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# **Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning**



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**FOREWORD**

**TBD**

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*\*\*\*\*Insert appropriate opening citation here*

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1     **I. Introduction**

2           The Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning (JCIC) describes how the  
3 Joint Force employs military power in concert with the other instruments of  
4 national power to promote and defend U.S. national interests. Its purpose is to  
5 guide force development and inform how joint leaders understand, visualize,  
6 describe, and direct military actions and align those actions with non-military  
7 activities. It provides an intellectual framework for the design, implementation,  
8 and follow through of a strategy. This publication addresses transregional and  
9 multi-domain challenges while accounting for changes in the operating  
10 environment and incorporating lessons from recent and ongoing conflicts.  
11

12           This concept aims to instill an appreciation that many aspects of the  
13 future security environment are likely to be significantly different than what we  
14 have experienced over the past several decades. Adversaries and enemies  
15 understand that the American system is optimized for conventional armed  
16 conflict and are adapting in ways that exploit our vulnerabilities. They are  
17 avoiding U.S. strengths and finding ways to achieve their political objectives in  
18 ways not easily countered by the Joint Force and other instruments of national  
19 power.  
20

21           With this context in mind, the JCIC begins the process of identifying gaps  
22 and mitigating risk in the way the Joint Force campaigns so that military  
23 operations do more than simply achieve military objectives. Synchronized with  
24 inter-organizational and multinational partners, Joint Force campaigns will  
25 contribute to the achievement of enduring political outcomes.  
26

27           Building on lessons of the past, this concept offers what some may regard  
28 as a paradigm shift in the way the Joint Force employs military power. It  
29 recognizes the enduring nature of war and the fact that war remains a clash of  
30 wills, with each actor attempting to impose its will through the use of coercion  
31 or violence. The endeavor is inherently human, political, and uncertain. The  
32 concept highlights that in some circumstances, adversaries, using subtle, non-  
33 lethal employment of military power, when combined with limited lethal force  
34 that is not easily attributable, can achieve substantial political aims.<sup>1</sup>  
35

36           Finally, this concept describes how military and non-military partners  
37 could align goals, objectives, and conditions for the attainment of enduring  
38 political outcomes. The solution is consistent with interorganizational partner  
39 planning processes and includes an expanded lexicon, new ways to view the  
40 operational environment, the addition of 'compete mechanisms' to solve  
41 problems, and an enhanced construct for campaigning.  
42

43     **II. Scope**

44 This concept focuses on future Joint Force campaigning, which will occur  
45 within the context of an increasingly complex international order. It supports  
46 the idea of globally integrated operations described in the *Capstone Concept for*  
47 *Joint Operations: Joint Force 2030* by offering solutions that address  
48 transregional and multi-domain challenges. It offers an approach to compete  
49 with or defeat state and non-state actors seeking to alter the international  
50 order in ways that are adverse to U.S. interests. It addresses how to align Joint  
51 Force activities with the efforts of non-Defense U.S. Government departments  
52 and agencies to achieve enduring political outcomes.

53  
54

### 55 **III. Operating Environment**

56  
57

#### **Recent Challenges**

58 Strategic rivals such as China, Iran, and Russia are employing coercive  
59 methods to accomplish objectives in the competitive space between peace and  
60 war. These competitors are aiming to change international norms with  
61 operations characterized by uncertainty to create murkiness in the minds of  
62 the parties involved and instill ambiguity into existing policy and legal  
63 frameworks. Additionally, they attempt to achieve their objectives while  
64 remaining below existing political leaders' military response thresholds.<sup>2</sup> This  
65 approach of coercive gradualism is commonly referred to by many national  
66 security professionals as "gray zone" challenges. This concept will characterize  
67 these challenges as unfolding within a condition of competition below the level  
68 of armed conflict.

69

70 Strategic rivals may seek to alter the international order through  
71 conventional conflict, but recently they have combined non-military coercion  
72 with the use of force in order to maintain an air of ambiguity. The means  
73 adversaries employ often avoids the use of attributable armed forces and  
74 instead combines sabotage, social media campaigns, cyber-attacks, proxy  
75 forces, and special forces. The use of such tactics is often used as part of a  
76 strategy of coercive gradualism, which is a form of aggression involving a step-  
77 by-step pursuit of one actor's interests contrary to accepted international  
78 norms.

79

80 China's rapid construction of artificial islands in the disputed Spratly  
81 island chain is an example of coercive gradualism. Avoiding direct military  
82 confrontations, China's island-building activities are being used to contravene  
83 international norms for the attainment of expanded regional influence.<sup>3</sup>

84 Iran's involvement in Lebanon and Syria provides another example of a  
85 state expanding its regional influence without direct military engagement.  
86 Since the 1980s, Iran has supplied Hezbollah in Lebanon with substantial

87 amounts of military training, weapons, political, and financial aid. It is also  
88 supporting Hezbollah efforts in Syria. Iran is also directly involved in the Syrian  
89 civil war. These actions are part of a larger effort on behalf of Iran to use  
90 aggressive diplomacy, economic overtures, and military action to pursue core  
91 national interests while limiting the risk of direct retaliation from global  
92 actors.<sup>4</sup>

93  
94 Finally, Russia's aggression against Ukraine, including Crimea in  
95 particular, highlights how Russia does not distinguish between the political  
96 realm and the security realm. Russia appears to be competing through a  
97 shrewd combination of diplomatic, informational, military, and economic  
98 means. Russia likely recognizes its weakness relative to other global actors and  
99 is therefore competing rather than using more confrontational approaches  
100 which would invite a direct military response from other global actors.<sup>5</sup> In  
101 addition to these recent challenges, other challenges to the international order  
102 are emerging.

103

#### 104 **Emerging Challenges**

105

106 Fundamentally, war will remain a contest of wills. Armed conflict will  
107 continue posing challenges for future leaders and planners, in part because  
108 threats, enemies, and adversaries are becoming increasingly capable and  
109 elusive across multiple domains. Future threats will emanate from varying  
110 combinations of states and non-state actors as well as transnational terrorists,  
111 insurgents, and criminal organizations.

112

113 The *Joint Operating Environment (JOE) 2035: The Joint Force in a*  
114 *Contested and Disordered World*, envisions a future with challenges  
115 significantly different from those of recent decades. The two overarching  
116 challenges are *contested norms* and *persistent disorder*; both have significant  
117 implications for how the Joint Force will campaign in the future.

118

119 *Contested norms* refers to a future in which states and select non-state  
120 actors will use any and all elements of power to establish their own sets of  
121 rules in ways unfavorable to the United States and its interests. The challenge  
122 of *persistent disorder* is characterized by an array of weak states that become  
123 increasingly incapable of maintaining domestic order or governance. These two  
124 challenges have distinct features but are not mutually exclusive. They will  
125 frequently intersect and involve competition with a military dimension short of  
126 traditional armed conflict.

127

128 In the future operating environment, adversaries may use creative  
129 strategies combining of conventional and non-conventional force. These  
130 methods will be employed to achieve objectives by operating below the

131 threshold that would invoke a direct military response from the U.S. or other  
132 global actors. Of particular note for the Joint Force, the way in which future  
133 adversaries attempt to accomplish objectives may be in manner markedly  
134 different than the challenges of previous decades. As competitive interactions  
135 become a normal and recurrent condition of the international order, our  
136 adversaries are likely to follow patterns that many will find unfamiliar.

137

### 138 **Implications of Recent and Emerging Challenges**

139

140 The current and emerging challenges within the operating environment  
141 have significant implications for the Joint Force. Presenting leaders and  
142 planners with unfamiliar problem sets, the operating environment is likely to  
143 confound the current planning paradigm and resourcing model while testing  
144 leaders' ability to retain the strategic initiative. The following implications  
145 pertain to how the Joint Force will approach campaigning:

146

147 • **A traditional, Western binary, peace/war model is inconsistent with**  
148 **emerging patterns of warfare.** Areas of instability and revisionist states  
149 contesting existing international norms do not fit a peace/war/peace model of  
150 Joint Force employment. Currently, Joint Force leaders can expect  
151 comparatively fewer resources during times of "peace" and receive substantial  
152 resources only during war. With the current planning construct, resources are  
153 largely withdrawn following the "Dominate Phase." However, the trends of the  
154 emerging operating environment indicate that rivals will pursue strategic  
155 objectives in conditions we currently regard as peace. They may operate  
156 beneath the threshold that would create a practical, if not legal state of war, so  
157 as not to trigger a direct military response. Consequently, the Joint Force may  
158 be in a reactive posture rather than being in a position to actively advance U.S.  
159 policy goals. Accounting for a condition between peace and war will require a  
160 more expansive model of the operating environment.


