DEPENDENCE AND INTERDEPENDENCE IN THE WARSAW PACT

by

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Throughout most of the post-World War II era, European international affairs have been dominated by the reality of East-West confrontation and the cold war. In recent years, however, this has changed. In August 1970, the Soviet Union and West Germany signed a nonaggression treaty, and in December of the same year, Bonn and Warsaw signed an agreement which formalized, for all practical purposes, the Oder-Neisse border. In September 1971, a four-power pact on the status of Berlin was finalized. Since then, the pace of East-West negotiations has been fast and furious, though not always successful. The acronyms of the negotiations—SALT, MBFR, CSCE—have in several instances become nearly household concepts.

Almost inevitably, the image which has been projected is one of two blocs of dissimilar unity conflicting and cooperating in an effort to reduce potential areas of confrontation and increase European security while at the same time seeking to protect bloc interests and, on occasion, preserve bloc superiority. One bloc—NATO—is generally viewed as a group of 15 nations, led by the United States, hammering out a common negotiating position. The other bloc—the Warsaw Pact, or WTO—is the subject of more debate.

At the time of its creation and immediately thereafter, the WTO was almost universally regarded as a body of Soviet satellites and near-satellites giving *pro forma* ratification to Moscow's policy positions; however, changes and perceived changes in Soviet-Eastern European relations have given rise to some speculation that intra-Pact relations have moved from dependence to interdependence. Thus, on the one hand, proponents of the dependency viewpoint maintain that the Eastern European WTO members still depend on the men in the Kremlin for both political stability and policy direction. The Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia is pointed to as proof of this position. On the other hand, proponents of the interdependency viewpoint argue that both the Soviets and the Eastern Europeans now recognize a mutual dependence. Supporters of this perspective see the November 1976 WTO meeting in Bucharest as proof of their interdependency theme. At this meeting, held in Romania for the first time since 1966, the Pact members established a formal Committee of Foreign Ministers and a Unified Secretariat to "continually improve the mechanism of political collaboration."

What, then, is the state of intra-WTO relations? Have the Warsaw Pact members—the Soviet Union included—in fact moved from a dependent relationship to an interdependent one, and if so, what implications does this have not only for Eastern Europe, but indeed for East-West relations and the world?

DEPENDENCE, INTERDEPENDENCE AND LEVELS OF ANALYSIS

Before we can even begin to address the

preceding question, it first is necessary to ask what "dependence" and "interdependence" mean. In recent years, a vast literature on both concepts has developed which, unfortunately for ease of analysis, seldom yields any definitive conclusions.

Since some analysts have defined interdependence as simply one manifestation of "mutual dependence,"[1] we will first examine dependence. Benjamin Cohen has argued that two necessary characteristics for the existence of dependency are a "high measure of sensitivity to external forces" and a "high measure of irreversibility of impact."[2] A dependent nation may thus be categorized as a nation which is greatly affected by decisions made by another nation-state while at the same time having only a limited ability to affect the dominant nation. Using this interpretation, then, there is little doubt that during the Stalinist period the Eastern European states were clearly dependent. Stalin regularly dictated the political, economic, military, and social policy which was to be followed in the newly Communistic states, and it was quite clearly impossible for them to have anything more than an extremely limited influence on Soviet policy.[3] Dependency, at least if Cohen's definition is used, was a fact of life in Eastern Europe.

Other analysts, without denying the legitimacy of Cohen's interpretation of dependency, have gone one step further. Marshall R. Singer has delineated types of dependencies, thereby implying that it is possible to be dependent in one way, but not necessarily in another. Singer identifies five types of potential dependence: political, military, economic, communication, and perceptual/identity.[4] Under Singer's dependency scheme, then, there exist not only varying degrees of dependency, but also varying degrees of types of dependencies.

This awareness has two major effects. First, by being cognizant of the different types of dependencies, analysts should be able to achieve a more accurate reading on the relationship between two nations. To say that an Eastern European nation is *politically dependent* on the Soviet Union is a very different thing than to say that an Eastern European nation is *dependent* on the Soviet Union. Second, and to a degree qualifying the improved credibility that a microanalysis of dependency gives, is the fact that the "balance sheet of dependencies," if it may be termed that, is almost as subjective as was the analysis before the components of dependence were dissected. Is it more significant, for example, that country A's economic dependence on country B is increasing, or is it more significant that country A's political dependence on country B is decreasing? To reiterate, although a more accurate measure of the relationship between two nations may be achieved by a microanalysis of dependence, the interpretation of the significance of all the pertinent factors may be no less subjective.

What, then, of interdependence? Defined solely as "mutual dependence," the concept is overly simplistic. Most authors recognize the multifaceted nature of interdependence, although its economic aspects usually receive greatest emphasis.[5] Gerhard Mally, however, views interdependence in its broader sense. According to Mally, interdependence may best be defined as a "complex transnational phenomenon" which involves "pluridimensional, multisectional patterns of interactions" between nations which result in "enhanced mutual sensitivity or vulnerability."[6] "Pluridimensional," to Mally, indicates a global, regional, and continental scope of impact, while "multisectional" implies that a broad spectrum of political, environmental, economic, technical, and sociocultural activity is involved. It is a complex phenomenon, since it is both objective and subjective; interdependence may be a physical reality and/or a subjective acknowledgement of mutual dependence.[7] Thus, just as it is possible to examine dependence by analyzing its constituent parts, it is similarly possible to examine interdependence.

A word of qualification is necessary here.

