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FORWARD

As the U.S. Army adapts to the complexities and uncertainties of the 21st Century security environment, doctrine and organizations will continue to change. This evolution must account for the expanding challenge of operating in and among the people, in an era of diminishing resources.

The Combined/Joint Forces Land Component Command (C/JFLCC) Commander’s overall responsibilities are to plan, coordinate, and employ land forces made available for tasking in support of the Joint Force Commander’s (JFC’s) concept of the operation (CONOPS). Modern joint and multinational operations encompass the full spectrum of air, land, maritime, space and now cyber forces operating throughout the operational area. Advances in capabilities among all forces, and the ability to rapidly extend operational reach over vast distances, have made the effective application of military power in the 21st Century even more dependent on the commander’s ability to synchronize and integrate joint land operations with other military and civilian operations.

DEFINITION: LANDPOWER

*The ability—to gain, sustain, and exploit control over land, resources, and people.* (ADP 1)

This reference guide offers the “how to,” presented succinctly with observations and insights from combat-experienced senior commanders, and is intended for senior officers. It addresses: the roles and responsibilities of an Theater Army/Army Service Component Command (ASCC); as it conducts long term support to a combatant command; and, if tasked, how it could transition to a C/JFLCC. It also addresses the supporting and enabling role a Theater Army plays when a Corps Headquarters is designated the C/JFLCC in a joint operations area (JOA). By combining experienced insights with doctrinal references, this guide will assist senior leaders to visualize the
challenges that they are likely to face as Land Component Commanders for theater-level operations conducted in a joint, interorganizational, and multinational (JIM) environment. The conduct of unified land operations, employing an appropriate mix of combined arms maneuver and wide area security enabled by mission command, remains a central component of our national security. Despite the Army’s organizational shift to brigade combat teams, the United States military must have commanders that can quickly organize, train, and lead large land headquarters, when required by the mission.

The Army is and will continue to be the backbone of the Joint Force, providing fundamental capabilities to each of the Combatant Commanders such as command and control, logistics, intelligence and communications support to set the theater, as well as providing ground combat forces, Special Operations Forces and Joint Task Force headquarters. Demand for Army capabilities and presence continues to increase across Combatant Commands in response to emerging contingencies. The Army has sent rotational forces to Europe, Kuwait and the Republic of Korea, and established JTF Headquarters in Iraq, Afghanistan, Honduras, the Horn of Africa, and Jordan. In multiple Areas of Responsibility, the Army is meeting simultaneous requirements based on our ten primary DSG missions. As part of the Joint Force, we support Combatant Commanders and work with interagency partners and our allies to enhance security cooperation, provide foreign humanitarian assistance, build partner capacity, and participate in multi-lateral exercises.

THE HONORABLE JOHN M. McHUGH, SECRETARY OF THE ARMY and
GENERAL RAYMOND T. ODIERNO CHIEF OF STAFF UNITED STATES ARMY
PURPOSE AND SCOPE

This Commander’s Reference Guide supplements Joint Publication 3-31, *Command and Control for Joint Land Operations* and FM 3-94, *Theater Army, Corps, and Division Operations*. It draws on current doctrine, relevant studies, and current best practices to provide fundamental principles, techniques, and procedures that are evolving in the joint community and moving toward incorporation into various joint publications. It can be used independently to help senior officers address the key tasks and functions they may be responsible for as an Army or Marine Service Component Commander, designated CJFLCC Commander, or as a Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Commander focused principally on land operations (e.g., Multi National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) or Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan (CFC-A)). Since 2001, the U.S. Armed Forces have conducted extended ground combat operations, with multiple headquarters transitions, in multiple and simultaneous operational areas. This guide offers insight into the conduct of those operations but reminds the reader that the Army must be prepared to initiate, as well as sustain, major land operations. There are considerably different challenges associated with beginning operations from a “cold start,” as we did in Operation Enduring Freedom I (OEF I) and Operation Iraqi Freedom I (OIF I) than from sustaining ground combat operations through the periodic rotation of forces. The leader skills, the detailed planning, and the entire “set the theater” function associated with the “cold start” are not competencies we can afford to lose. Discussions addressing Multi Domain Operations (MDO) reinforce the idea that headquarters at echelons above brigade (EAB) are required capabilities that set the conditions that will either create or limit strategic options for the commander. Operations in Haiti, West Africa, and the establishment of Combined Joint Forces Land Component Command-Iraq (CJFLCC-I, Annex A) remind us of the need to maintain capable, responsive, and operationally adaptable land headquarters. This guide serves to help us remember what we have so painfully learned from our OIF I experiences, the United States will likely do something similar, someday, somewhere, in another part of the globe.
This guide is not intended to replace existing doctrine. However, it does highlight what former commanders recommend they should: be thinking about; who they should be talking to; and, how they should be shaping guidance; to effectively focus their staff. The staff will probably be a formed from: additional joint augementees; coalition liaison elements; and, intergovernmental elements; as the headquarters transitions from an Army or Marine Service Component Headquarters to a C/JFLCC (combined and/or joint) headquarters. It is intended to be a hip-pocket tool for Commanders who already have plenty in their rucksack. Much of what is found in this reference guide is derived from the iterations of the C/JFLCC Course taught at the U. S. Army War College. This course is now approaching its 15th anniversary and has graduated over 597 general officer and senior advisor attendees. The attendees provided informed discussions of the challenges for planning and conducting sustained operations on land between senior: Joint leaders; coalition partners; interagency representatives; senior members of a broad range of international organizations; and Highly Qualified Expert-Senior Mentors (HQE-SM) with a wealth of experience.

DEFINITION: JFLCC

The commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or a joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of assigned, attached, and/or made available for tasking land forces; planning and coordinating land operations; or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The joint force land component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. Joint Pub 3-31

We have been given more tools and capabilities to help us to think more comprehensively about the operational environment. This guide is provided to serve as one of those valuable tools. We will continue to evolve this guide based on reader experiences and feedback. Accordingly, we welcome any thoughts, comments, or recommendations.
GENERAL

C/JFLCC Mission Areas

As reflected in Annex B, JP 3-31, Command and Control for Joint Land Operations, 24 February 2014, based on experience in the Central Command AOR, the C/JFLCC commander is normally responsible to the geographic combatant commander for six enduring mission areas, each viewed through a landpower lens

- Set the Conditions in the Theater/Set the Theater.
- Assess the Theater and Threat.
- Build the Joint Land Operations Plan
- Receive the Land Force.
- Fight the Land Force.
- Contribute to Operations or Campaign Success.

These mission areas will help the commander think about how to organize and train the C/JFLCC headquarters, determine linkages to organizations inside and outside the combatant command, and to set priorities in planning and executing major land operations that ultimately secure or enable enduring strategic success. In the Army’s FM 3-94, Theater Army, Corps, and Division Operations, the roles and responsibilities of division and corps headquarters and the theater army headquarters are clarified. To summarize this fundamental change, the strategy for global mission command of Army forces relies on the corps headquarters to command major operations instead of theater armies. Under the revised operational concept, theater armies operate as operational headquarters that utilize contingency command posts (CCP) to deploy mission command capability for small-scale contingency operations, including limited intervention, peacekeeping operations, and peacetime military engagement operations. Corps are designed to serve as the senior Army operational headquarters in a Joint Operational Area
(operational ARFOR) for mission command of major land operations. When designated, the corps headquarters may serve as the base organization for the formation of Joint Task Force (JTF) or Joint Force Land Component Command (JFLCC)/Army Force (ARFOR) headquarters to mission command major operations. However, the CCP, or Operational Command Posts (OCP), have not been resourced and removed effectively from the organizations. These changes are being codified doctrinally however, a capability gap now exists with a lack of an operational headquarters in every geographic combatant command (GCC) AOR. The defacto forces on the ground in the AOR become the only forces available for immediate response and initial action.

What remains unchanged are the six missions identified in JP3-31 above that normally fall to a C/JFLCC regardless of headquarters echelon. Current and projected force sizing initiatives have reduced the size of headquarters organizations and eliminated many CCP. The CCP still provides a good organizational headquarters model to consider for initial coordination of contingency operations. Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) are further considering these requirements.

**Understanding the Operational Environment**

It’s important to plan and execute these tasks with careful and deliberate consideration of the operational environment. The operational environment of today includes a far broader range of factors than ever before that must be fully addressed in campaign planning including: the increasingly important information dimension; cyberspace; political, social, cultural, and religious elements; and, increased global interdependency. Commanders cannot focus exclusively on the enemy. To better understand the environment and the problem to be solved, the joint community is now using “design” and “Army Design Methodology” as tools to achieve greater and more comprehensive understanding. This is approach is now codified in Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 5-0, *The Operations Process*, released in May 2012.

Given the inherent challenges of conducting land operations the use of design by the C/JFLCC Commander and his staff is encouraged. Design will not solve the problems, but it does provide a useful framework to consider complex, ill-structured problems.
Three Star Typical Duties

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SECTION I. C/JFLCC MAJOR MISSION AREAS

A. Set the Conditions in Theater/Set the Theater. The GCC owns the theater, but the theater JFLCC, when designated, plays a significant role in setting the theater to support a wide range of contingencies. The JFLCC typically addresses this mission area through the conduct of the GCC’s theater campaign plan or strategy as a steady state, pre-conflict, or competition activity. Each of the Service components leverage engagement activity to: strengthen military-to military and political-to-military relationships; increase the military capabilities of friendly countries; assure allies and partners; increase understanding of the operational environment; and, obtain and maintain access to key nodes within the AOR.

Set the Conditions in Theater:

Component forces, in support of the combatant commander, work with joint and multinational partners to set the conditions to: prevent conflict; execute contingency plans; transition to the next phase of the operation; and, set the conditions for actions by the corps/divisions and lower echelons. This is both a continuous process and an essential required capability for all that follows. Recent operations have forced commands to broaden collection and assessment activities beyond typical enemy order-of-battle analysis. A more detailed understanding of the operational environment is required. History and culture of peoples in the area of interest, infrastructure status, the strength of civil institutions, tribal and ethnic divisions, alligences, and hierarchies (among others) are central to C/JFLCC planning and execution activities. This assessment must be made in context of the theater or surrounding regions. However difficult it may be, the commander must understand the complex relationships between the focus country and its neighbors. This collection and assessment approach must include the entire C/JFLCC. It is not a C/J2 function alone; every Soldier is a collector, and there should be a reporting process in place to reinforce and capitalize on this capability. Even as the C/JFLCC transitions to
combat operations, this collection and assessment process must continue to inform decision that will shape how and when transitions should occur about current and future operations. Commanders and staffs must dedicate a great deal of energy to understanding the electromagnetic environment and the cyberspace aspects of the operational environment. This collective understanding enlightens a well integrated, holistic information operations effort and also aids broader communications synchronization activities that are reinforced by the actions of Soldiers and personnel on the ground. Understanding the electromagnetic spectrum: who uses it; how it can be effectively managed given the variety of emitters in the operating area; and perhaps most importantly, how an adversary can leverage it against coalition forces is simultaneously critical and difficult.

Directly related to the electromagnetic environment is the conduct of cyberspace operations. The National Military Strategy for Cyber Operations (NMS-CO) defines cyberspace as “a domain characterized by the use of electronics and the electromagnetic spectrum to store, modify, and exchange data via networked systems and associated physical infrastructures.” Increasingly, the C/JFLCC Commander must understand how to conduct these operations in close coordination with the other components and, in some cases, other government entities.

Set the Theater. The C/JFLCC Commander typically addresses this mission area through the conduct of the combatant commander’s theater campaign plan (TCP), as a preconflict or competition period activity, informed by continuous assessment of the Area of Responsibility (AOR). Each of the Service components leverage synchronized engagement activities to

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1 ADRP 3-0 replaces the five Army information tasks with inform and influence activities (IIA) and cyber/electromagnetic (C/EM) activities.
strengthen military-military and political-military relationships, increase the military capabilities of friendly countries, and obtain and maintain access to key nodes within the AOR. Building Partner Capability (BPC) and Security Force Assistance (SFA) activities have received considerable emphasis in national security guidance and joint and service doctrine. The land component plays a significant role in the planning and conduct of these activities. The C/JFLCC, however, has additional tasks that must be addressed within this mission area. Establishing and growing robust mission command networks and systems architecture; positioning Army and joint logistics material forward for quick access; investing in Seaport of Debarkation (SPOD) and Airport of Debarkation (APOD) infrastructure in coordination with the host countries; and, establishing base camp plans to facilitate rapid Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration (JRSOI); are a few of the many tasks that the C/JFLCC should be working on continuously to “set the theater.”

Shaping the information environment is an essential element of the combatant commander’s TCP strategy. The theater army and/or C/JFLCC Commander must prioritize this effort. Information activities should be coupled with operational activities; each must complement and reinforce the other. Information operations collectively must be considered as a main effort for the C/JFLCC. Information operations can play a pivotal role in preventing conflict and enabling land operations if deterrence fails. Communications synchronization and broad engagement activities that are grounded in an understanding of the people and institutions found in the operating area can be significant force multipliers.

Building partnership capacity in an era of prolonged conflict is not the theater army or C/JFLCC’s responsibility alone, but the theater army- more than any other command or component- will operate directly with the region’s people and their respective armies. Use these engagement activities to learn as much as possible about the culture and the traditions of the population, not just the military organizations.

As the combatant commander and components respond to increased indications of likely conflict, theater preparation tasks receive greater priority and resourcing. There will be an increased demand to provide Army Support to Other Services (ASOS) tasks that will add complexity and further tax limited resources. The theater Army commander must deal with these tasks even
as he is transitioning his command to a C/JFLCC or JTF, conducting detailed mission planning, and attempting to get key enablers into theater. Coordinate preparation tasks with: the combatant commander; fellow component commanders; intergovernmental partners; and, multinational organizations as soon as possible. The C/JFLCC (theater army commander) plays a significant role in shaping the theater to support a wide range of contingencies.

Resourcing “set the theater” tasks can be difficult during the competition phase prior to conflict, but doing so determines the options available when conditions change. During the “peace” the theater land component can: strengthen relationships with coalition partners; invest in building new relationships; develop a better understanding of the operational area; and, improve the standing of the United States in the region to accomplish our national objectives.

B. Assess the Theater and the Threat. As with setting the theater, the theater and threat assessment is also a continuous process. Experience from Iraq and Afghanistan forced the commands to broaden their collection and assessment activities beyond typical order of battle analysis focused on conventional formations. Infrastructure status, the strength of institutions, tribal and ethnic divisions and hierarchies, and the history and culture of peoples in the area of interest [AOI], become central to C/JFLCC planning and execution activities. This collective understanding informs a well integrated, holistic, IO effort. This collection and assessment approach must include the entire land component. It is not a J-2 function alone; every military member is a collector and there should be a reporting process in place to reinforce this vision. Understanding the commander’s intent and context is particularly important at the operational and strategic levels. Accomplish as much preparation as possible prior to conflict. Leverage every resource to do so: interagency capabilities, multinational formations, liaisons, IGOs, and the reports of members of the staff as they move throughout the theater. This broad collection and assessment process must continue as the command transitions to combat operations. The collection effort should also shape and respond to post-conflict planning and operations.