161

162 • **Military power alone is insufficient to achieve enduring political**  
163 **objectives, and there are limited means to achieve integration across the**  
164 **instruments of national power.** Overcoming the challenges in the OE to  
165 achieve enduring political objectives will require that military activities be  
166 aligned at the right time, in the appropriate space, and with a synchronized  
167 purpose with the activities of other governmental departments and agencies.  
168 As the Department of Defense articulates how it will integrate Joint Force  
169 activities, it must also provide for support to and coordination with other U.S.  
170 departments and agencies.

171

172 • **A complex and rapidly changing operational environment will require**  
173 **mechanisms for employing the Joint Force in conditions outside of armed**  
174 **conflict.** CJCSM 3130.01A (Theater Campaign Planning Procedures and

175 Responsibilities) directs GCCs to develop a theater strategy for employing  
 176 “normal and routine” military activities in conditions short of conflict to achieve  
 177 strategic objectives.<sup>6</sup> These are the Phase 0 activities depicted in Figure 1. The  
 178 activities in the base TCP are designed for the enduring strategic context.  
 179



**Figure 1: JP 5-0 Notional Operation Plan Phases**

180 Contingency plans are specific branch plans of a TCP designed to deal with  
 181 potential crises in the region, rectify failures of Phase 0 steady-state activities,  
 182 or defeat enemies. Most contingency plans describe a possible sequence of  
 183 events corresponding to phases I – V of the Notional Operation Plan Phases in  
 184 Figure 1. In contrast to the relatively enduring and static strategic context of  
 185 the base TCP, contingency plans are tied to a specific, discrete set of  
 186 conditions.

187 There are some challenges, however, that are not adequately addressed by  
 188 the base TCP or its branch plans. Our adversaries have changed the manner in  
 189 which they compete, with some seeking to obtain their objectives without  
 190 triggering a direct military response from global actors. Countering such  
 191 dynamic, adaptive adversaries requires more continual adjustments than is  
 192 intended for Phase 0 under the current construct.

193 While the processes and models in U.S. Joint and Service doctrine (e.g.  
 194 JOPP, MDMP, PMESII, etc.) will remain of value in countering such  
 195 adversaries, as with the procedures for planning theater campaigns, they must  
 196 be adapted to account for competition below the threshold of armed conflict.<sup>7</sup>

197 **IV. The Military Challenge.**

198 *How will the Joint Force campaign to enable globally integrated operations in*  
199 *support of the achievement of acceptable political conditions?*

200

201 **V. Central Idea: A Joint Construct for Integrated Campaigning**

202 Joint doctrine defines a campaign as “a series of related major operations  
203 aimed at achieving strategic and operational objectives within a given time and  
204 space.” (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 5-0). Although a campaign is not synonymous  
205 with a joint operation, joint doctrine also describes achievement of strategic  
206 and operational objectives as an outcome of major joint operations (JP 3.0 page  
207 I-5). Individual joint campaigns or operations orient on an objective and  
208 normally conclude in military terms, which may be short of the desired political  
209 outcomes. Therefore, the JCIC expands the scope and breadth of joint force  
210 campaigning and defines it as *an organized and active Joint Force effort in*  
211 *sufficient scope, scale, simultaneity, and duration to accomplish or enable a*  
212 *policy’s aim by implementing appropriate actions in the correct intervals, the*  
213 *required condition, and across all the relevant spaces; and ideally aligned with*  
214 *other elements of power. Actions within the scope of campaigning may include*  
215 *joint operations, service component operations, and the alignment of military*  
216 *actions with interagency and allied efforts. All of these actions are oriented on*  
217 *desired policy aims and outcomes. (See Appendix B)*

218 With this broadened definition of campaigning, the JCIC seeks to expand  
219 the current interpretation of operational practice and enable the Joint Force to  
220 campaign successfully across the continuum of conflict and competition.  
221 Accordingly, the JCIC provides a framework of discrete but mutually  
222 supporting elements:

223

- 224 • Factors of Campaign Design
- 225 • An Expanded View of the Operating Environment;
- 226 • Enhanced Joint Construct for Campaigning
- 227 • Employment of Compete Mechanisms; and the
- 228 • Alignment of military and non-military activities.

229

230 These elements enable the Joint Force to address transregional and multi-  
231 domain problems and to translate military success into political gains. The  
232 appendices provide greater detail for each element.

233

234

235

236

237 ***Factors of Campaign Design***

238

239 Joint doctrine currently describes thirteen elements of operational design  
240 that collectively allow joint leaders to create operations to defeat adversaries'  
241 war-making capability in conditions of armed conflict (JP 5-0). JCIC describes  
242 an additive array of factors that further enables the Joint Force to campaign in  
243 all conditions. These factors provide an intellectual framework to link strategic  
244 discussions and the development and refinement of the operational-level logic  
245 and mechanism used to pursue the chosen strategy. JCIC guides joint leaders  
246 toward informed and effective applications of military power in conditions of  
247 cooperation and competition below the threshold of armed conflict. The factors  
248 provide the necessary precision and depth to effectively guide the development  
249 and execution of joint campaigns across the spectrum of known and  
250 anticipated patterns of warfare. Furthermore, JCIC's factors of campaign  
251 design expands our understanding of operational art and practice beyond a  
252 narrow conception of armed conflict. They connect with, respond to, and  
253 inform evolving policy and strategy. Finally, the factors orient on outcomes  
254 beyond just military success, while recognizing that clear conclusion and  
255 finality are elusive while campaigning in any condition. (See Appendix C)

256

257 ***An Expanded View of the Operating Environment***

258 The way the Joint Force views the OE in the future should account for the  
259 full spectrum of strategic conditions, including peace and war but also the  
260 undefined space between. The JCIC offers a model comprised of three  
261 conditions of strategic reality: *cooperation* with allies and partners, *competition*  
262 with strategic rivals *below armed conflict*, and *armed conflict*. The three possible  
263 conditions result from the interplay of interests, the intensity of those interests,  
264 and the capabilities available to advance them.<sup>8</sup>

265 This model recognizes emerging patterns of warfare which are becoming  
266 inconsistent with the existing peace/war/peace model of prioritizing Joint  
267 Force employment, and it no longer considers the United States as being in a  
268 state of either peace or at war with a particular actor. The conditions of  
269 cooperation, competition below armed conflict, and armed conflict are  
270 applicable to state or non-state actors and are inclusive of all instruments of  
271 national power: diplomacy, information, military, and economics.

272 The significance of moving from a peace/war/peace planning paradigm is  
273 two-fold. First, it recognizes that the Joint Force is always campaigning; every  
274 day around the world multiple military activities advance many policy aims in  
275 different ways. Indeed, it is possible that in the course of a single day with just  
276 one strategic partner in a particularly fraught region, the Joint Force could  
277 conduct a combined exercise to aid regional security (cooperation), share  
278 intelligence to counter a malign actor trying to destabilize the region  
279 (competition below armed conflict), and conduct operations against a

280 completely different non-state armed group (armed conflict). The planning  
281 framework must be able to accommodate such complexity and enable the Joint  
282 Force will to retain the strategic initiative.

283 Second, an expanded view of the OE supports a more effective strategic  
284 dialogue with greater descriptive power to inform decisions. A more nuanced  
285 model from which to view strategic relations has utility for the Joint Force. In  
286 the following paragraphs, the conditions of *cooperation*, *competition below*  
287 *armed conflict*, and *armed conflict* will be described.

288 Conditions of *cooperation* are characterized by mutually beneficial  
289 relationships between strategic actors with similar or compatible interests.  
290 Although interests will only rarely be in complete alignment, relations that are  
291 fundamentally cooperative are strategically important for the U.S. because they  
292 underpin the international order, enhance collective security, help to ensure  
293 access to global commons, enable burden-sharing, and deter conflict.<sup>9</sup>  
294

295 The condition of *competition below armed conflict* exists when two actors in  
296 the international system have incompatible interests and one or both actors  
297 engage in or intend to engage in behavior that will be detrimental to the other's  
298 interests. However, the incompatible interest is either too low a priority or too  
299 difficult to attain given actor capabilities to trigger open armed conflict. This  
300 concept emphasizes that the Joint Force has a great deal of utility in securing  
301 strategic objectives in conditions of competition.  
302

303 Unlike the condition of competition below armed conflict, in *armed*  
304 *conflict* the use of violence is the primary means by which an actor seeks to  
305 satisfy its interests. Armed conflict varies in intensity and ranges from limited  
306 warfare to unlimited wars between great powers. The JCIC recognizes that the  
307 military has traditionally been the lead instrument of national power in this  
308 condition and is likely to lead in the future.