While in a theoretical sense it may be advantageous to analyze dependence and interdependence in each of their component segments, on a practical level this is clearly impossible. Military actions, for instance, have political consequences.[8] The same is true for the other factors, and vice versa. Since the WTO is a political-military organization, our examination will center on the political and military components of the debate over dependence and interdependence in the Warsaw Pact. Further reflection will reveal, however, that only part of the overall picture will have been uncovered. Perceptual/identity, communication, and economic relationships all will have been ignored—and, as pointed out earlier in the discussion of dependency, the final "balance sheet," if it is to have any hope of being accurate, must consider all the relevant parameters. Put simply, considerations beyond the political-military realm have a meaningful impact on the question of dependence and interdependence in the Warsaw Pact.

This by no means denigrates the importance of either political or military considerations. Rather, it places them in a more realistic perspective and consequently renders them even more valuable. In the final analysis, it must once again be stressed that the delineations themselves are artificial. Political dependence or interdependence has military, economic, communications, and perceptual implications. The same is true for each of the other types of dependence.

From a Western perspective, the Warsaw Pact itself must be viewed as a political-military organization operating amid a number of other transnational entities and in turn being affected by them. From a Marxist-Leninist perspective, however, the outlook is quite different. To further our understanding of the WTO self-image, we now turn to the dependence-interdependence question as seen from the Pact itself.

THE PACT'S VIEW: SOCIALIST INTEGRATION

The Western debate over the dependent or independent nature of the WTO is, not surprisingly, rejected by Pact members. According to a Soviet source, socialist cooperation in the Warsaw Pact and elsewhere "refutes the bourgeois revisionist myths of the allegedly supranational or coercive nature of their relations."[9] Publicly, Eastern Europeans take similar stances. A Czech paper described the WTO as an "alliance of partners with equal rights,"[10] while a Hungarian paper informed its readers that Pact members "always work in concert."[11] International relations within the Pact are theoretically based on "proletarian internationalism," and consequently, at least to the Pact members, "an entirely new kind of international relations" exists within the Warsaw Treaty Organization.[12]

This "entirely new kind of international relations" has come into existence because socialism has "eradicated the causes [which] disunite people [and which] breed exploitation of some nations by others."[13] New types of ties between socialist countries are based on "objective interdependencies"—such as public ownership of the means of production and the alleged unity of the interests of the proletariat—and "economic, political and ideological relations . . . consciously organized by the parties and governments" of the socialist countries; these ties serve to rule

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out the possibility of exploitation of one socialist nation by another.[14] Hence, dependence in a socialist commonwealth is theoretically impossible. One Soviet author has even gone so far as to argue that the independence which only socialism can give will disappear if socialism is not ardently pursued.[15]

Nevertheless, some Soviet sources in particular have recognized that nationalism distorts socialist cooperation by leading to the emphasis of the interests of one country over another. Indeed, it has even been admitted that "The solution of the nationalities question in some of the socialist countries has proved more complex than Communists expected."[16] Despite this recognition of imperfection in the socialist world, however, it is still avidly maintained that dependence does not exist. The reason, of course, is simple: Manifestations of nationalism have appeared in Eastern Europe, according to the Soviets, not the Soviet Union.

Thus, while the concept of socialist cooperation is carefully nurtured in Soviet and Eastern European ideology, it is at the same time argued that this cooperation can never lead to dependence. National sovereignty is guaranteed by the socialist underpinning of the WTO nations. The question of Eastern European dependence on the Soviet Union is consequently moot, at least in theory.

Still, both Soviet and Eastern European sources recognize that their relationship is dynamic. This dynamism is incorporated within the theory of *sblizhenie*, or gradual rapprochement. In Eastern Europe, the process of *sblizhenie* is already under way, and it will lead eventually to merger.[17] It must be stressed, however, that throughout the *sblizhenie* stage national sovereignty will be maintained. The role of sovereignty in the merger stage has been understandably glossed over.

How will this curious sort of rapprochement be attained? First, on a political level, it will be attained through the Political Consultative Committee (PCC) of the Warsaw Pact and through interparty relations. Second, on an economic basis, COMECON (the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) will serve as the basis for a nonexploitative integration of the socialist economies. Third, on a social basis, multilateral and bilateral agreements will serve as the vehicles through which contacts are carried out. Military rapprochement is conspicuous by its absence from the rapprochement literature.

Soviet preeminence, as Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone has vividly pointed out, is an integral part of this theory.[18] Interestingly enough, at least in public discussions, Eastern European WTO members concur with this deference to the senior Soviet partner.[19] Again, it must be stressed that under socialist definitions, Soviet leadership does not imply Soviet dominance or Eastern European dependence.

The Warsaw Pact may thus be viewed as one agent among many leading to gradual rapprochement and an eventual poorly defined merger of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, all carried out under the auspices of Soviet leadership—at least if viewed through orthodox WTO eyes. The difficulties of this task are recognizably immense, and it is not our task to examine them here. Rather, since we have seen the irrelevance of the dependence-interdependence debate from the Warsaw Pact's public perspective, we will now examine it from the somewhat more complicated Western perspective. The results may prove quite different.

POLITICAL-MILITARY QUESTIONS: THE MAIN ISSUES

Ever since the 1955 creation of the Warsaw Pact, it has been abundantly clear that political-military issues are its paramount concern. Article 5 of the original treaty established a Joint High Command of the Pact Armed Forces to "protect peaceful labors . . . , guarantee the inviolability of their frontiers and territories, and provide defense." Article 6 established a Political

Consultative Committee (PCC) to "consult among the Parties [and examine] questions which may arise in the operation of the Treaty."[20] Since that time, adjunct bodies of the PCC have also been created, as provided for in Article 6.