C. Build the Combined/Joint Land Operations Plan. To a larger extent than the other components, the C/JFLCC joint land operations plan involves a broader range of military and nonmilitary organizations which require horizontal and vertical coordination. The C/JFLCC commander and his staff often coordinate with the same organizations and entities that the
combatant command staffs work with on related issues. This puts a premium on cross-talk between
the two staffs and a clear understanding of the combatant commander’s intent. The roles,
responsibilities, and authorities of the C/JFLCC staff working on issues outside the command will
never be absolutely clear. The more that they can be clarified by the commander, from higher to
lower, the better. Use of design to develop a common understanding will facilitate campaign plan
development.

**Design.** After receipt of a mission, order, guidance, directive, or identification of a complex,
ambiguous problem, commanders use Design to Frame the Operational Environment (OE), Frame
the Problem(s), and Frame a Broad Approach that provides a logic for needed actions. These three
frameworks represent a complete Design. Design can precede or run concurrently with planning,
preparation, execution, and assessment, but these are all interdependent and complementary
activities. Also, Design can be applied at any time:

- Design precedes detailed planning. This is the recommended approach when time, conditions,
and resources allow. It is recommended that design activities result in, among other things,
detailed guidance to planners.

- Design and planning are simultaneous. Commanders may not be able or willing to direct a
separate design phase prior to planning. In this case, the staff would follow the doctrinal
planning process while using design principles to inform their work.

- Design is required in the midst of on-going operations. If initial conditions were
misunderstood or changed significantly, the complexity and ambiguity of the OE may require
Design. Once the Commander decides Design is required, the team is built and timeline
established that accounts for ongoing operations. This is also relevant for a design principle
known as “re-framing” where changes required a relook of an original Design. This will be
discussed later in more detail.

In all three cases, commanders initiate Design because they need to understand their OE and must
resolve a complex, ambiguous problem. Design provides a means to comprehensively analyze
problems in the context of: the environment, the variables within that environment and their
relationship to one another, and the implications of actions resulting from the broad approach
considered. Design is actually a way to think about the OE, the problem to be solved, and the logic
of the broad approach.
Framing. As stated, there are three frames under consideration in Design. While there is no wrong answer for which framework to start working on first, the Broad Approach Frame is dependent on results from the OE and Problem Frames. It is typically recommended work start on the Problem(s) to be solved, but, if resources allow, there is another way. Break the design work into Problem Frame and OE Frame teams that initially work independently. When the teams are reunited, the frames will inform each other.

The Problem Frame is almost always about more than one problem. If the CJFLCC receives a clear mission and higher order, some of the problems may have been identified; however, leaders should not assume higher got the problems right. The number of problems in a complex and ambiguous OE could be viewed as limitless. This means the team must identify design problems that frame the mission set – the problems, possibly in question form, that, if answered, would significantly advance the cause across the OE. Assuming that higher additional problems should not be discarded or ignored; they could easily form future challenges or be the true problems of the OE. List and review them as the Design proceeds and after.

The OE Frame poses its own challenges concerning complexity and ambiguity. The statement that all models are wrong, but some are useful applies to the OE Frame. No model or frame can replicate the complexity of an OE, so they must be bounded and simplified to be useful. Identifying what relationships and artifacts in the OE matter, not to mention their relative value in
comparison, is daunting. It is recommended that the team develop a meaningful outline of key factors, then identify the most relevant elements of each factor to form the backbone of a written narrative that describes the OE. Examples of factors could be political, social, military, para-military, police, economic, and so on; the goal is to analyze what matters. Care should be given to include actors and relationships that effect the OE, whether they are in the OE or not. The OE is complex, but there will be trends, potentials, risks (to action or lack thereof), and opportunities. There will also be informal coalitions of people or groups in the OE who will oppose, support, or be neutral regarding our intervention. Their allegiances can and will change over time, but we must understand them to the fullest extent possible.

The Broad Approach Frame uses the problem and OE frames to build the logic for how the capabilities of the organization should be used to address the problems in the OE. Short of end states or definitive objectives, the approach may outline expected transitions, general goals in context, and the intellectual structure needed for the intervention. In essence, it answers the question: Broadly speaking, how do we move from where we are today in the OE to where we want to be in the future? The amount of time needed between today and the desired future is situation dependent, of course. This frame also accounts, whenever possible, for the reaction of those in and around the OE to the intervention. A Broad Approach should address key elements of the planned intervention, as well as the major activities of the coalition of participants. For example, it could be argued that the initial Broad Approach of the British in the Revolutionary War was to deal with and isolate the rabble in Boston, maintain their course, and demonstrate their authority. There were a variety of plans, Acts, and actions that extended from the logic of this Broad Approach; and this did not simply address the military instrument of power. It did not take long for the Americans to respond and force the British to “reframe.”

Reframing is a critical element in Design. Once a Design has been implemented, plans made, actions taken, and assessments generated -- conditions change. The key to reframing is identifying when the OE or problems have changed so much that the broad approach, with resulting plans and orders, is no longer providing the logical underpinning for actions and activities. In the British example above, it could be argued they reframed when they realized their initial approach was no longer addressing the right problem (more than Boston) and the OE was significantly different (Second Continental Congress and battles with volunteer militias/armies). Eventually the French,
technically not a primary OE actor at the outset, played a significant role; this alone proves the value of thoughtful reframing. In short, intervention changes problems and OEs, so the team must monitor over time to ensure the existing broad approach is sufficient.

The CJFLCC Commander and team can make great use of Design and design thinking. First, it is recommended that the CJFLCC use the design process to learn and build the team. Design thinking would naturally include not only other Landpower capabilities (coalition, U.S. Marine, U.S. Special Operations, Reserves), but it would ensure integration with other domains and components was considered and addressed. Design offers a way to ensure perspectives are included and ideas are exchanged in a disciplined manner, resulting in better understanding and trust. The goal of each frame should be a written product – Problem, OE, and Broad Approach. This provides the Commander a clear start point when developing guidance to planners and it offers subordinates the clearest possible logic for the approach being taken in the Land Domain. Success on Land is significant and desired, but not at the expense of national objectives. The best Design accounts for strategic and operational considerations that will, in the end, determine the overall success of the major operations or campaigns. Designs must ensure the broad approach to land problems is framed in a manner that accounts for operations in all Domains, as well as national objectives.

These few additional items might make a difference: Commander’s must be involved and make time, discourse and learning are critical, differing perspectives are encouraged, write and rewrite, useful products on time are better than 100% products too late, someone must maintain and watch the work over time, frames must be relooked when conditions change (reframe when needed), products should be shared with higher and adjacent units (this can be problematic because Design done well usually identifies issues in the team), capture and maintain ideas and thoughts over time (in four weeks, that bad idea might become the answer), and time spent identifying the problem and understanding the environment is time well spent.

**End States** - The land campaign plan should be structured to assure a strategic end state is achieved, not just a successful military end state. The implications of this simple statement are profound for the C/JFLCC. Central to the development of the joint land operations plan is well-understood higher headquarters intent, clear understanding of priorities, and a mission narrative that frames the operational approach. Recent operations have reinforced the importance of
planning that addresses the complete depth of the joint campaign, well past major combat operations. In close collaboration with the combatant commander, and with direction from senior policy makers, the C/JFLCC commander must understand the desired strategic end state and then build the joint land operations plan to either achieve that or facilitate its accomplishment.

Operational Integration - Equally important is an understanding of the other functional components plans, including their priorities and their constraints. Much of this thinking has now been codified in the Army Doctrinal Publication (ADP) 5-0, The Operations Process. Framing the problem supports a commander’s discourse with his superiors to define clearly the problem and expectations regarding its resolution. This problem framing component of campaign planning also establishes a mutual understanding of the situation within which a fielded force will operate, and is of exceptional importance to the land component. A mutual understanding of the problem, its context, and its end states empowers leaders at every level to adapt their operations rapidly toward a common end.

Reinforcing this, the C/JFLCC must continuously cross-level information with fellow components and make sure staff work on the ground plan is closely coordinated with not only the combatant commander staff, but the other component staffs as well. Consistent with the development of the land campaign plan should be a thoroughly integrated and complementary information effort supported by an information operations plan that fully reflects the cultural dynamics of the operational area. More and more, conflict will occur “among the people,” so both operational and informational activities should account for this. Information activities must support operational maneuver and operational maneuver must validate information themes and messages. Coupling the two effectively is challenging but if done well, it will contribute directly to achieving a more lasting and durable strategic end state.

Key Planning Considerations - The following are key points commanders should consider as they organize their planning effort and direct their planners:

- Flexibility - Do not get wedded to any one plan. Things will change, often.
- Plan for tactical exploitation opportunities and how best to translate tactical success to strategic level success; exploitation creates opportunity but potentially risk as well.
- Staff Development - Building a staff with the right competencies, especially logistics planners and information operations (inform and influence activities (IIA) and cyber-electromagnetic (CEM) activities) planners (both technical and cognitive) is key. Get the right interagency and multinational planners and liaison representatives in place early, and use them.

- Sort out the roles of the long range strategic planners (CJ5) and the execution planners (CJ35), the latter responsible for orders development during execution, the former building the joint land operations plan that will be turned over to the CJ35 planners prior to execution. The timing of the hand-off of planning is critically important, as is task organization between the two planning staffs.

- Carefully develop the troop list and balance capabilities. Early and robust presence of enabler [sustainment, protective, intelligence, mission command] capabilities can go a long way toward securing early operational gains, paving the way to strategic success. The troop list should reflect your requirements for the duration of the campaign; don’t let the immediate combat actions at the line of departure be your principle focus when laying out your resource requirements. Think long-term!

The Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA)

Mission:
Capture and analyze security force assistance lessons from contemporary operations in order to advise combatant commands and Military departments on appropriate doctrine, practices and proven tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) to prepare for and conduct security force assistance missions efficiently.

- Strategic Lift - Expect quite a bit of friction with all the components fighting for limited lift during the Time Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD) conferences. Make sure you have enough planner horsepower present when some of the decisions are made. Make sure the planners understand your “red lines”—those issues you consider absolute imperatives for execution.
• Consider the requirement for security force assistance training in the latter phases of the campaign. The Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA) at Fort Leavenworth, KS is a resource. Make sure they are involved early in the joint land operations planning process.

**Operational Principles** - The fundamental operational principles that will be enduring throughout the conduct of the campaign guide future planning efforts and focus the collective energy of the command. These operational principles, developed after a thorough mission analysis or during the initial stages of the design process permeate the C/JFLCC’s operations. As an example, below, are the operational principles developed by then LTG David McKiernan.

![CFLCC Operational Principles](image)

A technique that served Third Army/ARCENT/CFLCC well in OIF I was the identification of a “czar” for every node in the C/JRSOI chain. The C/JFLCC was personally involved in the entire operation and directed multiple rehearsals. The division of labor for C/JRSOI in the Iraq Theater was as follows:

- CJ4 was responsible for reception, staging, and onward movement (RSO)
- CJ3 was responsible for integration (I)

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**Figure 1 CFLCC Operational Principles OIF I**
**Operations in the Information Environment** - Treat the information environment as key terrain and shape it accordingly. Influence operations from the tactical to strategic level must be planned in-depth, fully coordinated across multiple organizations, and applied with consistency and speed. An overarching strategic narrative for the campaign is a must. Use the media to your advantage—engagement with the press is leader business.

As the commander analyzes the information environment, he may want to consider the following information elements:

- What is the central message the commander wants understood in the operating area? How does the commander make sure his central theme is understood across the whole of the coalition force, and how is it communicated?
- Who is using the information environment to greatest effect, and how does the commander amplify or mitigate it? Who are the key influencers and what tools are they using?
- Who are the noncoalition players in the information environment and what are their means to affect/influence the environment (adversary, indigenous population, local, regional and international media, non-government organizations (NGOs), and other international organizations)? What are the tools they are using (word-of-mouth, local papers, leaflets, posters, radio, TV, sound systems)?
- What does the commander have in the way of tools and capabilities to affect the information environment, to include an understanding of any limitations to his authority?
- What process is the staff using to effectively integrate information activities with operational activities? The two activities must be symbiotic; every operational activity must have a supporting and reinforcing informational activity and every informational activity must have a complementary and substantiating operational activity.
• How is the electromagnetic spectrum in the operating area being managed? What is the division of labor between communicators, intelligence personnel, and operators? How has the commander identified how this information will be displayed as part of the Common Operating Picture (COP)? A key component of this mission area is the cyberspace aspect. Who is your “go-to” person to make sure you optimize other component and government agency cyber operations capabilities and make sure you understand your authority regarding employment options?
• Is the C/JFLCC communication system of systems effective? Is it protected, so that it can remain so?
• Use both inform and influence activities (IIA) and cyber/electromagnetic (C/EM) activities to conduct the above (codified in ADRP 3-0 Chapter 3).

D. Receive the Joint/Multinational Land Force. This mission area is far broader than the traditional reception, staging, onward movement and integration (RSOI) process, in part, because at this level, it becomes combined and joint RSOI and it’s commanders’ business. The entire receive/employ simultaneously construct will likely remain the standard. This operational construct increases risk to mission significantly and makes it even more important that this mission area be carefully planned and executed. Compounding the problem is the likelihood that the availability of selected APODs and SPODs may not be clear until late in the process. The C/JFLCC commander must get involved with the host nations, including both military and civilian leadership, to work access problems. The “receive the force” mission set is joint and interagency in every respect and requires a fully coordinated planning and execution effort. Another complication is the addition of multinational formations, many of which may not be known until late in the game.

The communication plan overlaid on the JRSOI plan must be airtight and rehearsed as diligently as the movement of troops and equipment. Importantly, the plan must integrate and fully consider the capabilities and political constraints of host nations. This is a mission area that requires considerable leader engagement, as the end result is combat power, an element of information that will be of keen interest, all the way back to Washington DC and other coalition capitals.
E. **Fight the Joint Land Force.** If in a multi-corps major operation such as OIF 1, at the C/JFLCC level, the headquarters fights the deep fight, setting conditions for corps, MEFs, or major tactical formations to succeed. Normally, it will be a corps serving as the C/JFLCC which will conduct the joint land fight setting conditions for divisions to succeed. In either case, it requires discipline to stay out of the subordinates' fight and that discipline must be translated to the staff as well. The C/JFLCC commander “fights the force” by assuring his intent is well understood and by shaping the operational area with operational fires (lethal and non-lethal), setting and reinforcing key information operations objectives and strategic communications themes, and by posturing and sustaining the total combined/joint land force as it moves to secure operational objectives.

