

The Military Meaning of the New Soviet Doctrine

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The current ferment in Soviet military doctrine has led to uncertainty and debate over its implications. On one hand, Gorbachev's peaceful rhetoric, backed by force reductions, is competing with the Bolshoi's ballerinas for favorable Western press reviews. Public opinion—and many public officials—perceive a reduced military threat from the Soviet army. On the other hand, skeptics believe that recent doctrinal changes are compatible with a modernized, more efficient Soviet military machine. In their view, the Soviet army is definitely changing, but the threat will not. A review of the operational implications of the new Soviet security themes indicates that neither the optimist nor pessimist is wholly justified. The effect on the military situation in Europe will be mixed: some changes appear to benefit NATO's position, while others suggest new challenges. Understanding the specifics of this evolution is crucial for determining how the West should respond.

Gorbachev's new thinking in security affairs has promised radical change, but its development has thus far seen greatest elaboration at the socio-political level of doctrine, which addresses the nature, objectives, and initiation of war. The focus in this article, however, will be on the military-technical aspect of change: how have the plans and operations of the Soviet army evolved under the "new thinking"? Because doctrinal developments take time to affect military operations, this is necessarily a speculative venture. Nonetheless, high-level Soviet officials have begun to speak out publicly and they deserve a measured hearing.

The Nature of Military-Technical Change

Although much of the doctrinal reformulation under Gorbachev is linked to political posturing, several of the declaratory themes appear to have consequences at the military-technical level. Three of the most prominent,

which will be addressed in turn, are defense dominance, quality over quantity, and prevention of war.

Defense Dominance. The central theme of the USSR's new security policy is that Soviet and Warsaw Pact doctrine is now defense-oriented. Soviet declaratory doctrine has always been defensive at the socio-political level, but now it is alleged that such will also hold true at the military-technical level.¹ Gorbachev and others have called for a strategy and posture that would exclude the possibility of offensive operations. While this outcome is to be the result of negotiations, the Soviets also maintain that they are unilaterally developing a defensive doctrine. A brief review of what "defense" means, the sources of military interest in it, and the nature of the changes occurring will help to illuminate the significance of this "new" orientation.

Soviet military officials have put forward different conceptions of the "defensive" doctrine. At one extreme is the view that it simply implies non-aggression; the USSR claims it will not attack anyone and therefore it has a defensive doctrine.² Apparent Soviet plans to fight a war through massive offensive operations aimed at deep penetration of enemy territory are brushed aside—after all, such options would be implemented only in the event that the USSR is attacked. The implication of this usage is that no substantial changes in military posture are needed. At the other extreme, the shift to defense suggests that Soviet strategy will be dominated by defensive operations and will demand only capabilities that permit the army to counterattack to regain the Warsaw Pact's own lost territory.³ In this version, the war is fought primarily in Eastern Europe.

The middle position (which appears most authoritative) is that the new focus on defense means (1) greater attention to how defensive battles will be fought, and (2) emphasis upon defensive operations at the *beginning* period of war, but (3) ultimate dominance of the offense within the full range of military operations.⁴ While the magnitude of the counteroffensive after the initial defensive stage is left undefined, the goal is to destroy the enemy's forces.⁵ The implication of this formulation is that significant dynamic capabilities are still required and the battle will be taken to the enemy's territory.

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The degree of military attention to defense cannot be completely separated from current political and economic needs, yet its roots predate Gorbachev and relate also to developments in military technology.⁶ A key source of interest in defense is the perceived threat from Western high-technology nuclear and conventional weapons which challenge the efficacy of the USSR's theater offensive. In particular, the Soviets fear that enhanced reconnaissance capabilities and high-accuracy munitions will allow NATO to disrupt the concentration of forces in the forward battle area and neutralize second-echelon forces that are moving up to the front.⁷

Also spurring attention to defense is uncertainty about how the next war will begin. More specifically, military authorities realize there is no guarantee that either the situation or political leaders will allow them to seize the initiative and implement an offensive at the start of a war, even if "purely" military factors demand such action.⁸ The historical analogy used is Stalin's choice at the beginning of World War II when "the political measures that were taken to avoid war were not correctly linked with concern over maintaining the armed forces at a high state of readiness."⁹ Like it or not, defensive operations may be a necessity. Finally, defensive operations remain important as a part of the overall strategic offensive plan. They would provide time to marshal forces to shift to the offense, hold ground in secondary sectors, or protect the flanks of the strategic offensive sector from counterattacks.¹⁰