Throughout the existence of the Pact, its members have sought to stress that the WTO's military component exists only because of the "NATO threat," whereas the political component is a natural by-product of socialist cooperation. The WTO has offered to disband its military aspects in exchange for a reciprocal dissolution of NATO on numerous occasions, most recently following the November 1976 Bucharest meeting of the PCC. While numerous authorities have pointed out that such an agreement would permit Soviet-Eastern European military planning on the basis of the numerous bilateral treaties extant in the bloc—an arrangement which NATO does not have—it has less often been noted that the political component of the WTO would not be affected by the proposal.

Nonetheless, the military aspects of the Warsaw Pact remain of most concern to the West. In the past, the Soviet Union has acted as military planner, commander, and supplier for the Eastern European WTO nations, and there is little evidence to indicate that this situation has changed. It is true that Czechoslovakia and Poland provide some of their own military equipment, and that Romania has recently joined Yugoslavia in a bilateral effort to produce military aircraft, but these efforts at self-sufficiency are miniscule when compared with Soviet military aid to the WTO nations. Soviet equipment may be dated, and repair parts may be scarce, but the Eastern European nations are nonetheless dependent on the Soviet Union for most of their military equipment. One need only scan *The Military Balance, 1977-1978* to verify this elementary fact.[21]

Similarly, in command considerations, the Eastern European nations appear heavily dependent on the Soviet Union. The 1969 reorganization of the Pact placed the Joint High Command under the command of the newly created Committee of Defense Ministers, thereby effectively reversing the previous chain of command,[22] but there is some doubt whether this change carried with it any operational significance.[23] The Joint High Command itself is composed of a commander-in-chief and a military council. The commander, who has always been a Soviet officer, chairs the council, which is composed of a chief of staff (who has also always been a Soviet officer) and a permanent representative from each of the Pact nations. Additionally, the Pact includes a multinational military staff. Key positions, again, are held by Soviet officers. In a war, Eastern European Pact forces would be operationally subordinate to the Soviet High Command in Moscow.[24] The entire Warsaw Pact air defense system is under the control of the commander of *PVO Strany*, the Soviet air defense forces.

In a strictly military sense, then, the non-Soviet WTO appears heavily dependent on the Soviet Union. Even more strikingly, the Soviet Union seems to consciously seek to minimize its own potential military dependence on the Eastern Europeans. Thus, the four Soviet groups of forces in Europe have their own independent lines of logistics stretching back to the Soviet Union, above and apart from those of the Eastern European forces. In almost every sense of the word, then, under peacetime conditions, military dependence is unidirectional. The non-Soviet WTO is dependent on the Soviet Union; the Soviet Union is not dependent on the non-Soviet WTO. Military interdependence does not exist.

The key phrase in the above paragraph, lest it be overlooked, is "under peacetime conditions." Once conflict breaks out, military necessities change, and the picture is altered. During conflict conditions, the Soviet Union in fact *does* become dependent on the Eastern European states, as we shall see, though the degree of dependence would vary depending on both the type and area of conflict.

To start with, as we have already seen, the Warsaw Pact is not a wartime command

organization. During a war, military command will be transferred to the Soviet High Command. As John Erickson points out, recent WTO maneuvers have implied that certain non-Soviet WTO forces may be earmarked for direct subordination to Soviet command.[25] If this is, in fact, a legitimate assumption, then it is apparent that Soviet planners to some degree depend on Eastern European military support in a projected conflict situation. In essence, Eastern European military dependence on the Soviet Union will have been transformed into Eastern European-Soviet interdependence.

What if the assumption is not legitimate? What if, using an extreme worst-case analysis, recent Soviet efforts to upgrade their combat divisions and logistics succeed in giving Soviet forces in Europe the ability to achieve their military objectives (whatever they may be) without the necessity of active Eastern European military support? Does interdependence then disappear?

Logically, the degree of interdependence would be reduced, but it would not disappear. In either case, regardless of the degree of Soviet reliance on direct non-Soviet WTO military support in the event of a conflict, Soviet front-line forces must be resupplied and reinforced by support lines running through the Eastern European nations.[26] At the very least, then, the Soviet Union must rely on a lack of active hostility within Eastern Europe toward their resupply and reinforcement efforts. This still means that the outbreak of hostilities in Europe will lead to Soviet-Eastern European interdependence. One might argue that it is a geographical imperative.

The transition of Soviet-Eastern European relations from dependence to interdependence during a war carries with it political implications with relevance to peacetime. From the Soviet viewpoint, interdependence would be less onerous if the reliability of its partners were more certain. It is in this context that we may better understand the Soviet drive to increase the political credibility of the WTO.[27]

The Soviet effort to increase the political credibility of the WTO began shortly after the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia. It has been well-documented that non-Soviet WTO nations participated in the invasion only grudgingly, and Romania did not participate. The entire affair cast the Soviet shadow over Europe—West and East—once again. The Warsaw Pact itself appeared little more than an agent of Soviet hegemony.

To counter this image, the earlier-mentioned WTO Committee of Defense Ministers was created and placed above the Joint High Command. In theory, then, a multinational body was placed above a Soviet-dominated body. Whether this had any policy impact is a moot question; the intent was to alter perceptions. It is possible to view the November 1976 creation of the Committee of Foreign Ministers and the Unified Secretariat as a continuation of this process. Since the goal of these bodies is to improve political collaboration, and since their decisions are not binding, there is some room to speculate that these mechanisms are little more than "window dressing." Indeed, the brevity of the PCC meetings themselves—none have lasted longer than two days—has given rise to speculation that decisions are made before the PCC meets, and then the PCC sanctions the decisions.

