


**U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE
ACADEMIC YEAR 2016**

CORE CURRICULUM

**INTRODUCTION TO STRATEGIC
STUDIES COURSE**

DIRECTIVE



**U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA 17013-5050
17-26 August 2015**

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SECTION I

COURSE OVERVIEW

Case Study: Analysis of the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf War.

Preparation for war is an expensive, burdensome business, yet there is one important part of it that costs little—study. However changed and strange the new conditions of war may be, not only generals, but politicians and ordinary citizens, may find there is much to be learned from the past that can be applied to the future...

Field-Marshal Viscount William Slim
(*Defeat Into Victory*, p. 535)

1. Introduction.

a. The study of war as an academic endeavor.

(1) War is an exceptionally complex human endeavor, maybe the most demanding collective endeavor that humans undertake. Cities, states, tribes, empires, civilizations, and other social collectives have been annihilated, subjugated, elevated, or disrupted by the outcomes of war. At the individual level, war can be a defining, often searing, event for all affected – not just those in the maelstrom of battle, but all who are marked by the clash of wills that is central to the act of war. Further, the prominence of war at the major milestones and inflection points of history attests to its power in shaping the course of human events.

(2) The study of war is a critical component of the U.S. Army War College's (USAWC) mission. The USAWC Institutional Learning Objective states, "Our graduates are intellectually prepared to preserve peace, deter aggression and, when necessary, achieve victory in *war* through ***studying and conferring on the great problems of national defense, military science, and responsible command.***"

(3) Thus, in the seven lessons that constitute this course, we will study a particular case, the 1990-91 Persian Gulf War (or "Gulf War" for short), as a means of understanding how to think about war at the strategic level. Academically, we intend this case to introduce most of the major themes and concepts of the entire core curriculum within the context where they matter most – war. The case study relies on an interdisciplinary approach, but it also provides an historical example that all students will hold in common and can refer to as we continue our more detailed exploration of theories, concepts, and processes throughout the remainder of the core curriculum.

(4) To some degree, we jump right into a particular example of war without having armed you with all of the tools of analysis that might be handy to understand this complex human endeavor. However, we will arm you with key questions you should be asking about war and its many facets.

b. The purpose of studying the Persian Gulf War Case.

(1) The Persian Gulf War provides a fascinating case study of key national security themes that cut across all the major elements of the School of Strategic Landpower's core resident education program. Strategic leadership, policy, strategy, defense management, and theater strategy and operations play out in interesting and intricate ways that draw attention not just to the use of the military instrument in war to achieve specific national security policy aims, but to an understanding of national security and the wider array of instruments of national power. This particular case (that included U.S. Operations named Desert Shield and Desert Storm) aptly highlights the use of the other three instruments of national power (diplomatic, informational, and economic) employed in conjunction with military activities. Additionally, the case provides an interesting perspective on joint and multinational operations, to include the importance of building coalitions. Moreover, while this conflict occurred more than two decades ago, it is surprisingly contemporary for our understanding of U.S. interagency roles and processes. Lastly, the case is pertinent in that it demands that we assess the strategic security environment at a time of great change. The Persian Gulf War took place as the Cold War was coming to an end. In the late 1980s, the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) had withdrawn from Afghanistan, begun a unilateral reduction of its forces (to include withdrawal of some forces from Eastern Europe), and agreed to limitations on intermediate range nuclear forces. Relaxed Soviet control over its Eastern European "allies" in the Warsaw Pact led to the "fall" of the Berlin Wall in November 1989. The Persian Gulf War (1990-91) takes place in the midst of this larger global drama. Indeed, at the end of 1991, less than a year after the Gulf War, the dissolution of the Soviet Union would be complete. The international order the U.S. had helped create in the aftermath of World War II was in transition, and a "New World Order" was being born.

(2) A crucial goal of the USAWC senior-level college is to develop strategic leaders who can think critically and apply military power in support of national security objectives. With this goal in mind, interwoven throughout the Gulf War case are myriad examples of senior national security professionals, both civilian and military, applying critical, creative, and ethical thinking while exercising discretionary judgment on behalf of society, understood in its broadest sense to include the international community. All of the various considerations of environment, objectives, methods, and instruments inform the profound strategic choices that such leaders make in this regard.

2. Course Learning Objectives.

a. Understand the relationship among the instruments of national power and their use by political and military leaders to accomplish national policy aims.

b. Examine how senior leaders employ strategic-level skills and competencies when influencing policy and strategy decisions.

c. Appreciate the security challenges and decisions that leaders and their nations face in the contemporary environment.

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SECTION II

COURSE REQUIREMENTS

1. General. This course lends itself to the active learning process, requiring imaginative thought and student interaction. A simplified model to follow is to ask the WHAT of a topic or issue, the WHY of its significance, and the HOW of its utility to professional military responsibilities. The answers to these questions are subjective; often no clear-cut solution exists. You may feel uncomfortable. That is normal; uncertainty and ambiguity are frequently the norm when studying such complex issues. Honing creative thinking skills is central to the educational experience. Meaningful research, diligent preparation, thought-provoking presentations, and participation and contribution in seminar discussions are the principle ingredients in making the active learning process successful.

2. Daily Reading.

a. Required Readings. You must read this material prior to the class because seminar discussions and learning rely on the readings. The readings support the lesson's learning objectives. They also provide basic knowledge and, in some cases, analysis of the topic. Follow-on discussions in the seminar room build upon these elements to achieve a more comprehensive understanding of the topic and, ultimately, an analysis of the lesson topic. However, the readings are demanding and often rigorous. Therefore, in general, you can expect to accomplish the readings in about 2 ½ to 3 hours for each 3-hour seminar session.

b. Focused Readings. Faculty Instructors (FIs) may assign these readings to selected students and ask them to provide a brief oral report and analysis to the seminar. These reports may offer an opposing point of view from the required reading, provide a degree of understanding beyond that required in the lesson objectives, or support one or more of the "Points to Consider" for the lesson.

