




JOINT DOCTRINE UPDATE

DEPUTY DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF, J-7, JOINT EDUCATION AND DOCTRINE,
JOINT DOCTRINE ANALYSIS DIVISION

JP 3-05.1, *Unconventional Warfare*



JOINT DOCTRINE DEVELOPMENT NOTICE

General

The Director of the Joint Staff approved the original version of Joint Publication (JP) 3-05.1, *Unconventional Warfare*, on 15 September 2015. This publication provides joint doctrine to assess, plan, and execute unconventional warfare.

Content

Unconventional warfare (UW) can be used to translate national strategy and policy into an operational concept that provides national decision makers an appropriate strategic military option that can be combined with a series of interrelated United States Government (USG) actions aimed at achieving specific strategic and

operational objectives. The inherent risk in UW is the time to develop viable forces, risk to small numbers of special operations forces operating with the insurgents or resistance forces, and diplomatic/political risk depending on the desired signature and effects. This JP presents the fundamentals and art of UW. It also addresses joint functions in UW; and it explains planning for UW.

Summary of JP 3-05.1:

- UW includes activities to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating with an underground, auxiliary, or guerrilla force in a denied area.
- Resistance is a mix of clandestine, covert, and overt US and indigenous activities. UW requires a varying mix of clandestine and overt sponsor activities and may require covert activities to hide the role of USG as the sponsor.
- The emphasis in UW is on the indigenous resistance elements, not US force structures and procedures.
- Within the Department of Defense, joint force commanders (JFCs) consider the wide array of joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational capabilities to support and accomplish USG objectives for UW.
- The operational approach to employing those military capabilities supports the integration of ends, ways, and means for the operational art of UW.
- The seven phases of UW operations are considered one line of operation that fits within the traditional phases of a JFC's plan. The seven phases are: preparation, initial contact, infiltration, organization, buildup, employment, and transition.
- The joint functions in UW are related capabilities and activities grouped together to help JFCs integrate, synchronize, and direct joint operations. These functions are the same as described in JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*: command and control, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection, and sustainment.
- The size, structure, geographic locations, level of cooperation, and leadership of resistance organizations will directly affect both the type of operations and the organization of the supporting joint force.
- There are two types of UW. The first type is UW as one major operation in support of a larger campaign in which military forces are the primary instrument of USG national power. The second type is as a stand-alone operation, not directly related to a larger military campaign.

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- The goal of UW in support of other major operations may be to facilitate the eventual introduction of conventional forces or divert enemy resources from other operations areas. When UW is the strategic main effort, it offers great advantages to the USG as an economy of force option to address hostile regimes without large military forces

JOINT PUBLICATION 3-05.1 REVIEW

Chapter I, “Fundamentals of Unconventional Warfare,” discusses the strategic environment, including the rise in the number of belligerent powers and a growing influence of non-state actors, and how UW can be employed against either adversary. Section A, “Overview,” also identifies fundamentals and considerations of UW, such as its support to one of three strategic end states to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow an adversarial governing authority. Section B, “Means and Ways,” for UW describes means as both indigenous resistance components and US forces conducting UW, with the indigenous resistance elements as the main effort and US forces in support. Ways include the activities used by the indigenous resistance components and support activities from US forces. The emphasis in UW is on the indigenous resistance elements, not US force structures and procedures. The primary components of a resistance include the underground, auxiliary, guerrilla forces, public components, third-party governments, and exiled groups. Section C, “Roles and Responsibilities,” discusses how UW is a national strategic undertaking and while it is a core special operations task; special operations forces do not conduct UW unilaterally as support from other agencies and elements is essential. This section then provides an overview of the potential actors and stakeholders, separate from the resistance movement itself, to consider in planning and conducting UW. When UW is directed, the JFC employs military forces in concert with the other instruments of national power (diplomatic, informational, or economic instruments), as well as coordination and collaboration and integration with intergovernmental organizations, and nongovernmental organizations to achieve unity of effort.

Chapter II, “The Art of Unconventional Warfare,” describes the application of operational art and operational design for UW. Paragraph 1, “Operational Approach,” provides an overview of how UW is primarily undertaken at the strategic level, developed and directed at the operational level, and conducted at the tactical level with every action intended to serve strategic ends. This paragraph also describes the operational approach for UW as bounded by four elements: the requirement for a whole-of-government effort; type of support (direct, mutual, clandestine, general close); the desired signature (overt, covert, clandestine, or combination); and ultimately, the potential of the resistance and underground movements. Paragraph 2, “Operational Design,” describes how operational design is the conception and construction of the framework that underpins a UW campaign or major operation which supports the commander’s guidance to focus efforts and bounds the problem. UW planning requires a

unique interagency approach supporting resistance effort, and operational design provides a method to anticipate and coordinate these requirements. Paragraph 3, “Elements of Operational Design,” explains, while UW is more complex, the operational design is not inherently different from other operations, and it still focuses on synchronizing the means in time and space along lines of effort (LOEs) or ways to attain desired end states. Accordingly, the three objectives of UW -- coercion, disruption, or overthrow -- have different characteristics and different operational approaches. Coercion and disruption are typically short-term effects and low US expenditures, compared to the all-or-nothing objective, high risk, and potential long-term commitment of overthrow. These UW objectives are factored into how the employment of the elements of operational design such as centers of gravity, effects, decisive points, and termination. Paragraph 4, “Understanding a Resistance,” discusses understanding the why and how resistance elements and movements organize and follow a strategy to reach their goals, which informs how best to advance or support that resistance. Both the regime and the resistance compete to influence the population of the country or region in their favor, and this competition occurs in human social networks, between regional leadership, religious, and tribal groups, and where the cultural approaches are often challenging for US forces to identify and determine. This paragraph also describes the variances of UW as depicted in the Figure II-2, Variances of Unconventional Warfare.




Figure II-2. Variances of Unconventional Warfare

Paragraph 5, “Phasing of Unconventional Warfare Operations,” explains how UW operations have traditionally been planned using a seven-phase model, which provides a planning template from starting to build a resistance through building an armed component -- the guerrilla force -- and transitioning from operations to governance. These seven phases are a conceptual template to aid understanding of a UW operational effort and serve as a guide for planning and

(JP 3-05.1 Continued)

command; and the resistance organization. Organizing for UW focuses on the resistance organization and emphasizes how the JFC should structure itself in a way that not only allows C2 of joint forces, but provides specific support to a resistance based upon the resistance organization, the locations of critical nodes, the type of support (general, mutual, direct, or close), and the desired signature. The size, structure, geographic locations, level of cooperation, and leadership of resistance organizations will directly affect both the type of operations and the organization of the supporting joint force. When planning UW organization, planners should consider the elements of resistance organization such as: organizational leadership, government in exile, shadow government, population, support networks, and guerrilla bases. Unity of command, centralized planning, synchronized operational effects, and decentralized execution are key considerations for organizing a joint force for UW. Based on the scale of the UW operation and the partners involved, the GCC can stand up a dedicated special operations command, also known as a special operations joint task force, or establish a joint interagency task force (JIATF) with either a military commander or civilian interagency director which provides a functional headquarters that incorporates all the instruments of national power. Due to the inherent whole-of-government effort of UW, the JIATF may be either a stand-alone unified command or it could be the overarching task force. An additional consideration for UW is operational areas, which have physical dimensions composed of some combination of air, land, maritime, and space domains. JFCs define these areas with geographical boundaries to coordinate, integrate, and deconflict operations and these operational areas vary depending on the size and capabilities of the insurgency and other factors.

Chapter V, “Planning Unconventional Warfare,” explains the planning for the two types of UW. The first type is UW as one major operation in support of a larger campaign in which the military instrument is primary, and the other with UW as a stand-alone operation, not directly related to a larger military campaign. Within the phases of shape, deter, seize the initiative, dominate, stabilize, and enable civil authority, UW phases should be viewed on a sliding scale that can move left or right along those same phases or reside within any single phase, as the situation permits. The established JFC and supporting components should be capable of translating the seven phases of UW into an operational construct. JFCs should articulate UW objectives, desired effects, LOOs, LOEs, decision points, required authorities, and necessary resources across all phases of a UW operation. Ultimately, JFCs should acknowledge a unified approach that clearly describes to a variety of stakeholders exactly how UW will attain strategic ends.

Appendix A, “Legal Considerations,” focuses on the legal parameters of UW, which depend on the specifics of a particular mission, operation, campaign, or conflict. UW often inhabits the gray area of diplomacy where it blends into warfare. It is crucial the joint force planning and executing UW pay careful attention to legal considerations and respect for authorities.