Still, it must be stressed that appearances are important, especially in politics, and the gradual proliferation of political bodies within the WTO has undeniably given it at least the appearance of being a multinational deliberative body during time of peace. It has similarly been observed that "Major international negotiations conducted by Brezhnev are preceded by talks with Girek and Honecker."[28] This, of course, implies interdependence, and from the Soviet point of view, perceived *political* interdependence during peace may aid actual *military* interdependence during war.

Perceived political interdependence may be strengthened, of course, by taking mutually beneficial actions. Recent American criticisms of human rights

violations in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, for example, may have enhanced the perception of political community and interdependence within the WTO. A March 1977 Sofia meeting of Communist Party officials from the Warsaw Pact countries concluded with a call for a "decisive" battle against human rights activists in Eastern Europe.

Even mutual action, however, should not hide the fact that there are enormous difficulties confronting Soviet efforts—and the efforts of certain Eastern European governments—to build political interdependence. The presence of Soviet military units in the non-Soviet Pact nations, even if justified by treaty, may well be a major example. Soviet urging precipitated the interventions in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, and Soviet units dominated the interventions. The threat of Soviet military action hung over Poland in 1970. These incidents undoubtedly influence Eastern European attitudes.

Similarly, it has not escaped notice in the WTO that following the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia, five Soviet category I divisions—including two tank divisions—remained in the country.[29] Three-quarters of all Soviet ground forces in Eastern Europe are stationed near major population centers.[30] While this does not suggest that Soviet forces in Eastern Europe are primarily concerned with political and population control in Eastern Europe, it does suggest that efforts to create a feeling of political interdependence have encountered some difficulties. As the Soviets themselves said, "The solution of the nationalities question in some of the socialist countries has proved more complex than Communists expected."[31]

Indeed, pressures which have been exerted through unknown means by unknown countries or coalitions of countries within the WTO have made it exceedingly apparent that political interdependence is at best an uncertain quantity. One recent example occurred during the November 1976 tour of a US congressional fact-finding commission through Europe. The commission was barred from entering all Communist countries save Yugoslavia, itself not a Pact member. On the day the tour began, the Soviet Union explained its rejection of the commission's request by saying that the request was a US attempt to "sow distrust and arouse hostility against the socialist countries." After the tour concluded, the commission revealed that Romania had earlier granted permission for the group to enter, but had rescinded the offer after the other WTO nations rejected the commission's request. In order to save some face, Romania told the congressmen they could enter individually, but not as a group.[32]

Despite Romania's vaunted independent foreign policy line, Ceausescu and the Romanian leadership apparently felt sufficiently pressured to rescind their offer and risk political embarrassment in the West.[33] The Romanian incident becomes all the more instructive when it is realized that Bucharest had only recently "joined" the Pact[34] and that the PCC was scheduled to meet in Bucharest later in the same month. Whichever WTO nations influenced Ceausescu to change his position must themselves have been willing to risk potential embarrassment if the Romanian reacted adversely to their pressures.

The point to be made here is that the degree of political interdependence between the Eastern European Warsaw Pact states and the Soviet Union varies widely on an issue-by-issue basis, on a country-by-country basis, and on the basis of any of a number of other objective and subjective parameters. There are apparent instances of interdependent political action without coercion on issues where interest is shared, but there is, conversely, an apparent lack of interdependence where interests are not shared.

Political dependence is similarly bifurcated, with the Soviet Union being cast in the dominant position. On a country-by-country basis, on some issues, there is apparent Eastern European dependence on Soviet political support. It is reasonably safe to argue, for example, that

Honecker recognizes the political utility of the 21 Soviet divisions stationed in his country, and he responds by offering almost fawning support for Soviet political positions. While the Soviets undoubtedly welcome his support, it cannot be argued that they are dependent on it. Honecker himself, however, quite possibly is dependent on the political impact of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany to continue his rule.[35] At the same time, it has often been observed that Todor Zhivkov of Bulgaria faithfully follows the Soviet lead on any and all issues, domestic or international. While the Soviets again undoubtedly welcome his support, they are by no means dependent on it. Zhivkov, on the other hand, is quite evidently reliant on Soviet support.[36]

It may be helpful at this time to differentiate between *willing* dependence and *enforced* dependence. In both of the above examples, it is quite probable that, for obvious reasons, the Eastern European leader willingly offers his support for Soviet positions. In other cases, however, it is clear that some form of pressure has been applied to achieve enforced support. The example of Romania's rescinded visitation offer to an American congressional delegation has already illustrated this. Indeed, Dubcek's "socialism with a human face" fell victim to a most extreme form of enforced dependence under the guise of socialist internationalism.

It must be stressed again that even enforced dependence is a sometime thing, regardless of whether it is at the covert level of pressure on Romania or the overt level of an invasion of Czechoslovakia. Hungary and Poland pursue their own relatively independent economic paths despite Soviet displeasure, and Romania follows its own druthers on foreign policy. To be sure, the non-Soviet WTO's policies are proscribed in certain areas and directions, but to argue that this proscription is tantamount to dependence would be to blink at reality or to alter the meaning of dependence. In a *political* sense, Eastern European dependence on the Soviet Union is extremely relative, just as was interdependence; in most cases, it may only be discussed on a country-by-country and issue-by-issue basis.