The C/JFLCC commander must manage the force flow to assure an uninterrupted introduction of additional capability. The C/JFLCC commander constitutes a reserve and is prepared to commit it to capitalize on exploitation opportunities or prevent or minimize setbacks. The C/JFLCC commander retains focus on the theater strategic end state, enabled by the effects created by the tactical formations, the effective integration of interagency and international capabilities, and the application of the right capability at the right time. “Fighting the force” includes leveraging the capabilities made available from across the interagency and international organizations that will be present in the operational area. As the C/JFLCC commander, you will be operating in a truly joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) arena. Maximizing the contributions of each to the advantage of the land force will be a central task for the commander. Success in this area will be relationship-based, so much of it cannot be delegated to deputy commanders. Given the significant interaction the C/JFLCC will have with these other agencies and organizations, it’s important that roles and responsibilities between the combatant commander and the C/JFLCC commander (and their respective staffs) get sorted out, as each will be engaging with many of these same organizations. Operational experience in the CENTCOM AOR suggests that this becomes particularly important as the C/JFLCC engages with SOF and other government
agencies (OGA), and whatever civil authorities will assume control in the latter phases of the campaign. Get clarity from higher headquarters on the extent of coordination that can be conducted with these organizations—the combatant commander may want to minimize the burden on the C/JFLCC and retain this work at his level, at least until later in the planning process.

The C/JFLCC commander and his staff should address the requests for information that will emanate from Washington, higher headquarters, and elsewhere regarding the conduct of the operation, keeping these requirements off the subordinate formations. Reporting is key and essential and requires practice and continuous discipline. There are clear differences between Marine and Army reporting practices and even more differences between U.S. military and non-U.S. military reporting procedures. Get this sorted out early and try to establish a single standard.

The C/JFLCC commander, more than any of the other component commanders, must structure a supporting joint land operations plan that addresses the complete depth of the operation, well beyond the largely lethal major combat operations phases. Transition events and stability operations must be fully interwoven into the joint land operations construct and not considered a secondary or sequential piece—setting end state conditions begins coincident with crossing the line of departure, if not sooner, informationally.

Perhaps the greatest challenge for the land component is to fashion a fire and maneuver concept that is decisive operationally while at the same time equally effective in setting conditions for an effective strategic end state. This is not a linear effort and requires holistic and thorough analysis; understanding and visualization are key. Very early in the planning process, the C/JFLCC commander must commit a significant amount of time and energy clarifying, with the combatant commander, what the end state should look like. The C/JFLCC commander and his staff will play a major role in translating broad U.S. strategic objectives into definable and achievable end state conditions.

The C/JFLCC commander should also be planning for and shaping transitions that will occur throughout the joint campaign. There will be transitions driven by enemy action (or inaction), coalition activities, and political action. Well before hostilities start, attempt to identify the required conditions that must be present before these transitions occur, and work hard to identify who gets to make the call when those preconditions are met. During execution, make every attempt
to link operational activity with informational activity; the two must be symbiotic, with each reinforcing and complementing the other. Transitions should be carefully planned for with clear articulation of who assumes responsibility for what, be it military or civilian lead. Work hard to eliminate as much ambiguity as possible while retaining a degree of flexibility, as conditions will undoubtedly change during execution. But there are some things the C/JFLCC commander can probably count on as lead transitions from the military to the civil authorities:

- Significant military resources will be diverted to support civil operations;
- There will be a large requirement to provide military staff augmentation to the civilian headquarters;
- It will take time for the civilian entity to gain sufficient situational understanding to be effective. In fact, there is some likelihood that the civilian organization will be undermanned and will come with a staff that has limited operational experience.

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**Comprehensive Whole of Government Approach**

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<th>Strategic Objectives</th>
<th>Conditions</th>
<th>Actions</th>
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<td>Nat’l and Int’l Objectives</td>
<td>Dialogue with national leaders and partners</td>
<td>Collaborate with stakeholders</td>
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<td>Country Team(s) Objectives</td>
<td>Deepen understanding of the environment and problem</td>
<td>Analyze the environment</td>
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<tr>
<td>Joint Force Commander Objectives</td>
<td>Translate dialogue into solid, logical Theater Strategic Objectives</td>
<td>Determine the required conditions</td>
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<td>Develop operational objectives</td>
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<td>Design framework to achieve objectives</td>
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<td>Comprehensive Approach (DIME)</td>
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<td>Actions</td>
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<td>Complex Operational Environment (PMESI)</td>
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**Strategic Objectives**

- Provide mission type orders with guidance and intent
- Empower decentralized, synergistic operations with stakeholders
Figure 1 Comprehensive Campaign Construct
F. **Assure “Back-end” Campaign Success.** Figure 2, above, serves as an excellent framework when formulating thoughts on end states. Strategic success is ultimately achieved on the ground, through the interaction of military and civilian entities with indigenous people and their institutions. The C/JFLCC, supported by the other components and the combatant command, must identify both the requirements and the operational approach to setting conditions that will facilitate stability, security, and transition to an enduring strategic end state. How the information environment is managed prior to and during major combat operations will have considerable effect on back-end campaign success. How the land force engages the adversary, the indigenous people and their institutions, and the myriad media organizations that will populate the operational area must be thought through in great detail, well before hostilities commence. The information dimension of the battlespace offers both great opportunity and great risk and includes the cyberspace domain. In the latter phases of the campaign, this may be the single most important “terrain” in which the C/JFLCC Commander seeks to gain advantage. Achieving and maintaining advantage in the information environment is essential.

Unity of effort is particularly important in these latter phases of the campaign, but it is very difficult to achieve as more and more organizations get involved in the transition process, many of which will not be under the direct mission command authority of the C/JFLCC commander. Important to success during transitions is continuity on the military side. Work to get absolute certainty on who is in charge on the ground, what the conditions will be to turn over lead to a civilian authority, and who makes the call when those conditions are met. The C/JFLCC commander should plan to retain responsibility for joint land operations well past any turnover of the lead from military to civil authority. The transitions that occurred in Iraq in the summer of 2003, replacing the robust and experienced Third Army/ARCENT with the smaller and more tactical V Corps, and the consequences of those transitions, reinforces the need to absolutely minimize individual and unit transitions in the latter phases of the campaign. Equally important is minimizing overlapping changes in senior military and civilian officials.
SECTION II. TRANSITIONING THE HEADQUARTERS

A. General. This section highlights some best practices to transition from a peacetime land headquarters to a warfighting joint and coalition land headquarters. It also addresses some of the current changes in the theater army headquarters. The functions and tasks identified as well as the organizational imperatives cited are relevant to both an Army or Marine service component headquarters tasked to transition to a C/JFLCC. The theater army has significant responsibilities to support the other components including routine Army Support to Other Services (ASOS) requirements, theater sustainment requirements, and the provision of necessary capabilities (MPs, MLRS, engineers, air defense, and communications) to Marines.

“Army transformation restructured echelon-above-corps responsibilities to better support employment of Army forces in that geographic combatant command. In order to make a modular Army work, significant changes became necessary at echelons above corps. The Army Service component command (ASCC) for each geographic combatant command became a

<table>
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<th>Warfighting Functions. A warfighting function is a group of tasks and systems (people, organizations, information, and processes) united by a common purpose that commanders use to accomplish missions. The Army’s warfighting functions are fundamentally linked to the joint functions.</th>
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<tr>
<td>- Mission Command (Command &amp; Control)</td>
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<td>- Movement and Maneuver</td>
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<td>- Intelligence</td>
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<td>- Fires</td>
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<td>- Sustainment</td>
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<td>- Protection</td>
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This better aligns fundamental Army functions with current joint doctrine. It also reinforces the notion that a C/JFLCC headquarters should organize itself around these six operational functions as it transitions from a Service component headquarters (Army or Marine) to a C/JFLCC. An important doctrinal point is the Army’s decision, reflected in ADRP 3-0, Unified Land Operations, elevating information as an element of combat power.
dedicated theater army with a common design."² Should a major joint land operation be required in a theater, it will normally be a corps-level headquarters that may take on C/JFLCC responsibilities in a Joint Operations Area (JOA) as opposed to the theater army. The theater army, using its limited capability CCP, will serve as a bridge while the corps headquarters organizes for the C/JFLCC mission. This poses some risk and will put a premium on very close coordination between what will now become the supporting theater army and the warfighting C/JFLCC as a transitioned corps headquarters.³ Another factor associated with modularity that the theater army and C/JFLCC commander must consider are theater assets. Much of these resources found at theater army level will be pushed down to better support subordinate formations. The challenge will be to maintain sufficient capacity at theater level to address broader joint, multinational, and interagency requirements across the entire AOR, many of which are not defined until late in planning.

B. **Mitigating transition challenges.** Service component headquarters supporting a geographic combatant commander whose theater is not at war typically are consumed with a myriad of important tasks that may not contribute directly to increasing operational-level, land-focused, warfighting skills. However, the headquarters should routinely convene the boards and centers required to effectively support joint land operations, even without the required joint and interagency plugs. The most important board that should remain in fully-trained status is the Joint Targeting Coordination Board (JTCB). The other critical task, receiving even greater importance and priority as we better understand the challenge of religious or ideological extremism, is the need to considerably expand TCP planning and partnership activities within the theater. Programs designed to build partner capability (BPC) and the use of security force assistance (SFA) activities in each AOR has been codified in key national security documents. These programs, when executed effectively, can foster goodwill for the United States, increase the stability and capacity of coalition partners, and reduce the spread and traction of extremist ideologies. Further, effective TCP planning is a powerful force multiplier should hostilities erupt, providing for access, cooperation, and, in many cases, the provision of actual coalition forces.

SECTION III. THEATER FUNCTIONS AND REQUIRED CAPABILITIES OF THE C/JFLCC

If the ASCC headquarters transitions to a theater-wide C/JFLCC, it has three fundamental responsibilities:

- Theater-wide responsibilities in support of the Combatant Commander (TCP, BPC, and SFA activities; logistics support);
- Title 10 ARFOR or MARFOR responsibility to provide ADCON support to all Soldiers or Marines in theater;
- Responsibility for the conduct of joint, interagency, and multinational land operations for the combatant commander.

With the redesign of the theater army headquarters, minimizing the role it will play as a Joint Operations Area (JOA) C/JFLCC, the theater army retains the responsibilities identified above but the bottom bullet; “Responsibility for the conduct of joint, interagency, and multinational land operations for the Combatant Commander” will now be split between a designated corps headquarters and the theater army. Most theater armies will retain a Contingency Command Post (CCP) that can take on smaller scale contingencies and serve as a temporary bridge while a corps headquarters transitions to a JOA C/JFLCC.

Regardless of how the command organizes as a C/JFLCC, the following is a categorized summary of the C/JFLCC commander’s responsibilities:

- **Service USC Title 10 and ADCON responsibilities.**
  - Task organization;
  - Personnel administration/GCM Authority/MWR;
  - In-theater training;
  - Theater maintenance programs/coordination of external support;
– Sustainment and distribution;
– Construction and real property.

• **Service component responsibilities.** This list includes tasks the headquarters retains unless relieved of selected tasks by the combatant commander:

  – Theater Security Cooperation Plan (TSCP) (This task must continue given the likely second and third-order consequences throughout the region of combat actions in a designated operational area and the need to strengthen coalition capabilities);
  – Army Support to Other Services (ASOS) and Executive Agent responsibilities (responsibilities largely levied on the theater army);
  – Contingency planning actions (incorporating adaptive planning) in support of other regional plans;
  – Nomination of Service force capabilities;
  – Army theater sustainment to land forces and surface distribution;
  – Program and budget requests and execution tracking;
  – Army theater signal architecture.

• **C/JFLCC Operational Mission Sets.**

  – Set the Conditions in the Theater/Set the Theater
  – Assess the Theater and Threat
  – Build the Joint Land Operations Plan;
  – Receive the Land Force;
  – Fight the Land Force;
  – Contribute to Operations or Campaign Success

What is different now is many of the above responsibilities will be shared between the theater army and the designated C/JFLCC. This “sharing of responsibilities” must be deliberately and methodically addressed, and it must be done early.
A. **Functional Area Focus.** The C/JFLCC headquarters must be capable of conducting rapid analysis, decision making, and product development. Thorough integration of effort across the staff to support the six operational functions outlined in JP 3-0 *Joint Operations*, (C2/Mission Command, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection, and sustainment) is essential. Organizing the staff by functional area rather than along traditional staff lines may immediately increase the effectiveness of the staff. By embedding within each operational function a range of different staff competencies (logistics, intelligence, personnel administration, etc.), each operational function is more capable of integrated planning and has a far more holistic perspective, especially important at the operational level. Staff products are not one-dimensional, and organizing by functional area produces staff products with the benefit of a broader range of staff expertise from inception. This organizational construct should be fully considered regardless of how the headquarters ultimately organizes as a C/JFLCC, whether the base of the C/JFLCC is an theater army or corps headquarters. However, care should be taken to ensure that higher, lower, and adjacent staffs know where and to whom to “plug in.” Traditional staff organizations can also
be established with cross-functional relationships indicated below that can coordinate through boards, centers, cells, and working groups. Figure II from JP 3-31 provides an example of one Joint Cross-Functional Staff organization.

- **C2/Mission Command:**
  - Prepare plans and orders;
  - Command subordinate operational forces;
- Assess operational situation;
- Establish, organize, and operate a joint force headquarters;
- Provide sustainment and distribution (supply);
- Acquire and communicate operational level information and maintain status;
- Coordinate and integrate joint, interagency, and multinational support;
- Operate a Current Operations Integration Cell (COIC);
- Provide, assess, manage, administer, and maintain data, voice, VTC networks, and websites;
- Provide joint and coalition C4I (now mission command networks and systems) and joint/ABCS (Army Battle Command System) integration and configuration management and sustainment training.

- **Intelligence:**
  - Collect and share operational information;
  - Process and exploit collected operational information;
  - Produce operational intelligence and prepare intelligence products;
  - Disseminate and integrate operational intelligence.