3. Student Academic Evaluation/Assessment Methods. To complete the course successfully, students will meet established standards in each of the two basic requirements specified below. The FIs will evaluate each requirement throughout the course. For the ISS course, contribution throughout the course will comprise 60% of each student's final grade. The written assignment due on August 26, 2015 will comprise the other 40% of the overall grade.

a. Contribution. The essential requirement to achieve the overall learning objectives of the course is active participation in the seminar-learning environment. Through active participation, students contribute to the learning of others. Students are expected to be prepared to contribute by accomplishing the required readings and other assigned tasks for each lesson.

b. Writing Requirement.

(1) Following the standard Communicative Arts Directive format, prepare a 4- to 5-page paper that answers the following:

Choose two Mission-Specific roles from the Galvin reading in Lesson 1, and use examples from the case study to identify areas you need to strengthen as you prepare for senior leadership.

(2) Students must include citations from the readings as appropriate, such as to define terms, give examples, and explain concepts. However, the citations should be limited as this is a reflection paper, intended to allow students to demonstrate skills in organizing thoughts and communicating them in written form. The points to consider in the lesson directive provide some ideas on how to proceed but are not prescriptive – students may organize the paper in any manner they wish so long as the paper satisfies the requirements.

c. Evaluation Standard. Written assignments will be evaluated based on content, organization, and style. The criteria for evaluating papers will be the student's demonstrated understanding of and ability to apply course concepts, to organize material logically, and to compose and express thoughts clearly and coherently through effective writing. Descriptions of the criteria for evaluation are found in the *Communicative Arts Directive*.

SECTION III

PLANNING CALENDAR

AY16 Introduction to Strategic Studies 17-26 August 2015

Monday, 17 August 2015	Tuesday, 18 August 2015	Wednesday, 19 August 2015
Time: 0830-1130 ISS-1-S Seminar Learning	Time: 0830-1130 ISS-2-S Senior Leader Environment	Time: 0830-1130 ISS-3-S The Strategic Environment
Thursday, 20 August 2015	Friday, 21 August 2015	
Time: 0830-1130 ISS-4-S Invasion and the U.S.. Response	Time: 0830-1130 ISS-5-S Building a Coalition	
Monday, 24 August 2015	Tuesday, 25 August 2015	Wednesday, 26 August 2015
Time: 0830-1130 ISS-6-S Liberation of Kuwait	Time: 0830-1130 ISS-7-S Aftermath	Time: 0830-1130 RWR (For ISS Writing Requirement)
Thursday, 27 August 2015	Friday, 28 August 2015	
Time: 0830-1130 SRP 2	Time: 0830-1130 SL Begins	

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SECTION IV

LESSONS

Lesson Index

<u>Lesson</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Page</u>
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ISS-02-S	Senior Leader Environment	14
ISS-03-S	The Strategic Environment	18
ISS-04-S	Invasion and the U.S. Response.....	21
ISS-05-S	Building a Coalition	24
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ISS-07-S	Aftermath	30

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SEMINAR LEARNING

Mode: Seminar

ISS-01-S

1. Introduction. This lesson introduces concepts associated with seminar learning that provide an intellectual foundation for the upcoming academic year. It covers different discourse types, reflection concepts, and team learning insights within an adult learning environment. Further, it introduces eight different persistent and mission specific senior leader outcomes associated with one's educational journey. Individual student commitment and preparation, combined with valued and productive seminar experiences, have proven to be a most effective learning environment at the U.S. Army War College. Students have the opportunity to learn not only from academic materials associated with lectures and readings but, more importantly, from a diverse group of civilian, military, and international experiences and perspectives associated with seminar members and faculty. The college's seminar learning approach provides valuable learning opportunities that involve exploring new concepts, presenting ideas and observations, listening carefully, appreciating diverse viewpoints, reflecting on complex issues, and refining one's thinking with a strategic perspective.

2. Learning Objectives.

a. Examine concepts associated with discourse types, team learning, and reflection that influence interactions and enhance learning within the seminar.

b. Develop a set of seminar norms for the upcoming academic year.

3. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks.

(1) Come to class prepared to explore what you can do individually and collectively as a seminar to optimize your own and the seminar's learning environment for the upcoming year.

(2) Be prepared to share your insights of General Powell and General Schwarzkopf's leadership from the book *The Gulf War, 1990-91* associated with the four mission-specific outcomes of Strategic Advisor and Communicator, Strategic Planner, Strategic Theorist, and Senior Leader at the Strategic Level described in Galvin's article.

b. Required Readings.

(1) U.S. Army War College, *Introduction to Strategic Studies Course Directive* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Academic Year 2016). Read the sections that explain the course overall, the writing requirement, and Lesson 1. **[Faculty Issue]** and **[Blackboard]**

(2) Thomas Galvin, *Welcome to the Seminar* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College), 1-9. **[Blackboard]**

(3) Richard M. Meinhart, *Reflection and Learning* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College), 1-6. **[Blackboard]**

(4) Peter M. Senge, *The Fifth Discipline: The Art & Practice of the Learning Organization* (New York: Currency Doubleday, 2006), 216-232 and 260-262. Read "The Potential Wisdom of Teams," "The Discipline of Team Learning: Dialogue and Discussion," and "Reflective Openness." **[Student Issue]**

(5) William T. Allison, *The Gulf War, 1990-91* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012). Review sections associated with General Powell and General Schwarzkopf. Specifically, for General Powell see pp. 44-45, 55-56, and 61-62, and for General Schwarzkopf, see pp. 58-59, 95-103, and 141-144. **[Student Issue]**

4. Points to Consider.

- a. What can I or we do to maximize the seminar's learning environment?
- b. Why is reflection important to my educational experiences?
- c. In what ways will the seminar be a microcosm of the joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational environment?
- d. What insights did you get from the leadership of General Powell and General Schwarzkopf related to the four mission-specific outcomes from Galvin's article?

5. Relationship to JPME II Joint Learning Areas (JLAs).

JLA 5.a.