There is one interesting exception to the above discussion which should be noted in passing. In a diplomatic sense, it may be argued that the Soviet Union is somewhat dependent on non-Soviet WTO political support to maintain a unified socialist front vis-à-vis the West. If, for example, the Eastern European WTO members were to unanimously withdraw their support from Soviet policy, the impact would be truly awesome. This, of course, presupposes widespread Eastern European cooperation against Soviet tutelage, and this presupposition is so remote as to border on the ridiculous. As noted by Jacek Kuron, spokesman for the Polish dissident Workers Defense Committee, Eastern Europeans have a healthy respect for "the Soviet tank factor."[37]

What, then, may be concluded about political and military dependence and interdependence within the Warsaw Pact? Beyond the obvious bromide that the situation is exceedingly complex and continually changing, it appears that in crises, and particularly in crises involving the possibility of military conflict in Europe, political and military interdependence within the Warsaw Pact will increase. The Soviet awareness of this reality (as well as other factors, such as ideology) has led the Kremlin to increase its stress on spreading the appearance of particularly political interdependence. There is some doubt about the effectiveness of these efforts. Indeed, at a political rally in East Berlin in early October 1977, shouts of "Out with the Russians!" forced military police to intercede.[38] While the significance of such attitudes should not be overstated, the existence of such attitudes nonetheless illustrates that even the perception of political interdependence is far from a reality.

In many respects, our analysis indicates that the non-Soviet WTO members are heavily dependent in both a military and a political sense on the Soviet Union. It also points out, though, that there is a certain degree of Soviet dependence on Eastern Europe in both these areas. Before we can

make any definitive conclusions, however, we must first turn to issues of economic, communicative, and perceptual dependence and interdependence. Although none of these issues are directly subsumed within the Pact, they all nevertheless impact upon it.

ECONOMIC, COMMUNICATIVE, AND PERCEPTUAL CONSIDERATIONS: THE SIDE ISSUES

Before the "side issues" are briefly discussed, it must be stressed that they are side issues only in that they are not specifically addressed by the Pact itself. In many ways, as factors determining the present state and future course of Eastern European-Soviet relations, they are more important than either the military or the political factors.

This is particularly true of the most subjective of these issues, perceptions. We have dealt briefly with mutual Eastern European-Soviet perceptions in the preceding section and have seen how the Soviet Union, in particular, has sought to strengthen the perception that a political and military interdependence exists within the WTO. The issue of perceptual dependence and interdependence goes much deeper than the attempted manipulation of viewpoints, however. It approaches the much more fundamental question of how individuals and governments view each other; consequently it becomes the most subjective of all measures of dependence and interdependence.

It is well-documented that strong currents of historical antipathy run between the Russians and Eastern Europe.[39] Memories of Russian invasions of Czechoslovakia in 1968, Hungary in 1956, and even Poland in 1939 and 1830 are far from dead. The storm of protest which erupted over Gierek's attempt to amend the Polish constitution in 1976 to insert a phrase stressing Poland's "inseparable and unbreakable" ties with the Soviet Union illustrates the point well,[40] as do the more recent anti-Russian shouts in East Berlin.

Still, one must wonder how widespread such sentiment is, and how deeply it runs. After more than 30 years of pro-Soviet propaganda, some abatement of traditional Eastern European-Soviet enmity must have occurred. The question is, of course, how significant is the abatement?

The impact of the perceptual dependence-interdependence issue on the Warsaw Pact is immense. It is also, unfortunately, unmeasurable. Will non-Soviet WTO forces follow Soviet orders? Will they fight outside their home countries? How reliable and effective will they be? Would they even take advantage of an outbreak of hostilities to turn on the Russians (and Russian supply lines) in their respective countries? The questions are important; the answers are imponderable.

The communicative dependence-interdependence issue plays a major role in the perceptual debate. In the past, Soviet control or veto power over Eastern European contacts with the West enabled the Russians to fashion information which was communicated to the Eastern European states to fit the Soviet's needs. Clearly, a communicative dependence existed. During the past decade, this dependence has broken down, and the Kremlin has proven unable (or unwilling) to replace it with even the facade of interdependence. While it is undeniable that the Soviet-oriented and Soviet-originated information enjoys by far the greatest dissemination throughout Eastern Europe, it is nonetheless apparent that Soviet domination of information dissemination has been reduced. The impact of this alteration, again of so obvious an importance for the Pact, is again imponderable.

An analysis of economic dependence and interdependence, on the other hand, leads to much more concrete conclusions. Ever since the April 1969 COMECON conference adopted a 25-point agreement on the coordination of economic activities, Soviet stress on economic integration has been increasing. In addition to the 1969 agreement, notable milestones in the integrative process include the July 1971 "Comprehensive Program of Socialist

Economic Integration" and the June 1975 "Agreed Plan for Multilateral Integration Measures."

There is no doubt that the Russians are well aware of the political and military ramifications of economic integration within COMECON. One Soviet source has argued that "Economic integration serves as a good basis for the deepening of [the COMECON nations'] political cooperation,"[41] while General Sergei Shtemenko, the late Chief of Staff of the Warsaw Pact Forces, has pointed out that economic integration "strengthens the defensive capacity of the Warsaw Pact Organization."[42] COMECON, then, cannot be overlooked when the WTO is discussed.