Defense-mindedness is apparently leading to institutional and operational modifications. One of the alleged purposes of Soviet force reduction is to demonstrate that the USSR's divisions in East Europe are no longer offense-oriented. Over the next two years, the number of tanks will be reduced by 40 percent in motor rifle divisions and 20 percent in tank divisions located in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. Independent tank regiments in the Central Group of Forces are to be converted into motorized infantry units, cutting the number of tanks by 60 to 80 percent. In addition, assault landing and assault crossing units will be withdrawn with all their equipment. Meanwhile the number of antitank, engineering, and air defense systems is to be increased, giving the units "a clear-cut defensive structure."¹¹ It remains uncertain how, if at all, forces within the Soviet Union will be restructured.¹²

Aspects of the military educational system are also being brought into line with the defense emphasis. Programs at the military academies have supposedly been overhauled and manuals revised.¹³ Military journals and books are pointedly giving more attention to topics related to defense. For example, a generally positive review of the book *Tank Armies on the Offensive* critiques it for not paying enough attention to tank forces as a defensive tool, which would have strengthened the "up-to date tone" of the study.¹⁴ At a conference in Moscow, a Soviet analyst proudly displayed a copy of the January 1989 issue of the restricted-circulation publication *Military Thought*,

in which most of the articles were devoted to defense.¹⁵ Thus it may be that attitudes and attention to defense will be strengthened by reforms in the way soldiers are taught to think, and encouraged to write, about military affairs.

Military authorities contend that defense awareness will indeed lead to operational modifications. One important area is military exercises. One article has stated that training on defensive operations will be increased to 50 percent of the time allocated, with offensive maneuvers receiving the remainder.¹⁶ Marshal Akhromeyev asserted that the Soviet army now plans to remain on the defensive for three weeks at the beginning of a war, a revision which is supposedly reflected in the USSR's exercises.¹⁷ In addition, all moving-target tank gunnery ranges and troop firing ranges have allegedly been reequipped in line with the demands of the defensive doctrine.¹⁸

Despite these claims, many reports of observers of Pact maneuvers have questioned their defensive nature.¹⁹ Not all accounts, however, have been skeptical. Admiral William Crowe, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recounted seeing exercises and wargames that were "truly defensive" during his June 1989 visit.²⁰ These differing reports suggest either that the defensive shift is just starting to take hold, that Crowe was shown "Potemkin" maneuvers which do not reflect overall training, or that it is simply difficult to distinguish between offensive and defensive maneuvers.

Ironically, Soviet plans for the defense appear to include concepts traditionally linked with the offense, such as preemption. Several military authors, including Marshal Akhromeyev, have noted that while the defensive orientation is being realized at the operational level, it will not be passive, but an active, aggressive defense. In the Soviet *Military Encyclopedic Dictionary*, however, "defense activeness" (*aktivnost' oborony*) includes "hitting the adversary with airstrikes and artillery fire during the time the adversary is preparing for an attack."²¹ Indeed, Soviet commentaries have specifically stated that new technologies allow the defense to take the initiative and defeat an offensive *before* it is launched.²² Thus, while preemption appears to have been downgraded relative to its previous prominent role in the theater offensive, Soviet writings still allow for it.

One of the most important implications of a defensive orientation is the perceived need to increase readiness. This involves both combat readiness and mobilization readiness. Combat readiness is seen as necessary because if the aggressor can make preparations covertly and has the advantage of seizing the initiative, the defender must be constantly prepared to neutralize the attack. Soviet force reductions have also heightened military interest in enhancing readiness.²³ Improving mobilization readiness—which apparently refers to the ability to field reserves quickly—has received less attention, but the chief of the General Staff, M. A. Moiseyev, has repeatedly mentioned it along with combat readiness.²⁴



DOD

Smoke veils a Soviet soldier during a tactical exercise witnessed by US Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci at the Taman Division Garrison Facility, near Moscow, on 2 August 1988.

A final implication of the defensive orientation is an emphasis on mobility, particularly that of strategic reserves. Mobility is supposedly needed for transferring forces rapidly to areas of enemy attack where additional troops may be required.²⁵ Of course, mobility is also useful for rapid offensives.