6. Relationship to USAWC Program Learning Objectives (PLOs), and Enduring and Special Themes.

- a. PLOs: 1, 2, 4.
- b. Enduring Themes: Strategic Leadership and the Exercise of Discretionary Judgment; Relationship of Policy and Strategy; Instruments of National Power and

Potential Contributions to National Security; Civil-military Relations; Instruments of War and National Security; History as a Vehicle for Understanding Strategic Alternatives and Choices.

c. Special Themes: None.

SENIOR LEADER ENVIRONMENT

Mode: Seminar

ISS-02-S

1. Introduction.

a. Having established the seminar learning environment and discussed the types of roles that you will play as future senior military leaders, we now move to a two-lesson introduction to some general principles about strategic leadership, the strategic environment, and the tools and resources available. The presentation of these principles here will help you through the case study presented later in the course and aid in an introspective look at who you are/were as a mid-career leader coming to this transition, which will be helpful for the reflection paper due in the last lesson. As you learn through the readings and in seminar dialogue, think about how you saw and interacted with senior leaders before. How did they see the environment and interact with it differently than how you do now?

b. This lesson will use excerpts from the autobiographies of General Powell and General Schwarzkopf, both key figures in the Gulf War case, at important points of their careers – shortly after senior service college attendance and in their duty positions as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Commander of U.S. Central Command before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Both men became well-known figures in the course of the war as four-star generals, but they were once colonels too, and experienced similar journeys to the one you now undertake. Each took related but different paths as strategic leaders. One stayed close to Washington, the other far away.

c. Strategic leadership is a human endeavor, and each of you probably have served with and been mentored by exemplary colonels, one- or two-star generals, or senior civilians. Understanding the roles, tasks, and competencies of strategic leadership can help you examine how and why these officers have excelled in the strategic environment. As the course moves toward the case study, you have an opportunity to reflect on what it takes to be part of a senior leadership team comprising Service, joint, and interagency members, working together yet also in competition with each other. You will begin to understand what it takes to lead a joint force, both from the warfighting perspective of a combatant command staff and its leadership, and an institutional perspective of the Joint staff or a service staff and its leadership, through the examples of those who have succeeded or are succeeding at those levels. These themes will be reinforced in many ways throughout the core curriculum.

2. Learning Objectives.

a. Comprehend the scope of strategic leadership, the character of the strategic environment, and the roles and responsibilities of military strategic leaders, particularly as members of a profession.

b. Understand the skills and competencies required for leaders to operate effectively in the joint interagency intergovernmental and multinational environment.

3. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks.

(1) Read the assigned readings and be prepared to discuss in seminar.

(2) Reflect on senior military leaders who have been inspirations or mentors to you. Consider how they demonstrated senior leader competencies or how their perspectives align with those of Powell or Schwarzkopf in the readings.

b. Required Readings.

(1) Stephen J. Gerras, ed., *Strategic Leadership Primer*, 3rd ed. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Department of Command, Leadership, and Management, 2010). Read the passage on The Strategic Leadership Team, on pp. 6-7, Chapter 1: "Introduction;" and Chapter 4: "Strategic Leader Competencies" and Chapter 7: "The Strategic Leader and the Human Dimension of Combat," in their entirety. Available at: <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/orgs/SSL/dclm/pubs/slp3.pdf> (accessed July 13, 2015). **[Student Issue]** and **[Online]**

(2) Don M. Snider, "The U.S. Army as a Profession," in *The Future of the Army Profession*, 2nd ed., ed. Don M. Snider and Lloyd Matthews (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2005), 13-21. Read "The Army as Profession and Bureaucracy" through the beginning of Section II. **[Student Issue]**

c. Focused Readings. Students are required to read one of the following and scan the other.

(1) Colin L. Powell, *My American Journey* (New York: Random House, 1995). Read excerpt of Chapter 9 (pp. 205-210); excerpt from Chapter 10 (pp. 233-248, on his post-brigade command assignment in DOD); and Chapter 17 in full (pp. 435-458, covering his term as Chairman prior to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, in the face of Cold War planning and the coup attempt in the Philippines). **[Blackboard]**

(2) General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, *It Doesn't Take a Hero* (New York: Linda Grey Bantam Books, October 1992). Read except of Chapter 11 (pp. 187-196, on War College and immediate Pentagon follow on assignment), Chapter 13 (pp. 217-233, on

his assignments in Pacific Command) and Chapter 15 in full (pp. 267-289, covering his early days in CENTCOM, ending with a passage about his views on Powell).

[Blackboard]

4. Points to Consider.

a. Why is it important for senior military leaders to understand organizational behavior?

b. How does the meaning of 'team' differ between a unit environment (where duties and responsibilities are typically well-defined) and the strategic environment?

c. How do the strategic leadership competencies (Chapter 4 of the *Primer*) differ from tactical or operational leadership competencies? Are the differences matters of scope, or are there qualitative differences?

d. What are the tensions facing the military between being a profession and acting as a bureaucracy? How do senior military leaders deal with these tensions to make sound decisions?

e. In what ways do the joint force and Services work together, and in what ways do they compete against each other? What factors might lead senior leaders to pursue cooperation and collaboration, or cooperation, or go back and forth?

f. From the readings by General Powell and General Schwarzkopf, consider the following:

(1) How did the senior service college and early strategic-level duty positions shape their perspectives as budding senior leaders? How did these carry on to four-star generalship?

(2) What strengths and vulnerabilities did these officers exhibit, what conflicts did it present, and how did they overcome them?

(3) What roles did relationships and collaboration serve for these officers?

(4) How were these officers oriented as the invasion of Kuwait was about to unfold?

g. Compare the Powell and Schwarzkopf examples with senior leaders who have personally inspired you. What do their stories tell you about your journey toward becoming a senior military leader?

5. Relationship to JPME II Joint Learning Areas (JLAs).

JLA 5. a,d,e,g.

6. Relationship to USAWC Program Learning Objectives (PLOs), and Enduring and Special Themes.

a. PLOs: 1, 4.

b. Enduring Themes: Strategic Leadership and the Exercise of Discretionary Judgment; Relationship of Policy and Strategy; Instruments of National Power and Potential Contributions to National Security; Civil-military Relations; Instruments of War and National Security; History as a Vehicle for Understanding Strategic Alternatives and Choices.

c. Special Themes: None.

THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

Mode: Seminar

ISS-03-S

1. Introduction.

a. Our attention now turns to the environment within which the leader operates, and tools (known as instruments of national power) available that the strategic leader may use to implement national security policy and strategy. The “strategic environment” contains both domestic and international elements, though both are often blurred in the increasingly interdependent world in which we live. Although most mid-career leaders have had some *exposure* to this environment, particularly in the context of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, as senior military leaders, the expectation will be to *lead* within this complex and dynamic environment. In assuming that responsibility, strategic leaders are obliged to assess strategic issues within a broad context that includes other views and the competing interests of government and non-government actors, to gather information to assist national leaders in decision making, to make decisions about the application of the military instrument in support of national policy, and to guide a large military organization into the future.

b. The purpose of this lesson is to introduce key concepts related to the strategic environment (domestic and international) and the instruments of national power that are foundational to the case study that follows and that will be explored in detail during the core curriculum. Topic areas regarding the first purpose include theoretical discussions about the characterization of the environment and civil-military relations.

c. The second objective of the lesson regards the instruments of national power, particularly the military instrument, and their use, taken mainly from the joint doctrine for introductory purposes. Senior leaders are responsible for not only advising on and contributing to the military element of power as part of a national response, but also integrating the military element with diplomatic, informational, and economic elements. Senior leaders must weigh options across the full range of military operations, depicted in Figure I-3 of Joint Pub 1.

2. Learning Objectives.

a. Analyze the characteristics of the strategic environment, considering the domestic and international influences on the development and implementation of national security policy and strategy.

b. Understand the instruments of national power available to senior leaders, particularly the military instrument.

3. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks.

(1) Read the assigned readings and be prepared to discuss in seminar.

(2) Identify one or two major issues facing your Service or your national military for presentation to the seminar, so that seminar dialogue may draw out the strategic perspectives of that issue and implications for national security.

b. Required Readings.

(1) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, Joint Publication 1, March 25, 2013, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1.pdf (accessed July 13, 2015). Read Chapter 1, "Theory and Foundations." **[Online]**

(2) Stephen J. Gerras, ed., *Strategic Leadership Primer*, 3rd ed. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Department of Command, Leadership, and Management, 2010). Read Chapter 2: "The Strategic Leadership Environment," starting with the passage on "Threats," pp. 13-19. **[Student Issue]** and **[Online]** <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/orgs/SSL/dclm/pubs/slp3.pdf> (accessed July 13, 2015).

(3) Deborah L. Hanagan, "International Order," *U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues Volume II: National Security Policy and Strategy*, ed. J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr., (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, June 2012), 123-136. <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1110.pdf> (accessed July 13, 2015). **[Online]**

(4) Richard K. Betts, "Are Civil-Military Relations Still a Problem?" in *American Civil-Military Relations: The Soldier and the State in a New Era*, ed. Suzanne C. Nielsen and Don M. Snider (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009), 11-41. **[Blackboard]**

(5) William T. Allison, *The Gulf War, 1990-91* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2012), 54-62. Review: "The U.S. Military in 1990". **[Student Issue]**

4. Points to Consider.

a. What does "war" mean and how does it differ between military and societal use?

b. What aspects of current joint doctrine describing the strategic level of war raises questions in your mind based on your experiences?

c. What are the four instruments of national power and how can they be applied across the range of military operations?

d. How does the strategic environment, to include the concept of international order, shape decisionmaking within an organization, such as a military Service, and within a national government?

e. What are the “two faces” of military policy and how do they relate to the dialogue and authority issues that Betts raises?

f. As the 1980s ended, the strategic environment (domestic and international) was undergoing significant changes. How did the vast changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the implementation of Goldwater-Nichols Act reforms, and the new generation of high-technology weapons, as examples, affect the U.S. military?

g. What impact did the outcome of the Vietnam War (2nd Indochina War) have on the U.S. military and on U.S. political leaders’ calculation of the use of force?

5. Relationship to JPME II Joint Learning Areas (JLAs).

a. JLA 2.a.

b. JLA 3.a,c,d.

c. JLA 5.a.

6. Relationship to USAWC Program Learning Objectives (PLOs), and Enduring and Special Themes.

a. PLOs: 1, 3, 7, 8, 9, 10.

b. Enduring Themes: Strategic Leadership and the Exercise of Discretionary Judgment; Relationship of Policy and Strategy; Instruments of National Power and Potential Contributions to National Security; Civil-military Relations; Instruments of War and National Security; History as a Vehicle for Understanding Strategic Alternatives and Choices.

c. Special Themes: None.

INVASION AND THE U.S. RESPONSE

Mode: Seminar

ISS-04-S

1. Introduction.

a. The reason why wars occur and recur is a complex subject, although there is a tendency among both scholars and practitioners to seek a single factor. Unsurprisingly, analysts who study war from a variety of disciplinary perspectives (e.g., biologists, philosophers, historians, and social scientists) do not agree as to what the causes are. Some focus on events that trigger conflict, while others examine the conditions surrounding a particular war arguing that each case is unique. Others, taking different theoretical approaches, consider the structure of the international system or the domestic politics of nation-states, especially their enduring beliefs and values. Still others focus on human nature, the psychological makeup of political leaders or group behavior, or humankind's propensity for violent behavior. Even these identified approaches do not exhaust the possibilities. Yet, examining the causes of war is not a mere academic exercise; it is also an important subject for strategic leaders since the causes of war can help anticipate the actions of a potential adversary and influence the formulation of feasible policy options. Additionally, the decision for war is one fraught with risk, which in ideal circumstances relies on political leaders rationally calculating the costs and benefits of undertaking such an aggressive act.

b. In this lesson, we examine the reason why Iraq invaded Kuwait and the U.S. response. Both aspects are relevant. Why did Iraq attack Kuwait? Was it simply a matter of Saddam Hussein's desire to annex Kuwaiti territory and resources? If so, what were his motives? Did he misperceive how the U.S. would respond? If so, what contributed to his misunderstanding of U.S. interests? Did the U.S. transmit conflicting signals to Hussein?

c. It is equally important to examine the willingness of the U.S. to take steps toward war first by using the economic instrument of power, and ultimately, military force. In scrutinizing the U.S. stance, it is critical to consider such issues as the strategic environment in the late Cold War era, U.S. national interests in the Persian Gulf region, and President Bush's political experience, leadership, and decisionmaking process. Understanding and examining these complicated features make the study of war an interesting but difficult undertaking.