309 Boundaries between conditions of *cooperation*, *competition below armed*  
310 *conflict*, and *armed conflict* are not always clear, and elements of two or more  
311 conditions may be present at the same time. For example, the relationship  
312 between the United States and an adversary may be characterized as  
313 geostrategic competition despite cooperative activities between the two states. If  
314 the overall intent of one or both actors is to undermine the others interests,  
315 then cooperative activities are superseded by the competitive intentions in  
316 categorizing the relationship.

317 Visualizing the geostrategic relationship between the United States and its  
318 adversaries enables leaders and planners to effectively combine military  
319 activities with the efforts of other agencies, departments and organizations to  
320 pursue national objectives. Each condition has implications for the Joint Force  
321 would campaign.

322

323 ***Enhanced Joint Construct for Campaigning***

324

325 Campaigning in Conditions of Cooperation

326

327 To foster greater cooperation, the Joint Force may assure an ally or  
328 partner, enhance interoperability to meet mutually agreed upon security  
329 objectives, collectively deter an adversary, or even prepare for conflict. Aspects  
330 of Joint Force campaigning may include building partner capacity and  
331 providing humanitarian assistance or disaster relief.

332

333 Joint Force activities in conditions of cooperation help create a favorable  
334 security environment and may be part of a deliberate campaigning framework  
335 intended to gain and retain the strategic initiative. Campaigning in conditions  
336 of cooperation has no discrete start or end point. Efforts to maintain a sphere  
337 of influence and strengthen ties with allies and partners in conditions of  
338 cooperation will endure. Joint Force activities in conditions of cooperation may  
339 orient on shaping a security environment in conjunction a partner and may be  
340 part of a broader theater cooperative effort.

341

342 As such, JCIC articulates a set of principles within a framework for  
343 campaigning in conditions of cooperation. These are:

- 344 1. Identify the condition(s) the Joint Force must enable to effectively shape  
345 the security environment toward US interests
- 346
- 347 2. Recognize the state and character of the US partner relationship.
- 348
- 349 3. Determine the propensity, likelihood, and capacity of partners to act in a  
350 manner aligned with US interests
- 351
- 352 4. Understand other US Departments and interests, objectives, and  
353 priorities with respect to specific circumstances
- 354
- 355 5. Comprehend the amount, categories, and purposes of all the US Foreign  
356 Assistance funding that Congress has planned for the relevant area(s),  
357 and
- 358
- 359 6. Understand the current legal environment surrounding security  
360 cooperation and DoD cooperation guidance can apply to the specific  
361 circumstance the joint force seeks to address.
- 362

363 These six principles along with the factors of campaign design form the  
364 framework to enable the Joint Force to campaign in these conditions formerly

365 described as “normal routine activities.” These principles are expanded upon  
366 in Appendix D.

367

368 Campaigning in Conditions of Competition Below Armed Conflict

369

370 Campaigns designed for conditions of competition below armed conflict  
371 will be distinctly different from contingency operations. These campaigns are  
372 intended to retain, seize, and exploit the strategic initiative and have no  
373 discrete start or end point. Campaigns in the environment of competition below  
374 the threshold of direct armed conflict are enduring and must be actively  
375 managed for as long as they support U.S. national security interests. Desired  
376 political and strategic outcomes will be expressed in terms of a desired future  
377 state of competition or one of cooperation.

378

379 As enduring efforts, these campaigns follow no linear or phased sequence  
380 but adapt to changing conditions in the environment. They are comprised of  
381 activities designed to counter an adversary’s strategy and deter actions that  
382 threaten U.S. or allied national security objectives. Campaigning in conditions  
383 of competition below armed conflict may include, for example, information  
384 operations designed to counter adversary propaganda campaigns or security  
385 force assistance missions to assure a partner in the face of an adversary’s  
386 actions.

387

388 Given the presence of strategic competition within a theater, leaders  
389 must to understand character and likely trajectory of the competitive  
390 relationship between the United States the competitor. Leaders can then  
391 forecast what the future situation is likely to be if measures are not taken to  
392 alter that trajectory. Planners employ compete mechanisms to favorably alter  
393 the trajectory of the relations between the United States and the adversary.  
394 Ongoing reassessments of the OE must be an integral component of  
395 campaigning against rivals to ensuring the military instrument of power,  
396 working in concert with non-military organizations, remains engaged until the  
397 desired political condition is achieved. Appendix E expands on these  
398 considerations with a framework for competition.

399

400

401 Campaigning in Conditions of Armed Conflict

402 The manner in which commanders employ the Joint Force in future armed  
403 conflict will in many ways remain consistent with current practices but differ in  
404 others. Contingency plans, for instance, will remain branch plans to a  
405 Geographic Combatant Command’s Theater Campaign or Functional  
406 Combatant Command’s Global Campaign. These plans are executed on order  
407 against enemy state or non-state actors to seize and exploit the initiative. They

408 employ coercive measures—both compellence<sup>10</sup> and deterrence— and strive to  
409 reach a defined conclusion. At the discretion of the Joint Force Commander,  
410 the operation may or may not adhere to a linear, phased execution model.

411 The JCIC alters the manner in which the Joint Force will campaign in  
412 armed conflict. To account for more capable future enemies, the Joint Force  
413 will synchronize the simultaneous or sequential application of joint, inter-  
414 organizational, and multinational capabilities using joint combined arms  
415 operations in and across all domains. Operating with greater dispersion than  
416 in the past, joint forces will present the enemy with multiple dilemmas to seize  
417 and exploit the initiative. Achieving this will require adaptive and innovative  
418 methods for exercising joint force command relationships during combat.  
419 Consequently, alternative command relationships will be employed to ensure  
420 that Joint Force commanders have the strategic agility to command and control  
421 in spite of trans-regional and cross-domain challenges. Success in contingency  
422 operations should be expressed in terms of the post-conflict order and include  
423 linkages to the Theater Campaign.

#### 424 Campaigning to Consolidate Gains

425

426 Current constructs exhibit an over-reliance on the idea of a focused  
427 decisive effort while demonstrating an under-appreciation of what follows  
428 (Echevarria and NMS1992). Joint Force campaigning is decisive only in the  
429 aggregate and when the result is the meaningful change sought by the war's  
430 aims.

431 The rise of adversaries contesting international norms and the spread of  
432 regional disorder highlights the need for enduring political outcomes, the  
433 achievement of which will require a recognition of the dual nature of war. On  
434 the one hand, a coercive, negative component is necessary to defeat an  
435 adversary, while a positive, constructive component is required to bring about  
436 a stable and desirable political settlement.<sup>11</sup> While the second component is  
437 often overlooked or misunderstood, the establishment of political order is part  
438 of war itself.<sup>12</sup> The two components cannot be disaggregated.

439

440 For joint leaders there should be an emphasis on consolidating activities  
441 from early in the planning process to ensure consistency with the national  
442 security interests at stake. Leaders should view combat operations and  
443 stability operations as both integral to war and occurring in tandem. Force  
444 must remain subservient to politics.<sup>13</sup>

445

446 While no nation can permanently secure the desired conditions in  
447 competition, consolidating the gains as a fundamental component of  
448 campaigns increases the likelihood of a desirable and enduring political  
449 settlement. This conclusion is empirically demonstrated in a 1978 study titled,  
450 Force without War: U.S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument, which

451 chronicled and analyzed over 200 cases occurring since World War II where the  
452 US employed forces to reinforce or modify foreign actors' behaviors. The study  
453 demonstrated that military success, if not translated into a political settlement,  
454 is likely to be short-lived. The patterns that follow military defeat of a country  
455 are well-known, JCIC seeks to further institutionalize actions to mitigate these  
456 circumstances within DoD's models and processes. (See Appendix F)

457 ***Employment of Compete Mechanisms***

458 While strategic conditions of armed conflict, competition below armed  
459 conflict, and cooperation help us to understand the environment, mechanisms  
460 suggest the means available to leaders and planners to solve problems and  
461 capitalize on opportunities.

462  
463 JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*, 11 August 2011, establishes defeat and  
464 stability mechanisms in joint doctrine. Defeat mechanisms, applicable to  
465 conditions of armed conflict, are intended to defeat armed enemies through the  
466 organized application of force. Stability mechanisms, applicable across the  
467 range of conditions, are the primary method by which the Joint Force affects  
468 the human dimension of the operational environment. Defeat and stability  
469 mechanisms are well suited to the conditions of peace and war and will have  
470 continued utility in the strategic environment. However, recognizing the  
471 importance of allies and partner to US national interests and the prominence of  
472 competition below armed conflict in the future OE, this concept introduces  
473 *compete mechanisms* as a way to maintain or establish favorable conditions  
474 within the international order. Taken together, *defeat*, *compete*, and *stability*  
475 *mechanisms* offer leaders a wider array of methods to employ the Joint Force in  
476 conditions of cooperation, competition, and armed conflict (See Figure 2).