How significant is the vaunted economic integration within COMECON? While any detailed analysis of it is far beyond the scope of this article, it is nonetheless possible to give a brief overview of the economic links between Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.[43] Figure 1 indicates trade relations between the two areas, as compiled from both Soviet and United Nations sources.[44]

Figure 1. Eastern European trade in 1975 (in billions of US dollars)

	Trade with USSR	Total Trade	Soviet Trade/ Total Trade
Bulgaria	5.6	10.1	.55
Czechoslovakia	5.4	17.5	.31
East Germany	7.8	21.4	.36
Hungary	4.4	13.3	.33
Poland	6.7	22.8	.29
Romania	NA	10.8	-

By comparison, Eastern European trade (excluding Romania) comprised 42 percent of the total Soviet trade turnover of $70.3 billion. Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, and Poland respectively comprised 8, 8, 11, 6, and 9 percent of the total Soviet trade turnover. It may thus be argued that, as a group, the Eastern European nations are roughly as dependent on the Soviet Union in their trade relations as the Soviet Union is on them. Individually, however, the Eastern European nations are much less important to the Soviets as trading partners than the Soviet Union is to them.

A somewhat similar conclusion is reached when bilateral trade with the Soviet Union is examined within the context of its role in the respective national economies. Figure 2 undertakes this examination.[45]

Figure 2. The role of bilateral trade with the Soviet Union in Eastern European economies (in billions of US dollars)

	Trade with USSR	Approximate GNP	Soviet Trade/ GNP
Bulgaria	5.6	23	.24
Czechoslovakia	5.4	57	.09
East Germany	7.8	70	.11
Hungary	4.4	28	.15
Poland	6.7	90	.07
Romania	NA	51	-

Eastern European trade, again excluding Romania, collectively amounted to only a rather paltry three percent of the Soviet economy, with the shares of individual countries being too insignificant to list. Thus, if Soviet-Eastern European trade is examined in the role of its importance to the respective national economies, a picture of much greater Eastern European dependence emerges.

A sector-by-sector analysis of national economies again implies Eastern European dependence on the Soviet Union. In the areas of natural resources and energy resources, in particular, the Soviet Union enjoys a stranglehold over its Eastern European partners. For example, all of the oil consumed in Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia is imported from the Soviet Union. East Germany, Poland, and Hungary are only slightly less dependent on the Soviet Union in this regard, respectively importing 95, 90, and 75 percent of their total oil consumption from the USSR. Romania, again, is the exception, meeting all of its national oil needs without importing Soviet oil.[46]

All of these figures, of course, mean little if the Soviet protestations of socialist cooperation are legitimate and exclude the possibility of the Kremlin using its economically superior position to pressure the non-Soviet WTO nations into line. The Kremlin points out, and rightfully so, that it sells raw materials to its Eastern European allies at rates less than the world market prices, often receiving in return inferior-quality goods from the recipient nation. However, the Kremlin does not point out the fact that since 1975 it has sharply increased the oil prices charged its Eastern neighbors and taken advantage of skyrocketing increases on the world market. Indeed, on 6 January 1977, the Hungarian Government announced that the Soviet Union was once again raising prices, this time from $7.15 per barrel to $8.90 per barrel, a 22.5-percent increase.[47] While this was still well below the prevailing rate of $12 to $14 per barrel on the world market, it was nonetheless a rather precipitous increase.

By now, the Eastern European nations are accustomed to such increases, but in 1975, when the Kremlin first raised its prices, they were not. The 1975 increases, coming in the last year of national plan periods, shocked the bloc nations. It became nearly impossible for Eastern European nations to reach national target figures. East Germany estimated that a 43-percent price rise for its industrial products was necessitated by higher prices for major Soviet exports[48] and informed the Russians that, if the price burden was not eased, then East Germany could no longer guarantee deliveries to the USSR under the 1976-80 plan.[49] To the Eastern Europeans, the price rise was another instance of Soviet efforts to force price and other concessions, an effort which extended back into the 1960's.[50]

Indeed, one measure of the political intent of Soviet integrative claims may be the fate of COMECON cooperative energy programs. The "Friendship Pipeline" continues to supply Eastern Europe with low-priced Soviet fuel; yet Eastern Europeans could not have failed to notice that in 1976 COMECON emphasized cooperative energy production, while in 1977 COMECON emphasized the development of domestic energy resources. During the same time frame, Soviet oil exports to the more lucrative Western market surpassed exports to COMECON countries (1.5 million barrels per day to 1.3 million barrels per day).[51] Cooperation is fine, the Russians may reason, but hard currency is also requisite.

What import does this have for the Warsaw Pact? Put simply, it limits the credibility of the Soviet assertion that proletarian internationalism leads to true interdependence. Limiting this credibility in the economic sphere must similarly limit it in the military and political spheres for, as we have seen, these areas cannot be legitimately compartmentalized.

Nonetheless, in the economic sphere, the hard fact of life remains for the Eastern European nations that the Soviet Union is more important to them than they are to the Soviet Union. They need the less expensive Soviet resources, and they need the Soviet markets for their products. Economically speaking, it is abundantly clear that a dependence relationship exists. Integration is proceeding apace, but integration at the level which exists in COMECON does not imply interdependence, despite Soviet protests to the contrary.

Rakowska-Harmstone has observed that COMECON's economic integration has been economically unprofitable for the Soviet Union, but that, from the Soviet perspective, the political advantages outweigh the cost.[52] This remains as true today as it was in the past. What should not be overlooked, though, is that if the Soviets are too ardent in their attempts to ease their own economic burden of Eastern European-Soviet "interdependence" through programs such as fuel price adjustments and joint investment,[53] they may well lose some of the military and political advantages which have accrued to their account. This would by no means be fatal to the WTO, but it would definitely reemphasize the dependence side of the relationship. And, as we have seen, the Kremlin has been striving to conceal this very thing.