2. Learning Objectives.

- a. Interpret the events that precipitated the Iraq invasion of Kuwait.
- b. Understand how senior leaders responded to the invasion.

c. Examine how senior leaders initially employed U.S. capabilities.

3. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks. Read the assigned readings and be prepared to discuss in seminar.

b. Required Readings.

(1) William T. Allison, *The Gulf War, 1990-91* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2012). Review: Preface and Chapters 1-2. **[Student Issue]**

(2) Gary R. Hess, "George H. W. Bush and the Persian Gulf Crisis: This Aggression Will not Stand," in *Presidential Decisions for War: Korea, Vietnam, the Persian Gulf and Iraq* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009), 153-198. **[Student Issue]**

(3) Department of Defense, *Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress* (Washington, DC: DOD, April 1992). Read "Overview," pp. i-xxviii, "The Invasion of Kuwait," pp. 1-20 and "The Response to Aggression," pp. 21-35. **[Blackboard]**

(4) The White House, "Responding to Iraqi Aggression in the Gulf (U)," in *National Security Directive 54* (Washington, DC: The White House, January 15, 1991). **[Blackboard]**

4. Points to Consider.

a. What were the motives for Iraq's invasion of Kuwait? How did the historical U.S. national interests in the Middle East affect the U.S. response to the invasion?

b. What did U.S. political leaders believe their response should be to the invasion? Did the U.S. response change after the immediate crisis had passed?

c. What policy objectives did President Bush want to attain by employing U.S. forces and other capabilities?

5. Relationship to JPME II Joint Learning Areas (JLAs).

a. JLA 1.a. b. c.

b. JLA 2.c.

c. JLA 3.a.

d. JLA 4.a.

e. JLA 5.a, b, d, f, g.

6. Relationship to USAWC Program Learning Objectives (PLOs), and Enduring and Special Themes.

a. PLOs: 1, 2, 3 7, 9.

b. Enduring Themes: Strategic Leadership and the Exercise of Discretionary Judgment; Relationship of Policy and Strategy; Instruments of National Power and Potential Contributions to National Security; Civil-military Relations; Instruments of War and National Security; History as a Vehicle for Understanding Strategic Alternatives and Choices.

c. Special Themes: None.

BUILDING A COALITION

Mode: Seminar

ISS-05-S

1. Introduction.

a. The formation of coalitions for the conduct of war requires the art of diplomacy. Unlike alliances, where there is a formal agreement, that is, a treaty, whereby two or more nations (actors) agree to collaborate for mutual security, including war, coalitions can be fragile arrangements. They are usually temporary or even a matter of expediency. Thus, coalitions rely on willing association based on common concerns or interests. Moreover, where alliances impose mutual obligations, coalitions rely on actors recognizing that they share an interest of such a magnitude that they are willing to act with other states to attain a common policy goal. The diplomatic instrument is crucial in the formation of coalitions since a state that believes its interests are threatened or at risk must convince other states that they share these same or related interests and that they should invest resources, and even lives, to attain their shared objective.

b. In this lesson, we will explore two major efforts. The first concerns how the Bush administration organized the coalition for the Persian Gulf War. As William Allison points out in his study of the conflict, the President and other senior U.S. officials invested substantial effort in assembling and preserving the coalition in response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The first step was the diplomatic effort to persuade likeminded states to impose economic sanctions on Iraq (the economic instrument of power) through a United Nations Security Council resolution that would induce Iraq to remove their military forces from Kuwait. When this approach did not resolve the problem, then the focus of U.S. and coalition diplomats turned to securing a United Nations Security Council Resolution to compel Iraqi military forces to leave Kuwait. Underlying U.S. diplomatic efforts were the administration's attention to U.S. domestic politics to build support for the possible use of force with particular attention to the role of Congress. This domestic debate ultimately put the spotlight on the Congressional vote on the use of force that took place on the eve of war.

c. The second major focus of the lesson is to consider the use of the military instrument of power through campaign planning from both a U.S. perspective (joint) and a coalition perspective. The planning effort was no small feat. There are sizable challenges in coordinating among the armed forces of a single nation even using the existing geographical combatant command structure, Central Command in this case. Ultimately, the coalition consisted of 34 countries, including several Arab states, many of whom provided substantial military assistance (land, air, and naval forces). To coordinate this effort effectively, U.S. military planners had to create an organizational

structure to integrate coalition planners in the planning process and ensure the successful execution of the plan by coalition forces.

2. Learning Objectives.

a. Examine how the U.S. built a multi-national coalition to attain its policy objectives (DIME).

b. Examine the evolution of the joint and coalition planning effort.

c. Examine how national leaders successfully attained authorization to liberate Kuwait. (i.e., national and international).

3. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks. Read the assigned readings and be prepared to discuss in seminar.

b. Required Readings.

(1) William T. Allison, *The Gulf War, 1990-91* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2012), 40-77. Review: Chapters 3 and 4. **[Student Issue]**

(2) James A. Baker III with Thomas M. DeFrank, "Building the Coalition," and "All Necessary Means," in *The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War and Peace, 1989-1993* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1995), 277-328. **[Blackboard]**

(3) Department of Defense, "Transition to the Offensive," in *Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress* (Washington, DC: DOD, April 1992), 83-108. **[Blackboard]**

(4) UN Security Council, *Resolution 678 (1990)*, November 29, 1990, <http://www.worldlii.org/int/other/UNSC/1990/32.pdf> (accessed July 13, 2015). **[Online]**

4. Points to Consider.

a. What challenges (e.g., logistical, organizational, financial) do strategic leaders face with deploying forces to another nation in an area of operations that is a considerable distance from CONUS?

b. What were the key elements involved in planning for a successful offensive operation?

c. What were the political steps necessary (domestically and internationally) for the Bush administration to attain authorization to liberate Kuwait, using force, if necessary?

d. What were the economic ramifications for the US economy and for the global economy in deciding to use economic sanctions to coerce Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait?