Appendix B, “Leveraging Social Movement Classified Intelligence Support to Personnel Recovery,” focuses on social movements and corresponding social revolutions and to leverage them to enhance the strategic flexibility and social support of UW by tapping into existing political fractures, informal social networks, and local narratives. Leveraging social movement begins by understanding how social movement and social revolution relate to each other during UW.

Appendix C, “References,” updates content.

Appendix D, “Administrative Instructions,” updates content.

The sole term sourced to JP 3-05.1 is “unconventional warfare.” This term is unchanged from the existing definition in JP 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, but was previously sourced to JP 3-05, *Special Operations*.

To view JP 3-05.1, navigate to the Joint Electronic Library Plus (common access card required) at <https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/index.jsp?pinde=2>.

Joint publications, universal joint tasks, and concepts closely related to JP 3-05.1:

Key Joint Publications: These JPs provide some related information on unconventional warfare:




Figure V-2. Example of Unconventional Warfare as the Strategic Main Effort

(JP 3-05.1 Continued)

- JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*
- JP 3-05, *Special Operations*
- JP 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*
- JP 3-25, *Counterterrorism*


Universal Joint Tasks (UJTs): The Universal Joint Task List provides an organizing mechanism and the basic language for developing joint mission-essential task lists. While there are no UJTs currently sourced to JP 3-05.1, the following are applicable to unconventional warfare:

- ST 1.3.7, *Conduct Unconventional Warfare (UW)*
- OP 1.2.4.8, *Conduct Unconventional Warfare (UW)*

Related Concepts: Concepts explore ideas and capabilities that can address current doctrinal gaps.

- *Joint Operational Access Concept*
- *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020*

JP 3-50, Personnel Recovery



JOINT DOCTRINE CHANGE NOTICE

General

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the change in lieu of revision for Joint Publication (JP) 3-50, *Personnel Recovery*, on 2 October 2015. It supersedes the 20 December 2011 version of JP 3-50. This publication provides doctrine for the preparation, planning, execution, and assessment of personnel recovery.

Content

This JP provides the basic constructs and principles to guide the Services, combatant commanders (CCDRs), and subordinate joint force commanders (JFCs) to prepare for, plan, execute, and adapt personnel recovery (PR). It describes command relationships to facilitate the synchronization and integration of recovery operations. It addresses the combination of command guidance, education and training, and products and equipment required to prepare for PR. It covers PR mission analysis; developing the operational concept of, and authorities for, PR in the basic plan; and developing the PR appendix to the basic plan. Finally, it discusses the five PR execution tasks of report, locate, support, recover, and reintegrate.

Summary of Changes

- Refines the scope of the publication to include assessment.
- Introduces the prevention function with further reference to JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*.
- Accounts for the realignment of the Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office to the Defense Prisoner of War/Missing in Action Accounting Agency and its roles and responsibilities.

- Identifies that CCDRs should maintain a joint personnel recovery center (JPRC) (enduring capability) at all times.
- Refers to the PR enterprise as those entities/organizations supporting PR in a geographic area, region, or globally.
- Within the definition of isolated personnel, clarifies the meaning of US military-sponsored activities to include military/civilian leave and how contractor leave status is considered.
- Uses the term combat support agencies clarifying applicability.
- Modified definition for reintegration to prioritize the medical health and psychological decompression of the recovered person.
- Clarification of United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) responsibilities in civil search and rescue, search and rescue regions, and the inclusion of Alaska to USNORTHCOM.
- Updated Service appendices to Service annexes with a brief description and reference to Service doctrine.
- Modified Appendix E, "Classified Planning Supplement," (published separately).

JOINT PUBLICATION 3-50 REVIEW

Chapter I, "Introduction," maintains the previous structure of two paragraphs: an overview and a description of the Department of Defense (DOD) PR system. Chapter I provides basic constructs and principles to guide the Services, CCDRs, and JFCs to prepare for, plan, execute, and adapt PR. The main change is the overview includes language on recovery of contractors authorized to accompany the force who have become isolated and clarifies sponsored military activity includes leave status for military and civilians. In addition, it covers the strategic objectives of PR as outlined in Presidential Policy Directive 30, *U.S. Nationals Taken Hostage Abroad and Personnel Recovery Efforts*. It also describes the connection between DOD force protection and the prevention and preparation tasks in the DOD PR model. Finally the overview describes the PR enterprise and that the enterprise consists of the DOD response and the host nation (HN), other US Government departments and agencies, and

(JP 3-50 Continued)

civilian agencies that can contribute to the success of the recovery of isolated persons. The second paragraph describes the four functions of the DOD PR system (preparation, planning, execution, and adaptation); the four categories of capabilities that can be drawn upon (the isolated individual, Services, joint/multinational force, and other government departments and agencies); and the options, capabilities, and methods available for use in recovering isolated personnel. The DOD PR system is largely unchanged from the previous version of the JP.

Chapter II, “Functions and Responsibilities,” is largely unchanged from the previous version and is structured exactly the same. It discusses the functions and responsibilities of the geographic combatant commanders, the Services and US Special Operations Command, the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency, the JPRC, component commanders and subordinate organizations, and the intelligence community and intelligence actions. The first significant change serves to alert commanders planning and preparing for PR operations occurs as part of the broader planning process. The second change reflects an organizational name change from the Biometrics Identity Management Agency to the Defense Forensics and Biometric Agency and explains how the JPRC should be maintained at all times and not just established when necessary. The last significant modification is the additional discussion on several tasks carried out by the unconventional assisted recovery coordination cell (UARCC), which is established by the joint force special operations component commander. The new tasks include the requirement of the UARCC to advise on and coordinate the use of nonconventional assisted recovery – PR conducted by indigenous/surrogate personnel.

Chapter III, “Command and Control,” is structured the same and is little-changed from the previous version. It includes three main paragraphs: “Command Relationships and Organization,” “Coordination and Liaison,” and “Communications.” The first paragraph describes the command authority and coordinating authority under which PR operations are carried out. It provides guidance on the establishment of and operations of the JPRC - the hub of the command’s PR efforts. It also describes the interaction between the command and the HN, along with the coordination with US embassy personnel. Paragraph 2, on coordination and liaison, details the interaction between the JPRC and the other




Figure I-1. The Department of Defense Personnel Recovery System

organizations critical to the conduct of PR. These include the joint air operations center, the component personnel recovery coordination cells (PRCCs), the UARCC, the joint security coordination center, other external agencies (including US, HN, and other international entities), and the coordination between the PRCCs and their respective forces. The final paragraph of the chapter details the

communications means and methods required to conduct PR.

Chapter IV, “Preparation,” is also structured the same as the previous version and includes an introduction, and the following paragraphs: “Command Policy and Guidance,” “Personnel Recovery Education and Training,” and “Products and Equipment.” There is little change to the first two paragraphs. Command and policy guidance states the requirement to fully plan and prepare for PR operations, to maintain appropriately staffed and trained personnel at the JPRCs and PRCCs to reduce PR response times and facilitate integration within the joint force, and to document PR requirements in appendix 5 (Personnel Recovery) to annex C (Operations) of the applicable plan. The PR education and training paragraph lays out the requirements to educate and train three groups (commanders and staffs, joint forces, and individuals at risk of isolation). The training methods and vehicles are unchanged and include education, training exercises, and predeployment and employment training, as well as training for members of the various cells involved in PR. The paragraph on products and equipment has changed through additional language on “pointee-talkees” and the personnel recovery reference product (PRRP). The PRRP is a reference document for PR-specific information on a particular country or region of interest and designed to facilitate combatant command and PR support staff planning in countries where US forces may conduct operations.

Chapter V, “Planning,” has the same structure as the previous version and includes the following paragraphs: “Personnel Recovery Mission Analysis,” “Communications Synchronization,” “The Basic Plan,” “The Personnel Recovery Appendix in the Operation Plan,” and “Personnel Recovery Mission Planning and Execution.” The detailed joint force PR plan is located within appendix 5 (Personnel Recovery) to annex C (Operations) of the plan. The PR appendix supports the basic plan, promulgates the PR concept of operations, and directs PR guidance and responsibilities to subordinate organizations. The changes to this chapter

(JP 3-50 Continued)

include the potential use of a red team to assist PR planners during mission analysis, a paragraph header change from “Strategic Communications/Communications Strategy” to “Communication Synchronization,” and the streamlining of the discussion on intelligence by directing readers to the applicable JP 2 series publication for additional information on specific intelligence means and methods.