- **Fires:**
  - Conduct joint force targeting;
  - Attack operational targets;
  - Develop high-payoff and high-value targets and prosecute time-sensitive targets;
  - Establish and maintain Army battle command system procedures and connectivity with higher and subordinate units;
  - Execute daily targeting board and serve as HQ proponent for Coalition Target Coordination Board (CTCB);
  - Plan, coordinate, and synchronize lethal and nonlethal effects and manage the information environment to complement or mitigate effects;
  - Develop measures of effectiveness to assess execution of lethal and nonlethal effects efforts.
• Movement and Maneuver:
  – Conduct operational movement;
  – Conduct operational maneuver and force positioning;
  – Conduct theater CJRSOI and redeployment operations;
  – Prepare CONOPS, OPLANs, OPORDs, and FRAGOS;
  – Maintain C/JFLCC deployable command posts;
  – Coordinate with other components within the AOR.

  **Important organizational element:**
  Combat Operations and Information Center (COIC) for battlespace management, task organization, Army aviation, and orders control.

• Protection:
  – Provide operational air, space, and missile defense;
  – Provide protection for operational forces, means, and noncombatants;
  – Protect systems and capabilities in the Joint Operations Area (JOA);
  – Execute joint theater personnel recovery operations;
  – Provide security for operational forces and means;
  – Coordinate active CBRNE Defense in JOA;
  – Develop and coordinate coalition air defense plan for the theater;
  – Conduct liaison with host nation security forces or police.

  **Important organizational element:**
  Coalition Operational Protection Coordination Committee (COPCC) for tracking the individual soldier through TMD, joint/coalition, and ROE “red lines.”

• Sustainment:
- Coordinate support for forces in the JOA;
- Conduct theater CJRSOI and redeployment operations;
- Maintain theater Joint Personnel Status (JPERSTAT);
- Organize, plan joint/combined AOR health service support;
- Perform budget execution;
- Assist host nation in population and resource control;
- Monitor theater contingency construction status; track and allocate critical supplies (JMPAB).

**Important organizational element:**

Logistics Operation Center (LOC) for theater-wide sustainment, battlefield distribution, infrastructure, CJRSOI, joint movements host nation support, and Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) contributions.

**Enduring C/JFLCC Missions**
- Set the Conditions in Theater/ Set the Theater.
- Assess the Theater, Mission, Threat.
- Build the Combined/Joint Campaign Plan.
- Receive and prepare the Land Force (C/JRSOI).
- Fight the Landforces.
- Contribute to Operations or campaign success.

**B. Staff Integration.** This organizational construct facilitates the conduct of the large number of boards, bureaus, centers, work groups, and cells necessary at the operational level. The functional integration of staff entities and competencies across the staff facilitates more expedient and informed recommendations to the commander and also facilitates more effective coordination both within and outside the command. The challenge, if the headquarters is split between a forward operational CP and a supporting rear MCP, is defining and fixing on selected leaders and staff entities responsibilities that are complementary rather than redundant. How the particular tasks identified above are overlayed across the headquarters, especially when geographically separated, requires careful analysis and thorough training.

**The Corps Headquarters as a JOA C/JFLCC**
During OEF/OIF, every active component corps headquarters served as the land component for operations in Afghanistan or Iraq. The land component, in these instances, has been a subordinate headquarters to what could be described almost as a quasi-subunified command, such as CFC-A (later ISAF) or MNF-I. However, none of these corps headquarters- based land component headquarters had the complete range of responsibilities that fell to the land component in the early years of OEF and more explicitly in OIF. With the decision to have corps headquarters serve as the C/JFLCC for a JOA rather than the theater army, the many and complex missions performed by the 3rd Army as the theater army to COMUSCENTCOM in the early days of OEF and OIF are now shared between two different headquarters. The division of labor and specific roles and responsibilities have to be determined early and will likely involve the combatant commander. Ideally the JOA C/JFLCC headquarters focuses exclusively on combat operations in the JOA, and the supporting theater army works the Title 10 and routine Service responsibilities AOR wide. However, given the complexity of the missions performed by the land component at the operational and strategic level and their crucial enabling role for the balance of the force, this division of responsibility must be done with great care and deliberation. Time available to conduct this detailed planning between the two Army headquarters as well as the combatant command headquarters will be a significant limiting factor. The enduring missions remain largely the responsibility of the theater army commander, but in this case, enabled by the supporting JOA C/JFLCC. The degree to which the designated C/JFLCC can take on the first two major mission areas, “assess the theater and the threat” and “set the theater,” will depend in large part on how soon the C/JFLCC commander is designated and how early he can get a mission command node forward. The supporting theater army, in coordination with the combatant command and the other components, will maintain a running estimate that addresses the threat and theater conditions and will more than likely have already put in motion some key theater preparation tasks. All that will be coordinated with and shared with the designated JOA C/JFLCC at the first opportunity.

The third major mission area, “build the joint land operations plan” will also be shared responsibility of the C/JFLCC commander. The C/JFLCC commander may want to tap into some of the permanent regional expertise found in the supporting theater army, but the execution is exclusively a JOA C/JFLCC responsibility. Important to this planning effort are the following:

- Employ the design approach to better understand the problem.
• Work plans development in close coordination with the other components. Understand what they will need from the land component and make sure they understand what you will need from them.

• In coordination with the combatant command or the supported CJTF, request appropriate interagency support and linkages.

• Seek to participate early in the dialogue with the senior civilian leadership regarding strategic objectives and end states. As the land component, you will have greatest influence on how this plays out on the ground and among the people. Strategic guidance will continually evolve and will likely remain, to a significant degree, ambiguous. This engagement will inform your planning efforts.

• In cooperation with the theater army, the executing corps must create a troop list that is comprehensive in nature. The joint land operations plan should be structured to enable more than the accomplishment of the military objective. It should facilitate the achievement of enduring and desired political end states. Planning that accounts for this more comprehensive approach will and should inform the development of the troop list and the need for other capabilities, military and civilian.

• At the earliest opportunity, include your coalition partners in the planning process. They will have experience and perspectives that can be of significant value to both the planning and execution processes. Work classification issues with a purpose—don’t let bureaucracy impede much needed collaboration. There are legitimate work-arounds.

• Focus lots of energy on assumptions, that is, both assumptions passed to you by higher headquarters and assumptions developed by your own staff. Challenge them aggressively. For those one or two assumptions that are absolutely critical to joint campaign success, validate them not one but two levels up. Share these assumptions with the supporting theater army, but work them hard with the supported combatant commander or CJTF and, for the critical ones, even civilian leadership.

The fourth major mission area, “receive the land force,” will require exceptionally tight coordination between the C/JFLCC and the supporting theater army. But this is an area where the theater army can really take quite a load off the back of the JOA C/JFLCC. The C/JFLCC should retain responsibility for planning the C/JRSOI, even considering it as the early stages of his scheme.
of maneuver, but may want to leave a large part of the execution of the C/JRSOI to the theater army. A caveat: This cannot be too much “hands off,” even in execution, as this will be one of the most vulnerable transitions the C/JFLCC commander will negotiate in the course of the operation. Considerations during the CJRSOI phase follow:

- This is commander’s business; it is not a logistics activity alone, although the logisticians will play a very large role in both planning and execution. The C/JFLCC commander must be personally involved in both the planning and the execution of the process.
- Remember, too, that the C/JFLCC will be supporting international and interagency organizations and other joint and coalition forces during C/JRSOI. This will place a premium on liaison and tight coordination with all concerned.
- Negotiation with host nations will be very important. This will place another demand on the C/JFLCC commander. Leverage relationships already established by the supporting theater army during TCP activities.
- The entire C/JRSOI process is difficult and must be managed closely. Two areas requiring special attention are mission command arrangements and force protection posture. Both can be ironed out a good deal with rehearsals, at every opportunity.

The fifth mission area is “fight the land force.” Of all six mission areas, this may be the least complicated and where the staff and leaders are most comfortable. The difficulty the staff will have is trying to stay at the right level, the operational to strategic. Their role is to set the right conditions for subordinate tactical formations to succeed. The information dimension (IIA and C/EM) and working the lateral coordination with other components and the next higher headquarters should be the focus of the C/JFLCC, not fighting the tactical formations. Important to how the C/JFLCC commander “fights the force” is how the headquarters organizes itself to do so. By doctrine, the theater army organizes the headquarters into the six operational functions: mission command, operational intelligence, operational fires, operational movement and maneuver, operational protection, and operational sustainment. The C/JFLCC may also benefit by reorganizing into this arrangement. But regardless of how the C/JFLCC commander organizes his staff, it must be focused on the longer term, stay out of the close fight, work the seams with the other components, and anticipate and shape transitions. The staff will have to train to work with
new and different battle command systems and will have to work operational issues not commonly found in a corps-level headquarters. Leaning on the theater army can help here.

The sixth mission area, and perhaps the most important (and difficult) of the mission areas, is “contribute to operations or campaign success”, or, more clearly stated, “assure ‘back-end’ campaign success.” Although all are committed to securing the success of the joint campaign, the C/JFLCC, by virtue of operating on the ground and among the people, will have greatest responsibility for securing or enabling achievement of the desired political end state. In the latter stages of the campaign, the higher headquarters and other components, as well as a number of interagency organizations, will be supporting the C/JFLCC as the command attempts to set conditions for key transitions and fundamental changes on the ground. The C/JFLCC commander must attempt to crystallize what will be required in the way of conditions to support the required political end state. He derives that from iterative discussions with his higher headquarters, and optimally, is included in discussions the combatant commander or CJTF will have with civilian leadership prior to and during execution. Essential to setting conditions for “back-end” campaign success include:

- Identify and describe the conditions necessary to negotiate transitions. What must be the conditions on the ground, and what are the command and support relationships necessary to secure these transitions? Make clear civil-military relationships, supported and supporting command relationships, and do not be in any hurry to turn lead responsibility over sooner than is absolutely necessary.
- Minimize the movement and changes in your own formations during and after major transitions.
- Imbue in your staff the responsibility of the command to secure or enable the political end state. The military objective is but the intermediate objective. The JOA C/JFLCC must be prepared to remain engaged for the long haul, and the staff must internalize this; but ultimately they will turn the situation back over the theater army for closing the theater and retrograde of material.
- Make sure you identify your requirements for the depth of the joint campaign. You will need continued support from the other components and increasing support from the interagency. Put these markers down early in the planning process. The other components,
for good reasons, may not be looking past the military objective to the extent the C/JFLCC commander must.

**Enabling the JOA C/JFLCC Headquarters**

Although the intent is to unencumber the JOA C/JFLCC to the maximum extent possible, allowing the C/JFLCC headquarters to focus on the warfight, the C/JFLCC will have to remain engaged in a host of other supporting and enabling tasks and missions. The importance of the relationship between the supporting theater army and the C/JFLCC cannot be overstated. Army forces, whether they are at the JOA C/JFLCC level or the theater army level, have a number of responsibilities to support the broader force, both military and civilian. Gaps and seams between the C/JFLCC and the theater army put at risk not only the ground force but the entire collective joint, interagency, and multinational effort. The two headquarters must be hand-in-glove. The theater army should encourage the early designation of the JOA C/JFLCC commander, advising the combatant commander and seeking his support and the timely support of Department of the Army—the earlier, the better.

As a guide to help the staff and commanders first identify and then determine what tasks will be performed between the JOA C/JFLCC and the supporting theater army, the information provided below describes doctrinally, what tasks are the responsibility of the theater army and what tasks are the responsibility of the C/JFLCC. In some instances they overlap, which is not necessarily a problem when an theater army transitions to become a theater C/JFLCC. However, this overlapping nature becomes more problematic when the theater army does not become the C/JFLCC and another headquarters, in this case a corps headquarters, becomes the JOA C/JFLCC.

Depicted below are the critical tasks required of each headquarters. The task lists are fairly comprehensive but not all inclusive.

**Mission Command (Operational Command and Control)**

**The Theater Army Headquarters**

- Support communications synchronization objectives of the combatant commander
• Develop Army deliberate supporting plans, consistent with combatant commander direction.

• In coordination with the supported the corps-level C/JFLCC, request Army forces (both combat and theater-enabling) required for joint land operations.

• Provide mission command for all Army forces assigned, attached, or OPCON; provide ADCON over all Army forces.

• In coordination with the JOA C/JFLCC, synchronize the arrival, assessment, preparation, and employment of all Army forces.

• Plan for, request forces for, and recommend employment of theater network architecture necessary to support the C/JFLCC and meet ASOS and executive agent responsibilities.

• Organize and control mission command networks and systems capabilities and support to deployed forces across the theater, to include ASOS and executive agent responsibilities:
  – Theater communications architecture, to include voice, data, and computer/Internet communications.
  – Integrate joint/multinational forces into theater network architecture.
  – Provide and/or integrate BASOPS communications as directed.
  – Provide oversight of theater mission command networks and systems commercialization.

• Establish information systems standards; maintain oversight and provide system administration and oversight for Army, joint, and coalition information systems.

• Ensure system integration of communications and information systems.

• Conduct joint communications training.

• Integrate space support into the joint land operations plan. Plan well in advance for space support, as it may take months to reposition distant satellite assets.

• Coordinate employment of Operational Security (OPSEC) measures and TTP.
Integrates Military Information Support Operations (MISO) and Inform and Influence Activities into current operations utilizing forces from U.S. Army Civil Affairs & Psychological Operations (USACAPOC), 4th or 8th Military Information Support Operations Group, and other Information Operations units, as required.

The JOA C/JFLCC Headquarters

- Plan, synchronize, execute, and assess major joint land operations for the combatant commander (or CJTF) that accomplish his campaign objectives.
- Support national strategic and combatant commander operational-level decision making and policy accomplishment through timely reporting, information operations, and handling of public news media.
- Develop the major land operations plan that accomplishes the combatant commander's or CJTF’s operational and strategic objectives across all phases of the campaign.
- Accept and integrate forces from Army, Marine, and multinational forces into the joint land component command; assess capabilities and provide for supplemental training/equipment.
- Synchronize joint land operations with other functional components across the theater/JOA (Commander/Joint Force Air Component Command (C/JFACC), Commander/Joint Force Marine Component Command (C/JFMCC), Commander/Joint Force Special Operations Command (C/JFSOC)), as well as with coalition commands, interagency elements, and international organizations.
- Establish theater signal and information management systems that ensures continuous connectivity and effective information superiority across operational distances for all joint and coalition land forces; establish requirements and standards that ensure systems work together effectively and information is posted and readily accessible (which includes tactical, operational, strategic interfaces for voice and data)
- Work effectively with host nation, regional leaders and governments, and news media to preserve effective, positive, and supportive relationships.
Operational Intelligence

The Theater Army Headquarters

- Recommend employment of intelligence capabilities.
- In coordination with the JOA C/JFLCC commander, determine requirements and prioritization.
- Support joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) force requirements.
- Consider intelligence requirements throughout the complete depth of the campaign.
- Support the generation of force intelligence requirements. Plan, coordinate, integrate, synchronize, and manage theater requests for, deployment tracking of, and receipt of intelligence capabilities and assets.
- Provide Human Intelligence (HUMINT), Counter Intelligence (CI), and interrogation support to the C/JFLCC.
- In coordination with the JOA C/JFLCC commander, develop an intelligence collection plan that completely integrates Army intelligence capability with other Service and interagency capabilities.
- Recommend the use of Army unique programs and capabilities (Special Access Programs (SAPs)).
- Consider the complete range of collection targets, enemy forces, institutions, government, history, culture, religion, and infrastructure.
- Recommend minimum training standards for intelligence forces and capabilities to the JOA C/JFLCC.
- Support the modernization of intelligence capabilities for headquarters and units
- Coordinate and integrate intelligence unique capabilities across the components for exercise and training.
The JOA C/JFLCC Headquarters

- Prioritize land force intelligence requirements.
- Request and integrate support from national and theater levels.
- Integrate and synchronize land force intelligence.
- Conduct intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance operations as one would maneuver combat operations.
- Disseminate and ensure a common intelligence picture.