CONCLUSIONS: THE PREEMINENCE OF DEPENDENCE

To a great extent, Eastern Europe as a whole is still dependent on the Soviet Union for most of its material needs. Almost all WTO military equipment is of Soviet origin. The Soviet Union similarly supplies most of Eastern Europe's resource and fuel requirements. On the political side, it may be argued that at least some of the leaders of Eastern European nations depend on Soviet support for their political survival. On the basis of these very significant parameters, then, it would appear that while Eastern Europe is not entirely dependent on the Soviet Union, dependence is preeminent. For the Pact itself, Roman Kolkowicz' 1969 observation is still fundamentally valid:

> In a larger sense, the Warsaw Pact serves as an alliance system through which the Soviet leaders seek to entangle their unwilling allies in the web of Soviet national interests.[54]

Kolkowicz' statement is interesting not only for what it says, but also for what it implies. The Soviet leaders "seek" to entangle; they are not always successful. The Soviet allies are "unwilling"; therefore, they are not reliable. Dependence may be preeminent, but it is not all-pervasive.

What, then, of interdependence within the Pact? With the Soviet Union still holding most of the trump cards in intra-Pact relations, are there any discernible trends which may lead to increased interdependence?

Ideologically, the Soviet Union is committed to cooperation and eventual "merger" with the rest of the bloc. However, there are obstacles to this commitment, not the least of which is Soviet great-power chauvinism, to borrow a Chinese phrase. Does the Soviet Union genuinely want interdependence, or is it satisfied with the current dependent situation? Interdependence implies loss of independence, and any great power may be expected to jealously protect what independence it has.

Still, the Kremlin recognizes the difficulties which it will face in a crisis with Western Europe if a sense of interdependence is not developed with its non-Soviet WTO allies. Consequently, the Soviet leadership is faced with a perplexing problem of cost-benefit analysis: Is increased interdependence worth the loss of independence, in view of the increased reliability such interdependence would theoretically bring? So far, at least, the Kremlin's response has been to subsidize Eastern European economies through COMECON while at the same time verbally stressing military and political collaboration in the WTO. In sum, the answer is a qualified yes.

Soviet attitudes may not be the only obstacle to comprehensive interdependence. Even though Eastern Europe is largely materially dependent on the Soviet Union, other areas of dependency—notably perceptual—are at most questionable. When all is said and done, this lack of mutual perceptual dependence may prove more significant than political, military, or economic dependence.

For the foreseeable future, then, we may expect dependency to be preeminent within the WTO. Interdependence and the appearance of interdependence will ebb and flow as the Soviet and Eastern European leaderships perform their respective cost-benefit calculations. But interdependence itself probably will not supercede dependence as a force in intra-WTO relations until Eastern Europeans—and Russians as well—overlook the fact that the new uniform-gauge railroad connecting the USSR and Poland—and implicitly all of Eastern Europe—can speed the delivery of Soviet guns as well as butter. And that may be some time.

NOTES

1. See, for example, James W. Howe, *Interdependence and the World Economy*, Headline Series No. 222 (New York: Foreign Policy Association, October 1974), p. 9.

2. Benjamin Cohen, *The Question of Imperialism* (New York: Basic Books, 1973), p. 190.

3. Indeed, under Stalin, Soviet personnel held what amounted to veto power over policy actions and decisions in

Eastern Europe. See Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, *The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969).

4. Marshall R. Singer, *Weak States in a World of Power* (New York: Free Press, 1972), pp. 89-364.

5. Richard N. Cooper, *The Economics of Interdependence* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968); Lester R. Brown, *The Interdependence of Nations*, Headline Series No. 212 (New York: Foreign Policy Association, October 1972); and Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., eds., *Transnational Relations and World Politics* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971).

6. Gerhard Mally, *Interdependence* (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1976), p. 5.

7. *Ibid.*

8. Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan have pointed this out exceedingly well in their *The Use of the Armed Forces as a Political Instrument* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1976).

9. B. Ladygin and Yu. Pekshev, "Law of Gradual Rapprochement Among Socialist Countries," *Kommunist* (March 1977), 20-31.

10. Bratislava *Pravda*, 26 November 1976, trans. in *FBIS Daily Report (Eastern Europe)*, 1 December 1976, p. AA6.

11. *Esti Hurlap*, 27 November 1976, trans. in *FBIS Daily Report (Eastern Europe)*, 30 November 1976, p. AA6.

12. A. A. Grechko, *The Armed Forces of the Soviet State* (Moscow: [n.p.], 1975), p. 324; Sh. Sanakoyev, *The World Socialist System* (Moscow: Progress, 1972), p. 118; and *The World Socialist System and Anti-Communism* (Moscow: Progress, 1972), p. 15. See also L. I. Brezhnev, *On the Policy of the Soviet Union and the International Situation* (Moscow: Novosti, 1973), p. 51, where the Soviet leader speaks of "socialist internationalism" as a basis for the "new type" of relations.

13. Sanakoyev, p. 116.

14. *The World Socialist System and Anti-Communism*, pp. 15-16.

15. E. Usenko, "International Legal Principles of Relations Between Socialist Countries," *International Affairs* (August 1973), 51.

16. V. V. Zagladin, ed., *The World Communist Movement: Outline of Strategy and Tactics* (Moscow: Progress, 1973), pp. 450-52.

17. For a good Soviet view of this process, see Ladygin and Pekshev, pp. 20-31. An excellent Western analysis appears in Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, "'Socialist Internationalism' and Eastern Europe—A New Stage," *Survey*, 22 (Winter 1976), 38-54.