Chapter VI, “Execution,” likewise, is structured the same as the previous JP. It provides information on the various steps of PR with the significant change being the addition of a discussion on the joint terminal attack controller (in the paragraph on recovery force elements), a discussion on tilt-rotor aircraft (in the paragraph on recovery vehicles and forces); the role the US Navy expeditionary combat forces can play in PR, additional guidance on medical treatment (in the paragraph on support to families and designated individuals), and a new discussion on post isolation support activities.

Appendix A, “Department of Defense Support to Civil Search and Rescue,” was significantly updated and provides greater detail on how DOD assets participate in international and national search and rescue operations. The updates were based, in large part, on lessons learned from DOD hurricane, earthquake, and tsunami relief operations conducted over the past decade.

Appendix B, “Classified Intelligence Support to Personnel Recovery,” has been brought up to date per its references and current joint doctrine; however, there were no structural changes made.

Appendix C, “Evasion,” replaces Appendix K, “Evasion,” of the previous version of the JP and is little-changed. The most significant change eliminated the discussion of evader’s actions relative to the front line of troops and reflects the less linear battlefield upon which the joint force operates.

Appendix D, “Personnel Recovery Instructions,” replaces the former Appendix L and is little-changed.

Appendix E, “Classified Planning Supplement,” replaces the former Appendix M and has been brought up to date per its references and current joint doctrine; however, there were no structural changes made.

Appendix F, “Sample Checklists,” replaces the former Appendix N and is little changed.

Appendix G, “Capabilities,” captures the five uniformed Services and special operations forces PR capabilities that were detailed in Appendices C through H of the previous JP 3-50. The information is now included in the following annexes of Appendix G: Annex A, “United States Army Personnel Recovery;” Annex B, “United States Marine Corps Personnel Recovery;” Annex C, “United States Navy Personnel Recovery;” Annex D, “United States Air Force Personnel Recovery;” Annex E, “United States Coast Guard Personnel Recovery;” and Annex F, “Special Operations Forces Personnel Recovery.”

Appendix H, “References,” updates content and replaces former Appendix O.

Appendix J, “Administrative Instructions,” updates content and replaces former Appendix P.

Lastly, the former Appendix J, “Blood Chit Program Administration,” was deleted, as the pertinent information contained within it has been moved into the basic text of the JP.

The following terms and definitions were removed, modified, or added in the change to JP 3-50:

The following terms and definitions were removed: “authenticate,” “combat search and rescue task force,” “combat survival,” “diplomatic authorization,” “ditching,” “helicopter support team,” “holding point,” “inland search and rescue region,” “joint personnel recovery support product,” “neutral state,” “personal locator system,” “personnel recovery task force,” “recovery force,” and “safe area.”

The following terms were modified for incorporation into JP 1-02: “contact procedure,” “isolated personnel,” “isolated personnel report,” “recovery mechanism,” “recovery team,” “reintegrate,” “terrain avoidance system,” and “unconventional assisted recovery coordination cell.”

There were no new items added to JP 1-02 with this change.

To view revised JP 3-50, navigate to the Joint Electronic Library Plus (common access card required) at <https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/index.jsp?pindex=2>.

Joint publications, universal joint tasks, and concepts closely related to JP 3-50:

Key Joint Publications: These JPs provide more details on specific aspects of the joint communications system:

- JP 2-0, *Joint Intelligence*
- JP 3-30, *Command and Control of Joint Air Operations*
- JP 3-52, *Joint Airspace Control*
- JP 5-0, *Joint Planning*


Universal Joint Tasks (UJTs): The Universal Joint Task List provides an organizing mechanism and the basic language for developing joint mission-essential task lists. JP 3-50 is the primary source for the following UJTs:

- SN 3.4.9, *Manage Personnel Recovery (PR)*
- ST 6.2.7, *Synchronize Personnel Recovery (PR)*
- OP 6.2.9, *Coordinate Personnel Recovery (PR)*

Related Concepts: Concepts explore ideas and capabilities that can address current doctrinal gaps.

- *Joint Concept for Entry Operations*

JP 3-68, *Noncombatant Evacuation Operations*



JOINT DOCTRINE REVISION NOTICE

General

The Director of the Joint Staff approved the revision of Joint Publication (JP) 3-68, *Noncombatant Evacuation Operations*, on 18 November 2015. It supersedes the 23 December 2010 version of JP 3-68. This publication provides doctrine to plan and conduct joint noncombatant evacuation and repatriation operations.

Content

Noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs) are conducted by the Department of Defense (DOD) to assist in evacuating US citizens and nationals, DOD civilian personnel, and designated persons (host nation and third country nationals), whose lives are in danger, from locations in a foreign nation to an appropriate safe haven, when directed by the Department of State (DOS). NEOs represent a critical capability available to the US Government to safeguard US citizens and designated personnel abroad.

Summary of Changes

- Modifies the definition of a “noncombatant evacuation operation,” to be consistent with DOD guidance.
- Describes situations when diplomatic or other considerations may preclude the use of the term NEO to describe evacuations.
- Removes the US Army as DOD Executive Agent for repatriation and identifies the Commanders of United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) as being offices of primary responsibility for repatriation
- Incorporates former Chapter IV, “Contingency and Redeployment Planning,” and Appendix C, “Noncombatant Evacuation Operation Planning Considerations,” along with a new section on multinational planning, to produce a comprehensive Chapter IV, “Planning.”
- Provides planning considerations for NEO transition, termination, and repatriation.
- Provides a new chapter focused on safe havens and repatriation, emphasizing interorganizational coordination.
- Expands the discussion of the NEO tracking system; US embassy information sharing; use of biometrics; and NEO incidental to a chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) incident.
- Provides a new appendix on the use of joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment during a NEO.

JOINT PUBLICATION 3-68 REVIEW

Chapter I, “Overview,” is divided into five major paragraphs. The first, “Introduction,” describes NEOs as conducted by the DOD in support of the DOS and reinforces they are conducted under chief of mission (COM) authority. Significant changes from the previous version include language on the COM as being the lead federal official for the protection and evacuation of all US civilians designated as noncombatant evacuees, including DOD dependents. Commanders will ensure DOD actions related to the evacuation of DOD dependents, nonessential and essential DOD civilian employees, and their families are consistent with the direction of the COM. The authority of the COM to order evacuation does not extend to personnel of the Services that are not under the COM’s authority, except as agreed upon between DOS and DOD. The introduction also details the consultation and coordination required between the commander responsible for executing the NEO operation and the COM. Paragraph 2, “Terminology,” again adds language to clarify the role of, and the interaction with, the COM; and discuss circumstances when the term NEO may not be advisable for use; and increase understanding of various terms used when conducting a multinational NEO. These are contained in a new reference for multinational NEO, Allied Joint Publication-3.4.2, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations*. Paragraph 3, “Special Nature of Evacuation Operations,” describes the command and control structure and political and diplomatic factors that differentiate NEOs from other military operations. The sub-paragraph on rules of engagement has been modified to provide more comprehensive guidance to military commanders conducting NEOs. Paragraph 4, “Operational Environments,” was revised to highlight the need for the NEO force to gain a greater appreciation for the situation through the use of the joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment and develop plans to account for permissive, uncertain, and hostile environments. Paragraph 5, “Military Planning and Forces,” was little-changed.

Chapter II, “Roles, Coordination, and Interaction,” discusses the responsibilities and coordination involved by all organizations involved in a NEO. Paragraph 2, “Department of State,” is largely unchanged. The text covers DOS actions and specifically addresses three entities: the Washington Liaison Group, that coordinates and implements plans for the protection and evacuation of persons abroad for whom the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense are responsible; other liaison groups that may be collocated with combatant commands, as necessary, to coordinate and synchronize emergency and evacuation planning; and the Emergency Action Committee, established by the COM at a foreign service post, to direct and coordinate the post’s response to contingencies. Paragraph 3, “United States Embassy Representatives,” includes updated descriptions of the key DOS personnel and organizations with whom NEOs must be coordinated – including the COM, the deputy COM, consular

(JP 3-68 Continued)

officer, US Defense Attaché Office, security assistance officer, chief of station, management officer, political and/or economic officer, regional medical officer, regional security officer, public affairs officer, country team, US Marine Corps security guard detachment, DOD force protection detachments, and mission disaster response officer. Paragraph 4, “Other United States Government Departments and Agencies,” has been updated to include the Department of Justice. Paragraph 5, “Secretary of Defense, Combatant Commanders, and United States Military Commanders,” has also been updated. The most significant change in this paragraph is the change in responsibilities of the Commander, United States Northern Command (CDRUSNORTHCOM) and Commander, United States Pacific Command (CDRUSPACOM), as each is now designated to receive evacuees and conduct repatriation within their geographic areas of responsibility. A second significant change is the addition of a paragraph on the responsibilities of the Marine Corps Embassy Security Group. Finally, three combat support agencies with a NEO role were either added or edited. Paragraphs 6, “Host Nation,” and 7, “Nongovernmental and Intergovernmental Organizations,” are essentially unchanged. Last in the chapter, paragraph 8, “Multinational Noncombatant Evacuation Operation,” was significantly changed by moving sections on command and control, task organization, execution, logistics, and terminology from Chapter II to Chapter III.