Operational Fires

The Theater Army Headquarters

- Develops requirements for, requests, and employs Army theater fires forces.
- Accomplish combatant commander assigned joint fires missions.
- Through the Battlefield Coordination Detachment (BCD), provide liaison, situational awareness, and input into the targeting/engagement priorities of the C/JFACC
- Maintain special technical operations capability and interface.
- Conduct joint fires training.
- Support joint operation and exercise fires and fire support planning.
- Conduct TCP/steady-state activities.

The C/JFLCC Headquarters

- Develop objectives for the joint land area of operations which accomplish objectives set forth by the Combatant Commander.
- Act as the single joint land commander who determines the joint fires that support the combined and joint land force within the Combatant Commander’s Combined Targeting Coordination Board (CTCB or appropriate effects coordination board) process.
- Request, receive, employ, and synchronize all land-based joint fires capabilities with other functional components (especially the CJFACC).
- Assess effects of enemy actions on joint and coalition land forces and host nation military, government, and population.

**Operational Movement and Maneuver**

**The Theater Army Headquarters**

- In coordination with the JOA C/JFLCC commander, plan for, recommend employment of and control of Army Forces to enable theater maneuver.
- Oversee combined and joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (C/JRSOI) of assigned forces into the AOR.
- Control movement to posture and sustain tactical forces over operational distances.
- In coordination with the JOA C/JFLCC Commander, generate Force Requirements: Plan, Coordinate, Integrate, Synchronize, & Manage Theater Request for, deployment tracking and receipt of Forces ((Request for Forces (RFF), Operational Needs Statement (ONS), TPFDD, etc.)).
- Allocate space and organize Army Theater enabling forces.
- Assess arriving Army units in theater and conduct necessary in-theater/joint training.
- Coordinate force modernization and integration efforts for the headquarters, assigned units, and all Army units deployed in the AOR.
- Support other components and combatant commander preparation, planning, and exercises.

**The JOA C/JFLCC Headquarters**

- Position, move, and maneuver tactical forces to gain positional advantage over the enemy and generate options for the combatant commander and other functional components to exploit.
- Maneuver to defeat enemy forces.
• In coordination with the theater army, propose force flow for land forces and theater enablers.

• In coordination with the theater army, execute C/JRSOI in the JOA to build and position the joint land force for effective operations.

• Ensure timely request, reception, movement, positioning, protection, and employment of all forces to support the joint tactical fight.

• In coordination with the theater army, prepare and employ theater mobility support (theater engineers, bridging, MPs, etc.).

• In coordination with the theater army, provide situational awareness and synchronize land movement across the theater/JOA with other operations by other functional components (C/JFACC, C/JFMCC, C/JFSOC).

**Operational Protection**

**The Theater Army Headquarters**

• In coordination with the JOA C/JFLCC, recommend employment of Army ADA, CBRNE, & MP forces.

• Accomplish assigned force protection missions:
  - Air defense of the AOR (in a supporting relationship to the C/JFLCC).
  - Integrate countermine and Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) information across the AOR.

• Plan and execute the development of facility force protection construction plans.

• Conduct facility vulnerability assessments.

• Fulfill Army Support to Other Services (ASOS) and executive agency responsibilities.

• Conduct EPW and detainee operations (this can be highly sensitive—treat it so).

• Execute the Military Working Dog program.

• Manage the DOD customs preclearance inspection program.
• Conduct joint force protection training.
• Support joint operation and exercise planning.
• Provide theater operational protection support to deployed forces and joint and combined exercises.
• In coordination with the C/JFLCC Commander, establish theater-wide FPCON & NBC THREATCON.
• Provide policy and procedures on antiterrorism and force protection.

The JOA C/JFLCC Headquarters

• In coordination with the theater army, deploy and synchronize theater-level capabilities that protect joint and coalition land-based forces, including air defense, chemical protection, route security (MP), and consequence management.
• Coordinate with and support host nation efforts. (Army ADA is often the regional “price of admission” for coalition commitment, involvement, and support).
• Execute detainee operations in the JOA, to include transportation, installation establishment and operations, processing, interrogation, and release. (This can be highly sensitive—again, treat it so.)
• Execute sensitive site exploitation when weapons of mass destruction or effects are involved.
• Serve as Joint Security Coordinator. Organize and synchronize protection across the theater among all joint and coalition elements based in the C/JFLCC area of operations in coordination with the theater army.
Emergent Operational Protection Challenges

Roles and responsibilities previously associated with traditional force protection responsibilities have grown significantly. OEF/OIF experiences demonstrated that force protection responsibilities more closely resemble homeland security missions than the more limited DOD definition. It’s an issue that the C/JFLCC commander must fully consider in planning land campaigns designed to achieve enduring end states.

- Intelligence assessments must provide the C/JFLCC commander a better sense of infrastructure status in a targeted country or area—this must be an explicit task.
- There must be clear understanding and agreement between the C/JFLCC commander and interim civil authorities on who has authority and responsibility for securing and protecting what infrastructures, organizations, and institutions. Normal civil police functions may be inadequate to the task, especially following combat operations.
- What are the legal implications and constraints that would apply to members of the coalition as coalition commanders take on greater, nontraditional protection responsibilities? This should be fully considered as part of nation-to-nation negotiations on coalition participation and reinforced and clarified at the combatant command and Service component levels.
- A considerably expanded operational protection mission-set will drive capability requirements (troop lists) that must be identified early in the planning process. Force protection is not an economy of force effort and is of paramount importance to achieving mission success. Given the focus on post-conflict mission planning, codified by DOD as Stability Operations (DODI 3000.5, Sep 16, 2009), many of these protection requirements must be addressed and executed early in the conflict period. The C/JFLCC commander must stand firm on getting the right assets and resources into the fight early to gain control of key nodes and infrastructure, to include facilitating the secure entry of coalition formations and other international organizations. In addition, specific organizations may be required to conduct Intermediate Staging Base (ISB) security (Regional Support Groups) or to serve as Joint Security Coordinators for Joint Security Areas (Maneuver Enhancement Brigades).
• The C/JFLCC should fully leverage the resources and capabilities of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and other unique coalition capabilities to get at this expanded protection mission set. Early and adequate investment in securing the right capabilities can favorably influence the conduct of the campaign.

• FM 3-37 *Protection*, September 2009 represents a significant departure from how commanders addressed force protection in the past—get briefed on it to better understand the scope of the C/JFLCC commander’s responsibilities and the new terminology; the five forms and five principles of protection, and the twelve Army tasks that comprise the protection warfighting function.

*Operational Sustainment*

*The Theater Army Headquarters*

• In coordination with the JOA C/JFLCC Commander, recommend employment of theater sustainment forces.

• Provide theater sustainment/distribution/movement to deployed forces and joint and combined exercises.

• In coordination with the C/JFLCC Commander, plan for replacement requirements (Army) and individual augmentation management/Joint Manning Document (JMD).

• In coordination with the C/JFLCC Commander, establish Personnel Policy/MWR/R&R and Pass Program/Postal Planning.

• Provide Army Support to Other Forces, Common User Item Support, and executive agent sustainment tasks.

• Determine funding sources and receive and distribute funding.

• Plan for political/military support across the AOR via Foreign Area Officers (FAOs).

• In coordination with the C/JFLCC Commander, plan, program, and coordinate construction for force bed-down.

• Provide administration and budget for Title 10 support for all Army forces.
- Conduct joint sustainment/distribution/movement training.

**The C/JFLCC Headquarters**

- In coordination with the theater army, coordinate and synchronize theater joint land movement; integrate military, multinational, and contract assets.
- In coordination with the theater army, plan and establish theater facilities and infrastructure to support theater and major land operations.
- In coordination with the theater army, negotiate, obtain, integrate, and ensure host nation support.
- Integrate and synchronize coalition logistics and support to interagency and international efforts.
- In coordination with the theater army, conduct sustained C/JRSOI for joint, follow-on, rotational, and coalition forces.
SECTION V. FORMING AND TRAINING THE TEAM

A. **Important Task.** Forming and training the team may be the commander’s most important task. Whether the C/JFLCC headquarters is established on the foundation of an Army or Marine headquarters, theater army or Corps/Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) headquarters, there will be many new faces added in what may be a very short period. It could be that serving principle staff members at the O-5 and O-6 levels will be “plussed up,” in many cases, to general officer level (as was done in OIF I). That alone can create a degree of friction that requires senior leader attention. Essential too will be the addition of the right kinds of staff augmentees who will come from other services, coalition partners, and ideally other government agencies. The C/JFLCC headquarters will be heavily weighted with Army and Marine Corps personnel, but staff augmentees from the Navy and Air Force (different from liaison teams) are important as well and must be properly integrated. The sooner that interagency elements can be embedded into the headquarters the better. Liaison personnel have completely different reporting chains and may even have substantially different on-station parameters that must be considered. There will be significant reserve component presence, too, in the headquarters, and their experience levels will vary considerably. Even with all these new faces as the land headquarters expands, the biggest challenge may well be training the staff to get comfortable and competent at the operational level of war. This will be particularly difficult for a designated corps headquarters that does not train routinely to fight and command at the operational to strategic level. Army and Marine Corps staff members by and large will all be well grounded at the tactical level, but the skill sets and capabilities required to be effective at the operational level are different.

B. **Integrating Coalition Partners.** Coalition integration on the staff and as subordinate formations will be the rule. The C/JFLCC commander must know and understand the limits of what coalition partners can do. Properly integrating coalition members on the staff requires careful thought. They can bring extraordinary perspective and talent or they can offer little operational value, depending on the contributing nation's policies and caveats—and how you use them. Regardless, all coalition members should be made to feel part of the team.
C. **Training focus.** The staff must be fully capable of using a wide variety of battle command systems that demand digital skills and work to develop products and analysis that are predictive in nature and always focused on the end state. The focus for the land staff at the operational level is to shape the battlespace for subordinate tactical formations, getting well out in front of the movement and maneuver of the tactical formations to set conditions for their success, a success that enables, if not secures, an enduring strategic end state. This may well be the most leader-intensive and time-consuming training effort on the part of the senior leaders. Do not expect the staff to arrive fully capable and competent at the operational level—nor will they typically be adept in the use of all battle command systems. And recognize that a corps headquarters-based C/JFLCC will need additional time and assistance to learn new battle command systems and processes not trained to or used routinely by a corps headquarters.

**Staff TTP.** TTPs can speed the transition to a more effective and capable land headquarters. The following serve to develop skills required at the operational level and also creates cohesion and team focus through training.

**Team Building and Battle Rosters.** Team building remains a leader responsibility. Evolve different “tribes” (and there will be many: multinational partners, interagency representatives, different Services, coalition members, reserve augmentees) into teams through training. As the commander develops a battle roster to address the complete range of tasks associated with the C/JFLCC mission, spend extra energy determining which tasks could best be performed from the Main CP and what tasks absolutely have to be completed at the forward CP. Do not get locked into battle rosters—plan for a long operation with rotations required to assure the entire staff remains fresh and has good situational awareness of the activities of the entire headquarters.

**Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs).** The entire organization must work to satisfy CCIRs. The commander’s CCIRs are tightly linked to the operational design of the joint land operation. The commander chooses selected data points that help him make decisions and guide the staff. CCIRs will change over time and are not locked in concrete. The staff should help the commander identify those data points that have significant influence on execution. It may be worth adding CCIR reviews as part of the battle rhythm.
**Battle Drills.** These drills are developed and trained across the staff but particularly in the COIC and range from downed aircraft to incoming missile systems to NBC drills. These drills also serve to get the entire team on one page with respect to response actions to anticipated events. Training should routinely occur right on the COIC floor, and the CJ3 should be the leader responsible for developing and training these battle drills. The C/JFLCC commander must assess the theater through the lens of DIME (Diplomatic, Information, Military, Economic) and PMESII-PT (Political Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, Information, Physical Environment, and Time). Training, rehearsals and battle drills must reflect this focus.

**Rehearsals.** Rehearsals are equally if not more important at the operational level than the tactical level. Rehearsals may be conducted by operational function, by phase of the operation, or by selected boards and bureaus. Just as at the tactical level, a terrain model that helps leaders visualize is important to any rehearsal; invest in the creation of a model that adequately covers the land component’s operating area. Recent best practices have demonstrated the value of these rehearsals to interagency members, also.

**Battle Rhythm.** Develop a battle rhythm that works well for a split headquarters and is nested with higher headquarters. Equally important is assuring the command’s battle rhythm does not adversely impact subordinate formations. Train to it, but be prepared to modify it as required.

**Planning.** The Operation Planning Group (OPG) must have the right functional representation, and it must stay focused on the deep fight. The organizational relationship between the CJ5 (campaign planners) and the CJ35 (execution planners) deserves senior leader attention. This cross-staff (CJ3 and CJ5) future-focused function is a commander’s call—and an critically important one.

**Managing Reporting.** Reporting requirements change upon each transition and as every phase progresses. The command will need different data points. Be proactive rather than reactive to help higher headquarters and national decision makers determine what they will need from reporting.
**IT Software Compatibility.** The commander must establish a “good idea cut off point” (GICP) for all software upgrades. Battle command systems will all receive a number of upgrades as time passes, but there must be a point in time where the command trains with what it will fight. The GICP must buy the command sufficient time to do final rehearsal and training, even at the expense of some software packages that potentially offer increased effectiveness. The staff must be capable of translating information superiority to execution superiority (CCIRs are just such a critical task)—digital skills and an understanding of battle command systems are essential.

**Collaborative vs. Hierarchical.** The scope and pace of headquarters activity at the operational level demands decentralized and lateral coordination. The staff must be perfectly comfortable working with fellow components, appropriate Service staffs, interagency staffs, and international organizations. The development of staff products must be done in a completely collaborative fashion with any and all parties that could be affected or could offer insight into the staff product. The extraordinary number of staff actions and leader decisions required to prepare and then execute land operations demands analysis and decision-making actions that are thorough and expedient. Standing by for the right leader to move an action forward is not the way to go. However, this places a premium on widely held, complete understanding of the commander’s intent and narrative.

