and imaginative solutions to many difficult problems.

Albert Wohlstetter's study on overseas basing of Air Force bombers stands as a striking example of how an independent analyst, unfettered by organizational biases or restraints, can devise an original solution to a purely military problem.[5] It speaks well for the Air Force, too, that his findings were accepted—even though they conflicted with long-held beliefs within that service.

The growth in man's knowledge and the increasing expense of weapons have made the use of explicit analysis inevitable and necessary. Sound resource management is as much a requirement in defense matters as it is in other business structures in the public and private sectors. Robert S. McNamara's traumatic introduction of systems analysis as the primary management mechanism within the Department of Defense undoubtedly sped the transition. As a framework for defense managers, however, linear analysis not only endured, but grew in the decade following his departure.

However, the very success which the technique has enjoyed has set in motion trends which warrant close scrutiny. The specific areas we will examine here are: the emphasis on cost-benefit calculations applied to strategy; the evaluation of military forces on the basis of warfighting ability alone; and the tendency to regard numerical data as being inherently more trustworthy than human judgment.

HOW COST-EFFECTIVE CAN WE AFFORD TO BE?

One far-reaching effect of systems analysis has been the introduction of cost-benefit calculations to defense management.[6] Developed originally to evaluate whether civil works projects were worthwhile by comparing the benefits obtained with the estimated costs, cost-benefit analysis can also be extended to include optimization: "Minimize cost subject to fixed benefits" or "Maximize benefits subject to fixed costs." This type of analysis is probably the best-known and most widely-applied product of systems analysis in contemporary defense planning. In countless cases where costs and benefits could clearly be identified, or where a decision had to be made between several

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alternative means of attaining exactly the same objective (e.g., alternate aircraft or ship designs, or alternate parts procurement strategies), the process has served well.

When applied to the design of an entire military force structure, however, cost-benefit analysis creates a dilemma for the defense planner. In the broadest terms, benefits accrue from proper defense planning when potential threats are countered. But which threats should be considered, those which presently exist, or those which might yet be developed? How does one evaluate an offensive capability against which enemy defenses are marginal? Unfortunately, the thrust of linear logic is to focus on specific, existing threats, which can be directly related to costs and capabilities. Future threats and uncontested offensive capabilities contain too many unknowns and cannot be associated with a set of costs or explicit objectives. And so, in their search for direct costs, defense planners tend to discount the development of tactics or weapons which do not respond to some previously identified threat.

There is no lack of threats. Quite the contrary—there are so many potential threats as technology expands that a perfectly efficient and competent defense establishment could work full time designing countermeasures to defeat each successive generation of offensive weapons. Therein lies the real danger: Total involvement in this process of countering tangible threats makes planners myopic. The scope of their interests is unnecessarily restricted to areas in which the opposing forces are strong, and they fail to give due emphasis to attempting to capitalize on enemy weaknesses. As research and development efforts are diffused to cover all the identified, technologically-related threats, forces evolve into a defensive counterpoint to those of the opposition, and any incentive to shift the form and conduct of battles to more advantageous terms is lost. Instead, an arms race develops, resembling the product competition between unimaginative commercial manufacturers: What firm A introduces, firm B moves to counter, and vice versa.

The linear "Match A with B" logic also creates an incentive to overstate enemy capabilities, or to claim that a program will respond to more than one requirement, in order to justify programs. The several attempts by the Department of Defense to design one fighter-bomber for use by both the Navy and the Air Force stand as examples of this latter syndrome. The continual debate over whether or not more large aircraft carriers are worthwhile serves as proof that offensive capabilities which do not address a specific enemy threat can be difficult to sell, especially if they are expensive. Ironically, texts on business management warn about the phenomena just described. R. N. Anthony and R. Hertzlinger have this to say:

> If the decision-maker rejects all proposals in which no causal connection between costs and benefits have been demonstrated, the total program is unlikely to be innovative. This is because a primary characteristic of many new, experimental, promising schemes is that there is no way of estimating benefit/cost relationships in advance.[7]

More worrisome still, the preoccupation with the cost of benefits leads toward parity. Under the "Minimize cost subject to fixed benefits" philosophy, the acquisition of too large a margin of victory is perceived to be wasteful. "Overkill"—a popular term used to decry excesses in nuclear destructive might—is an example of such a perception. This adds a new and potentially dangerous dimension to the defense planner's problem. No longer is it sufficient that he plan to win; to rate an "A" in the course, he must do so with as little left over as possible. This allows very little margin for error, either in planning estimates or actual battlefield performance.