Chapter III, “Command and Control,” contains an introductory paragraph and then paragraphs on “Authorities and Relationships,” “Command and Control,” “Joint Task Force Organization,” and “Multinational Command and Control.” The significant changes are in the roles of CDRUSNORTHCOM and CDRUSPACOM in repatriation and the addition of the Secretary of Health and Human Services as a key player in repatriation. The changes are reflected in a new figure, Figure III-1, Noncombatant Evacuation Operations/ Repatriation Operations Organization Chain of Command. Paragraphs 1, “Introduction,” and 2, “Authorities and Relationships,” are little-changed. Paragraph 3, “Command and Control,” provides changes to the Service secretaries and

geographic combatant commanders (GCCs), and removes the paragraph on US Strategic Command. Paragraph 4, “Joint Task Force Organization,” is unchanged. Paragraph 5, “Multinational Command and Control,” incorporates all of the text that was previously found in Chapter II of the former version.

Chapter IV, “Planning,” has fourteen major paragraphs. They are: “United States Embassy and Consulate Plans;” “Military Planning—Combatant Command Plans;” new paragraphs 3, “Framework for Noncombatant Evacuation Operations Planning,” and 4, “Operational Environment Considerations;” “Intelligence Support;” “Notification Procedures;” “Notification Phases;” “Evacuee Identification;” “Coordination with Senior In-Country Military Officials;” “Embassy Security and Operations;” “Intermediate Staging Base Considerations,” which moved from Chapter VII of the previous version; “Repatriation Considerations;” “Other Planning Considerations;” and “Multinational Planning Considerations,” which contains the text that was in Chapter II of the previous version. The intent of the chapter is to capture the planning considerations of all pertinent NEO actors in one cohesive chapter. New paragraph 3 poses questions that serve as focus for detailed planning and operational dialogue between US embassy and military forces.

They may also serve as a starting point for GCC priority information requirement development. New paragraph 4 highlights the importance of understanding the NEO operational environment and increasing situational awareness, and covers the three environments (permissive, uncertain, and hostile) that a NEO force may encounter. The remaining paragraphs are little-changed from the previous version of the JP.

Chapter V, “Employment and Evacuation Operation Procedures,” has five main paragraphs. The first, “Evacuation Plan Implementation,” is unchanged from the previous version. Paragraph 2, “Intermediate Staging Base,” contains text that was formerly in Chapter VII of the previous version of the JP, covering intermediate staging bases and safe haven operations. Paragraph 3, “Advance Party,” details




Figure III-1. Noncombatant Evacuation Operations/ Repatriation Operations Organization Chain of Command

(JP 3-68 Continued)

the responsibilities and actions to be taken by the joint force commander advance party. The significant changes include the requirement for increased synchronization and coordination of logistics operations with all parties, greater air support coordination, and a new sub-paragraph on amphibious advance force. Paragraph 4, “Joint Task Force Main Body Organization and Missions,” provides more information on several elements of the force, including the evacuee processing element, the security element, the marshalling element, and the logistics element. The final paragraph is “General Considerations.” The significant changes remove redundant language found in JP 4-02, Health Services, in the paragraph covering aeromedical evacuation; a new sub-paragraph on sea based medical evacuation; greater guidance on mortuary affairs; and a new sub-paragraph on NEO in a CBRN environment.

Chapter VI, “Evacuee Processing,” has four main paragraphs. The first, “Evacuee Processing,” was changed by adding language on the advisability of using the COM’s consular officer to facilitate processing and establish connectivity with DOS databases. It also recommends the use of a public affairs officer to address media throughout the processing operation. Paragraph 2, “Evacuation Control Center,” is unchanged from the previous version. Paragraph 3, “Evacuation Control Center Organization and Operations,” provides a detailed breakdown of positions, responsibilities, and stations of the evacuation control center. The significant addition is language on the “registration station,” that reads, “COM or designated DOS representative will be the final authority on acceptability of evacuee identification. If there are doubts about a person’s identity, the matter will be turned over to DOS and the person should not be evacuated until cleared by DOS.” The paragraph also includes greater detail in the discussions of the “NEO tracking system” and the “debriefing station.” The fourth and final paragraph in this chapter, “Classification, Priorities, and Considerations for Evacuees,” is unchanged.

Chapter VII, “Safe Haven and Repatriation Operations,” has four main paragraphs, one of which is new from the previous version of the JP. The first, “Temporary Safe Haven Site,” is essentially unchanged but does highlight they [temporary safe haven sites] are normally designated by the DOS, in coordination with the DOD, and can be within or outside the US. If required to be outside the US, DOD coordinates with the government in the country where it/they will be located. In addition, it highlights an intermediate safe haven may be a US Navy ship. The site selection factors are unchanged. The second main paragraph, “Alternate Safe Haven Site,” is unchanged and addresses those evacuees who may opt to reside somewhere other than the designated safe haven arranged by DOS. The third main paragraph, “Repatriation Operations,” is new and describes the procedures whereby US citizens and their families are officially processed back into the US following evacuation from overseas. As touched on earlier in the JP, the commanders of USNORTHCOM and USPACOM have specific responsibilities to establish and

operate joint reception coordination centers and manage all of the noncombatant evacuees’ needs as specified in their respective combatant command noncombatant evacuee repatriation plans. It adds information on the Department of Health and Human Services acting as the lead federal agency for the reception of all evacuees in the US. Finally, it provides information on funding, public affairs, evacuee information documentation requirements, family assistance, and pets. The fourth major paragraph, “Organization and Functional Considerations,” is unchanged and discusses the temporary safe haven force, which consists of the command group, reception team, processing team, comfort team, scheduling team, security team, religious support team, and family support services. As stated earlier, the paragraph on intermediate staging bases was moved from Chapter VII to Chapter V.

Appendix A, “Rules of Engagement,” was changed by removing the section on “law of war,” which was in some degree redundant to language already included in Appendix B.

Appendix B, “Legal Considerations;” Appendix C, “Sample Emergency Action Plan Checklists;” and Appendix D, “Sample Notice Forms,” have each been brought up to date per applicable references and current joint doctrine; however, there were no structural changes made.

Appendix E, “Repatriation Processing Center Processing Sheet,” was changed by incorporating the 2014 version of Department of Defense Form 2585, “Repatriation Processing Center Processing Sheet.”

Appendix F, “Operational Risk and Safety,” is essentially unchanged from the previous version.

Appendix G, “Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment Considerations,” is new and provides planners and those conducting operations a framework to analyze the operational environment in which they will conduct operations, from a NEO-specific perspective.

Appendix H, “References,” and Appendix J, “Administrative Instructions,” have been brought up to date.

The former Appendix C, “Noncombatant Evacuation Operations Planning,” was removed with this revision and its contents woven into the text throughout the JP, but specifically in Chapter IV, “Planning.”

The following terms and definitions were removed, modified, or added in the change to JP 3-68:

The following terms and definitions were removed: “all appropriate action,” “regional liaison group,” and “repatriate.”

(JP 3-68 Continued)

The following terms were modified for incorporation into JP 1-02: “Automated Repatriation Reporting System,” “dependents,” “emergency action committee,” “evacuation,” “foreign service national,” “geospatial intelligence base for contingency operations,” “joint reception coordination center,” “noncombatant evacuation operation,” “noncombatant evacuation operation tracking system,” “noncombatant evacuees,” “ordered departure,” “safe haven,” “warden system,” and “Washington Liaison Group.”

There were no new terms added to JP 1-02 with this revision.

To view revised JP 3-68, navigate to the Joint Electronic Library Plus (common access card required) at <https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/index.jsp?pinde=2>. To simply download JP 3-68, navigate to the Joint Electronic Library at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jointpub.htm.