18. Rakowska-Harmstone, p. 39. See also Grechko, p. 339.

19. See, for example, "Statement by the SED Central Committee Politburo and the GOR Council of Ministers on the Meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact States," in *FBIS Daily Report (Eastern Europe)*, 3 December 1976, pp. AA1-3, particularly in reference to detente.

20. A complete text of the Warsaw Pact treaty is provided in Robin Alison Remington, *The Warsaw Pact: Case Studies in Communist Conflict Resolution* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1971), pp. 201-06.

21. International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance, 1977-1978* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1977), pp. 13-15.

22. Before 1969, the respective national ministers of defense, as individuals, were to respond to the Joint High Command. The 1969 reforms combined the individual ministers into a committee, and made the Joint High Command subordinate to that committee.

23. See V. Kulikov, "Soviet Military Science Today," *Kommunist*, trans. in *Strategic Review*, 5 (Winter 1977), 127. See also John Erickson, "Trends in the Soviet Combined Arms Concept," *Strategic Review*, 5 (Winter 1977), 39.

24. It is interesting to note that Soviet military doctrine maintains that multinational armies are unreliable when engaged in offensive warfare. See Christopher D. Jones, "Just Wars and Limited Wars: Restraints on the Use of the Soviet Armed Forces," *World Politics*, 28 (October 1975), 44-68.

25. John Erickson, *Soviet-Warsaw Pact Force Levels* (Washington: United States Strategic Institute, 1976), pp. 65-67. Even so, there is speculation in the West that non-Soviet formations would be kept within combined battle groups and "corseted" by Soviet units. Lawrence L. Whetten, ed., *The Future of Soviet Military Power* (London: MacDonald and Jane's, 1976), p. 150.

26. The ongoing Soviet effort to upgrade their own independent support lines running through Eastern Europe may, in this interpretation, be intended to reduce interdependence during war *as well as* eliminate it during peace.

27. "Better understand" does not imply "exclusively understand." As will be shown, other considerations are also operant.

28. Arthur R. Rachwald, "Poland Between the Superpowers: Three Decades of Foreign Policy," *Orbis*, 20 (Winter 1977), 1063.

29. Category I divisions, in Soviet parlance, are between three-fourths and full strength, with complete equipment. See *The Military Balance, 1977-1978*, p. 9.

30. US Congress, *Congressional Record*, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 1976, 122, E1735.

31. Zagladin, pp. 450-52.

32. "Warsaw Pact nations bar U.S. panel," *Facts on File*, 27 November 1976, p. 880.

33. There is, of course, a school of thought which argues that the independent Romanian foreign policy course is more smoke than fire. See Vladimir Socor, "The Limits of National Independence in the Soviet Bloc: Rumania's Foreign Policy Reconsidered," *Orbis*, 20 (Fall 1976), 701-32.

34. Again, see Socor, pp. 713-17 for an analysis of Romania's military participation in the Warsaw Pact.

35. This is not to say that East Germany would necessarily rise in revolt against Honecker if Soviet support for him were withdrawn. Rather, it is to imply that within the SED (*Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands*, the Soviet-oriented Socialist Unity Party) there are individuals who would welcome a hypothetical withdrawal of Soviet support for Honecker in order to further their own political ambitions.

36. There are numerous indications that the Soviets place major importance on the political impact of their military units and military presence in Eastern Europe. General Sergei Shtemenko, late chief of staff of the Warsaw Pact, wrote in May 1976 that "suppression of counter-revolution" in East Europe is a major role of the Pact. *Za Rubezhom*, 7 May 1976, trans. in *FBIS Daily Report (Soviet Union)*, 13 May 1976, pp. D2-5. See also Grechko, p. 324, and Usenko, p. 51, for similar observations.

37. Quoted in Peter Osnos, "The Polish Road to Communism," *Foreign Affairs*, 56 (October 1977), 219.

38. CBS news broadcast on 7 October 1977.

39. Not to mention between certain Eastern Europeans themselves, of course!

40. See Osnos, pp. 211-15, for an interesting analysis of the constitutional discord.

41. Y. Nalin and A. Nikolayev, *The Soviet Union and European Security* (Moscow: Progress, 1973), p. 46.

42. *Za Rubezhom*, 7 May 1976.

43. For detailed analyses of COMECON, see Henry Schaefer, *Comecon and the Politics of Integration* (New York:

Praeger, 1972); Michael Kaser, *COMECON: Integration Problems of the Planned Economies* (New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1967); and Hans Hermann Hohmann, et al., *The New Economic Systems of Eastern Europe* (London: C. Hurst, 1975).

44. The UN source was the *1976 United Nations Statistical Yearbook* (New York: United Nations, 1977). The Soviet source was the 1975 annual foreign trade report compiled by *Ekomicheskaya gazeta*, contained in part in "U.S.S.R. records '75 trade deficit," *Facts on File*, 15 May 1976, p. 340.

45. *Ibid.*

46. *Ibid.*

47. "Soviet oil export prices rise," *Facts on File*, 29 January 1977, p. 67.

48. "Price Rise Barred by East Germany," *The New York Times*, 30 November 1975, p. 19.

49. *Financial Times*, 23 June 1975.

50. Andrzez Korbonski, "Detente, East-West Trade and the Future of Economic Integration in Eastern Europe," *World Politics* (July 1976), 581.

51. *Soviet Foreign Trade*, May 1977.

52. Rakowska-Harmstone, p. 47.

53. Daniel S. Papp, "Foreign Investment Resources, and the Tenth Five Year Plan," *Resources Policy* (September 1977), 195-202.

54. Roman Kolkowicz, "The Warsaw Pact: Entangling Alliance," *Journal of Eastern European Studies*, p. 101.