Quality Over Quantity. The notion that force generation should be guided by qualitative rather than quantitative criteria received great attention beginning in the summer of 1988 following the 19th Party Conference and has been a central principle in Yazov's and other high military officials' speeches and writings.²⁶ The term "quality" is no stranger to Soviet military discourse. In the early 1960s when the Soviets lagged the United States in numbers of ICBMs, they emphasized that the quality of the rockets was more important than the quantity.²⁷ In the first part of the 1980s, Marshal Ogarkov was an outspoken proponent of the importance of qualitative improvements in weapons. Nonetheless, the degree to which the quality theme has been emphasized since the Party Conference and the explanation for this emphasis suggest that it could be particularly important in the way the military operates in the future.

The sources of Soviet interest in military quality are tied to economic, foreign policy, and military considerations. Reductions in troops and military expenditures will allegedly free resources for socio-economic development.²⁸ Furthermore, these cuts contribute to the "new thinking" foreign policy campaign aimed at changing international perceptions of the Soviet threat and slowing the arms race. The Soviet Union's economic restructuring is predicated on a placid external environment.²⁹ The goal of the quality campaign in the military sphere (as is the case for the economy as a whole) is to switch to intensive development: try to get more out of what is being produced rather than just producing more. The past emphasis on building large numbers of weapons and maintaining a massive standing army is eschewed because it provokes an international reaction (e.g. anti-Soviet coalition) and is expensive.³⁰

From the military viewpoint, "quality" makes sense for several reasons. One is combat effectiveness. As Yazov has proclaimed, quantitative indicators are becoming less effective even in strictly military terms.³¹ Although he does not fully explain this idea, the tenor of other military writings suggests that he is referring to the increased range and accuracy of high-technology weapons which could help numerically inferior troops defeat larger forces.³² This, of course, would be a challenge to a Soviet strategy based in part on taking advantage of superior quantities of "low-tech" tanks and artillery to overwhelm a Western defense.³³ The stress on economical quality, alongside commentaries on the importance of new types of weapons, suggests that the Soviet Union, and especially the military, is practicing deferred gratification: economizing is accepted now so that in the longer run systems suited for the modern battlefield will be available.³⁴

Gorbachev's reduction of the military forces is another factor that military personnel refer to when emphasizing quality. In fact, even before the reduction plan was announced, quality was cited as especially significant if troop levels were lowered.³⁵ With Gorbachev's cuts, the armed forces foresee a period of trial when quality must be sought because, despite smaller numbers, Soviet forces will be expected to fulfill the same tasks.³⁶

The new focus on quality also has implications for hardware and training. In terms of hardware, officials imply that there will be a shift away from the traditional Soviet emphasis on quantity of weapons toward fewer systems with greater reliability and technological sophistication. The production plan for both arms and equipment has allegedly been cut in favor of developing weapons that cover the same missions in fewer numbers.³⁷ At the same time, however, it is not clear how this qualitative shift fits in with the political priority of economic stringency. Soviets reading reports of the United States' \$500-million Stealth bomber undoubtedly realize that quality achieved via high technology is not necessarily cheaper. Indeed, in one article, the United States is accused of using the "competitive strategies" concept to drag

the arms race from the quantitative to the qualitative plane in the hope of weakening the Soviet economy by pressuring the USSR to devote more resources to the defense sector.³⁸

One of the main areas of expected opportunity in the quality campaign is military training. The Soviets hope to get the most out of available resources by improving personnel skills and combat training. Articles in the Soviet press indicate that Soviet troops are having problems operating the more sophisticated weapons. Soldiers are urged to increase their skill in using and maintaining existing arms so that capabilities can be maximized.³⁹ Combat training is criticized as too formal and inadequate in scope.⁴⁰ Troops are being diverted from training by other duties ranging from helping with the harvest in the fall to pandering to high-level officers during their inspections and visits.⁴¹ The Soviets have announced that they have cut the number of large-scale exercises in order to devote more time to "qualitative" training of sub-units.⁴² The army also hopes to enhance training and tactics in field exercises through laser simulation like that used by the US Army's National Training Center at Ft. Irwin, California.⁴³ Perhaps one reason why training is receiving so much attention is that the Soviets feel it can enhance capabilities significantly at low cost.⁴⁴

Prevention of War. According to prominent military figures, the third important new element of Soviet military doctrine is its aim of preventing war.⁴⁵ Of course, one might question the novelty of this goal, as the argument has been made since the 1970s that the Soviet Union's military power, especially its strategic nuclear parity with the United States, has been a key factor in preventing war. Today, however, prevention is portrayed not just as a side benefit of building military power, but rather as the primary purpose of the armed forces. Such a change seems largely limited to semantics at the socio-political level of doctrine, but may have some operational consequences.