HIGH RESOLUTION MEANS A NARROW FIELD OF VIEW

Much of the power which analysis enjoys as a management tool stems from its characteristic of forcing the practitioner to identify and focus on the central issues of a

problem. By requiring a claimant to define his objectives and his measures of costs and effectiveness clearly, the analyst is often able to strip away side issues which have little effect on the outcome. Thus, he can reduce a seemingly large and complex problem to a much more straightforward and tractable one. This process is at once a result of, and a prerequisite to, successful analysis. The claimant sees the transformation as a product of the analyst's art. The analyst looks on it merely as a necessary first step which must be taken before any serious work can be accomplished. Unfortunately, this requirement that a problem be sharply defined can, of itself, introduce distortions into the work which can subtly influence the end results.

For example, to stay abreast of a rapidly evolving technology and a fluid political world, defense planners have been driven to adopt short planning horizons. This permits them to continually revise estimates and increase the confidence levels of their decisions, but, for example, it does not alter the fact for the Navy that ships take almost a decade to design and build, and remain in service for several decades. Thus, ship designs derive no benefit from shorter planning horizons.

Another facet of this desire for precision shows itself in the belief that a system's capabilities must be maximized before any commitment can be made to its construction. This fixation on perfection can be counterproductive. Often the various power groups involved use cost-benefit analysis, explicitly or implicitly, to argue for delays or changes in a system on an annual basis, to the frustration of planners. In his book, *On Watch*, Admiral Elmo Zumwalt describes how arguments over whether the Navy should procure large, nuclear-powered surface ships or a number of smaller, more austere ships played havoc with naval ship construction programs during his term as Chief of Naval Operations (CNO). No one involved openly questioned the need for the ships. The controversy was over their design;[8] the consequence was a delay of several years in several shipbuilding programs.

Linear logic demands that military forces be evaluated according to specific warfighting missions. This applies an infinite discount rate to any effect that force presence has upon diplomatic policies. In 1974, Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner delared that the Navy had four functional missions: sea control, projection, deterrence, and presence.[9] In the 1976 *CNO Statement*, Admiral Holloway espoused only two "naval warfare functions": sea control and power projection. The nuclear ballistic missile submarine fleet's deterrent value is mentioned once, but the ships themselves are classed as power projection forces in the section entitled "Naval Force Structure."[10] "Presence," which Admiral Turner defined as "the use of naval forces, short of war, to achieve political objectives,"[11] is not mentioned, nor is there a reference to similar tasks being performed as part of sea control or power projection.

The implication is that naval presence is no longer a defensible criterion for structuring forces, because it does not involve the active engagement of enemy forces. The numerous occasions upon which military forces have been employed to influence other nations (the role of the carrier *Enterprise* in the 1971 war between India and Pakistan is one example),[12] to evacuate refugees or American citizens (Lebanon, Korea, and Vietnam come to mind), or to administer relief to allies, have all contributed significantly to the nation's foreign policy efforts. No other forces could have accomplished these tasks, yet defense planners dare not suggest that these capabilities are worth keeping.

The decision about how the future shall be represented is basic to the formulation of any time-oriented planning process. For defense planning, an explicit hierarchy of conflict scenarios has been adopted. These scenarios range from a global war between the United States and the USSR through limited wars in which the superpowers do not fight each other directly, but support the efforts of other states. While logical from a functional point of view, this treatment creates two problems.

First, the scenarios are not, in the words of

an oddsmaker, mutually exclusive. There is no guarantee that a limited war will not escalate into a larger war, nor is there any assurance that only one conflict will occur at any one time. This fact has long been recognized; planners have been asked to prepare for "1½" wars, or "2½" wars. The use of fractions is misleading, however, because it conveys the impression that a "major" war, like a NATO war, is somehow equal to two or more "limited" wars. Unfortunately, wars are not modular, except perhaps in the percentage of the GNP which they consume. Each war bears the singular stamp of the climate, terrain, societies, and objectives which gave it birth. Thus, to the practical planner who would have forces trained and on hand to fight, each is a unique occurrence which defies aggregation.