477  
478 Intended to be compatible with other U.S. government departments and  
479 agencies in conditions of cooperation or competition below armed conflict, the  
480 compete mechanisms are: Advance, Maintain, Counter.

481  
482 *Advance* – To increase alignment between an actor and the U.S. when  
483 congruence between interests is existent but insufficient. It may be applied to a  
484 rival with the potential to enter into a cooperative relationship.

485  
486 *Maintain* – To perpetuate existing conditions by preventing the escalation of  
487 rivalry; it perpetuates cooperative relations or rivalries acceptable to U.S.  
488 policy.

489  
490 *Counter* – To limit a rival's ability to undermine U.S. interests by employing  
491 Joint Force capabilities short of armed conflict. It may be applied to a rival  
492 challenging US interests.

493  
494



**Figure 2: Mechanisms and Conditions of the Operating Environment**

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In applying compete mechanisms, leaders and planners continuously evaluate their efficacy in relation to U.S. national objectives. They seek to link and arrange military activities to operational objectives that result in maintaining or altering the current trajectory between the U.S. and another actor using compete mechanisms. As conditions and activities are identified, coherent groupings of authorizations are developed and requested, collaboration with appropriate interagency elements is conducted, and alignment with multinational partner actions is pursued.

**507 Alignment of military and non-military activities**

508 Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States,  
509 defines unity of effort as “coordination and cooperation toward common  
510 objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same  
511 command or organization.”<sup>14</sup> Meeting the challenges of current and future  
512 operations requires alignment of all instruments of U.S. national power plus  
513 foreign governmental agencies and military forces and civilian organizations.  
514 Consequently, there is a need to conduct integrated campaigns to effectively  
515 employ the appropriate instruments of national power.

516  
517 The JCIC describes the Joint forces’ approach to coordinating and  
518 cooperating toward common aims with partners and allies in an environment  
519 comprised of cooperation, competition below the level of armed conflict, and  
520 armed conflict. The object of integrated campaigning is to align non-military  
521 and military activities to enable establishment of conditions for enduring  
522 political outcomes. For the purposes of this concept, *integration* is the  
523 arrangement of military and non-military entities and their actions to operate

524 by engaging as a whole.<sup>15</sup>

525

526 The recent and emerging challenges of the preceding section establish  
527 the purposes for which Integrated Campaigning may be required now and in  
528 the future. The elements section above described the components of the  
529 solution. This section describes in general terms how the components of the  
530 solution comprise an integrated campaign framework to meet those  
531 challenges.

532

533 The Joint Force uses integrated campaigning to create unity of purpose  
534 and effort in part by providing non-military and military entities with unified  
535 decision-making and execution processes to better combine a whole of  
536 government approach to achieve enduring outcomes.

537

538 The JCIC integrated campaigning framework presents joint leaders with a  
539 common method and terminology to work together with their partners in  
540 different U.S. government (USG) departments, agencies, and State bureaus to  
541 support cooperation, competition below armed conflict, and armed conflict.<sup>16</sup>

542

543 *Conducting Situational Analysis* – develops a common understanding of the  
544 operating environment which serves as the unifying starting point for further  
545 planning and execution, and continues to maintain and update that analysis  
546 and assessment during execution of transformation efforts towards desired  
547 future conditions. This may include efforts to understand the environment and  
548 threats. The Joint Force and USG/international partners accomplish this  
549 requirement by:

- 550 - Adversary templating for known actors.
- 551 - Systems analysis of the adversary (Abrams and Odierno approach;  
552 looks at inputs, processes and outputs—also part of the IC process).
- 553 - Incident mapping for actors that are not well known.
- 554 - Applying PMESII or similar construct (e.g., human factors).
- 555 - Relevant actor analysis (i.e., JC-HAMO approach).

556

557 *Developing Guidance & Confirming the Parameters for the Campaign* in order to  
558 frame the problem, understand the planning task and organizes the planning  
559 effort. This may include efforts to inform the Nation's political strategy. The  
560 Joint Force must engage the Nation's civilian leaders to:

- 561 - Inform/develop strategic guidance and identify the national interests  
562 at stake.

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563 - Understand how the United States will mobilize/sustain support at  
564 home and abroad—while isolating and weakening adversaries (as part  
565 of the political strategy).

566 - Develop *integrated* action (with partners) around a common purpose,  
567 method and desired state—while anticipating contingencies.

568

569 *Outlining the Strategy & Operational Design and Producing the Plan* in order to  
570 develop a strategy to address the problem, define the overarching concept for  
571 what the USG is seeking to achieve, and provide the necessary guidance and  
572 direction to execute that concept. This may include efforts to identify campaign  
573 objectives and then align resources and operations—across the range of  
574 partners—to ensure these objectives are accomplished. The Joint Force and its  
575 partners need to adopt an appropriate campaigning construct or combination  
576 thereof:

577 - *Phasing by Activity*. OIF approach: Shape, Deter, Seize the Initiative,  
578 Dominate, Stabilize, Enable Civil Authority (Ph. 0-5) (see JP 5-0  
579 Figure II-17). This approach is well-suited to combat adversaries that  
580 control territory.

581 - *Line of Effort by Activity*. Petraeus approach: included lethal and  
582 non-lethal efforts. Example: civil control, civil security, essential  
583 services, economic/infrastructure development, and governance (see  
584 JP 5-0 Figure III-14). Approach is useful for combating transregional  
585 threats and non-state actors that may not hold territory.

586 - *Phasing by Geography*. WWII approach: progressed from periphery  
587 (N. Africa), to semi-periphery (France & Italy), to core (Germany).  
588 Approach is helpful when a direct effort against an adversary is not  
589 feasible initially.

590 - *Line of Effort by Actor*. JC-HAMO approach: align operations to  
591 influence friendly, neutral, and adversary actors. Approach helps  
592 when the collaboration of friendly and neutral actors is needed to  
593 counter and defeat adversaries and achieve stability.

594

595 • *Executing, Assessing, and Adapting the Campaign* in order to coordinate  
596 and monitor implementation of the plan and change the course of the  
597 plan when needed as environmental conditions change. This may include  
598 efforts to develop measures of performance and measures of effectiveness  
599 (MOP/MOE) to assess the friendly forces' campaign. The Joint Force  
600 should adopt some MOP/MOE that align with the campaigning construct  
601 selected as part of the previous element (or task) of the Central Idea.  
602 However, friendly forces should—regardless of the campaigning  
603 construct—still be interested on second and third order impacts on

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604 friendly, neutral, and adversary relevant actors in the environment. By  
605 “assessing” changes in the Operating Environment, commanders and  
606 their staffs can “adapt” the friendly forces’ campaign to accomplish  
607 objectives.  
608

609 JCIC applies this framework in an environment comprised of cooperation,  
610 competition below armed conflict, and armed conflict. The integrated planning  
611 framework may produce recommendations for integration into existing U.S.  
612 government (USG) planning processes such as the State Department's  
613 Integrated Country Strategies, USAID's Country Development Cooperation  
614 Strategies and the Defense Department's Combatant Theater Campaigns.

615

## 616 **Summary**

617 The JCIC enhances the Joint Force’s appreciation of the future operating  
618 environment and offers an alternative construct for campaigning in all  
619 conditions. With an enhanced construct for campaigning, the Joint Force will  
620 be able to conduct campaigns integrated with the efforts of others and seize,  
621 retain and exploit the strategic initiative to support the achievement of  
622 acceptable political conditions.

623

624

## 625 **VI. Concept Required Capabilities. *(Under Development)***

626

627 Required Capability 1: The ability to assess, plan, and execute theater  
628 campaign plans with the agility and authority necessary to prevent conflict,  
629 deter adversaries, and strengthen partnerships.

630

631 Required Capability 2: The ability to assess, plan, and execute seamless  
632 transition from competition below armed conflict, to conditions of armed  
633 conflict, and back to competition below armed conflict.

634

635 Required Capability 3: The ability to assess, plan, and execute global and  
636 cross-geographic combatant command operations.

637

638 Required Capability 4: The ability to plan for and seamlessly apply low  
639 density-high demand resources across multiple combatant commands.

640

641 Required Capability 5: The ability to plan, coordinate, and synchronize  
642 activities with other US. Government agencies.

643

644 Required Capability 6: The ability to plan, coordinate, and synchronize

645 activities with Allies and partners.

646

647 Required Capability 7: The ability to align joint force activities in conditions of  
648 competition below armed conflict.

649

650 Required Capability 8: The ability to synchronize various plans and processes  
651 that provide strategic guidance.

652

653 Required Capability 9: The ability, via UCP, GEF & CCMD plans, to identify  
654 force headquarters elements, required capabilities and associated coordinating  
655 relationships.