An aspect that bridges the socio-political and military-technical levels is the explicit Soviet pledge not to initiate hostilities, including the foregoing of preemptive attacks, a calling card of the Soviet operational modus operandi.⁴⁶ It is of course questionable that such pledges would be honored if conflict threatened. For example, it is unclear whether a Soviet reaction based on a perception that the other side is preparing for war would fall under the rubric of initiating hostilities.⁴⁷ If so, such definitional gymnastics would allow the East to strike at NATO even if the latter's actions were merely a precaution.

Perhaps spurred on by their "no first use of nuclear weapons" and "no initiation of hostilities" promises, the Soviets also aim to reduce the vulnerability of the army. The goal is not merely to limit casualties and equipment loss during the course of a conflict. The perception of vulnerability in this case results from the declared intention to absorb the first blow in a

war. The problem of protecting forces when restricted to defensive maneuvers is viewed as particularly challenging.⁴⁸

Another implication of the prevention-of-war theme is continuing attention to avoiding inadvertent use of forces with strong escalatory potential, especially nuclear weapons. The doctrine's practical implementation will be more rigorous control over tactical and strategic nuclear munitions to avoid unauthorized use.⁴⁹ Again, however, interest in this area predates Gorbachev. Then Defense Minister D. F. Ustinov noted in 1982 that preventing a nuclear war would demand tighter control to exclude unauthorized release.⁵⁰

The Meaning of Military-Technical Change

The implications of the new doctrine can be assessed in terms of the components of its military-technical level, including (1) the nature of the military threat, (2) force structure, (3) force employment concepts and strategy, and (4) the preparation of the armed forces.⁵¹ Let us examine each of these four elements, highlighting where appropriate the effect of the new thinking on the USSR's ability to attack NATO successfully.

Military Threat. The political leadership has stressed inadvertent war as one of the primary threats to peace, thus downgrading a calculated NATO attack and providing a doctrinal basis for reducing defense spending and seeking arms control. While the military has paid lip service to this theme, prominent officers appear to put much greater emphasis on the purposeful aggressive actions of the West as the most important challenge to Soviet security. If anything, military officials see the peril from NATO growing as new systems are modernized and Western military strategy becomes more "offensive."⁵²

The results of a threat assessment that endows the West with considerable high-tech capabilities are mixed. On the one hand, it strengthens deterrence if the Soviets believe that new types of weapons endanger the viability of their offensive. On the other hand, traditional military interests will undoubtedly try to use this threat to build an internal consensus for quickening the development of new weapon systems to negate Western advantages.

Force Structure. Gorbachev's plan to restructure forces in Europe—if carried out as announced⁵³—should benefit NATO security because it decreases the likelihood of a successful Soviet short-warning attack.⁵⁴ Even so, the Soviet Union is left with considerable forces capable of conducting offensive operations against NATO after mobilization.

A potential negative implication from the Western perspective is the desire on the part of some Soviet military leaders to produce improved high-technology weapons. Of course, it is not realistic to expect zero modernization or production of new systems. The real issues thus are the types of weapons built and the quantities and rates of production. If the systems are primarily suited for offensive operations or the pace of production is rapid

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and the quantity large, the threat would obviously increase. The types of weapons produced would also influence which scenario is most affected. For example, if accurate long-range missiles, strike aircraft, or attack helicopters were to appear in greater numbers, the possibility of an effective short-warning attack might increase. On the other hand, if the quantity of tank transporters jumps or airlift capacity is expanded, then a mobilized attack would gain credibility. Despite the desires of Soviet professional soldiers, however, there is little in military writings to suggest that weapons development will receive resource priority. The mood conveyed is one of having to accept less in resources, at least in the short run.

Also related to force structure is the emphasis on creating highly mobile reserves for rapid maneuvers, which if realized would pose a challenge to NATO capabilities. Mobility might be necessary to secure a lengthy frontier against a foe with superior forces whose main breakthrough sites could not be predicted. However, increasing the mobility of the USSR's strategic reserve, which has easier access to central Europe than NATO's US-based reserves, could represent a serious danger. Soviet forces would be able to move from the rear to the front and concentrate near the FEBA more rapidly, thus enhancing the possibility of a successful mobilized attack.