5. Relationship to JPME II Joint Learning Areas (JLAs).

a. JLA 1.a, b, c, d, e.

b. JLA 2.b, c, f.

c. JLA 3.a, b, c, d.

d. JLA 4.a, c.

e. JLA 5.a, b, d, e, f.

6. Relationship to USAWC Program Learning Objectives (PLOs), and Enduring and Special Themes.

a. PLOs: 1, 2, 7, 8, 9, 10.

b. Enduring Themes: Strategic Leadership and the Exercise of Discretionary Judgment; Relationship of Policy and Strategy; Instruments of National Power and Potential Contributions to National Security; Civil-military Relations; Instruments of War and National Security; History as a Vehicle for Understanding Strategic Alternatives and Choices.

c. Special Themes: None.

LIBERATION OF KUWAIT

Mode: Seminar

ISS-06-S

1. Introduction.

a. For most citizens throughout the world in the early months of 1991, the Persian Gulf War was an event of daily interest, brought into living rooms and other places where people congregated, by various television networks and especially CNN, the 24-hour news channel founded a decade earlier. Not only did the numerous reporters on the ground cover air and ground operations in depth, but the Pentagon conducted extensive briefings for journalists and, more importantly, the public as a means of shaping opinion. It was largely a televised war, one in which U.S. taxpayers learned firsthand about the investments in capabilities they had made possible in the previous decade. Pundits also viewed it as a psychological turning point. President George H. W. Bush declared to the U.S. Congress on March 3, 1991, when touting the military campaign's success, "We have finally kicked the Vietnam syndrome."

b. This lesson investigates the coalition's military operations and their contribution to this military triumph, delving into the immediate preparations for the offensive campaign, the air attack, the ground attack, and the often-neglected element, the maritime campaign. Victory was not, however, a foregone conclusion. Therefore, in dissecting these military operations, it is critical to examine the factors that contributed to the effective outcome. These factors include planning, training, technology, doctrine, and even the application of airpower theory to the campaign. Other conditions were also important such as terrain and weather. Yet, in using any case study, the cautious application of analogical reasoning is paramount to comprehending the critical lessons that may be useful in other instances. As the authors of the Defense Department's report on the Gulf War observed: "Prudence dictates that national defense planning assume future adversaries will be more adept, better equipped, and more effective than Saddam Hussein." This is a vital point. The detailed analysis of history has much to teach strategic leaders, including how the present situation or a future scenario may be similar and dissimilar from the past, provided they are willing to evaluate the evidence before them critically.

2. Learning Objectives.

- a. Examine the implementation of coalition operations.
- b. Analyze how senior leaders prosecuted the campaign..

3. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks. None.

b. Required Readings.

(1) Department of Defense, *Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress* (Washington, DC: DOD, April 1992). Read “The Air Campaign,” pp. 117-141; “The Maritime Campaign,” pp. 249-256; and “The Ground Campaign,” pp. 311-348.

[Blackboard]

(2) Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations, *Core Course Introduction to Strategic Studies, Case Study: Operation DESERT STORM* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, August 2015). **[Blackboard]**

(3) William T. Allison, *The Gulf War, 1990-91* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2012), 78-144. Review: Chapters 5 through 7. **[Student Issue]**

4. Points to Consider.

a. What strategic centers of gravity did each side identify? How well were they understood and attacked? [Alternatively, how well did the U.S. understand its strengths and vulnerabilities. How well did the U.S. exploit its strengths and guard against its vulnerabilities?]

b. How well were command and control relationships structured in order to plan and execute military operations effectively? Consider links between tactical, theater (combatant command), national, and coalition organizations involved in war.

c. How strategically effective was air power in the Gulf War? Landpower?

d. What role did coalitions play in the Gulf War? Were they an asset or a hindrance to strategic success? Why or why not?

5. Relationship to JPME II Joint Learning Areas (JLAs).

a. JLA 1.a, b, c, d, e.

b. JLA 2.b, c, f.

c. JLA 3.a, b, c, d.

d. JLA 4.a, c.

e. JLA 5.a, b, d, e, f.

6. Relationship to USAWC Program Learning Objectives (PLOs), and Enduring and Special Themes.

a. PLOs: 1, 2, 7, 8, 9, 10.

b. Enduring Themes: Strategic Leadership and the Exercise of Discretionary Judgment; Relationship of Policy and Strategy; Instruments of National Power and Potential Contributions to National Security; Civil-military Relations; Instruments of War and National Security; History as a Vehicle for Understanding Strategic Alternatives and Choices.

c. Special Themes: None.

AFTERMATH

Mode: Seminar

ISS-07-S

1. Introduction.

a. As the historian Jeffrey Kimball has pointed out, research into how wars end as a separate field of historical and social science investigation is relatively new, having its beginning in the 1960s. There are a number of reasons why this subject became of interest at this particular time, but certainly, the ongoing U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War was a contributor. Consequently, one of the outcomes of this research was that scholars started to categorize war termination into three general categories. The first category comprises cases in which there was a decisive victory by one combatant and the conditional or unconditional surrender of the opponent. The second category consists of instances where an outside power or powers impose peace terms on the belligerents. The final category encompasses armistices that belligerents negotiate, which bring about the cessation of fighting and an agreement identifying specific concessions on political and military matters. However, such broad categories can obscure some larger issues associated with ending wars. These issues include planning for conflict termination and post-conflict activities, determining the conditions under which a peace settlement might occur, assessing when the timing is suitable for peace negotiations to be initiated, deciding when the politico-military stakes are no longer valid or just, and in a democracy, concluding that public opinion no longer supports the war.

b. Many of these fundamental concerns were present in the Persian Gulf War. The United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) that authorized the use of force and the Bush administration's declaration of war aims were important factors in ending military action against Iraq and the removal of sanctions, provided Iraq accepted and complied with the conditions that the UN Security Council established. Additionally, once the coalition achieved the mandate specified in UNSCR 678, and therefore believed it had achieved its objective of expelling Iraqi forces from Kuwait, the odds of maintaining the coalition began to diminish considerably. As the readings indicate, the Bush administration linked the Persian Gulf War to its larger foreign policy goals concerning how to handle aggression in a Cold War period that was beginning to end, and equally important, how this incident could strengthen U.S. relations with regional states in addition to bringing stability to the Middle East. For all these reasons, understanding how national interests as well as security policy and strategy connect to the conduct of military operations is an essential component of this lesson.