Second, categorizing wars in this fashion fails to take into account the external political factors (national objectives and policies, treaties, and other commitments) which, although separate in function from the military effort, nonetheless exert influences on the way the war must be fought. This loss of detail might be acceptable in considering a global conflict where these factors can be estimated with some precision. It is unrealistic, however, to ignore such elements in limited war scenarios, where they may well influence the solution more than the geography, weather, and enemy forces combined.

Mariners have long recognized that a relatively low-powered glass which has a large field of view is more useful in a seaway than one which offers better magnification but a narrow field of view. In applying the linear logic of systems analysis to *all* aspects of force planning, the defense community—military and civilian alike—is in danger of using a tool which is too high-powered to provide the breadth needed to cope with an uncertain world.

JUDGMENT OR NUMBERS: WHICH DO WE TRUST?

Defense planners are fascinated with numbers. This may be a legacy of the early operational researchers' success in debunking "sacred cows" through the use of scientific methods, as well as contemporary systems analysis' own foundation in economics. Consequently, test data and the results of model simulations are often accepted with little question, whereas any findings which are based on human judgment are held suspect. Mr. J. A. Stockfisch, himself an analyst of some note, warned in a recent report:

> There also exists a body of knowledge relevant to military operations which is possessed by the Officer Corps and is the product of both experience and intensive study. This body of knowledge is often referred to as military judgement. The expression is unfortunate whenever the context suggests that the kind of information it incorporates is either inferior or superior to that produced by the application of scientific quantitative methodology. Particularly misleading is the idea that knowledge produced by the application of quantitative methodology is objective, whereas military judgement is subjective.[13]

Quite apart from the question of whether military judgment is superior or inferior to test results, there is a trend among military officers themselves to seek those theses which can be backed by data. This search is motivated by the belief that numerical analyses are more easily defended before a skeptical audience than those based on opinion or judgments. There is a disturbing absence of Billy Mitchells—stridently arguing, with the zeal of a country evangelist, for novel applications of ships or weapons beyond the scope of any present doctrine, unable to "prove" a thing, but nonetheless buttonholing anyone who will listen. Instead, tactics take on a curiously fatalistic cast, and become a probabilistic duel between opposing arrays of weapons and sensors. This is disturbing, because it was as much innovation as improved weapons which permitted the Arabs to offset Israel's air support tactics in the 1973 war.[14]

THE BOTTOM LINE: ONLY THE WORST CASE FITS INTO THE BOX

Taken together, the effects of these trends of linear analysis influence force planners to:

- Contemplate a discretely-ordered set of possible war scenarios, which are divorced from any background of national goals or policies; and
- Respond with weapons and formations which will prevail over those of the opponents without relying on any tactical brilliance or imagination on the part of the commanders who employ them.

When the defense picture is described in these terms, it is difficult to avoid concentrating on the NATO war. It enjoys almost universal acceptance as the "worst case" war, and the force planners can be relatively certain of the missions to which forces would be committed and the conditions under which they would fight. Where NATO forces are concerned, contemporary analysis has done a commendable job of fitting the various services of several nations into a coherent force structure. Analysts have directed further development of capabilities toward those areas in which the enemy is most likely to concentrate. As a deterrent to an attack by Warsaw Pact nations, the NATO force structure is a model of what analysis can accomplish: "maximum fighting ability subject to the resources which are available."

True to the thrust of contemporary analysis, successive Secretaries of Defense have argued that the United States' obligations to NATO and Japan should constitute the primary basis for the structure of its general purpose forces:

Melvin R. Laird, 1972:

> Our general purpose theatre force requirements are largely determined by planning for U.S. and Allied conventional forces which will enter the Warsaw Pact nations from a conventional attack of NATO Europe.[15]

James R. Schlesinger, 1974:

> The needs of the Center Region of Europe and our sea lines of communication provide the basis for most of our general purpose forces.[16]

Donald H. Rumsfeld, 1976:

> In order to plan the conventional forces with restraint and realism, we seek to maintain—in conjunction with our allies—two principal areas of strength and stability—in Western Europe and Northeast Asia . . . . If we and our allies have the forces to perform those tasks—particularly in response to a major conventional assault on NATO—the United States will also have the necessary capabilities (both active and reserve) to deal with other contingencies which might arise separately.[17]