**Information Operations.** Teach each and every staff section to deliberately consider the information dimension of the mission area as they prepare products and recommendations. Whether protecting information or optimizing the influence affects of a given action, make the staff think through the information implications of all actions, both lethal and non-lethal. Every battlefield action will have effects, and it is up to the C/JFLCC commander to be attentive to those effects and consequences, as many will be unanticipated. Every battlefield action will have effects, and it is up to the C/JFLCC commander to be attentive to those effects and consequences, as many will be unanticipated.
Information Operations assessment is iterative, continuously repeating rounds of analysis within the operations cycle in order to measure the progress of information related capabilities toward achieving objectives” – JP 3-13
SECTION VI. COALITION ISSUES AND INSIGHTS

Land operations conducted as part of a coalition will be the norm in the future, and with coalition operations, the complexity of planning and executing large land operations are compounded by an evolving force of coalition partners with different political imperatives, different military capabilities and capacities, and, in most cases, different languages and cultural proclivities. These realities create and compound frictions that must be addressed by senior leaders.

A. Forming, Training, and Fighting the Coalition Land Component Command. Listed below are a number of insights offered up from senior U.S. and coalition land leaders regarding coalition operations.

- Coalitions are created at both the national and unified command level. National authorities will have the lead, but combatant commanders and their service components contribute extensively to coalition building by their linkages and relationships with military members of other countries. Early liaison presence can transition to full-fledged troop participation when liaisons become advocates back to their respective national headquarters.

- “Policy is not Strategy.” Civilian leadership may tend to believe they are synonymous. Help clarify the difference and make both your policy and strategy needs clear to achieve a given strategic end state.

- You must be explicit in your communications with your coalition partners. It is better to be absolutely clear and agree to disagree than be ambiguous and risk confusion.

- The simple reality is that politics will dominate coalitions. The C/JFLCC commander must still translate that reality into effective land operations. Don’t fight the reality; understand it and work through it.

- Many, if not most, coalitions lack a unifying strategy. Work hard to get as close to unity of effort as possible, doing so with the full participation of your partners.
In coalition operations, there are inherent frictions and inefficiencies at the tactical level, but the strategic value of a unified coalition effort more than compensates for the risk and challenge at the lower echelons. It is coalition and international efforts, as well as the professional capability of the U.S. military, that secure enduring end states. Mitigate the challenges at the lowest levels and make a concerted effort to invest in coalition unity.

Coalition members may share with the U.S. military similar doctrinal foundations and training backgrounds, but with varying degrees of expertise and resources. However, these similarities are still shaped in large part by culture and tradition of contributing nations. Commander’s Intent, for example, remains central to any land operation. In large coalitions, intent must be shaped to address a far broader audience; simplicity and clarity become even more important as that intent will be translated into a number of different languages. Bounce draft intent off major coalition members to see if it translates as you would want it to.

Joint campaign planning should fully consider the strengths and weaknesses of coalition members, to include the United States. Assess the capabilities and capacities of coalition members through both a military and political lens. Work hard with subordinates and the staff to ensure they are sensitive to the nuances of coalition arrangements and understand the criticality of cohesion between the entire team.

Carefully consider coalition nominations for key staff positions. With some you may have little influence, but work to get those that can make great strategic contribution. The right coalition perspective can have significantly greater value than additional combat capability.

We must work hard to carefully balance coalition national prestige with operational missions. Protecting a nation's reputation and political standing is as important as protecting the force. Make it clear that you will help coalition leaders succeed—many will face extraordinary pressures from their higher national authorities.

Coalition operations demand greater personal interaction on the part of commanders. Coalition warfare optimally will use less written communication and when used, “less is more.” Greater personal interaction between leaders and staff helps diffuse the SIPRNet sharing problem and promotes transparency. In coalitions, “you must fight your way away
from technology.” Use it, but recognize that the broader coalition, almost without exception, does not have access to it.

- Get out and get familiar with the coalition. Personal presence (both commander and staff) breaks down stereotypes and generates cohesion and a better understanding of capabilities and limitations. Respect the TTPs of coalition members; try to employ them as they have been trained.

- There are different technical/information capabilities and capacities at different echelons just among U.S. forces, and this is magnified as a consideration as the C/JFLCC Commander passes information down through a coalition. Tie the procedures for passing the word to a practical information management plan and rehearse it.

- The integration and sustainment of a coalition land force is extraordinarily difficult, and it’s leader business. The senior logisticians must have visibility on all requirements, U.S. and coalition, and this visibility must be “end-to-end” from national provider to foxhole. This process is hard for U.S. sustainment; it is much harder for coalition sustainment.

- We cannot conduct coalition operations using liaison arrangements of the past. Liaison must be robust and liaison teams must be A-level players. It will be these liaison teams who bridge the technology divide and overcome communications impediments. Weight your liaison arrangements as you would any other combat capability; consider strategic as well as operational-level implications as you position limited resources to achieve greatest effect. Request Digital Liaison Detachments (TOE 51610L) for use with multinational headquarters. This is the function they are organized, trained, and equipped to perform.

B. Persistent Friction Points Associated with Coalition Land Operations. Coalitions create strategic strength and tactical vulnerabilities. Warfare in the 21st Century will almost always be conducted by coalitions, coalitions often (but not always) knitted together with a degree of common strategic purpose, but significantly different capabilities and resources. The technology divide alone will only widen in the coming years. Given this reality, coalition friction should be an expectation, planned for and mitigated to the maximum extent possible. Senior coalition members often use the term “manage” over “lead.” It’s important to note the choice of verbs and what it portends for the C/JFLCC commander who will build and fight a coalition. The reality of
these frictions is underscored at every C/JFLCC Course, from senior coalition officers reporting from in-theater to course attendees. We have gotten better but these issues will be enduring, regardless of how much we prepare for them. What follows are perennial friction points deserving of senior leader attention:

- Senior civilian leaders often do not appreciate the limitations of coalition operations, which can contribute to strategic risk.

- Fitting the coalition force to the field requires an assessment of both the capability of formations themselves and their capacity to sustain themselves. There may also be a tendency, however well intended, for coalition members to overstate both. There may be tension associated with what a coalition member offers, what he can take on, and what the commander should prudently assign. And the reverse will be true—highly capable coalition formations will be constrained by national policies from taking on certain missions for which they would otherwise be ideally suited. Leader-to-leader trust and personal relationships can bridge this friction.

- Operational effectiveness will rest on trust and confidence between leaders more than it will on command and support relationships articulated in an order. This is an issue that requires not only senior leader engagement between coalition members but also greater flexibility and sophistication on the part of the staff, as reinforced by the commander. Clear Commander’s Intent, precise mission-based orders, and robust liaison arrangements will often reduce the friction associated with executing formal, directed command and support arrangements.

- Within a land coalition, there may be a number of different Rules of Engagement (ROE) actually in play. National authorities dictate the bounds of ROE in nation-to-nation negotiations, and, to a lesser extent, at the combatant command level. ROE limitations affect almost every operational decision a commander makes: battlespace geometry, unit dispositions, command and support relationships, decisions on the operational reserve—all are influenced to a significant degree by the ROE of coalition members. Commanders and staff must recognize that this is not a call made by the senior military member on the ground; it is directed by national authorities. Key to minimizing the friction associated
with ROE differences is an understanding and appreciation of the ROE constraints each contributing member operates under during planning and course of action determination. “After things go badly” is not the right time to try to sort this out.

- International law is interpreted differently by different coalition members. Commanders must get a thorough understanding of potential legal issues that can and will create friction if not resolved early on. Military-to-government relations, detainee operations, oversight responsibilities for selected government functions, for example, are just a few strategic level issues that must be addressed early on.

- How the land coalition passes and accesses classified information remains a major source of friction between even the closest of allies. Transparency is the goal and common visibility on all operational matters of substance should be the objective. Given the technology gaps between contributing nations’ militaries and U.S. statutory constraints associated with sharing classified systems, this potential dislocation must be managed early and effectively. Robust, informed liaison arrangements, operating with equipment capable of receiving real-time classified information that can be made immediately available to coalition members are key, as is the presence of the senior coalition commander out with coalition formations and headquarters, breaking down any notions of operational information withheld intentionally. This is leader-to-leader business at all levels, but especially at the level of the C/JFLCC commander.

- All coalition members will engage with journalists. A common narrative theme, informed by a common assessment of facts on the ground, filtered through appropriate cultural lenses, will reduce frictions that may not manifest themselves immediately on the battlefield, but may well surface at international political and diplomatic levels. Share information and make it a point to elevate potentially divisive issues to coalition senior leaders. Coalition partners are often much more adept at understanding the political, diplomatic, and cultural nuances associated with any given issue or operation. Tap into it.
SECTION VII. INTERAGENCY INTEGRATION

Just as the joint force will operate as a coalition, it will also operate as part of a broader interagency effort. The integration of a wide range of interagency organizations and capabilities is critical to securing the desired strategic end state. The C/JFLCC has a key enabling role to play in making these interagency capabilities a reality. The OEF/OIF experience highlighted the criticality of applying a more comprehensive whole-of-government approach from the beginning of crisis intervention.

A. National Security Directive 44, Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization

The C/JFLCC commander, perhaps more than any of the other functional components, must be familiar with State Department’s Conflict and Stabilization Office (CSO) which replaced the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/ CRS)—Key capabilities and limitations the C/JFLCC should consider engaging elements of CSO with, contingent on the Combatant Commander’s approval:

- **Joint Planning.** CSO has developed multilevel, integrated planning for stability reconstruction and conflict transformation. The JFLCC, at minimum, needs visibility on the planning process, if not active engagement.
- But, unlike the S/CRS, the CSO has no planning authority over other agencies.

B. Shaping Interagency Operations at the Strategic and Operational Levels

Vertical and lateral integration of control mechanisms is often confusing in the interagency process. A **principle difficulty of coordinating operations between agencies is determining counterparts among them.** Organizational differences exist between the military hierarchy and other organizations, particularly at the operational level where there is seldom a counterpart to the geographic combatant commander. Further, overall lead authority in foreign operations is likely to be exercised not by the geographic combatant commander, but by a U.S. ambassador or other
senior civilian, who will provide policy and goals for all U.S. agencies and military organizations in the operation. Decision making at the lowest levels is frequently thwarted because field coordinators form other agencies may not be vested with the authority to speak for their agencies, departments, or organizations.

C. The Interagency Environment

If the interagency process is to be successful, it should bring together the interests of multiple agencies, departments, and organizations. This cohesion is even more complex than the multidimensional nature of military combat operations viewed in isolation. When the other instruments of national power—economic, political and/or diplomatic, and informational—are applied, the dimensions of the effort and the number and types of interactions expand significantly. The essence of interagency coordination is the effective integration of multiple agencies with individual agendas. This process and the divergent agency cultures typically challenge the military ethos of results orientation. Nonetheless, by understanding the interagency environment and culture, campaign and operation plans can be more adeptly crafted to synchronize the efforts of the myriad agencies and focus their core competencies synergistically toward the desired end state.

Understand the Nature of Interagency Bureaucracy

The basic precepts of the American political system distribute power to prevent any one branch from accumulating overwhelming influence over the political process. Certain powers are concentrated in the executive branch during wartime emergencies. Even then the tendency is toward diffusion, and concentrating the powers of different agencies toward national security objectives is difficult.

- Core Values. Each agency has core values and legal requirements that it will not compromise. These values form the foundation upon all other functions of the agency grow. In any interaction, all participants must be constantly aware that each agency will continuously cultivate and create external sources of support and will be maneuvering to protect its core values.
• **Insular Vision.** Domestic politics are usually the single most important driver of the various U.S. agencies' agendas, which may or may not coincide with international security issues. It is fortuitous, as in the First Gulf War, when there is some congruency, but that is not always the case. On 16 April 1990, the deputies committee of the National Security Council met under the leadership of Robert Gates to reconsider the US policy toward Iraq. Because of Iraq's recent actions, there was a proposal to stop the government-guaranteed rice and other grains sales and government-backed Export-Import Bank credits. Some U.S. agencies argued that the credit programs should go forward because “all we would be doing is hurting U.S. rice producers and the U.S. firms looking to do business.” The Department of State wanted to continue the credits regardless of the intelligence reports about Iraq so as not to “tie the administration's hands.”

• **Reduction of Uncertainty.** Most bureaucracies try to routinize their operation and few are optimized for crisis management. Crisis increases uncertainty and the likelihood that compromises will have to be made. With that compromise may come the fear that power, security, and prestige may be sacrificed. Uncertainty allows for the coexistence of varying views about the likely outcomes of a given action; these differences in viewpoint often lead to conflicting interests. An organization will struggle to reduce uncertainty and lessen the threat to its own stability. Information can reduce uncertainty and increase an organization’s power. Thus, information is the coin of the realm in interagency operations, as it provides those who possess it a decided advantage in the decision-making process. It may not always be readily shared.

• **Individual Agendas.** Personal agendas can significantly affect interagency consensus. The goals of an institution may conflict with the private, usually short-term, agendas of its members. Because personality plays such a large part in interagency operations, personal agendas can be a significant—often even creating an informal hierarchy within the department or agency. All organizations have some sort of formal and informal hierarchy which results in a specific distribution of power, income, and prestige among the members of the organization. Informal structures are created to serve the personal needs of the organization's members and tend to modify the organization's overall behavior patterns. Informal structures inherent in every organization contribute significantly to its ability to
perform formal functions. Thus, developing an understanding of an organization and of the personalities involved in its informal structure can provide insight to how the organization performs overall.

First Gain Consensus Within the Department of Defense

Before attempting to gain consensus in the interagency arena, it must first be attained in the Department of Defense. The various elements (Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Staff, Defense agencies and DOD field activities, military departments, and combatant commands) should agree to the ends, ways, and means of an operation before trying to integrate the military instrument of power with other agencies, departments, and organizations. The Department of Defense has a common culture, common procedures, and a hierarchical structure, and the Armed Forces of the United States possess unique capabilities. Be sure to align these before going outside to other agencies.

D. International Agencies and Nongovernmental Organizations

International agencies (IAs), such as the United Nations or the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), often seek to maintain a distance between them and U.S. and coalition forces. Likewise, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) engaged in humanitarian causes seem distinctly reluctant to appear associated with C/JFLCC forces or to appear to be acting in cooperation with C/JFLCC operations. These organizations generally are not armed, and hence they apply principles of neutrality, independence, and confidentiality as protective measures, both for safety and for freedom to operate. In order to leverage their capabilities, which are often useful and sometimes quite robust, the C/JFLCC commander must understand and respect these principles.