2. Learning Objectives.

- a. Examine how senior leaders balanced policy objectives with military operations.
- b. Examine the terms and conditions for terminating offensive operations.
- c. Examine the outcomes and consequences of the campaign.

3. Student Requirements.

- a. Tasks. Read the assigned readings and be prepared to discuss in seminar.
- b. Required Readings.

(1) William T. Allison, *The Gulf War, 1990-91* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2012), 145-165. Review: Chapter 8. **[Student Issue]**

(2) Gary R. Hess, "George H. W. Bush as Commander in Chief: The Imperatives of Coalition Warfare," in *Presidential Decisions for War: Korea, Vietnam, the Persian Gulf and Iraq* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009), 210-220. **[Student Issue]**

(3) General H. Norman Schwarzkopf with Peter Petre, *It Doesn't Take A Hero: General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, The Autobiography* (New York: Bantam Books, 1992), 466-491. **[Blackboard]**

(4) UN Security Council, *Resolution 686 (1991)*, March 2, 1991, <http://www.worldlii.org/int/other/UNSC/1991/3.pdf> (accessed July 13, 2015). **[Online]**

(5) George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, "Desert Storm" and "After the Storm," in *A World Transformed* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998), 450-492. **[Blackboard]**

(6) James A. Baker III with Thomas M. DeFrank, "Saddam Stays in Power," in *The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War and Peace, 1989-1992* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1995), 435-442. **[Blackboard]**

4. Points to Consider.

a. Ultimately, what U.S. national interests and foreign policy objectives did the Bush Administration consider vital enough to use force? How did the changing strategic environment affect their definition of those interests and objectives?

b. What factors should strategic leaders consider in ending a conflict? What importance do ethics and the laws of war have in terminating a war?

c. Was the Persian Gulf War a “victory” for the U.S. and its coalition partners? If so, how do you define victory? If not, then why was the U.S. and its coalition partner’s efforts unsuccessful?

d. What were the lessons of the war for U.S. military forces, especially with respect to such issues as operational planning, command and control of a multinational force, investment in high-technology weapons, and military leadership?

5. Relationship to JPME II Joint Learning Areas (JLAs).

a. JLA 1.a, b, c, d, e.

b. JLA 2.b, c, f.

c. JLA 3.a, b, c, d.

d. JLA 4.a, c.

e. JLA 5.a, b, c, e, f, g.

6. Relationship to USAWC Program Learning Objectives (PLOs), and Enduring and Special Themes.

a. PLOs: 1, 2, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10.

b. Enduring Themes: Strategic Leadership and the Exercise of Discretionary Judgment; Relationship of Policy and Strategy; Instruments of National Power and Potential Contributions to National Security; Civil-military Relations; Instruments of War and National Security; History as a Vehicle for Understanding Strategic Alternatives and Choices.

c. Special Themes: None.

SECTION V – APPENDIX

USAWC MISSION

The USAWC educates and develops leaders for service at the strategic level while advancing knowledge in the global application of Landpower.

PROGRAM LEARNING OBJECTIVES (PLOS)

The School of Strategic Landpower (SSL) establishes program learning objectives (PLO) that delineate critical fields of knowledge and appropriate jurisdictions of practice for our students to master. The core competence of our graduates is leadership in the global application of strategic Landpower.

To accomplish its mission, SSL presents a curriculum designed to produce graduates who can:

PLO 1. Apply critical and creative thinking to national security issues and the environment at the strategic level.

PLO 2. Demonstrate the ability to communicate clearly, persuasively, and candidly.

PLO 3. Demonstrate anticipation and adaptation to surprise and uncertainty.

PLO 4. Understand how to recognize change and lead transitions.

PLO 5. Analyze ethical decisions and distinguish military cultures that reflect the values and traditions of the American profession of arms.

PLO 6. Understand the ability to operate on intent through trust, empowerment, and understanding (Mission Command).

PLO 7. Assess the strategic security environment and the contributions of all instruments of national power.

PLO 8. Apply theories of war and strategy to national security challenges.

PLO 9. Assess the processes and relationships of the Department of Defense, as well as those of interagency, intergovernmental, multinational, and nongovernmental organizations.

PLO 10. Understand the utility of Landpower in joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational operations.

SERVICE SENIOR-LEVEL COLLEGE
JOINT LEARNING AREAS AND OBJECTIVES
(JPME Phase II)

SOURCE: The REP and DEP curricula address requirements for JLAs and JLOs derived from CJCSI 1800.01E, *Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP)*, May 29, 2015, Enclosure E-E-1.

1. Learning Area 1 - National Security Strategy.

a. Apply key strategic concepts, critical thinking and analytical frameworks to formulate and execute strategy.

b. Analyze the integration of all instruments of national power in complex, dynamic and ambiguous environments to attain objectives at the national and theater-strategic levels.

c. Evaluate historical and/or contemporary security environments and applications of strategies across the range of military operations.

d. Apply strategic security policies, strategies and guidance used in developing plans across the range of military operations and domains to support national objectives.

e. Evaluate how the capabilities and limitations of the U.S. Force structure affect the development and implementation of security, defense and military strategies.