Employment Concepts. In the category of force employment concepts, doctrinal developments indicate both positive and negative consequences for Western security. A positive, albeit superficial, effect is the Soviet promise not to initiate hostilities nor launch preemptive attacks. If honored, these pledges would directly undercut key elements of the Soviet theater offensive: preemption of NATO's airfields, nuclear weapons, and storage sites; and seizing the initiative. Pledges such as these would be mostly relevant to a short-warning attack, since after a mobilization they would have even less credibility. The obvious problem here is that talk is cheap. Declaratory statements can easily be retracted in the heat of the moment and could have little bearing on Soviet military actions. This is particularly true since preemptive options appear to have been subsumed under "defensive" plans.

The new emphasis on defensive operations may also have mixed implications for Soviet capabilities. The upside is that the Soviet Union is devoting more attention to the defense and is intent on developing a strategic

defensive option. This means that in a crunch Soviet leaders will have other choices besides the deep-strike offensive. There is, however, a downside. Although more attention will be given to defense, offensive potential and plans (e.g. the "counteroffensive") are not disappearing. The possibility arises, then, that the USSR will improve its capabilities in combating NATO's plans (e.g. FOFA) but also maintain its deep offensive operation potential, particularly after mobilization occurs.

Preparation of Forces. Here, defensive military exercises, improved combat and mobilization readiness, and improved training come into play. One good omen is the Soviet claim that its exercises will now be defense-oriented. As noted, however, there is no evidence yet of any widespread shift and it is unclear how defense can be practiced without exercising some offense.

So far as military readiness is concerned, it is understandable why with smaller forces the Soviets feel the need for higher readiness. But the USSR's reduction of forces still leaves the East with important advantages in some major ground systems in central Europe (e.g. artillery). Even more disturbing, however, would be the improved combat readiness of Category I and II troops in the western USSR. These troops become more significant if the Soviets also improve their mobilization readiness, which—via the USSR's geographic advantage of land lines of communication—would increase the chance of a successful reinforced Warsaw Pact attack.

Finally we may note the disadvantages for NATO in the event of improved technical knowledge and training of Soviet soldiers. General Yazov's repetition of Lenin's dictum, "Better less, but better," is comforting only if the "less" is somewhat more than the troops and systems that Gorbachev has already offered to cut. However, personnel skills and training have long been an area of concern in the USSR's conscription army and it is unclear how easily they can be enhanced even with renewed efforts.

Conclusion

It is difficult to disagree with the notion that the predominant themes of the new Soviet doctrine are preferable to past rhetoric. However, when one focuses on how these general declaratory principles of national security policy will be implemented in terms of day-to-day military operations and plans for war, the picture shows mixed results. The USSR's reduction of forces in Eastern Europe, especially their mobile firepower, would benefit Western security because it lessens Soviet capabilities for a standing-start attack. Furthermore, increased Soviet attention to the defense—in training, academic programs, and military research—is positive because it means that other options besides a quick offensive based on preemption are being actively considered. Thus, in a crisis, the East will not be backed into a corner where its security is perceived as dependent on striking massively and early.

While acknowledging the positive, the West must also confront the potentially threatening aspects of current changes. First, Soviet military officials remain interested in the capability to conduct deep offensive operations. The leaders of the Soviet army recognize the political and military need to pay attention to defensive operations, but their discussions are generally crafted in a way that continues to recognize the offensive as the dominant form of operations. It may be that the forward-based, standing-start threat has decreased, yet the USSR will continue to maintain a powerful force potential on its territory. Furthermore, their declared aim is to increase the readiness and mobility of such forces. If these goals are met, the Soviet Union will retain the capabilities and plans to conduct significant offensive operations against NATO. This suggests that the West should respond, through arms control and/or force improvements, to Soviet mobilization and reinforcement advantages that will become increasingly important to military stability in Europe.

NOTES

1. General Colonel Makhmut Gareyev, *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, 44 (December 1988), 31. Gareyev is a deputy chief of the General Staff and the foremost Soviet authority on military science.

2. See the remarks of General Colonel V. N. Lobov, first deputy chief of the General Staff on the TV program "Studio 9," 15 October 1988; translated in *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (hereinafter cited as *DR:SU*), Foreign Broadcast Information Service (hereinafter cited as FBIS), 18 October 1988, p. 84.

3. Andrei Kokoshin and General Major V. V. Larionov, "Protivostoianie sil obshchego naznacheniia v kontekste obecnecheniia stratigicheskoi stabil'nosti" (The Confrontation of Conventional Forces in the Context of Strategic Stability), *Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia* (June 1988), pp. 23-31.