Neutrality

Neutrality enables these organizations to keep everyone’s trust by not taking sides in hostilities or controversies of a political, racial, religious, or ideological nature. Neutrality does not mean indifference to suffering, acceptance of war, or quiescence in the face of inhumanity; rather, it means not engaging in controversies that divide peoples. Neutrality benefits such an organization because it enables the organization to make more contacts and gain access to those affected.
In order to continue to enjoy a climate of trust with all, IAs and NGOs may not take sides in hostilities or engage at any time in controversies of a political, racial, religious, or ideological nature. Neutrality is a matter of perception. It is not so much about what is done, but rather how it is perceived. A detainee may perceive an ICRC delegate as a friend of the detaining authority if he observes him talking companionably with guards. In contrast, the latter may, in turn, perceive the delegate as a friend of the detainee as they see them talking together.

**Independence**

For IAs and NGOs, independence is not an end in itself, but a means to an end. It is understood as a deliberate decision to abstain from taking sides in any violence or controversy or conflict. Independence is to be understood in terms of an organization's decision-making power and action over which it has and continues to strive to keep independent control, as it strives to avoid taking directions, or even appearing accountable to, any political or military entity. For these organizations, projecting credible neutrality and independence requires the deliberate abstinence, at all times, from acting in any way or making any form of declaration that might be interpreted as taking sides or as being associated with a specific agenda.

**Confidentiality**

IAs and NGOs go about their humanitarian work often without reference to political concerns. In order for them to establish working relationships with a wide range of people and organizations, any of which may be on polar (and shooting) sides of an issue, they must be seen as worthy of trust. Accordingly, they will avoid transmitting any information or actionable intelligence at all costs. Their confidentiality allows for a frank and open bipartisan exchange of views for all the various groups and individuals with whom they work and permits representation of the interests of the people these organization seek to help. It maintains access to these people across military boundaries and political policies. This principle will be zealously guarded.

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**A Guiding Principle for C/JFLCC Commanders:**

C/JFLCC Commanders will have a role to play in enabling the activities of international agencies and non-governmental organizations. Get to know these organizations well and leverage their networks and capabilities, but do not try to compromise their core values or fundamental principles.
SECTION VIII. COMMANDEERSHIP AND LEADERSHIP CHALLENGES

Tactical competence lays a foundation for senior leadership, but operational-level commandership requires greater vision, patience, and interpersonal skills. Teamwork among senior commanders, particularly the willingness to envision and support the requirements of others, is central to the success of the C/JFLCC.

- Getting what the C/JFLCC requires must constantly be balanced against rapidly changing, and often conflicting, priorities of the campaign. Do not allow staff parochialism to undermine effective teamwork; be attentive to and work key issues commander-to-commander.

- The C/JFLCC commander enables the operations and activities of a broad range of actors and organizations, over many of which he does not have authority or control. Unity of effort, in many cases, will take precedence over unity of command. This puts a premium on the exercise of senior leadership interpersonal relationship skills to get results.

- Be flexible, responsive, and resourceful, but call it like you see—some risks are not worth taking on.

- The most difficult part of “decisive operations” and “whole of government” piece is the mental part. Get the right help.

- Figure out who the individual or organization is that will contribute the most to your organization's success. Chances are that agent or agency is outside your organization.

- Strategic direction and policy will always come late. Make sure you fully understand your next higher commander’s intent and use it prudently for both planning and execution.

- Strategic leadership requires persistence—you must exert great willpower to get things done at higher echelons, where competition for forces, resources, and strategic lift is keen and political constraints and restraints impinge upon planning and operations.
Keys to the success of your organization:

- Crafting a vision that is holistic, understandable, and enduring.
- Acquiring the right resources and allocating them at the right time.
- Building consensus that is inclusive and transparent.
- Taking the lead in crafting strategy and policy.
- Balancing the physical, emotional and intellectual.
- Managing personalities.

Thoughts from recent senior commanders:

- Work diligently to balance effectiveness and efficiency, especially when components compete for resources.
- Information operations, to inform and influence a broad range of audiences, must get more effective with connecting to and communicating with a whole host of different actors and institutions.
- Communicate, but communication starts by listening. Review your Commander’s Intent frequently, and verify that it is understood the same way you yourself understand it.
- The health of the force is not just a Service problem. There are always joint and combined constraints.
- Anticipate and manage transitions: internal, host nation, coalition, and enemy.

You take families to war with you. Do not neglect morale issues and family readiness.
The following observations were collected from earlier iterations of the C/JFLCC Course. They concisely offer thoughts for a C/JFLCC commander to consider as he organizes his headquarters and prepares to conduct full spectrum major land operations.

A. *Mission Command (Operational Command and Control)*

- Clear Commander’s Intent remains essential! It anchors collective effort in an increasingly complex, ambiguous, data-rich, and conflicting environment. Intent must address the complete depth of the campaign, either in phases or in a simple holistic summation. Commander’s Intent must withstand the rigor of multiple language translations—keep it simple and direct.

- Personalities count. Nothing can compensate for the leadership, experience, attention, and presence of commanders.

- Time and energy must be expended training staff and leader competency at the operational level, fully grounded in tactical level expertise. Operational level expertise is still rare across the force.

- All transitions must be completely woven into the campaign construct, those you create and those imposed on you—changing mission command relationships, force mix, and the increasing presence of coalition, interagency, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) must be accounted for. Try to minimize overlapping change if possible.

- The reality of “shared battlespace” on the ground increases the need for greater coordination; done effectively, can be a significant force multiplier. This shared battlespace is also growing in size. As operations in Afghanistan demonstrated, small unit formations take responsibility for far larger pieces of real estate. This dispersion or
distribution of the force places significant stress on both mission command and sustainment operational functions.

- Mission command networks and systems connectivity and mission command agility (command and support relationships) are key. Battle command systems must be increasingly integrated and battle command systems operators thoroughly trained. Digital skills for staff and leaders are becoming increasingly important.

- Decentralize to the point of discomfort.

- “Whole of government” (also referred to as the comprehensive approach) solutions are problematic; that’s a simple reality, so plan to compensate for it. DOD resources continue to be the most robust, most available, and best positioned for the conduct of major land operations. Attempt to force a more comprehensive and inclusive planning and execution effort, but recognize there will be limits. Set your staffs expectations accordingly and aim for optimization, rather than ideal perfection.

- Get the resources you need. Substantiate the need and make clear the risk that follows should they not be provided. The articulation of that risk is critical, and very difficult to do.

- Shape your external environment. With increasing seniority, more of your organization’s success is determined by factors outside your command.

Bottom line:
The Operating Environment (OE) demands an increase in staff and leader training and development at the operational and strategic levels. Relying alone on a strong tactical foundation is inadequate, given the uncertainty and complexity of the environment and the expectation that we must be “trained and ready” (train, alert, deploy).

B. Operational Intelligence

The commander drives intelligence; he must be involved in both the collection function and the
analysis function. And there is a significant role to play well before conflict is initiated—think setting and shaping the theater.

- Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) is a system of systems, and echelon of assignment does not equal echelon of support. This will be increasingly the case as new intelligence management systems are rolled out. Know what you “own” and what you do not.

- “Get your arms around ISR or it will get its arms around you.” The command must make a compelling case for ISR; many demands placed on limited systems. Work it early and in thorough coordination with fellow component commanders.

- Your ISR system is not self-sufficient. You will have to rely on a whole host of systems, many outside of DOD.

- The intelligence assessment has grown in scope and complexity. It is far more than just a threat assessment, and must include infrastructure, culture, history, and demographics. The development of HUMINT capabilities requires additional skills for our intelligence personnel, and those skills must expand to encompass the entire operational environment.

- SFA activities require greater focus and linkage to theater intelligence collection so that there is continuous assessing, setting, and shaping of the theater.

- The Commander's Critical Intelligence Requirements (CCIRs) and Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs) must be validated and revalidated continually as essential to putting limited resources against the right efforts.

- ISR resources will continue to be high demand and create natural friction between land and air components. Consider ISR as a key resource throughout the depth of the joint campaign, and it may be in the latter phases of the campaign where these resources become most valuable as you attempt to verify conditions that will facilitate a number of different transitions.

- Shared intelligence must become a fact, not an aspiration. We will fight as a coalition and must be willing to take some risk to get our coalition partners prudent but greater access.
Liaisons are effective but highly resource intensive. Moreover, they must be allowed to function as intended, which mandates trust, transparency, and confidentiality.

- Getting at the accurate and timely battle damage assessment (BDA), a critical component of ongoing combat assessment, remains a challenge. Given its importance to mission success, this requires better training (what do ground formations look for and report) and improved doctrine (fixing components and technical platforms with more clearly defined responsibilities and tasks). But at the operational level, this task remains largely an art—the C/JFLCC commander must use experience and intuition to make the tough calls.

- Understand the use of new technologies, such as communications exploitation, information technologies exploitation, and biometrics. Fight through classification restrictions, resource limitations, and unfamiliarity to get these capabilities applied at the right echelons and at the right times.

- Get a grip on the electromagnetic spectrum and cyberspace. Increasingly this domain offers great opportunity to secure operational advantage, but equally, it presents extraordinary risk if not properly attended to. It’s in the commander's lane, so get smart on it.

- The criticality of properly trained foreign disclosure officers is a force multiplier. Coalition information and intelligence flow will depend on it.

- Don’t let your intelligence specialists fixate on one threat group or one technology. We all tend to operate where we are most comfortable. The complexity of the C/JFLCC's operating environment demands collection and assessment on a broad array of targets with an even broader array of capabilities.

- Think about how you want to use your intelligence system:
  - Indications and Warning (I&W);
  - Situational awareness / development;
  - Target development / targeting;
  - Assessment;
  - Commander’s Communication Strategy
- Local hire vetting;
- Support of legal process / detainee processing;
- Training of host nation forces.

**Bottom line:**
Intelligence collection and dissemination must be continuous, rigorous, and fully leverage security cooperation activities. The complexity and scope of the requirement will put increasing pressure on the institutions which produce intelligence analysts who are fully capable of working at the operational and strategic level. The intelligence community is now considered an enterprise, and this enterprise approach is intended to make more capabilities available to the entire force.

C. *Operational Fires*

- The operational area will demand the application of effective nonlethal activities. Current technologies can produce nonlethal munitions and effects that can facilitate desired end states without increasing significant risk to the force. Factor nonkinetic actions and effects in when planning.

- Information Operations (IO) and Cyber/Electromagnetic Activities (C/EMA) should be considered to more effectively integrate them throughout the depth of the campaign. This particular dimension of power may be the most effective tool commanders have in the war on terror, but its use is not optimized.

- Leaders need greater exposure to media figures in a training/seminar setting. Tapping in to these figures during informal, nonattribution sessions will give leaders a better sense of what journalists are looking for and how their various media can be used to our advantage. Remember, though, there is no true anonanimity in nonattribution.
• The integration and synchronization of a broad range of activities in order to produce an effect is optimum. However, we still have not completely integrated all the enablers in order to execute mutually supporting activities on a continuous basis in every theater.

• The Joint Air Component Coordination Element (JACCE) and the Battlefield Coordination Detachment (BCD) are big force multipliers. Embrace the JACCE and make sure the BCD is capable of representing your interests. There has been some discussion of making the colonel-level BCD commanders brigadier general positions. This is an indication of how important the BCD commander position is and how much attention it deserves.

**Bottom line:**

Synchronization must become a formal activity in each theater every day. It is a leadership imperative, and it must reinforce the C/JFLCC Commander's Intent and Combatant Commander's theater objectives. The establishment of a daily process, even outside of an active campaign (OEF or OIR (Operation Inherent Resolve)), will increase the effective use of nonkinetics and integrate interagency efforts. Synchronization is central to the theater and functional operational planning construct to support steady-state activities as well as combat actions.

D. *Operational Movement and Maneuver.*

• Force packaging and force flow prioritization are key—and must address the complete depth of the joint campaign. The later phases of the campaign require as much analysis to determine force capabilities as the front end. Think end state even before you cross the LD (Line of Departure).

• Set the battlespace geometry to facilitate maximum joint, coalition, interagency, and NGO integration. The effects produced by these organizations should not be one-dimensional. Common graphics are essential.

• Use doctrinal terms, and especially don’t invent new ones that merely recast existing operational factors in fashionable jargon. Basic planning terminology works, and such
terms are widely understood. This is especially important in multinational contexts, when language translation poses inherent risks to understanding. Use doctrinal terms as is.

- Operational maneuver facilitates effective transitions by maintaining the initiative and shaping end state objectives throughout the depth of the campaign. Operational maneuver should begin to shape back-end conditions immediately; it is not sequential, but interconnected throughout all operational phasing.

- Every unit arriving in theater must be assigned to a headquarters, by an order. The current force package construct makes this a very leader-intensive task. Fix responsibility on the CJ3 for this.

- Maintain a posture to exploit success. Opportunities are fleeting and a commander must be alert to the effects of successful tactical level exploitation on the broader operational and strategic objectives.

- We have a long ways to go towards increasing our proficiency with the integration of conventional and special operations capability. Although the integration improved from OEF to OIF, it still requires greater effort. We do not routinely train together, nor is there adequate doctrine to codify the use of these complementary and reinforcing capabilities.

**Bottom line:**

Force packaging and force flow must give the Land Component Commander the necessary resources to be decisive during major combat operations and during transitions. Campaign success is most vulnerable during the transition periods, and must be considered the most resource intensive, fully leveraging joint, coalition and interagency resources. Our leader development institutions must teach the importance of transitions and how to “win” them, using all the additional capabilities that the CFACC, CFSOCC, and CFMCC can bring to bear, as well as our interagency partners.
E. **Operational Protection**

The complete scope and responsibilities associated with force protection are not well understood. The policies of host nation and other regional states play a significant role in how force protection is planned, resourced, and executed.

- The Joint Security Area (JSA) determination by the combatant commander for the land component is critical. Increasingly, noncontiguous battlespace poses new and difficult challenges in determining what constitutes “the rear area” and it may be impractical to fix the C/JFLCC alone with these responsibilities.