Joint publications, universal joint tasks, and concepts closely related to JP 3-68:

Key Joint Publications: These JPs provide more details on specific aspects of noncombatant evacuation operations:

- JP 1-0, *Personnel Support*
- JP 1-06, *Financial Management Support in Joint Operations*
- JP 3-02, *Amphibious Operations*
- JP 3-05, *Special Operations*
- JP 3-16, *Multinational Operations*
- JP 3-33, *Joint Task Force Headquarters*


Universal Joint Tasks (UJTs): The Universal Joint Task List provides an organizing mechanism and the basic language for developing joint mission-essential task lists. JP 3-68 is the primary source for the following UJTs:

- ST 8.4.3, *Coordinate a Noncombatant Evacuation Operation (NEO)*
- OP 6.2.6, *Conduct a Noncombatant Evacuation Operation (NEO)*
- TA 6.4, *Evacuate Noncombatants*

Related Concepts: Concepts explore ideas and capabilities that can address current doctrinal gaps.

- *Joint Concept for Entry Operations*
- *Joint Concept for Rapid Aggregation*

JP 4-01.5, Joint Terminal Operations



JOINT DOCTRINE CHANGE NOTICE

General

The Director of the Joint Staff approved the change in lieu of revision for Joint Publication (JP) 4-01.5, *Joint Terminal Operations*, on 2 November 2015. It supersedes the 6 April 2012 version of JP 4-01.5. This publication provides doctrine for the planning and operation of air, land, and maritime terminals in support of joint operations.

Content

The ability to conduct effective and efficient terminal operations is critical in the joint deployment and distribution enterprise. Sustainment of the military operation will hinge heavily on the terminal's effectiveness. Joint terminal operation functions include the reception, processing, and staging of passengers; the receipt, transit, storage, and marshalling of cargo; the loading and unloading of modes of transport conveyances; and the manifesting and forwarding of cargo and passengers to their final destination. This JP provides a terminals overview to include: background; roles,

responsibilities, and relationships; and terminal infrastructure. It covers joint operations, air, maritime, and land terminal planning and describes air, maritime, and land terminal operations.

Summary of Changes

- Incorporates consideration of the use of best practices.
- Incorporates changes to *Defense Transportation Regulation 4500.9, Part V*.
- Modifies command and control of assigned and attached port and terminal and watercraft units to better reflect current mission command methodology.
- Replaces reference to Field Manual 55-60, *Army Terminal Operations*, with Army Techniques Publication 4-13, *Army Expeditionary Intermodal Operations*.
- Removes discussion of automated air load planning system.
- Updates discussion of cargo inspection authorities.
- Provides clarity on the strategic overview of terminal management/operation responsibilities.
- Clarifies senior leader responsibilities in providing transportation resources and removes information redundant to JP 4-01, *The Defense Transportation System*, and JP 4-09, *Distribution Operations*.

JOINT PUBLICATION 4-01.5 REVIEW

Chapter I, “Terminals Overview,” provides an overview of terminals and is broken down into three sections. Section

(JP 4-01.5 Continued)

A, "Background," consists of an introductory paragraph describing the role terminal operations plays in execution of the joint deployment and distribution enterprise and a discussion of the Defense Transportation System (DTS), and then describes the criticality and scope of terminal operations. Section B, "Roles, Responsibilities, and Relationships," provides descriptions of the key players in the planning and execution of transportation and terminal operations functions within and external to the Department of Defense (DOD). The major paragraphs are the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Military Departments, United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), other combatant commands, Service component commands, the Defense Logistics Agency, and other US Government departments and agencies. Section C, "Terminal Infrastructure," includes paragraphs on "assessment" of sea and aerial port "complexes;" describes the three general "categories of terminals" (air terminals, maritime terminals, and land terminals); provides guidance on "classification of terminals" based on three factors – the physical facility (fixed or unimproved); describes the general type of cargo handled and the methods of cargo handling; and closes with a discussion on terminal "selection" criteria used by geographic combatant commanders (GCCs), in collaboration with the Commander United States Transportation Command (CDRUSTRANSCOM), to support their missions. The main changes from the previous version of the JP are the incorporation of language from the Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) Process and the removal of language redundant to JP 4-01, *The Defense Transportation System*. In addition, the discussion on Military Sealift Command (MSC) has been rewritten to provide greater granularity of its role in maritime terminal operations.

Chapter II, "Terminal Planning Considerations," is largely unchanged from the previous version and is structured exactly the same. Section A, "Joint Terminal Operations," provides an introduction and discusses joint operation planning (APEX) and joint force staff planning common to all types of terminals. Considerations include: "port infrastructure;" "throughput capacity;" "terminal workload phases;" "host-nation support (HNS);" "sustainment;" "joint task force-port opening;" "protection, security, and anti-access;" "intelligence support;" "cargo;" "passenger;" "environmental;" "safety;" "chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear;" "public affairs;" "deployment;" "joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration;" "redeployment;" and "intermodal platform management." The most significant change is additional language on incorporating contracting officers to leverage HNS of contingency operations. Sections B, "Air Terminal Planning," C, "Maritime Terminal Planning," and D, "Land Terminal Operations," each provide specific considerations related to the respective type of terminal.

Chapter III, "Air Terminal Operations," is structured the same and is little-changed from the previous version. The chapter discusses air terminal operations that are conducted at both fixed and expeditionary ports in theaters and includes

responsibilities and organizational considerations in both Service-oriented and joint terminal operations, along with the specific functions to be executed. The responsibilities described include the GCCs, the Services, host or supporting installations, USTRANSCOM, Headquarters Air Mobility Command (AMC), and US Air Force component commanders. The section on "organizational considerations," discusses requirements at both fixed and expeditionary aerial ports and the how responsibilities are shared between AMC and the supported command, the host nation (HN), and AMC or Service transportation support. It provides detailed information on various elements of an AMC response including contingency response groups, contingency response elements, contingency response teams, and contingency support elements. The chapter continues with discussions on the "joint aerial port complex," "aerial ports of embarkation," and "aerial ports of debarkation."




Figure III-1. Notional Aerial Port of Debarkation

Chapter IV, "Maritime Terminal Operations," is also structured the same and is little-changed from the previous version. It discusses maritime terminal operations that are conducted at fixed, unimproved, bare beach, and/or degraded port facilities and at off-shore anchorages in theater. The sections on "responsibilities," details the responsibilities of CDRUSTRANSCOM, the Surface Deployment and Distribution Command, MSC, the GCCs, and the US Coast




Figure IV-2. Characteristics of Maritime Terminals

(JP 4-01.5 Continued)

Guard; and the section on “organizational considerations,” provides guidance on the myriad of considerations based on type of maritime terminal operation and the anticipated involvement of HN seaport organizations. Major paragraph 4 describes the “categories of maritime terminals” which are based on three characteristics (physical facility, commodity handled, and methods for cargo handling). The chapter continues with discussions on the execution of “seaports of embarkation” and “seaports of debarkation.” The final major paragraphs provide details on “cargo reception and clearance” and “passenger reception and clearance.”

Chapter V, “Land Terminal Operations,” is unchanged in structure; little-changed in content from the previous version; and outlines land terminal operations at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. It describes the responsibilities and capabilities of each Service component and the major considerations a GCC may integrate as the theater expands. Land terminals include activities at single mode land terminals (motor, rail, and inland water) or at multimodal (sea-to-land, air-to-land) terminals. CDRUSTRANSCOM, as the DOD single manager for transportation (other than Service-organic or theater-assigned assets), provides terminal management to support global deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment of US forces. USTRANSCOM assists joint force commanders with transportation terminal operation planning and execution. GCCs develop their plans using terminal operations units and assumptions on location of terminals. The GCCs joint deployment and distribution operations center coordinates the employment of all modes of common-user theater transportation (including those provided by HN), as well as coordinating terminal operations to support the GCCs concept of operations. The chapter also describes the US Army and US Marine Corps components that provide significant cargo-handling capabilities for terminal operations. Major paragraph 5 describes “land terminal resources” including the centralized receiving and shipping point, rail terminals, and inland waterways; the role in-transit visibility plays in conducting efficient land terminal operations; and detailed information on pipeline terminals. The chapter concludes with discussion of cargo operations and intermodal transfer terminals. This chapter is essentially unchanged from the previous version.

Appendix A, “Enablers.” This appendix had a minor update to reflect the change from “Global Information Grid” to “Department of Defense information networks” and provides descriptions and information on various systems and tools used to conduct terminal operations.

Appendix B, “Joint Task Force-Port Opening;” Appendix C, “Planning Considerations;” and Appendix

D, “Terminal Units,” have been brought up to date per its references and current joint doctrine; however, there were no structural changes made.

Appendix E, “References,” updates content.

Appendix F, “Administrative Instructions,” updates content.