656

657 Required Capability 10: The ability to globally synchronize the transfer and  
658 employment of Joint Forces.

659

660 Required Capability 11: The ability to fully implement the Joint Information  
661 Environment and Mission Partner Environment across CCMDs, Services,  
662 combat support agencies, interorganizational partners and others as required.

663

664 Required Capability 12: The ability to distribute and coordinate planning,  
665 activities & actions vertically and horizontally across multiple supporting  
666 organizations.

667

668 Required Capability 13: The ability to implement a comprehensive training and  
669 exercise program to prepare selected headquarters for joint and multinational  
670 competition below armed conflict.

671

672 Required Capability 14: The ability to mitigate threats and hazards to  
673 personnel, equipment and facilities while maintaining competition below armed  
674 conflict activities.

675

676 Required Capability 15: The ability to source required forces and capabilities  
677 regardless of organizational affiliations or command assignments.

678

679 Required Capability 16: The ability to integrate campaign design and planning  
680 across multiple CCMDs for transregional challenges.

681

682

683 **VII. Risks of Adopting this Concept. (TBD)**

684

685 **VIII. Conclusion. (TBD)**

686

687

688 **Appendix A: Glossary (Under development)**

689 *Campaign*: a series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing  
690 a military strategic or operational objective within a given time and space.  
691

692 *Campaigning*: An organized and active joint force effort in sufficient scope,  
693 scale, simultaneity, and duration to accomplish or enable a policy's aim by  
694 implementing appropriate actions in the correct intervals, the required  
695 condition, and across all the relevant spaces; and ideally aligned with other  
696 elements of power.

697  
698 *Joint Operations*: A general term to describe military actions conducted by joint  
699 forces and those Service forces employed in specified command relationships  
700 with each other, which of themselves, do not establish joint forces.

701  
702 *Major Operation*: A series of tactical actions (battles, engagements, strikes)  
703 conducted by combat forces of a single or several Services, coordinated in time  
704 and place, to achieve strategic or operational objectives in an operational area.  
705 For noncombat operations, a reference to the relative size and scope of a  
706 military operation.

707  
708 *Strategic Initiative*: the ability to take action in support of national objectives.

709

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712

713 **Appendix B: A New Interpretation and Definition of Campaigning**

714 JCIC offers that campaigning is not synonymous, equal to, or much less  
715 subordinate to the idea of a joint or major operation. As briefly described in the  
716 central idea, JCIC recognizes campaigning as the activity that connects  
717 evolving policy and to the orchestration of simultaneous actions across the  
718 joint forces' pursuit of that policy. These simultaneous actions include service  
719 component operations, joint operations, and aligning military actions with  
720 interagency and allied efforts oriented on the policy's desired outcomes.  
721 Currently accepted descriptions of campaigning associates the attainment of  
722 objectives within a given time interval and space. Although the current  
723 definition has an appreciation of multiple domains, its description of space is  
724 based solely on the notion of a geographic area and assumes the condition is  
725 one of armed conflict. Additionally, time has not always been what really  
726 defines a campaign. In fact, many on many occasions the actual duration is  
727 only identifiable after the fact or with retrospection. Anyway, the current joint  
728 definition of campaign is:

729 ***Campaign: A series of related major operations aimed at achieving***  
730 ***strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space. (JP 1-***  
731 ***02. SOURCE JP 5-0***

732 As such the definition of a campaign is dependent upon the definition of  
733 a major operation. The current definition of a major operation is:

734 ***Major Operation: A series of tactical actions (battles, engagements,***  
735 ***strikes) conducted by combat forces of a single or several Services,***  
736 ***coordinated in time and place, to achieve strategic or operational***  
737 ***objectives in an operational area. 2. For noncombat operations, a***  
738 ***reference to the relative size and scope of a military operation.***

739 The definition of a joint operation is:

740 ***Joint Operations: A general term to describe military actions***  
741 ***conducted by joint forces and those Service forces employed in specified***  
742 ***command relationships with each other, which of themselves, do not***  
743 ***establish joint forces.***

744 An expanded description of the role and enduring activity is of the joint  
745 force is through the lens of the verb campaigning as opposed to the noun  
746 campaign. JP 1 states that, (The joint force is) "CCDRs are responsible for the  
747 development and production of joint plans and orders. During peacetime, they  
748 act to deter war through military engagement and security cooperation  
749 activities and prepare to execute other missions that may be required. During  
750 a conflict/combat, they plan and conduct campaigns and major operations to  
751 accomplish assigned missions." (JP 1.0 Page IV-6). JCIC expands this  
752 description and recognizes that a fraction of the joint force is always  
753 campaigning, just not always in conditions of armed conflict. JCIC recognizes  
754 that joint force campaigning is certainly more than a series of battles,

755 engagements, and strikes. Joint campaigning may consist of many small  
756 activities without kinetic exchanges. Additionally, JCIC offers that the joint  
757 force campaigns against antagonists in more contested spaces than just  
758 geography and in more conditions than high-stakes armed conflict; such as  
759 perception, legitimacy, criminality, coercion, cyber intrusion, political  
760 subversion, and nuanced uses of military force without war.

761 Therefore, JCIC's proposed definition of campaigning is:

762 **Campaigning: An organized and active joint force effort in sufficient**  
763 **scope, scale, simultaneity, and duration to accomplish or enable a policy's**  
764 **aim by implementing appropriate actions in the correct intervals, the**  
765 **required condition, and across all the relevant spaces; and ideally aligned**  
766 **with other elements of power.**

767  
768 JCIC views campaigning as much more than battle. With an expanded  
769 definition that fully captures the character of joint force campaigning, the  
770 integrating aspect of JCIC recognizes that effective campaigning requires  
771 integration between multiple regional and functional combatant commands to  
772 coherently act against current and future adversaries. JCIC seeks to leverage  
773 all the tools normally associated with shaping, deterrence, and leveraging the  
774 initiative, armed conflict, and consolidation. Furthermore, JCIC seeks to  
775 liberate imaginative ways of effectively organizing and employing the joint force  
776 in conditions outside of armed conflict. Finally, the joint force requires effective  
777 integration between joint headquarters and service components. JCIC's  
778 alternative framework allows the thinking necessary for joint force to organize  
779 around antagonists' and adversaries' actions in conditions of cooperation,  
780 competition, armed conflict, and while consolidating the gains across all  
781 conditions.


782 The joint force's current and future capability to campaign across these  
783 varying conditions serves as a vital element of national power. Second, the  
784 joint force's persistent and enduring engagement in the context of campaigning  
785 fosters long-term strategic success. Third, the joint force's forward presence  
786 fosters the deep and coherent sociocultural understanding that is required to  
787 successfully campaign. Fourth, the joint force's aligning operations with other  
788 agencies and elements of national power increases the probability of strategic  
789 success.<sup>1</sup> Finally, JCIC's construct offers much more than a choice between  
790 peace and war.

791  
792 **Endnotes**

- 793 1. Lohaus, Philip and Sutton, Thomas. *Pursuing Strategic Advantage: The Utility of*  
794 *Armed Forces in Peace, War, and Everything In Between.* American Enterprise  
795 Institute. Washington, DC July 2015  
796

797  
798

**Appendix C: The Factors of Campaign Design**



**Table 1. The Universe of Competitive International Relations and Differing Styles of Warfare**

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801

JCIC offers an additive array of factors of campaign design that further enables the joint force to think through campaigning in conditions it may encounter. These factors provide an intellectual mooring, framework, and feedback loop between the strategic discussion and development and refinement of the operational-level logic and mechanism used to pursue the chosen policy. JCIC’s factors offer a guide for joint leaders and staffs in creating an informed and effective application of the joint force in all conditions. Additionally, the factors provide the necessary precision and depth to effectively guide the development and execution of joint campaigns across the universe of known, emerging, and anticipated styles and patterns of warfare

JCIC recommends that any alternative campaign framework should have an updated more and precise set of factors of design that:

- 1) Expands our understanding of operational art and practice beyond a narrow conception of armed conflict and what is required to prevail.
- 2) Provides a model that connects with, responds to, and informs evolving policy and the design of the military dimension’s instrument to pursue

819 that policy.

820 3) Orients on long-term political outcomes beyond just military success,  
821 while recognizing that clear conclusion and finality are elusive.

822 Below are examples of new considerations or factors of actual campaign  
823 design. Although discrete, the Joint Force will not consider each factor in  
824 isolation. Moreover, as the factors are all mutually supportive, the Joint Force  
825 will not consider them sequentially, but collectively. This function may guide a  
826 more informed application of the joint force and its alignment with other  
827 instruments of power. This array includes, but is not limited to a:

828 1. Deep and relevant understanding of the environment, the antagonist  
829 and its behavior, the vector, direction, and the driving logic behind their  
830 actions, the dynamics and perspectives of other relevant actors, and the  
831 contested political issue(s) at stake within the context of international relations.  
832 Achieving this level of understanding enables true empathy and the ability to  
833 identify changes in behavior.