Harold Brown, 1977:

> The most satisfactory way to assess the sufficiency of our force structure is by testing its performance—hypothetically—in the main planning contingencies.[18]

There is, however, a trade-off involved. As the general purpose forces of the United States become progressively more adapted to optimal employment in a NATO war, they become more specialized. They are thus less useful as true general purpose forces. Under the "worst case" fixation, capabilities which are not required for NATO are viewed as luxuries which should be sacrificed to permit the development of capabilities which will further increase the probability of success in that theater. For example, inclusion of the three Marine divisions in the NATO force structure could be advocated to reduce the Warsaw Pact armies' numerical superiority. However, this would require that the Marines be withdrawn from Asia. Thus, the cost of using NATO as the definitive basis for force planning is a loss of flexibility to respond to other crises in other theaters.

THE DILEMMA: DOES THE BALANCE SHEET MAKE SENSE?

In the face of the constancy of the public statements, the course of planning would seem straightforward. The Army and Air Force should be reorganized strictly to defend NATO; the Navy should be sized and constituted to defend the sea lines of communication (SLOC) to Europe and Japan and to effect or support a massive sealift effort to these areas; and the Marines should either be disbanded or integrated into the NATO force structure. This would maximize the United States' ability to fight a major war in NATO or Northeast Asia with the forces at hand. The reluctance of the armed services—particularly the Navy—to acquiesce to this viewpoint is depicted by critics as bureaucratic inertia and self-perpetuation at its worst. To be fair, there are organizational inputs at work. For example, the Army, which stands to gain most from a planning datum which requires that it fight a continental war against a numerically superior foe, has greatly reorganized its doctrine and organization to accommodate this view of the future. Within the Air Force, the NATO war scenario benefits the Tactical Air Command and the Military Airlift Command. Only the Navy has large communities—notably the Marine Corps and the surface fleet (especially the aircraft carriers in an attack role)—whose utility in a NATO scenario might be questioned.

But these organizational inputs are not necessarily the only objections to structuring forces in this fashion. Apart from the internal motivations of the military services, there are several good reasons for looking twice at the NATO war scenario and questioning whether the trade-offs demanded in its name are justified.

First, for all its importance, the NATO case is not the only source of conflict. Other nations may not see the future in the same light. Do the Soviets, for example, see a NATO war as the only means by which their goals may be attained? One fact which does not seem to fit this hypothesis is their present trend toward a "blue water" surface navy. Such a force would be only marginally useful in a NATO scenario. It is their submarine and land-based bomber forces which present the greatest threat to the SLOCs, while their surface navy is vulnerable to attack by American and allied carriers, land-based aircraft, and submarines.

Second, the ideological rift and hard feelings which exist between the USSR and the People's Republic of China also pose problems for the Soviets in the event of a NATO war. A war in the West might tempt the Chinese to create a second front for the USSR by attacking the Soviets from the east. Surely the oft-invaded and defense-sensitive Russians have considered that possibility.

Third, although the United States and the USSR retain their positions as superpowers, it is generally accepted that the increasing influence of the developing nations and of the People's Republic of China has created a multipolar power structure in the world today,[19] in contrast to the bipolar image which was commonly espoused when the cold war was at its height. This suggests that there is a considerable number of nations for which a NATO scenario does not loom as large as it does to this country. Even in the NATO countries and Japan, economic and other nonmilitary issues rival, and often overshadow, any fear of Communist aggression.[20] Thus, in assessing the forces at work in world politics, defense planning must also give due weight to other imperatives which influence the policymakers in other nation-states. There are, as sociologists have discovered, distinct limits to conscious, cognitive theories of motivations. American defense planners should be very cautious about defense concepts which imply: "We needn't worry about thus-and-so because it would be irrational for Nation X to act thus."