The following terms and definitions were removed, modified, or added in the change to JP 4-01.5:

The following terms and definitions were removed: “aerial port squadron,” “critical item,” “military resources,” “operationally ready,” “organizational maintenance,” “perishable cargo,” “quay,” “road net,” “unit loading,” “war reserves,” and “wharf.”

The term “dangerous cargo” was modified for incorporation into JP 1-02.

The term “materials handling equipment,” was added to JP 1-02 with this change.

To view revised JP 4-01.5, navigate to the Joint Electronic Library Plus (common access card required) at <https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/index.jsp?pindex=2>.

Joint publications, universal joint tasks, and concepts closely related to JP 4-01.5:

Key Joint Publications: These JPs provide more details on specific aspects of the joint terminal operations:

- JP 3-17, *Air Mobility Operations*
- JP 4-01, *The Defense Transportation System*
- JP 4-01.2, *Sealift Support to Joint Operations*
- JP 5-0, *Joint Planning*

Universal Joint Tasks (UJTs): The Universal Joint Task List provides an organizing mechanism and the basic language for developing joint mission-essential task lists. JP 4-01.5 is the primary source for the following UJTs:

- SN 1.2.3, *Coordinate Terminal Operations*
- OP 1.1.3, *Conduct Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration (JRSOI)*

Related Concepts: Concepts explore ideas and capabilities that can address current doctrinal gaps.

- *Joint Concept for Logistics*

JP 6-0, Joint Communications System

JOINT DOCTRINE REVISION NOTICE

General

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) approved the revision of Joint Publication (JP) 6-0, *Joint Communications System*, on 10 June 2015. It supersedes the 10 June 2010 version of JP 6-0. This publication is the keystone document for the communications system series of publications. It provides the doctrinal

foundation for communications system support to joint operations and provides a comprehensive approach to the support of joint force command and control through the integration of joint communications and information systems across the range of military operations.

Content

A joint communications system is comprised of the networks and services that enable joint and multinational capabilities. The objective of the joint communications system is to assist the joint force commander (JFC) in command and control (C2) of military operations. All joint functions—C2, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection, and sustainment—depend on responsive and available communications systems that tie together all aspects of joint operations and allow JFCs and their staffs to initiate, direct, monitor, question, and react. The communications system is the JFC's principal tool to collect, monitor, transport, process, protect, and disseminate information. This JP provides an overview of the joint communications system. It describes the information environment. It addresses joint force communication, system operations, and management planning. It covers information sharing and services. It addresses communications system support to the President, the Secretary of Defense (SecDef), and the intelligence community.

Summary of Changes

- Synchronizes related terminology with JP 3-12, *Cyberspace Operations*, including replacing “Global Information Grid” with “Department of Defense information network.”
- Replaces “information assurance” with “cybersecurity.”
- Updates organization relationships and describes command and support relationships for Department of Defense information network (DODIN) operations.
- Discusses the joint information environment.
- Updates communications planning considerations for operations with mission partners.
- Discusses information sharing and services.
- Updates information on national security and emergency preparedness and communications.

- Corrects and updates factual errors due to procedural and organizational changes.

Chapter I, “Joint Communications System Overview,”

maintains the format of the first five paragraphs from the previous version and moves most of the previous paragraph 6, “Joint Communications Roles and Responsibilities,” to Chapter II, “The Information Environment.” The introduction offers a brief discussion on the DODIN and the benefits it provides to the JFC. Paragraph 2, “Command and Control,” briefly addresses elements of the C2 system, quality of information, and information management. Paragraph 3, “The Role of the Communications System,” states processes and procedures facilitate: joint and multinational operations and interagency coordination, strategic agility, operational reach, tactical flexibility, network-enabled operations, and information superiority. Paragraphs 4 and 5 discuss “communications system functions” and “communications system principles,” respectively.

Chapter II, “The Information Environment,” is a complete rewrite from the previous version, except for paragraph 7, “Roles and Responsibilities.” Paragraph 1, “General,” provides basic information on the information

Command and Support Relationships for Department of Defense Information Network Operations




Figure II-2. Command and Support Relationships for Department of Defense Information Network Operations

(JP 6-0 Continued)

environment. Paragraph 2, "Operational Construct," discusses how the DODIN supports military operations. Paragraph 3, "Department of Defense Information Network Operations," provides additional information on DODIN operations and sets the stage for further discussion on the DODIN. Paragraph 4, "The Tactical Level," elaborates on the communication challenges encountered by tactical forces. Paragraph 5, "Network Operations, Network Management Cross Flows," states deployed networks within the DODIN require a framework to address the network management cross flows required to establish seamless transitions across systems to support transitions between administrative, movement of forces, and tactical networks. Paragraph 6, "Operations in Degraded and Denied Environments," discusses various environments and emphasizes failures within the DODIN should be transparent to the end users because of systems and capabilities that automatically and immediately transfer to designated alternate capabilities. Paragraph 7, "Roles and Responsibilities," covers entities from the Department of Defense (DOD) chief information officer to the Joint Communications Support Element. Paragraph 7 also includes a graphic representation of the command and support relationships for the DODIN.

Chapter III, "Joint Force Communication, System Operations, and Management Planning," is very similar in structure to the previous version. Paragraph 1, "Planning and Management Organizations," discusses the joint network operations control center, Service component management, and the joint information management board. Paragraph 2, "Planning and Management Structure," focuses on the executive agent for communications, the combatant command communications system directorate of a joint staff (J-6), the joint force J-6, the joint network operations control center, the joint cyberspace center, and subordinate communication units. Paragraph 3, "Communications Planning and Management," addresses systems requirements, in general terms, and communications system planning in relation to Adaptive Planning and Execution, and communications planning considerations (e.g., cybersecurity; multinational communications system operations; support to intelligence; interagency organization, intergovernmental organization, and nongovernmental organization communications; support to homeland security and defense support of civil authorities; and satellite communication planning and management). Paragraph 4, "Communications Planning Methodology," discusses the five areas of communications system planning (mission analysis; information requirements analysis; interoperability, compatibility, and supportability analysis; capability analysis; and allocation of communications system assets) and planning tools. Paragraph 5, "Communications Planning Factors," highlights factors that should be considered during development of the communications system plan (e.g., organic communications system resources; time-phased force and deployment data flow; modular planning; and commercial capabilities), operational limitations, collaborative capabilities; and communications risks and risk management. Paragraph 6, "Communications System Employment," outlines the

objectives, methods, and means for the activities associated with predeployment, deployment, employment, sustainment, transition, termination or post conflict, and redeployment.

Chapter IV, "Information Sharing and Services," is a complete rewrite from the previous version. DOD information sharing is the cultural, managerial, and technical behaviors by which one participant leverages information held, or created by, another participant. The initial paragraph also discusses the three core principles and five goals of The National Strategy for Information Sharing and Safeguarding. Paragraph 2, "Mission Partners," emphasizes the environment that enables assured information sharing among mission partners consists of a combination of people, systems, agreements, standards, policies, procedures, and processes. Paragraph 3, "Enablers," focuses on the tasks that should enable achievement of DOD information sharing goals and the goals of DODIN operations (i.e., assured system and network availability, assured information protection, and assured information delivery). Paragraph 4, "The National Information Exchange Model," discusses its background and development. Paragraph 5, "Cybersecurity," provides basic information relevant to cyberspace and then details support to additional cyberspace operations (e.g., DODIN operations, routine operations in cyberspace, and information and communication technology), insider threat mitigation, and integration with the intelligence community.

Chapter V, "Communications System Support to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Intelligence Community," is very similar in structure to the previous version. Paragraph 1, "National Military Command System," states the National Military Command System (NMCS) is a system of critical command centers, C2 nodes, and underlying support systems designed to support the President, SecDef, CJCS, and other senior leaders in the exercise of their responsibilities. Paragraph 2, "Nuclear Command and Control," contains a brief discussion that highlights the Nuclear Command and Control System comprises the critical core NMCS capability that enables the President to consult with the SecDef, CJCS, combatant commanders, and other advisors to assess the scope and intent of a threat, and direct the transfer, deployment, employment, or termination of US nuclear weapons. Paragraph 3, "Intelligence," provides guidance on intelligence communications planning and information on the DOD Intelligence Information System. Paragraph 4, "National Security and Emergency Preparedness Communications," provides background on the Department of Homeland Security's Office of Emergency Communications and the National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee.

Appendix A is retitled "Department of Defense Information Network Components." The appendix focuses on several components that provide key services (e.g., access, voice, transport, applications, and video).