4. See General Colonel M. Gareyev, "The Armed Forces in the Condition of Glasnost," *Argumenty i fakty*, 24-30 September 1988, pp. 4-5. Gareyev continually stresses that defensive operations will dominate the beginning of war—a phrasing that allows for offensive operations to dominate the remainder. In one of the most extensive recent discussions of defense at the operational and tactical levels, it is still described as subordinate to the offensive. See Colonel G. Ionin, "Osnovy sovremennogo oboronitel'nogo boia" (Foundations of Modern Defensive Battle), *Voennyi vestnik*, 3 (March 1988), 18-21.

5. For example, see Minister of Defense D. T. Yazov, *V zashchite sotsializma i mira* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1987), pp. 30-32.

6. This was evident in the writings of Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, former chief of the General Staff. See Dale Herspring, "Nikolay Ogarkov and the Scientific-Technical Revolution in Soviet Military Affairs," *Comparative Strategy*, 6 (No. 1, 1987), 29-60.

7. For a detailed Soviet view of the threat based upon their analysis of NATO's deep-strike concepts, see General Lieutenant I. Perov, "Agressivnaia sushchnost' novykh kontseptsii SShA i NATO" (The Aggressive Essence of the New Concepts of the USA and NATO), *Zarubezhnoe voennoe obozrenie* (February 1988), pp. 7-17. Also see the discussion in Phillip A. Petersen and Notra Trulock III, "A New Soviet Military Doctrine: Origins and Implications," *Strategic Review*, 16 (Summer 1988), 17.

8. General Colonel M. A. Gareyev, *M. V. Frunze—Voennyi teoretik* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1985), p. 242.

9. General Lieutenant of Aviation V. Serebriannikov, "Sootnoshenie politicheskikh i voennykh sredstv v zashchite sotsializma" (Correlating the Political and Military Methods in the Defense of Socialism), *Kommunist v vooruzhennykh sil*, No. 18 (September 1987), 12-13.

10. Ionin, p. 20. This point is made by historical analogy in General Colonel V. N. Lobov, "Aktual'nie voprosy razvitiia Sovetskoi teorii voennoi strategii 20-kh—serediny 30-kh godov" (Actual Questions in the Development of the Soviet Theory of Military Strategy from the 1920s to the mid-1930s), *Voенно-istoricheskii zhurnal* (February 1989), 43-44.

11. D. T. Yazov, "Na nachalakh realizma i balansa interesov" (Based on Principles of Realism and a Balance of Interests), *Pravda*, 9 February 1989, p. 4; interview with USSR Defense Minister Army General D. T. Yazov, "V interesakh obshchei bezopasnosti i mira" (In the Interests of Universal Security and Peace),

Izvestiia, 27 February 1989, p. 3; M. A. Moiseyev, "Sokrashchenie vooruzhennykh sil i vooruzhenii—garantia bezopasnosti dlia vseh i dlia kazhdogo" (Reduction of the Armed Forces and Armaments is the Guarantee of Security for Each and Everyone), *Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn'* (August 1989), 3-4.

12. Some analysts speculate that the Soviet army will shift to a corps/brigade structure. See David M. Glantz, "Force Structure: Meeting Contemporary Requirements," *Military Review*, 68 (December 1988), 58-70; David Eshel, "Soviet Force Reductions: Eyewash or Reality," *Defense Update*, April 1989, p. 18. Of course, macro-organizational changes have been made, including the removal of the border, internal, and railway troops from the control of the armed forces and the merging of several military districts. In addition, a hot debate continues over whether the Soviet Union should shift from a conscript army to a professional or militia-style one.

13. Gareyev (December 1988), p. 32.

14. Marshal of Tank Forces O. Losik's review of I. M. Anan'ev's *Tankovye armii v nastuplenii* (Voenizdat, 1988), in *Krasnaia zvezda*, 8 March 1988, p. 2.

15. The titles included "Several Questions on the Preparation and Conduct of Counterstrikes in Defensive Operations," "Maneuver in Defensive Operations," "Tactical Defense," and "The Problem of Raising the Survivability of the PVO Forces in Defensive Operations." At least one analyst has noted a similar trend in the non-classified Soviet military literature. See Edward Warner III, "New Thinking and Old Realities in Soviet Defense Policy," *Survival*, 31 (January/February 1989), 25.

16. See Colonel G. Miranovich and Colonel V. Shitarenko, "Chem sil'na oborona?" (How Is the Defense Strong?), *Krasnaia zvezda*, 10 December 1987, p. 2.