2. Learning Area 2 - Joint Warfare, Theater Strategy and Campaigning for Traditional and Irregular Warfare in a Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental and Multinational Environment.

a. Evaluate the principles of joint operations, joint military doctrine, joint functions (command and control, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection and sustainment), and emerging concepts across the range of military operations.

b. Evaluate how theater strategies, campaigns and major operations achieve national strategic goals across the range of military operations.

c. Apply an analytical framework that addresses the factors politics, geography, society, culture and religion play in shaping the desired outcomes of policies, strategies and campaigns.

d. Analyze the role of OCS in supporting Service capabilities and joint functions to meet strategic objectives considering the effects contracting and contracted support have on the operational environment.

e. Evaluate how strategic level plans anticipate and respond to surprise, uncertainty, and emerging conditions.

f. Evaluate key classical, contemporary and emerging concepts, including IO and cyber space operations, doctrine and traditional/ irregular approaches to war.

3. Learning Area 3 - National and Joint Planning Systems and Processes for the Integration of JIIM Capabilities.

a. Analyze how DoD, interagency and intergovernmental structures, processes, and perspectives reconcile, integrate and apply national ends, ways and means.

b. Analyze the operational planning and resource allocation processes.

c. Evaluate the integration of joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational capabilities, including all Service and Special Operations Forces, in campaigns across the range of military operations in achieving strategic objectives.

d. Value a joint perspective and appreciate the increased power available to commanders through joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational efforts.

e. Analyze the likely attributes of the future joint force and the challenges faced to plan, organize, prepare, conduct and assess operations.

4. Learning Area 4 - Command, Control and Coordination.

a. Evaluate the strategic-level options available in the joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational environment.

b. Analyze the factors of Mission Command as it relates to mission objectives, forces and capabilities that support the selection of a command and control option.

c. Analyze the opportunities and challenges affecting command and control created in the joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational environment across the range of military operations, to include leveraging networks and technology.

5. Learning Area 5 - Strategic Leadership and the Profession of Arms.

a. Evaluate the skills, character attributes and behaviors needed to lead in a dynamic joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational strategic environment.

b. Evaluate critical strategic thinking, decisionmaking and communication by strategic leaders.

c. Evaluate how strategic leaders develop innovative organizations capable of operating in dynamic, complex and uncertain environments; anticipate change; and respond to surprise and uncertainty.

d. Evaluate how strategic leaders communicate a vision; challenge assumptions; and anticipate, plan, implement and lead strategic change in complex joint or combined organizations.

e. Evaluate historic and contemporary applications of the elements of mission command by strategic-level leaders in pursuit of national objectives.

f. Evaluate how strategic leaders foster responsibility, accountability, selflessness and trust in complex joint or combined organizations.

g. Evaluate how strategic leaders establish and sustain an ethical climate among joint and combined forces, and develop/preserve public trust with their domestic citizenry.

ENDURING THEMES

Elihu Root's challenge provides the underpinnings for enduring themes within the USAWC curriculum. The enduring themes stimulate intellectual growth by providing continuity and perspective as we analyze contemporary issues.

- Strategic Leadership and the exercise of discretionary judgment
 - Evaluate leadership at the strategic level (national security policy and strategy, especially in war)
 - Understand the profession's national security clients and its appropriate jurisdictions of practice
 - Evaluate leadership of large, national security organizations
 - Evaluate strategic thinking about the future (2nd and 3rd order effects)
 - Analyze the framework for leadings and managing strategic change, specifically the components of organizational change and the process by which organizations change.
- Relationship of policy and strategy (relationship between ends, ways, and means)
 - Analyze how to accomplish national security aims to win wars
 - Analyze how to connect military actions to larger policy aims
 - Analyze how to resource national security
 - Evaluate international relations as the context for national security

- Instruments of national power and potential contributions to national security
 - Comprehend Diplomatic Power
 - Comprehend Informational power
 - Evaluate Military Power
 - Comprehend economic power

- Professional ethics
 - Evaluate the ethics of military operations (to include jus in bello and post bello)
 - Evaluate the ethics of war and the use of force (to include jus ad bellum)
 - Evaluate the ethics of service to society (domestic civil-military relations)

- Civil-Military Relations
 - Evaluate relationships between military and civilian leadership
 - Evaluate relationships between the military and domestic society
 - Evaluate relationships between armed forces and foreign populations

- Instruments of war and national security
 - Joint: Evaluate the capabilities and domains of joint forces (especially land, maritime, air, space, cyber)
 - Interagency: Understand other U.S. government agencies and departments
 - Intergovernmental; Understand potential relationships with other national governments
 - Multinational: Understand potential relationships with armed forces or agencies of other nations/coalition partners

- History as a vehicle for understanding strategic alternatives and choices
 - Identify and analyze relevant historical examples of strategic leadership and strategic choices (across time and around the world)
 - Evaluate historical examples relevant to war and other national security endeavors

SPECIAL THEME FOR COMMANDANT'S LECTURE SERIES (CLS)

The AY16 special theme is “**Educating and Developing Adaptive Senior Leaders for a Complex World.**” This draws on key elements from the Chief of Staff of the Army priorities: “Adaptive Army Leaders for a Complex World” and “A Globally Responsive and Regionally Engaged Army.”

Supporting elements of the theme:

- Analyze means for strengthening education and life-long learning
- Evaluate the evolving roles and challenges for strategic leaders
- Evaluate and refine concepts of strategic leadership and mission command
- Evaluate ways to better work across domains (land, sea, air, space, and cyber)
- Understand and evaluate competing visions of American grand strategy as they affect evolving joint concepts and capabilities, particularly with respect to Landpower
- Understand the International environment, particularly the ‘security paradox’ posed by positive global trends potentially subject to increasingly dangerous threats
- Understand American domestic political priorities and constraints
- Evaluate Integration with allies and partners--traditional and non-traditional
- Evaluate the relevance of post-9/11 experience with respect to anticipated future challenges

The Commandant's Lecture Series (CLS) presents prominent speakers of the highest quality, representing diverse backgrounds, expertise, and varied perspectives. A limited number of lecturers, with a formal invitation by the Commandant, will explore the special theme. Chairman DMSPO, with the assistance of the Deputy Dean, will schedule the lectures throughout the academic year. Faculty will nominate speakers and the Commandant will approve speakers and topics. Students may have assigned readings to provide context and background information for the series and will have seminar time to reflect upon the lecture.