(JP 6-0 Continued)

Appendix B, “Joint Force Communications System Estimate Preparation Guide,” was updated. The format was not altered.

Appendixes C and D are titled “References” and “Administrative Instructions,” respectively.

The following terms and definitions were removed, revised, or added in JP 6-0:

The following terms and definitions were removed: “active communications satellite,” “capstone requirements document,” “communicate,” “communications satellite,” “computer security,” “defense message system,” “frequency management,” “Global Information Grid,” “Global Network Operations Center,” “immediate message,” “Military Affiliate Radio System,” “network operations,” and “traffic flow security.”

The following term was modified for incorporation into JP 1-02: “Department of Defense information network.”

The following terms were added to JP 1-02: “command and control system,” “communications network,” “configuration management,” “Defense Information Systems Network,” “Defense Switched Network,” “interoperability,” “joint communications network,” “joint network operations control center,” “message,” “signal operating instructions,” “tactical data link,” and “transmission security.”

To view revised JP 6-0, navigate to the Joint Electronic Library Plus (common access card required) at <https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/index.jsp?pindex=2>. To simply download JP 6-0,

navigate to the Joint Electronic Library at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jointpub.htm.

Joint publications, universal joint tasks, and concepts closely related to JP 6-0:

Key Joint Publications: These JPs provide more details on specific aspects of the joint communications system:

- JP 3-12, *Cyberspace Operations*
- JP 3-13, *Information Operations*
- JP 3-13.1, *Electronic Warfare*
- JP 6-01, *Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Management Operations*

Universal Joint Tasks (UJTs): The Universal Joint Task List provides an organizing mechanism and the basic language for developing joint mission-essential task lists. JP 6-0 is the primary source for the following UJTs:

- SN 5.1, *Manage Global Communications*
- SN 5.1.2, *Direct Command, Control, Communications and Computer (C4) Systems*
- ST 5.1.1, *Communicate Information*
- OP 5.1.8, *Execute Command and Control (C2) Procedures*

Concepts: Concepts explore ideas and capabilities that can address current doctrinal gaps.

- *Joint Operational Access Concept*
- *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020*



Did You Know?

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 5120.01A, *Joint Doctrine Development Process*, was promulgated in December 2014 and had several changes. Some important changes include:

Program Directive (PD): The PD provides the content outline, milestones, and guidance for the development/revision of a joint publication (JP). It also assigns an organization as the lead agent (LA); primary review authority (PRA), if assigned (if applicable); and the Joint Staff doctrine sponsor. The scope of a JP concisely describes the aspect of joint force operations that will be explained in the JP. Changes to the scope of a JP that alter the intent of the original PD, must be provided to Joint Staff (JS) J-7 prior to release of the first draft (FD) of new JPs or the revision first draft (RFD) for existing JPs. There are three options for completing the PD for an existing JP:

- The assessment agent (AA), in coordination with the LA (in conjunction with any assigned technical review authority), recommends approval of the draft PD for RFD development if the scope and the title are not changed; and if JS J-7 concurs, no further coordination of the PD is required.
- The AA may also recommend the PD receive only final coordination, and if JS J-7 concurs, the PD can be approved after a single coordination.

(Did You Know? Continued)

- If JS J-7 approves the formal assessment report, but does not approve the draft PD, then the draft PD will normally be used to develop a preliminary coordination PD.

Joint Doctrine Development Tool (JDDT): The JDDT is a collaborative, web-based application residing on the NIPRNET and requiring common access card (CAC) access, that implements automated business practices to improve the joint doctrine development process. There are two classes of reviewers in the JDDT.

- **Primary Reviewers:** Primary reviewers are individuals and organizations that are typically assigned to review draft JPs. Primary reviewers may use a CAC-logon by associating their JDDT account to their CAC. This can be accomplished in the user's profile. They represent commands and agencies that are established members of the JDDC.
- **Contributing Reviewers:** Contributing reviewers are individuals or organizations that possess some specialized knowledge or interest in a draft JP, but not registered as a primary reviewer within the JDDT. A JDDC member organization (primary reviewer) informs a contributing reviewer of a requirement to review and comment on a JP draft in the JDDT as a contributing reviewer.

See Enclosure C, "Joint Doctrine Development Tool (JDDT)," of CJCSM 5120.01A, for additional information.

Joint Doctrine Note (JDN): The JDN can be used to inform the joint community of techniques and procedures and organizational constructs, underpinned by lessons learned and best practices, that could be applied with existing or emerging capabilities to address joint doctrinal voids. They are developed outside of the normal development cycle of a JP, are non-authoritative and pre-doctrinal, but can provide a short term, bridging solution to a potential doctrine void identified by the joint doctrine development community. They must explain the information in sufficient detail for commanders and staffs to consider its utility.

See Enclosure G, "Joint Doctrine Note," of CJCSM 5120.01A, for additional information.

**Joint publications that are scheduled for approval within the next 60 days include:**

JP 1-0, Joint Personnel Support

JP 1-06, Financial Management Support in Joint Operations

JP 2-01.2, Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence in Joint Operations

JP 3-13.3, Operations Security

JP 3-34, Joint Engineer Operations

JP 3-61, Public Affairs

JP 4-01.2, Sealift Support to Joint Operations

JP 4-03, Joint Bulk Petroleum and Water Doctrine






Joint Doctrine

The Joint Staff J-7 Directorate for Joint Force Development

Per Title 10, U.S. Code, the CJCS has authority for developing “doctrine for the joint employment of the Armed Forces.” Supporting the CJCS for Joint Force Development, the JS J7 is responsible for the content of joint publications (JPs) and for managing the joint doctrine development process described in CJCSM 5120.01.

The Deputy Directorate for Joint Education & Doctrine (DD JE&D) is a subordinate element of the JS J7. The DD JE&D doctrine arm has two divisions, the Joint Doctrine Division (JDD), located at the Pentagon, and the Joint Doctrine Analysis Division (JDAD), in Suffolk, VA.



How To Submit Change Requests

The normal revision (17.5 month) and change request (12 month) cycles are governed by the Annual Campaign Plan, available on the Joint Electronic Library Plus (JEL+), or on requests from CCMDs, Service or JS Directorate GO/FOs. For fast-tracking doctrine changes or for joint doctrine note support, contact the DD JE&D through formal requests from CCMD, Service or JS GO/FO.

All formal actions are staffed via the Joint Staff Action Processing (JSAP) which minimizes Planner-level coordination.

For informal or pre-coordination support, contact JDD. JDD action officers are coaches and integrators to Joint Doctrine Sponsors and Lead Agents. They can guide/support the journey of part-time players through the process and connect the dots across publications.

Key POCs

Deputy Director, Joint Education & Doctrine (DD JE&D):
Mr. Jerome Lynes
(703-692-7261)

Assistant Deputy Director, Joint Education & Doctrine (ADD JE&D):
CAPT Bradford Brown
(757-203-6742)

Joint Doctrine Division Chief:
LtCol James McArthur
(703-697-8646)


Joint Doctrine Analysis Division Chief:
COL Steven Hite
(757-203-6150)

The Governance Model

The **Joint Doctrine Development Community (JDDC)** consists of both voting (DJ7, Services and combatant commands) and non-voting members (the other Directorates of the Joint Staff, CSAs, and other DOD and interagency elements). Voting members have a vote in the resolution of issues. Nonvoting members have an opportunity to present comments and positions through the Joint Staff/J7.



Joint Doctrine
There is no special governance model for the joint doctrine process, the chain of command suffices.



Multinational Doctrine

The U.S. participates in Allied joint doctrine development via several NATO forums, principally the Allied Joint Operations Doctrine Working Group (AJOD WG), an O6 level body responsible for the development, review, and harmonization of Allied Joint Publications (AJP). DD JE&D serves as the U.S. Head of Delegation to the AJOD WG, ensuring that U.S. positions on multinational joint doctrine are based on current U.S. joint doctrine. For more information, see CJCSI 2700.01.

AJP 01 ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE

The Iterative Process of Creating Joint Doctrine

Doctrine reflects proven principles and best practices, but must be responsive to changes from lessons identified and validated concepts. The joint doctrine development process has evolved to meet this need through new publications, timely revisions to approved publications, and more expeditious changes to existing publications. The joint doctrine development process includes four stages: initiation, development, approval, and maintenance.