Fourth, rationality itself is ethnocentric, and the behavior of men and of the nations they form may be as well described by instinctive theories of motivation as by cognitive theories of rationality. Psychologist Dr. Abraham Maslow has postulated that individuals respond to a hierarchy of

instinctive needs.[21] Robert Ardrey, an anthropologist, is one of a growing number of writers who suggest that human groups—and hence, nations—are similarly motivated by instinctive drives. Ardrey borrows the concept of needs from Maslow, and theorizes that humans in groups seek identity, stimulation, and security. The possession of territory and war both satisfy all three needs and, therefore, will always be sought. War, he writes, has been the most successful of all cultural traditions. It provides identity (rank and membership in armies), powerful stimulation (release from boredom), and security (the aggressor seeks rewards and increased security, while the defender fights to preserve security). Territory, too, provides "security . . . the stimulation of border quarrels . . . [and] identity." He finds that "Both satisfy all three basic needs. And we have few other institutions to rival them." His conclusion, then, is that wars will continue to occur because people like war.[22] All in all, there is an increasing recognition that man's conflicts need not be governed by rational causes.

The conclusion to be reached is not that nations of the world will suddenly run amok, seeking stimulation in war. Rather, it is suggested that strong tensions exist in many places other than in Northeast Asia and along Western Europe's borders with the Warsaw Pact, and that no one concept of rational behavior will suffice to explain them all. Thus, for a country with as many varied interests as the United States to rely for protection of those interests on a general purpose military force structured solely to defend NATO and Japan would seem to be perilous. Some future historian may cite the NATO conclusion of linear logic as a classic example of suboptimization.

THE EMPEROR NEEDS A NEW TAILOR

Where did analysis, with its careful logic and rigor, go wrong? From the foregoing, it would seem that rigor has been pursued at the expense of realism. This has resulted in the planners' focus on quantitative measurements, divorced from the untidy political and diplomatic objectives which the forces they design must be prepared to support. Wars, unlike the weather, do not simply happen. War is, as Clausewitz observed "only a branch of political activity . . . it is in no sense autonomous."[23]

In the prosecution of national objectives, military forces must be prepared to perform many tasks other than the destruction of opponents' armed forces. While the military officer and the diplomat may claim to be specialists in different professions, they are so only in the sense that the aviator and the infantry officer are specialists. The diplomatic role, the formal protest, the show of force, and the armed intervention are but gradations in a continuum; international relations *must* be a "combined arms" effort. This point seems so obvious as to be self-evident, yet it has been overlooked by contemporary defense analysis, which insists on focusing exclusively on the warfighting role of military forces and discounts entirely their role in the maintenance of the uneasy peace.

A realistic appraisal of the military force structure would recognize that, although NATO (and Korean) forces represent a necessary investment against the possibility of a major confrontation with the Soviet Union, their present utility is largely limited to deterrence. They cannot be readily tasked with other missions because to deter European aggression they must be in place or ready for instantaneous deployment to Europe from other bases. Further, as part of an international force formed to fight a particular war, many NATO units require relatively specialized composition and training. Perhaps, then, the NATO forces should be categorized apart from the general purpose forces, just as the strategic nuclear forces have been.

In contrast with contemporary practice, however, the realistic planner would recognize the importance of military—and particularly naval—forces in the execution of what is somewhat inaccurately

called "peacetime diplomacy." While not denying the worth of the Pacific fleet as a wartime guarantor of the sea lines of communication with Japan, he would point out that, by filling what would otherwise be a power vacuum, it also compensates for China's lack of a large navy in the maintenance of the Sino-Soviet power balance. He would also cite the tiny Mideast force (one amphibious transport, reinforced, from time to time, with destroyers) for its part in influencing the stable development of the Persian Gulf area, filling a void created by the withdrawal of British forces.

The image of the United States as a "world policeman" has passed from vogue, at least in the sense that Americans are less willing to be involved in other nations' conflicts. However, the analogy could still be drawn between naval and amphibious forces afloat off other coasts and the foot patrolman—the "neighborhood cop." Like residents in a high-crime area of a city, ambassadors and overseas businessmen alike can be reassured during crises by the thought that, should events go badly, forces can be quickly deployed to protect or evacuate them. For a nation so dependent on foreign trade as the United States, this must surely be a cost-effective means of encouraging commerce in high-risk areas, with the benefits measurable in dollars rather than the uncertain coinage of "threat avoidance."

Offshore oil and mining, managed exploitation of the ocean's fisheries, and "farming of the sea," industries which are as yet in their infancy, deserve consideration as well. All venture beyond the shelter of well-established and universally recognized legal traditions. In any new experience there is to be expected an unsettled period, during which occasional outbursts of limited hostilities will accompany the orderly forging of equitable regulatory agreements. As always, those nations which can best assert their own interests will, in the end, fare best.