17. See William Odom, "Soviet Military Doctrine," *Foreign Affairs*, 67 (Winter 1988/1989), 130.

18. Interview with Army General B. Snetkov, commander in chief of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, "V usloviakh sokrashcheniia" (In the Conditions of Cuts), *Krasnaia zvezda*, 23 March 1989, p. 2.

19. Bernard E. Trainor, "Soviet Maneuvers: A New Strategy?" *The New York Times*, 4 November 1988, p. A8. Also see "The Soviets Practiced Only Attack Type Combat," *Die Welt*, 12-13 November 1988, p. 4, as translated in *Daily Report: Western Europe*, FBIS, 16 November 1988, p. 11; and Don O. Stovall, "A Participant's View of On-Site Inspections," *Parameters*, 19 (June 1989), 14-15.

20. Interview on "Good Morning America," 21 June 1989, as reported in DOD, *Current News*, 23 June 1989, p. A2; Michael Dobbs, "Joint Chiefs View Soviet Weaponry," *The Washington Post*, 19 April 1989, pp. A1, A23.

21. Marshal Akhromeyev, ed., *Voennyi entsiklopedicheskii slovar'* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1986), pp. 496-97.

22. Ionin, p. 18.

23. Army General D. T. Yazov, Minister of Defense, stated on TV, "One of the main tasks of this doctrine is the prevention of war, followed by the maintenance of military readiness, repulsion of aggressive intrigues, and so forth." See "I Serve the Soviet Union" program, 29 October 1988; as translated in *DR:SU*, FBIS, 1 November 1988, p. 89; Army General M. Sorokin, "S tochki zreniia inspektsii" (From the Inspectorate's Point of View), *Krasnaia zvezda*, 6 September 1989, p. 2; Gareyev (September 1988), pp. 4-5.

24. Report on a meeting of General Colonel Moiseyev with Communist Party members of the General Staff, "S pozitsii oboronitel'noi doktriny" (From Defensive Doctrine Positions), *Krasnaia zvezda*, 10 February 1989, pp. 1-2; Army General Moiseyev, "Na strazhe mira i sotsializma" (On Guard for Peace and Socialism), *Krasnaia zvezda*, 23 February 1989, p. 2.

25. See Gareyev (December 1988), p. 31. For a historical analysis emphasizing the importance of maneuver and mobility, see Lobov (February 1989), pp. 44, 48.

26. The first appearance of this theme was a major article by Yazov in August 1988, "Kachestvennye parametry oboronogo stroitel'stva" (The Qualitative Parameters of Defense Building), *Krasnaia zvezda*, 9 August 1988, pp. 1-2. Also see Gareyev (September 1988), pp. 4-5; General Colonel V. Lobov, first deputy of the General Staff, "Vysokoe kachestvo—glavnyi kriterii boevoi podgotovki" (High Quality—The Main Criteria of Military Training), *Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil* (January 1989), 12-18.

27. See Benjamin S. Lambeth, "The Sources of Soviet Military Doctrine," in *Comparative Defense Policy*, eds. Frank B. Horton III, Anthony C. Rogerson, Edward L. Warner III (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1974), p. 203.

28. Army General D. T. Yazov, "Armiia naroda" (The Army of the People), *Pravda*, 23 February 1989, p. 3.

29. Yazov (9 August 1988), p. 1, explicitly says, "The acceleration of the country's socio-economic development and the revolutionary restructuring and renewal of society are pinned on peace."

30. See the speech of Foreign Minister Shevardnaze delivered at the Scientific and Practical Conference of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 25 July 1988, in *Vestnik Ministerstva Inostrannykh Del SSSR*, 15 (August 1988), esp. 32-33. Also relevant are the remarks of V. Falin, head of the CPSU's International Department on the TV show "Studio 9," 15 October 1988; see note 2.