Joint Doctrine Annual Battle Rhythm

MO	Key Events
JAN	Joint Doctrine Campaign Plan Released
FEB	
MAR	DJS Joint Doctrine Report Released
APR	Quinquartite Combined Joint Warfare Conference (QCJWC)
MAY	Joint Doctrine Planning Conference (JDPC) Military Committee Terminology Conference (MCTC)
JUN	DJS Joint Doctrine Report Released
JUL	
AUG	
SEP	DJS Joint Doctrine Report Released Allied Joint Doctrine Conference (AJOD)
OCT	Military Committee Terminology Conference (MCTC)
NOV	Joint Doctrine Planning Conference
DEC	DJS Joint Doctrine Report Released

The JS J7 supports the Chairman and enhances joint warfighting by guiding the development of the joint force, today and tomorrow, through advancement of transformational joint concepts, which are refined into relevant doctrine; promulgated through high quality, career long education and training; and validated through a robust exercise program, resulting in decisive, adaptable war plans.

Governing Documents

CJCSI 5120.02D, *Joint Doctrine Development System*
 CJCSM 5120.01A, *Joint Doctrine Development Process*
 CJCSI 5705.01D, *Standardization of Military and Associated Terminology*
 CJCSI 2700.01F, *Rationalization, Standardization, and Interoperability (RSI) Activities*

The Joint Doctrine Campaign Plan is released at the beginning of every calendar year, directing the revision and development of joint doctrine publications in order to provide the most relevant joint doctrine possible to the joint force. It can be found at: <https://jdeis.is.mil/jdeis/index.jsp?pinde=19>.

The Quinquartite Combined Joint Warfare Conference is an annual forum for the U.S., U.K., Canada, Australia, and New Zealand to share best practices and achieve a common framework and lexicon.

The semiannual JDPC serves as a forum for representatives of the Services, combatant commands, and Joint Staff to address joint doctrine issues such as project proposal examination, project scope development, project validation, and lead agent recommendation. The JDPC provides recommendations that are approved by the J7 in the name of the Chairman. More information can be found at: <https://jdeis.is.mil/jdeis/index.jsp?pinde=13>.

Each quarter, the DJ7 submits a report to the Director, JS updating him on the status of the Joint Doctrine Campaign Plan. This report is not released to the public, but more information can be obtained from the Joint Doctrine Division Chief, LtCol James McArthur.

Joint Doctrine Products & Resources



Joint Pubs



Multi-Service TTPs



Custodian of Allied Joint Pubs

JEL+

JEL+ is a limited access portal deployed on both NIPRNET and SIPRNET under the Joint Doctrine, Education, and Training Electronic Information System (commonly known as JDEIS). JEL+ is designed to directly support the Chairman, the Joint Staff, combatant commanders, other members of the interagency community, and selected multinational partners. It provides a centralized location for the development, access, and distribution of joint doctrine, education, training, concepts, and other force development, employment, and assessment related information for the joint warfighting community.

JEL+ also supports the defense readiness reporting community by providing network-centric access to authoritative databases of joint doctrine and UJTL tasks required for the evaluation and reporting of readiness. JEL+ provides tools to automate major portions of the joint doctrine development process, deliver web-based joint doctrine, and provides capabilities to cross-index related information.

JEL

The Joint Doctrine Development Process and the worldwide distribution of approved joint doctrine are supported by various information systems. The Joint Electronic Library (JEL) is a public-facing website providing unlimited distribution of select joint doctrine and related content.

Key NIPRNET Reference Sites

Joint, Multi-Service, and Service Doctrine Publications (*requires a CAC)

*Joint Electronic Library Plus: <https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/index.jsp?>

Joint Electronic Library: http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jointpub.htm

*Multi-Service: <http://www.alsa.mil/>

Army: <http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/>

*Marine Corps: <https://www.doctrine.usmc.mil/MCDP.asp>

*Navy (Registration required): <https://ndls.nwdc.navy.mil/Default.aspx>

*Air Force: <https://doctrine.af.mil/>

Lessons Learned (** requires a CAC AND an account)

**Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS): <https://www.jllis.mil/>

**Army Lessons Learned: <http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/call/index.asp>

**Marine Corps Lessons Learned: <https://www.mccl.usmc.mil/>

**Navy Lessons Learned: <https://www.jllis.mil/NAVY/>

**Air Force Lessons Learned: <https://www.jllis.mil/USAF/>

Directives, Issuances, and Publications

Department of Defense Issuances: <http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives>

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Directives: http://www.dtic.mil/cjcs_directives/

Army Publications: <http://armypubs.army.mil/index.html>

Marine Corps Publications: <http://www.marines.mil/News/Publications/ELECTRONICLIBRARY.aspx>

Navy Issuances: <http://doni.daps.dla.mil/default.aspx>

Air Force Publications: <http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/>

Presidential

Executive Orders: <http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/executive-orders/>



JOINT PUBLICATION MILESTONES DECEMBER 2015-JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2016				
Number	Title		Milestone	Date
JDN Z-ZZ	<i>Command Red Team</i>		RFC comments due	1 Dec 15
JP 3-28	<i>Defense Support of Civil Authorities</i>		RFF comments due	3 Dec 15
JP 3-13.4	<i>Military Deception</i>		RFD comments due	4 Dec 15
JP 3-03	<i>Joint Interdiction</i>		RFC comments due	14 Dec 15
JDN X-XX	<i>Identity Activities</i>		RFC comments due	15 Dec 15
JP 3-07	<i>Stability Operations</i>		RFC comments due	16 Dec 15
JP 5-0	<i>Joint Planning</i>		RFD comments due	16 Dec 15
JP 3-32	<i>Command and Control for Joint Maritime Operations</i>		RFF comments due	17 Dec 15
JP 3-33	<i>Joint Task Force Headquarters</i>		RFD due from LA	18 Dec 15
JP 3-05	<i>Special Operations</i>		RFF comments due	13 Jan 16
JP 3-07.4	<i>Counterdrug Operations</i>		RFF comments due	22 Jan 16
JP 3-41	<i>Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Consequence Management</i>		RFC comments due	29 Jan 16
JP 3-01	<i>Countering Air and Missile Threats</i>		RFD comments due	3 Feb 16
JP 3-42	<i>Joint Explosive Ordnance Disposal</i>		RFC comments due	4 Feb 16
JOINT WORKING GROUPS (DECEMBER 2015-JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2016) DATES ARE FOR PLANNING PURPOSES AND ARE SUBJECT TO CHANGE.				
Joint Working Groups		JWG Date	Location	
JP 3-14, <i>Space Operations</i>		26-27 Jan 16	SAIC, Crystal City, VA (Betts)	
JP 2-01, <i>Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations</i>		2-3 Feb 16	SAIC, Crystal City, VA (Van Cleave)	
JP 3-41, <i>Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Consequence Management</i>		23-24 Feb 16	SAIC, Crystal City, VA (Lewis)	
ALLIED JOINT PUBLICATION ACTIONS				
Item	Title		Milestone	Date
AJP-3.3	J-7A 00303-15	<i>Allied Joint Doctrine for Air and Space Operations</i>	Ratification Draft	25 Jan 16
AJP-4.10C	J-7A 00379	<i>Allied Joint Doctrine for Medical Support</i>	Study Draft 2	18 Feb 16
ATP-3.16.1	(USA)	<i>Countering Insider Threats</i>	Ratification Draft	26 Feb 16
AJP-2.6	J-7A 00380	<i>Allied Joint Doctrine for Imagery Intelligence</i>	Study Draft 2	1 Mar 16
AJP-3.16	J-7A 00298-15	<i>Allied Joint Doctrine for Security Force Assistance</i>	Ratification Draft	16 Mar 16
AJP-3.22	J-7A 00304-15	<i>Allied Joint Doctrine for Stability Policing</i>	Ratification Draft	6 Apr 16
AJP-3.5	J-7A 00373	<i>Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations</i>	Ratification Draft	16 Mar 16
AJP-2.4 (NR)	J-7A 00369-15	<i>Allied Joint Doctrine for Signals Intelligence</i>	Ratification Draft	26 Apr 15
JOINT PUBLICATION ACTIONS				
JP 3-16	J-7A 00371-15	<i>Multinational Operations</i>	RFF	3 Mar 16
JP 4-08		<i>Logistics Support of Multinational Operations</i>	RFC Draft Prep (LA/JSDS)	NLT 20 Apr 16
RELATED / PENDING ACTIONS (JSAP)				
NSTR	NA	NA	NA	NA
ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE WORKING GROUPS				
	MCSB	NATO HQ		TBD 2016
	AJOD WG	Paris		9-13 May 16
	JINTWG	NATO HQ		TBD 2016
	MAROPSWG			TBD 2016
	AOWG	NATO HQ		TBD 2016
	LOWG	NATO HQ		TBD 2016

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