834 2. Recognition of an evolving range of possible outcomes. A living  
835 estimate/forecast of the range and time interval of the possible political  
836 consequences of the circumstance, in terms of both acceptable and  
837 unacceptable futures.

838 3. Comprehension of the conditions and behaviors the joint force must  
839 produce to achieve and enable an outcome within the range of acceptability.

840 4. Methodology of long-term consolidation of gains and perpetuation of  
841 outcomes. Effective consolidation requires a comprehensive understanding of  
842 the requirements to translated military success into outcomes. This  
843 understanding enables design of the methodical and informed transitions  
844 required over long periods to achieve those outcomes.

845 5. An effective civilian/military dialogue. The essential factor in campaign  
846 design. This is the joint force's sound recommendation of alternatives and the  
847 civilian leadership's selection, acceptance, and legitimization of the initial aim  
848 of the associated policy shifts – followed by the continual discussion, feedback,  
849 adaptations and refinements of the aims and corresponding maintenance of the  
850 campaign.

851 6. Principal and cascading narratives that orient on outcomes by  
852 unmasking and delegitimizing the adversary and championing our vision, that  
853 military actions and activities promote, reinforce, and advance; which  
854 empowers the Joint Force to produce the required conditions and  
855 behaviors.<sup>1</sup>(Dubik, 2016)

856 7. Coherent groupings of authorizations and permissions that enable  
857 multiple forms of national power to employ and work in unison; Authorizations  
858 recognized as means, accompanied by an understanding of how and when they  
859 enable the campaign.

860 8. Interagency alignment of simultaneous and inter-related efforts  
861 orchestrated toward the outcome. True integration occurs, but infrequently.  
862 Integration is a function and many variables, but most of all an expenditure of  
863 senior leader horsepower and time. On the other hand, alignment can be just  
864 as effective. Alignment is actually a historical norm and can be captured in  
865 doctrine, taught in PME, and practiced regularly. Finally, alignment is a much  
866 better expectation and workable construct that integration.

867 9. Synchronization, prioritization, and de-confliction of funding over  
868 extended periods. The longer term, but essential means that joint campaign  
869 design must appreciate.

870  
871 10. Logic of why the military campaign will work. Methodology of linking  
872 and arranging military actions and activities that produce the necessary  
873 condition, forces the required adversarial behavior, and leads to a sustainable  
874 situation with the range of acceptability. This may include concepts for  
875 achieving surprise, denial, and deception. Maintaining this logic's relevance  
876 and proper context requires continual assessment.

877  
878 11. Description of the intricate, simultaneous application and command  
879 and control of relevant forces, resources, and capabilities, including the  
880 alignment of efforts of all participating combatant commands and specific  
881 description of how their contributions enable the campaign and deliver  
882 outcomes. (This is the detailed planning where many of the existing elements of  
883 operational design may be effective)

884  
885 In terms of being grouped together and described as fundamental to  
886 campaign and operational-level planning and execution, this is different. These  
887 factors provide an intellectual mooring, framework, and feedback loop between  
888 the strategic discussion and development and refinement of the operational-  
889 level logic and mechanism used to pursue the chosen strategy. Recent history  
890 shows how we've relied too much on the current elements of operational  
891 design, only to discover the critical nature and necessity of these highlighted  
892 foundational factors and underpinnings of actual campaigning. Sometimes  
893 after the fact, or worse – during implementation and execution. These factors  
894 or these styles of factors are essential to the initial and ongoing logic of effective  
895 campaign design and adaptive execution in all conditions the joint force may  
896 face.

897  
898 Endnotes-----

899 1. LTG(R) Dubik, James "Winning The War We've Got, Not the One we Want"  
900 Army Feb 2016  
901 -[http://www.armymagazine.org/2016/01/12/winning-the-war-weve-got-](http://www.armymagazine.org/2016/01/12/winning-the-war-weve-got-not-the-one-we-want/)  
902 [not-the-one-we-want/](http://www.armymagazine.org/2016/01/12/winning-the-war-weve-got-not-the-one-we-want/)

903

904 **Appendix D: Campaigning in Cooperation with Allies and Partners**

905  
906 The Joint Force has always recognized the value of forward presence.  
907 Since the early 1990's national guidance has emphasized that the idea of  
908 shaping through cooperation is important. JCIC offers the joint community an  
909 additive logic of considerations, clear definitions, and description of how to  
910 think about cooperation that adds utility to the existing body of thought. JCIC  
911 seeks to lay the ground work to identify patterns of effective shaping and form  
912 usable principles for shaping. Furthermore, JCIC's offers a framework for  
913 organizing the force for shaping and develop a methodology to inform our  
914 planning and preparation for shaping. Finally, JCIC seeks to highlight  
915 shaping's best practices in order to guide future execution. JCIC recognizes  
916 the laws that govern existing authorities, priorities, and funding routinely  
917 change, but describes a resilient framework for cooperation that it does not  
918 require a complete re-tooling with every NDAA.

919 In the conditions of cooperation, the Joint Force works conscientiously  
920 and purposefully with elements of state and non-state actors to achieve  
921 mutually beneficial outcomes. Efforts intended to strengthen ties and bolster  
922 the security capabilities of allies and partners support objectives of the joint  
923 forces' GCC Theater Campaigns and Functional Combatant Commanders'  
924 (FCC) Global Campaigns.

925 JCIC highlights that campaigning in conditions of cooperation has no  
926 discrete start or end point. Efforts to maintain a sphere of influence and  
927 strengthen ties with allies and partners in conditions of cooperation will  
928 endure. In contrast to the existing planning paradigm, Joint Force activities in  
929 conditions of cooperation orient on shaping a security environment and may be  
930 part of a broader theater cooperative effort.

931 As stated previously in the central idea, JCIC articulates a set of principles  
932 within a framework for campaigning in conditions of cooperation. These are:

- 933 1. Identifying the conditions the joint force must enable to effectively shape  
934 the security environment toward US' interests.  
935  
936 2. Recognize the state and character of the US' partner relationships the  
937 joint for will exercise.  
938  
939 3. Determine our partners' propensity, likelihood, and capacity to act in a  
940 manner aligned with our interests.  
941  
942 4. Understand other US' Departments and interests, objectives, and  
943 priorities with respect regarding specific circumstance.  
944  
945 5. Comprehend the amount, categories, and purposes of all the US Foreign  
946 Assistance funding Congress planned for the relevant area(s).

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6. Understanding how the DoD Cooperation Focus areas can apply to the specific problem the joint force will face.

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These six principles along with the factors of campaign design begin to form the needed framework to enable the joint force to truly campaign in these conditions formerly described as “normal routine activities.” A more detailed description of each principle follows.

955 **Identifying the conditions.**

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JCIC describes emerging thoughts on decisions and expectations for cooperation and seeks to narrow the joint force’s interpretation of cooperation and shaping. Additionally, JCIC describes a joint organizing framework to plan and execute the concept of shaping. The idea of shaping is in the context of seeking favorable and beneficial conditions of a specific security environment. Good news is that each service, joint, and OSD communities have published volumes on cooperation, just not in the context of true campaigning; mainly because it is not in a condition of armed conflict. Therefore, under the definition of shaping, JCIC describes six distinguishable characterizations of purposes the joint force would adopt as a terms within a new lexicon. These articulate to seek favorable conditions in the context of pursuing strategic guidance and US interests. JCIC nominates that with cooperative relationships, the joint force and other departments seek to advance, create, change, maintain, counter, or restore specific METT-TC conditions favorable to US and partner interests. These terms are additive to the joint force’s current military specific tasks and terms to help describe the joint force’s purpose. This framework enables the joint force to intellectually organize to campaign in these conditions. Moreover, the current array of operational terms are irrelevant can even alienate our partners and interagency elements. These terms underpin and characterize proactive, competitive methods and measures. By and large these are interagency friendly or at least neutral terms.