31. Yazov (9 August 1988), p. 2.

32. For example, see Ionin, p. 18.
33. For example, Soviet plans rely on being able to push fresh units into the battle when others are used up as opposed to reconstituting them as is the case with NATO. Should new weapons threaten these forces, the chances of Soviet strategy's succeeding would be reduced.
34. "Na strazhe mira i sotsializma" (On Guard for Peace and Socialism), in *Zarubezhnoe voennoe obozrenie* (January 1988), 3-8, notes that the CPSU's focus on boosting economic development will contribute to enhancing the military's combat power.
35. Yugoslavian newspaper interview with D. T. Yazov, "We Are Not Hawks," *Danas*, 15 November 1988, pp. 54-58; translated in *DR:SU*, FBIS, 22 November 1988, p. 73. Yazov says, "The process of perfecting the quality of combat techniques is accompanied by certain reductions in their total quality."
36. Report on comments by D. T. Yazov, "Po strogomu schetu" (Strict Accountability), *Pravda*, 22 January 1989, p. 8. Also see Lobov (January 1989), p. 13.
37. Army General V. Shabanov, Deputy Minister of Defense for Armaments, "Novye podchody" (New Approaches), *Krasnaia zvezda*, 18 August 1989, p. 2; Army General M. Moiseyev, "Sovetskaiia voennaia doktrina: realizatsiia ee oboronitel'noi napravlenosti" (Soviet Military Doctrine: Realization of its Defensive Thrust), *Pravda*, 13 March 1989, p. 5.
38. General Lieutenant V. Pavlov, "I vot teper' 'strategii konkurentsii'" (And Now "Competitive Strategies"), *Krasnaia zvezda*, 30 November 1988, p. 5.
39. See Lobov (January 1989), pp. 12-18; Moiseyev (23 February 1989), p. 12. For a specific example of concern over low technical skill levels of Soviet soldiers, see Jeanette Voas's analysis of General Lieutenant R. Akchurin, "From Technology and Armaments—The Maximum Possible," *Vestnik protivovozdushnoi oborony*, 11 (November 1987), 33-36, in *Soviet Defense Notes*, 1 (May 1989), 6-7.
40. Army General D. Yazov, "Voennoi shkole—novoe kachestvo" (New Quality in Military Education), *Krasnaia zvezda*, 27 January 1989, p. 1.
41. Lobov (January 1989), p. 15.; Yazov (22 January 1989), p. 8.
42. Interview with Snetkov, 23 March 1989, p. 2.
43. Discussion with General Lieutenant V. Khazirkov, deputy chief of the Main Combat Training Directorate of the Ground Forces, "Vozrodit' kak iskusstvo" (To Regenerate as an Art), *Krasnaia zvezda*, 7 January 1989, pp. 1-2.
44. See Gareyev (September 1988), pp. 4-5; Defense Minister Yazov is quoted as saying that officer cadres' training is "one of the key sources for enhancing the armed forces' qualitative condition while incurring virtually no additional costs. Full use must be made of this source." See Yazov (27 January 1989), p. 1.
45. For example, see Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev, "The Doctrine of Preventing War, Defending Peace and Socialism," *World Marxist Review* (December 1987), 40; in Russian see *Problemy mira i sotsializma* (December 1987).
46. Gareyev (December 1988), p. 31, states, "In other words, Soviet military strategy completely rules out the possibility of launching a preemptive or preventive strike, no matter what the political circumstances."
47. For example, Ionin, p. 18, states that defense in combined arms battle can be used to "break an offensive being prepared by the enemy."
48. Gareyev (December 1988), p. 30.
49. D. T. Yazov, "Voennaia doktrina Varshavskogo dogovora—doktrina zashchity mira i sotsializma" (The Military Doctrine of the Warsaw Pact Is the Doctrine of Peace and Socialism), *Pravda*, 27 July 1987, p. 5. Also see Yazov (15 November 1988), p. 74.
50. D. F. Ustinov, *Otvesti ugrozu iadernoi voiny* (To Repel the Threat of Nuclear War) (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1982), p. 6.
51. These four areas are listed in Gareyev (December 1988), p. 31.
52. For example, see Moiseyev (13 March), p. 5; interview with General Lieutenant V. Achalov, Commander of the Airborne Troops, "Golubie berety" (Blue Berets), *Pravda*, 3 August 1989, p. 3.
53. It is unclear how faithfully the force reduction will be implemented. One report from a US congressional group maintains that the Soviets are shifting soldiers and equipment from disbanded units to remaining forces. See Michael R. Gordon, "Congress Inspects a Soviet Pullback," *The New York Times*, 9 August 1989, p. A10.
54. Phillip A. Karber, "The Military Impact of the Gorbachev Reductions," *Armed Forces Journal International*, January 1989, pp. 54-64. Karber, part of the congressional delegation (see preceding note), has scaled back his optimistic January estimate, concluding that Soviet units in Europe have "by no means made the transfer to a strictly defensive force," but nonetheless are still less capable than before the reductions. (See Peter Almond, "Experts Say Soviets Play Old Shell Game," *Washington Times*, 14 September 1989, p. 5.) Some believe that even if the reduction is carried out, the Soviet short-warning threat will remain and could increase. Eshel (see note 12) makes this case.