The ability to mount, at a moment's notice, humanitarian efforts on a scale or under conditions which preclude the use of all but military forces is another non-NATO requirement. Massive efforts like the Berlin airlift (for which almost all supplies were sealifted to Europe) and "Operation Amigo" (relief for the victims of the 1960 Chilean earthquake) are the positive counterparts to so-called coercive diplomacy. Formal acknowledgement of this aspect of military power (which has hitherto been taken for granted as a secondary, or derivative, quality) will require a fundamental shift in present thinking.

Specifically, planners must recognize two truths:

- The future *is* uncertain, but the United States cannot let its Korean and NATO forces become a latter-day Maginot Line. Deterrence can only channel an aggressor into concentrating on other areas (or weapons). It will not stop a determined opponent altogether. While the Soviet Union remains America's major opponent in world affairs, Soviet initiatives need not be restricted to Japan and Europe—in fact, the more successful Americans efforts are in containing them in those vital areas, the more likely they are to seek opportunities elsewhere.

- In predicting the actions of other states, rationality has no universally accepted coordinates. The rigid scenarios upon which the present forces are structured do not adequately describe the rich variety of threats—and opportunities—which arise from a world of diverse cultures, each whimsically exercising its right to apply its own private rationale to assess its present and determine its future.

As stated at the beginning, defense planning has become too rigid and narrow. The United States is the major economic and military power center in a changing, multipolar world. To truly exercise leadership on behalf of the values of free societies, it cannot be content with status quo defense policies. America must seek instead to encourage evolutionary development along ordered lines compatible with its own interests and needs. Leadership may be

defined as the ability to impress one's will upon others; in a national sense, this translates to the ability to influence other nations to accede to, or participate in, one's own objectives.[24] It is certain that others—notably the Soviet Union and possibly coalitions of other governments—will oppose several of those key objectives. Thus, the relevance of force as an instrument of foreign policy should be taken into account by defense planners.

Linear logic has distinct strengths. It is particularly useful for relating the costs in national resources to desired force capabilities. However, it does not provide sufficient breadth to be the *only* criterion by which the utility of forces is determined.

NOTES

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12. Kenneth R. McGruther, "The Role of Perception in Naval Diplomacy," *Naval War College Review* (September-October 1974), 3-19. This article offers a particularly interesting analysis of the part *Enterprise* played in the India-Pakistani War.
13. Jacob A. Stockfisch, *Models, Data, and War: A Critique of the Study of Conventional Forces* (Santa Monica: Rand, 1975), p. 6.
14. The Arabs capitalized on the Israelis' preconceived ideas that the Arabs would only launch a broad, "all out" attack and that they did not know how to use air defense weapons. Their limited thrust with concentrated air defense cover and its timing (during a religious holiday) caught the Israelis off their guard and decimated the Israeli Air Force when it tried to attack the Arab columns.
15. US Department of Defense, *Statement of Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird Before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the FY 1973 Defense Budget and FY 1973-1977 Program* (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1972), p. 108.
16. US Department of Defense, *Report of Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger to the Congress on the FY 1975 Defense Budget and FY 1975-1979 Defense Plan* (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1974), p. 91.
17. US Department of Defense, *Report of Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld to the Congress on the FY 1977 Authorization Request and the FY 1977-1981 Defense Programs* (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1976), p. iv.
18. Harold Brown, "Today's Critical Challenges," *Commander's Digest*, 3 March 1973, p. 7.
19. Seyom Brown, *New Forces in World Politics* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1974), pp. 117-18. Mr. Brown's study favors this view of world power, although his explanation of its basis is much more detailed. Interestingly enough, as early as 1972, Melvin R. Laird, then Secretary of Defense) also referred to the world as being "multipolar."
20. *Ibid.*, pp. 31-32.
21. David J. Lawless, *Effective Management: Social Psychological Approach* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1972), Ch. 5. This text describes Maslow's hierarchy theory of motivation. He cites A. H. Maslow, *Motivation and Personality* (New York: Harper & Row, 1954) as his source.
22. Robert Ardrey, *The Territorial Imperative* (New York: Atheneum, 1966), pp. 334-37.
23. Karl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 605.
24. Seyom Brown, p. 112.