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JCIC offers a more detailed definition of each for the conditions the joint force seeks in conditions of cooperation. These are:

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**Advance** – To advance a condition means here is some level of existing favorable situation that aligns with our interests, but not to the degree or at the level which meets our long-term aims or purposes. Historically, the joint force has made essential contributions that have helped produce strategic allies characterized by democratic governments, educated middle classes, and powerful economies, with useful and enduring treaties and relationships. To enable these accomplishments, the joint face has campaigned in spaces well beyond geography or specific time intervals. The hallmarks of successful joint force campaigning have not been a related series major operations in armed

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990 conflict, but a coherent collection of many small events and activities  
991 conducted over many years and decades, that build trust and exercise  
992 relationships. In most of these cases, the joint force rarely aims a weapon or  
993 fires a munition, but demonstrates that it can. What the joint force does  
994 employ is patience, persistence, and perseverance.  
995

996 **Maintain** – For maintain the desired condition, order, or rule set exists,  
997 and it is in the US’ interests to neither degrade to increase significantly, where  
998 increasing would risk changing the condition unfavorably. In contrast to  
999 ‘Restore’, no large shock has occurred to disrupt this condition, however the is  
1000 always an opportunity cost of maintaining the status quo. The U.S. Navy’s  
1001 daily actions in the space is germane in that we expect our naval and maritime  
1002 forces to maintain access to the global commons and freedom of navigation in  
1003 international waters. This isn’t a given and requires constant vigilance.  
1004 Moreover, global commerce depends on the Navy’s continual efforts.  
1005

1006 **Change** - The existing condition is not malignant nor counter to U.S.  
1007 interests, but offers opportunity and has the potential to positively align w/  
1008 U.S. OBJs or warrants concerted effort prevent deterioration of stable situation.  
1009 Although, there is no assumption of immediate malign intent by other actors, if  
1010 ignored this condition could provide opportunity and advantages for  
1011 antagonistic or even adversarial behavior in the years ahead. A small, but  
1012 informed investment by the joint force may buy decades of institutional and  
1013 economic growth.  
1014


1015 **Counter** – As a response to a condition that has devolved or in  
1016 anticipation of a deteriorating condition that is detrimental to U.S. interests.  
1017 The threat doesn’t manifest itself within a specific antagonist, but the situation  
1018 preclude US long-term interests and promote and advance adversarial pursuits  
1019 or ideologies in the near term. Countering a deteriorating condition is the most  
1020 difficult for the joint force as there is no real enemy to confront, but rather  
1021 ideas, dis-information, and, coercion and crime, and political subterfuge spread  
1022 and practiced by various groups. Success in this space depends on capable  
1023 and partners committed and dedicated to their own viable vision of the future.  
1024

1025 **Create** – Every so often, the joint force is required to actually help create  
1026 a condition where does not exist, and its existence could positively impact  
1027 achievement of national interests or may be essential. This is a recurrence  
1028 where the US doesn’t have the necessary access, understanding, presence, or  
1029 partners regarding a developing circumstance or an unanticipated shift in  
1030 world events. The most recent example  
1031

1032 **Restore** - Some condition that was aligned with US interests existed, but  
1033 a shock (e.g. natural disaster, famine, radiological hazard) happened to  
1034 significantly alter the area. It is within US interests and values to provide

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1035 assistance, alleviate suffering, and re-establish order and return to some  
 1036 normalized state that resembles the condition before the shock. The joint force  
 1037 has a long history in supporting many nations of different types in time of great  
 1038 need. In the past 10-12 years, the joint force has helped restore Japan,  
 1039 Pakistan, Haiti, and Indonesia.



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**Table 1. Description of the Range of Conditions the Joint Force seeks in Cooperation with Allies**

**Character of Relationships**

In addition to determining the desired condition, joint leaders and staffs will normally exercise long-standing or emerging relationships to pursue those conditions. Recognizing the state or character of those relationships relative to the preferred condition is key. A way to categorize these relationships is through a range beginning with *Cooperative*, which is the most common and ranging as far as *Control*, which is rare. Other examples of relationships are when the joint force realizes it doesn't have meaningful relationships to pursue a desirable condition; therefore, we have to *Establish* one. This range can be characterized by a total seven discrete delineations, but recognizes there may be some blending of several. JCIC defines these relationships as:

1058 **Cooperative** – Most of the time, the joint force works alongside willing partners  
1059 with similar interests. These actors are not overtly supportive of all the U.S.’  
1060 actions and activities, but have specific interests which aligns with ours.

1061  
1062 **Reinforce** - At times, independent actor(s) may already have taken action , of  
1063 their own accord, that aligns with our interests. In these cases, we seek to  
1064 support their actions, and do not necessarily need to take the lead (though that  
1065 may change with continual assessment).

1066  
1067 **Inspire** - In contrast to ‘reinforce’, in this case potential actor(s) have not yet  
1068 taken action, but there is potential that with the proper incentive and signals,  
1069 that actor could be motivated to initiate action that would be aligned with our  
1070 interests.


1071  
1072 **Establish** – A situation unfolds that affects a U.S. issue or interest and we  
1073 realize that we do not have a partnership with an actor who shares our  
1074 concerns and the joint force must help establish a relationship that is .

1075  
1076 **Broaden** - When we have an established relationship with an actor, but realize  
1077 that we must further our relationship without coercion to achieve our desired  
1078 condition/behavior. In other words, we must strengthen the good terms of our  
1079 relationship.

1080  
1081 **Leverage** - Like ‘control’, this is normally applied to those actor(s) who would  
1082 align counter to our desired condition/behavior. While it may not involve direct  
1083 influence as with ‘control’, it implies that we have the means and the will to  
1084 apply that level of influence if necessary.

1085  
1086 **Control** - This relationship is rare, but there are cases where the US has a  
1087 certain level of control in a relationship. Historically, that relationship is  
1088 undergoing radical transition. This is normally involves direct influence over an  
1089 actor as a part of an occupation, who would normally not be aligned with our  
1090 desired conditions.

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**Table 2. A Description of Character of Differing International Relationships**

**State of Partners' National Power & Propensities**

A propensity is “a strong natural tendency to do something.” Regarding cooperation it is function of a natural tendency, willingness, and capacity to campaign alongside the joint force for mutual objectives. JCIC offers a guide to recognize a partner’s ability to act toward similar interests aligned with our values. This is key in establishing expectations. Many times, the propensity is a function of a potential protagonist’s control over its over its own sovereignty and maturity and capacity of its governing institutions. JCIC describes an illustrative range of propensities of actors to work and achieve results alongside the joint force. JCIC defines and characterizes indicators of these states’ propensities as:

**Pursuing External Interests** - Mature systems with broad and resilient elements of national power and competitive/comparative advantages. A state enjoying these circumstances may be interested in:

- Employ their advantages internationally and reap the benefits.
- Moderate to aggressive foreign policy objectives to further advance and protect their advantages.
- Exporting stability and security

1118

1119 **Growing/Expanding** - Signified by established systems of governance,  
1120 education, and justice. Mature institutions that can accumulate economic,  
1121 diplomatic, informational power. A state leveraging these circumstances may  
1122 be interested in:

- 1123 • Increasing International Trade/broadening markets
- 1124 • Joining Alliances
- 1125 • Limited Foreign Policy objectives
- 1126 • Exporting security

1127

1128

1129 **Maintaining Stasis** System is durable and evolving & advancing slowly.  
1130 Credible & effective institutions. A state maintaining the status quo may be  
1131 interested in:

- 1132 • A clear and distinguishable identity
- 1133 • A focused on maintaining status quo
- 1134 • A perception of Legitimacy
- 1135 • Maintaining Relationships
- 1136 • A conservative approach to regional engagement

1137

1138

1139 **Kleptocracy/Clientelism** - System and power is established either by  
1140 extortion of the country's resources and GDP or by continually paying off key  
1141 sectors of the population. Maintained by internal security institutions, masked  
1142 legitimacy, and fear. A state depending upon its human capital for survival in  
1143 these circumstances may be interested in:

- 1144 • Control of populations; and
- 1145 • Resistant to outside influence

1146

1147 **Fragile** – System or power base is functional, but weak and threatened by  
1148 internal and external. A state existing in these circumstances may be  
1149 interested in:

- 1150 • Establishing and maintaining stability to consolidate power and  
1151 authority


1152

1153 **Contested** - System/Power base is weak and under duress from both internal  
1154 and external opposing sources of power. A state surviving in these conditions is  
1155 probably focused on its:

- 1156 • Near-term survival; and
- 1157 • Willing to accept outside assistance

1158

1159



**Table 3. Illustrative Range of a Partner’s propensity to campaign in a manner aligned with US interest**

**Understanding U.S. Foreign Assistance Funding**

The United States has a long history of providing foreign assistance in response to global needs, to assist people overseas struggling to build a better life, and make the world safer. Comprehending where the U.S. is committing Foreign Assistance funding and effort in a manner or region that affects joint force’s specific situation in question is key. “Foreign assistance is aid given by the United States to other countries to support global peace, security, and development efforts, and provide humanitarian relief during times of crisis. It is a strategic, economic, and moral imperative for the United States and vital to U.S. national security... Today, the U.S. manages foreign assistance programs in more than 100 countries around the world through the efforts of over 20 different U.S. Government agencies. These investments further America's foreign policy interests on issues ranging from expanding free markets, combating extremism, ensuring stable democracies, and addressing the root causes of poverty...”<sup>1</sup>

“According to Section 634(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended:

(b) For purposes of this section—

1. "foreign assistance" means any tangible or intangible item provided by the United States Government to a foreign country or international organization under this or any other Act, including but not limited to any training, service, or technical advice, any item of real, personal, or mixed property, any agricultural commodity, United States dollars, and any currencies of any foreign country which are owned by the United States Government; and

1187 2. "provided by the United States Government" includes, but is not limited to,  
1188 foreign assistance provided by means of gift, loan, sale, credit, or guaranty."<sup>2</sup>

1189 In simpler terms, official foreign assistance is the unilateral transfers of U.S.  
1190 resources (funds, goods, and services) by the U.S. Government to or for the  
1191 benefit of foreign entities (including international and regional organizations)  
1192 without any reciprocal payment or transfer of resources from the foreign  
1193 entities. Foreign assistance is not just confined to funds or commodities, it also  
1194 includes the provision of technical assistance, capacity building, training,  
1195 education, and other services, as well as the direct costs required to implement  
1196 foreign assistance.