- Consider implementation of the following control mechanisms and procedures outlined in JP 3-10, *Joint Security Operations in Theater*.
  - The establishment of a joint security area (JSA). A JSA is a specific surface area, designated by the JFC to facilitate protection of joint bases and their connecting lines of communications that support joint operations.
  - Conducting joint security operations (JSO). JSO provide for the defense of the joint force and facilitate force protection actions in designated areas. JSA and JSO provide for unity of effort and efficient use of constrained resources to maintain a relatively secure environment allowing the JFC to focus on their primary mission. JSO may entail the participation of host nation or coalition forces. The JFC will establish the operational framework that best addresses the operational environment while providing for maximum flexibility.
  - The establishment of a joint security coordination center (JSCC) using elements from the JFC staff and representatives from all components operating in the operational area will also assist in meeting joint security requirements.
  - The establishment of a joint movement center (JMC). The JMC executes movement control and coordination of convoys passing through higher-level organizational and cross-Service boundaries. The JSCC links to the JMC ensuring Lines of Communication (LOC) security is maintained throughout the operational area. One
viable technique to link the JSC and JMC planning functions is to establish a joint LOC security board (JLSB).

- C/JFLCC commanders must expect and plan for significant troop support requirements to provide for security requirements for the C/JFACC and the C/JFSOCC (airfields, bases, and camps). These requirements will generally not be for military police but for more general purpose forces.

- The information domain will become increasingly vulnerable to threat attempts to collect, degrade or destroy friendly systems—just as we become more reliant on these same systems. This entire area will require increased training at the leader and staff level and increased command emphasis on protection.

- Coalition members have different force protection capabilities and may operate under different national ROEs. These factors must be considered when assigning coalition formations roles and responsibilities.

- Additional considerations for operational protection planning—it is a far broader basket of tasks than in the past (ADRP 3-37 Protection, August 2012):
  - Air and missile defense (AMD);
  - Personnel recovery (PR);
  - Information protection;
  - Fratricide avoidance;
  - Operational area security;
  - Antiterrorism (AT);
  - Survivability;
  - Force health protection (FHP);
  - Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) operation;
  - Safety;
  - Operations security (OPSEC);
– Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD).

**Bottom line:**
Operational force protection will become increasingly challenging. Defining the joint rear area and who has responsibility for these areas is not always clear but remains important. Also essential is to acknowledge and plan for the resource bill associated with meeting these joint requirements. Early and continuous theater shaping operations can significantly enhance our force protection posture in time of conflict (intelligence collection, APOD/SPOD analysis, infrastructure assessments, and more).

F. **Operational Sustainment.**

- “Logistics is operations and operations is logistics” at the operational level. Effective operational sustainment is independent, interdependent, and interoperable—and developed in depth.

- Properly executed force reception operations provide the foundation for effective campaign sustainment operations. This is leader’s business.

- Getting at the C/JRSOI requirements for the entire joint and coalition force early is important. We must improve on the requirements determination process, across all the Services, and these requirements must consider the complete depth of the campaign.

- Make sure you understand the difference between asset visibility and requirements visibility; you must help your CJ4 get at land requirements for the other components. Many, especially the SOC, may perforce present these late. Talk this up between the component commanders to gain as much advance planning time as possible.

- Reception operations support the entire force but must be centrally managed and controlled—no “free-lancing”! Directive Authority for Logistics is a combatant commander authority that is a de facto requirement for the theater C/JFLCC commander, but rarely delegated. Fight hard for it!
• The C/JFLCC commander must seek to maintain total asset visibility from strategic to tactical levels, but we do not yet have a single, fully integrated joint system. This is a key component of tracking combat capability.

• Operational sustainment must enable overlapping deployment and employment operations for all functional components. Unfortunately, that increases the natural tension and competition for strategic lift.

• Clear Commander’s Intent is critical to sustainment planning. Consider tasking the senior logistician to develop logistic intent that reinforces your intent.

• It is essential to have logistics planners involved in early campaign planning and represented in every staff planning cell, center, and board.

• Distribution of sustainment requires the application of joint solutions, and these joint solutions must have staying power well into (and past) the latter part of the campaign.

• TRANSCOM has the capability and capacity to push forward to you far more than you have the capability to receive effectively. Push back when through-put limitations threaten to clog the resource pipeline. Faster is not always better on the receiving end.

Bottom line:

Support to the joint and coalition force can be made more effective if the right shaping activities are conducted in theater as part of security cooperation or as prudent actions to set the theater. In a combined and joint context, operational-level sustainment is an inherently joint function that requires greater joint training and integration throughout the joint campaign.
The 21st century security environment underscores the importance of maintaining a ready and flexible land force headquarters with expertise at the operational and strategic levels, capable of shaping, and if necessary controlling, events on the ground. Whether the land force is committed against a conventional threat or that more typical of the fights in Afghanistan and Iraq, or disaster assistance and humanitarian relief, the land component headquarters must ultimately set conditions for the desired strategic end state—achieving the military objective is essential but still insufficient.

The C/JFLCC commander, on behalf of the combatant commander or JTF commander, works to secure enduring national policy objectives. The C/JFLCC commander works to set the right conditions for achieving enduring success while concurrently supporting and enabling his civilian counterparts and their organizations. Opportunities for collaboration still exist among the varied participants with diverse missions and priorities. Focusing on the capabilities available to meet common objectives will go a long way toward achieving unity of effort and progress. There is no more demanding dimension of the battlespace than operations on land, where people, live, work, trade, and interact with one another. Moreover, the complexity and challenge for the C/JFLCC commander is only likely to increase in the years ahead. The art and science associated with the conduct of full spectrum major land operations remains central to our national security. It is unlikely that unified land operations will become irrelevant. Accordingly, it is incumbent on senior land leaders to share what they know and grow the land leaders of the future.
ANNEX A - COMBINED JOINT FORCES LAND COMPONENT COMMAND 2014 ESTABLISHMENT IN IRAQ (CJFLCC-I)

In the fall 2014, the U.S. Army’s First Infantry Division (1 ID) returned to Iraq to establish the Combined Joint Forces Land Component Command-Iraq (CJFLCC-I) after the Islamic State in the Levant (henceforth referred to as DA’ISH) seized the key towns of Fallujah and Mosul a few months prior. In planning to establish the CJFLCC-I, 1 ID encountered a theater and mission set which had drastically changed in the three years since the conclusion of OPERATION NEW DAWN in 2011. Establishing a land component command again in Iraq required assessing a new theater and threat, setting that theater, building a joint land operations plan, and receiving the land force.

Assessing the Theater and the Threat Environment

The withdrawal of United States forces from Iraq in December of 2011 ended nearly nine years of involvement in the training and development of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). By 2014, the geo-political power play from actors vying for power inside Iraq had worsened, and many regional countries were exerting more influence on Iraq’s fledgling government. In just three years, U.S. influence with the Government of Iraq (GoI) had waned.

Without the ability to directly combat DA’ISH with ground troops, CJFLCC-I would need to engage in Build Partner Capacity (BPC) activities and Advise and Assist (A&A) missions at locations where they could interact with key ISF command nodes and maintain the broadest possible influence of the GoI across the area of operations. Relying on historical knowledge U.S. forces gained from 2003-2011, Combined Joint Task Force-OIR (CJTF-OIR)
assessed multiple locations and, with the influence from the GoI, chose airfields throughout key population centers to establish initial command nodes and training sites.

Assessing the threat in the theater was severely inhibited without the use of previous intelligence networks. CJFLCC-I lacked the use of a human intelligence (HUMINT) and reliable Iraqi Army intelligence experts. With restricted manning levels and limited access to ISF tactical formations, the CJFLCC-I command and staff had to rely on national and Combatant Command assets such as full motion video and other intelligence sources to build an understanding of DA’ISH patterns and to facilitate targeting operations. Partnership with the ISF, albeit limited by few locations, and the integration of intelligence assets proved vital in illuminating DA’ISH and assessing the theater.

Setting the Theater

The collective shared interests of the coalition nations drove the process of setting the OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE (OIR) theater. CJFLCC-I integrated service members from coalition nations to form a cohesive structure characterized by unity of effort, common understanding of the operational and tactical environment, shared operational objectives, and coordinated resources and capabilities. Setting the OIR theater initially focused on gaining the permissions and authorities necessary from the GoI and U.S., respectively, to operate aircraft and transit in/out of Iraqi airspace, establish training sites in Iraq, and train Iraqi Army units.

Respect for the national sovereignty of Iraq was the foremost consideration for CJFLCC-I in setting the theater, as the campaign against DA’ISH does not usurp Iraq’s status as a sovereign nation. Unlike previous experiences in Iraq for U.S. forces, the Department of State (DoS) maintained the lead for all operations in Iraq and the Department of Defense (DoD) was a
supporting partner, meaning CJFLCC-I would be limited in the type of operations it could conduct.

After U.S. forces departed Iraq in 2011, all previous ground and air lines of communication (ALOCs, GLOCs) ceased to exist. CJFLCC-I found significant logistics shortfalls in Iraq and required additional logistics units and contracted assets to support operational requirements. After the DoS gained the agreement of the GoI, personnel deployment and equipment distribution was primarily accomplished using ALOCs. The Combined Forces Air Component Command (CFACC) assisted through allocating aircraft and supporting airlift to fixed sites throughout Iraq. Additionally, CJFLCC-I utilized DoS contract capabilities to bridge incoming coalition requirements at those fixed sites.

CJFLCC-I established its logistics capability in a resource constrained environment centered on providing combined support. Operational success depended on the self-sustainability of coalition forces through rapid fielding and delivery of critical equipment – including war reserve material – and gaining host nation approval for specific logistics access in Iraq via diplomatic clearances and customs inspections. The Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq (OSC-I) facilitated the continued delivery of materiel through both new and pre-existing Foreign Military Sales (FMS) cases.

Critical logistics hubs included an Intermediate Staging Base (ISB) in Kuwait as the main hub for combined, joint, reception, staging, onward movement and integration (JRSOI), as well as sustainment operations for coalition forces. All forward deployed components synchronized support requirements through the Kuwait ISB. From Kuwait, CJTF-OIR provided sustainment command and control of theater assigned A/SPODs. Kuwait’s proximity and existing logistical footprint allowed uninterrupted flow of supplies into the theater. Logistics constraints and
limitations throughout Iraq highlighted Kuwait ISB as a critical requirement and sustainment center of gravity to enable coalition efforts.

**Building the Joint Land Operations Plan**

Land operations planning in Iraq required the close collaboration between many organizations, including the GoI, CJTF-OIR, OSC-I, CJFLCC-I, and the Special Operations Joint Task Force-Iraq (SOJTF-I). In particular, CJFLCC-I and SOJTF-I were in danger of competing for CENTCOM and CJTF-OIR controlled resources if integrated planning was not considered to promote unity of effort between the two headquarters. Without such collaboration, the CJFLCC-I headquarters would be in danger of pursuing different endstates than SOJTF-I.

Using only a draft CENTCOM campaign plan and an implementation plan from CJTF-OIR, CJFLCC-I and SOJTF-I planners conducted multiple planning sessions over several weeks to build and produce a combined campaign plan (CAMPLAN). The completed document served as a common operational architecture – a framework within which subordinate units planned and executed assigned missions with clear lines of effort (LOEs). The first LOE focused on Operations. It consisted of lethal fires from Strike Cells; advise and assist efforts at the Iraqi Ministry of Defense, corps-level headquarters, operations commands, and brigade level; tribal resistance from SOJTF-I; and information operations. The second LOE focused on Building ISF Capacity at fixed BPC sites and using mobile training teams if necessary.

With this combined operational approach, CJFLCC-I was able to task organize into a headquarters that could span the theater to accomplish its endstates – defeating DA’ISH, controlling the borders to preserve Iraqi sovereignty, and building an ISF capable of supporting GoI security. Perhaps the most significant effort was influencing the Ministry of Defense to
create a Combined Joint Operations Command (CJOC), which commanded the ISF’s geographic operations commands throughout the country. Inside the CJOC, CJFLCC-I was able to advise and assist the ISF leadership, as well as authorize coalition air strikes in support of ISF operations.

**Receiving the Land Force**

CJFLCC-I would need to rely heavily on coalition participation and joint individual augmentees to comprise the headquarters. Building a coalition in Iraq was necessary for global recognition of the OIR mission, to combine and maximize talent and resources, and to garner greater acceptance from the GoI. Given the CAMPLAN, CJFLCC-I created a Joint Manning Document (JMD) to help scope coalition participation. Incorporating coalition partners in key leadership positions across the CJFLCC-I would assume a significant share of manning responsibilities for A&A teams, as well as BPC leaders and trainers. CENTCOM then hosted multiple manning conferences with OIR-participating nations to fill the JMD. Additionally, the Joint Staff was asked to fill critical positions identified on the JMD and send forward an even more diverse set of staff officers.

With the Force Management Level (FML) restriction, 1 ID had to task-organize its own headquarters to send only a small portion of the staff forward, where it established the CJFLCC-I headquarters in Baghdad and a Tactical Command Post (TAC) in Erbil. The headquarters also established a Rear Command Post focused on JRSOI from Kuwait, and maintained distributed command and control with the 1 ID footprint at Fort Riley, Kansas. Much of the operations and planning staff came forward to Iraq, while the administrative and logistics function remained largely in Kuwait. CJFLCC-I was able to rotate key staff and enablers north into Iraq on a
temporary duty (TDY) status for short periods of time to gain a greater understanding of the mission, constraints, and restraints with which the command was working. CJFLCC-I headquarters also brought coalition partners and subject matter experts from places such as Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO), Rapid Equipping Force (REF), centers of excellence (CoEs), the Combined Arms Center (CAC), and multiple other enablers forward on TDY to contribute to the OIR campaign.

The process of filling the JMD with coalition contributions and joint individual augmentees took many months. While nations went through their political decision-making process to determine levels of support and caveats to their OIR participation, CJFLCC-I had to create and man four BPC sites across the country. As a bridging solution, CJFLCC-I requested through CJTF-OIR to bring forward command teams and Soldiers from the 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1 ID, to initially man the BPC sites on a short-term basis. 1/1 ID was stationed in Kuwait as part of OPERATION SPARTAN SHIELD, but by February 2015 it had reached the end of its nine month deployment window. Knowing neither the Spanish nor Australians would be fully operational as Task Forces at Besmaya Military Range Complex or Taji Airfield, respectively, CJFLCC-I initiated a request for forces that ultimately called forward the 3rd Infantry Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division, to serve as the interim trainers and base operating support integrators at Besmaya and Taji until BPC Task Forces could be formed, deployed, and established in theater.

All told, assessing the threat and mission, setting the theater, building the CAMPLAN, and receiving the land force took seven months. The threat is constantly changing, which highlights the need for continued combined campaign planning. Setting the theater conditions
for OIR required – and still requires – a collective effort of coalition support and improvised use of existing logistics infrastructure. As operations evolve and new challenges emerge, CJFLCC-I will continue to rely on coalition forces to contribute personnel and resources to maintain operational tempo. The command and control architecture remains challenging. Only now is the theater set for CJFLCC-I to accomplish its mission of defeating DA’ISH. Critical to the mission will be building and maintaining the coalition to enable GoI security.

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