1197 "Foreign assistance funding is classified into one of nine categories,  
1198 which is further detailed into 52 sectors. Funds are uniquely aligned to one  
1199 category and sector."<sup>3</sup> For example, FA's Peace and Security category has seven  
1200 unique sectors. These are Counter Terrorism, Combatting Weapons of Mass  
1201 Destruction, Stabilization Operations and Security Sector Reform, Counter  
1202 Narcotics, Transnational Crime, Conflict Mitigation and Reconciliation.  
1203 Understanding the specific rules, purposes, and applications of each is  
1204 essential.

1205  
1206 **Identifying and Applying the DoD's Security Cooperation guidelines**  
1207


1208 With a grasp of the first four principles, the fifth is understanding the  
1209 DoD Security Cooperation Guidelines and determine which of these applies to  
1210 the circumstance and the condition the joint force will pursue. These areas  
1211 contract and expand over time. JCIC's additive logic recommends a broader  
1212 framework that is resilient to the changes within this facet of cooperation: Most  
1213 recent DoD guidance highlights these but guidance and law can and will  
1214 change. This guidance should not unhinge or make irrelevant an alternative  
1215 framework. JCIC's outlined logic anticipates these changes and responds.  
1216 Current recent guidance outlines these focus areas, but these can be revised at  
1217 any time. Typical and historical norms for cooperation:

- 1218
- 1219 • Capacity building
- 1220 • Operational capacity and capability building
- 1221 • Human capacity and/or human capital development
- 1222 • Institutional capacity and/or security sector reform
- 1223 • Support to institutional capacity and/or civil-sector capacity
- 1224 building
- 1225 • Combined operations capacity, interoperability, and standardization
- 1226 • Facilitating access and relationships
- 1227 • Operational Access and Global Freedom of Action (U.S. Defense
- 1228 Posture)

- 1229 • Intelligence and information sharing
- 1230 • Assurance and regional confidence building
- 1231 • International armaments cooperation
- 1232 • International suasion and collaboration
- 1233
- 1234

**Understand other US' Departments and interests**

1235  
1236  
1237 Invariably, other USG Departments will have a direct or indirect interests,  
1238 objectives, and priorities with respect to the condition the joint force will  
1239 pursue. Much has been written and discussed over the past decade or more  
1240 regarding interagency integration. True integration within the US system  
1241 demands senior leader attention and energy and is usually a matter of extreme  
1242 urgency. Of course most joint force actions and activities in conditions of  
1243 cooperation don't need or warrant that level of continual attention. So, the join  
1244 force cannot depend on a great of integration. However, aligning activities  
1245 across the interagency to work toward common objectives is a normal  
1246 occurrence that can be taught, practiced, and regularly exercised. The key is



**Table 4. Six principles within a framework for campaigning in Conditions of cooperation.**

1249 being able to understand and appreciate other USG priorities, objectives, and  
1250 their associate activities that may well have a bearing on the joint force's  
1251 desired outcomes. To foster greater cooperation, the Joint Force may assure  
1252 an ally or partner, enhance interoperability to meet mutually agreed upon  
1253 security objectives, collectively deter an adversary, or even prepare for conflict.

1254

1255 This framework for campaigning in conditions of cooperation and its  
1256 associated descriptions enables the joint force to intellectually organize the  
1257 essential and optimal capabilities of the force in order campaign to foster the  
1258 favorable conditions, leverage the initiative to take advantage of opportunities,  
1259 anticipate and preclude deteriorating conditions, respond to and build  
1260 resilience against malign ideas and influences or dramatic shifts to  
1261 international order. As such, joint force efforts can over time somewhat  
1262 inoculate these environments from detrimental consequences.

1263 The combination of a deep understanding of the environment, determining  
1264 the desirable condition, and recognizing the state of existing relationships  
1265 relative to the interests at stake, guides joint force understanding of a range of  
1266 what could possibly be accomplished, and therefore develop a useful military  
1267 purpose. Once established, the joint force can begin to imagine how to link and  
1268 arrange military activities to operational objectives that result in the desirable  
1269 conditions needed to counter the adversary's alternative styles of warfare.  
1270 Once, understood the joint force can develop and request the required coherent  
1271 groupings of authorizations, collaborate to align efforts across the germane  
1272 elements of the interagency, and inform the synchronization and deconfliction  
1273 of funding. This type of logic underpins and characterizes proactive,  
1274 competitive methods and measures within a revised campaigning philosophy to  
1275 promote and continually pursue favorable conditions.

1276

## 1277 **Endnotes**


- 1278 1. **"Foreign Assistance.gov"** The ForeignAssistance.gov website was initiated by the  
1279 Department of State and USAID under the policy guidance of the National Security  
1280 Council. Future iterations of the site will be developed in consultation with U.S.  
1281 Government agencies receiving or implementing foreign assistance. The  
1282 ForeignAssistance.gov website provides a view of U.S. Government foreign assistance  
1283 funds and enables users to examine, research, and track aid investments in a standard  
1284 and easy-to-understand format.<http://beta.foreignassistance.gov/>  
1285
- 1286 2. Ibid  
1287
- 1288 3. **"Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance"** To promote and strengthen effective  
1289 democracies in recipient states and move them along a continuum toward democratic  
1290 consolidation.[http://beta.foreignassistance.gov/categories/Democracy-Human-](http://beta.foreignassistance.gov/categories/Democracy-Human-Rights-Governance)  
1291 [Rights-Governance](http://beta.foreignassistance.gov/categories/Democracy-Human-Rights-Governance)

1292

1293 **Appendix E: A Framework for Competition Below Armed Conflict**

1294  
 1295 JCIC views campaigning in conditions of competition below armed conflict  
 1296 distinctly different from armed conflict. Campaigning to retain, seize, and/or  
 1297 exploit the strategic initiative does not have clearly identifiable beginnings or  
 1298 ends, similar to conditions of cooperation. Future campaign design will offer  
 1299 rules-based methods to combine and align appropriate narratives with  
 1300 influential, coercive, and deterring force, coherent groupings of authorizations,  
 1301 inter-agency and partner efforts, and alliance maintenance. The Joint Force  
 1302 will continually manage campaigning in this future environment and  
 1303 appreciate that competitions are enduring and continual. They will remain on  
 1304 going as long as they support U.S. national security interests.<sup>2</sup> (Rose) JCIC's  
 1305 model's description expresses desired aims in terms of a preferable future state  
 1306 of competition or one of cooperation.<sup>3</sup> (Smith, R.) Therefore, the integrated  
 1307 campaigning approach will not call upon the joint force to pre-determine a  
 1308 military end state as described with the current elements of operational design.  
 1309 Instead, they will require descriptions of the desired condition(s) between the  
 1310 United States and the competitor relative to a state of cooperation, competition,  
 1311 or armed conflict.

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
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**Table 1. Different Styles of Competitive Approaches**

1316

1317 As enduring efforts, these campaigns follow no linear or phased sequence  
 1318 but adapt to changing conditions in the environment. They are comprised of  
 1319 activities designed to counter an adversary's strategy and deter further actions

1320 that threaten U.S. or allied national security objectives. Specific to the space  
 1321 between peace and war, the United States has a rich history of confronting  
 1322 antagonists and cooperating with and reinforcing allies and partners in  
 1323 conditions beyond armed conflict. In 1978, Barry Blechman and Stephen  
 1324 Kaplan published the results of landmark study titled, Force without War: U.  
 1325 S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument. Their study chronicled and analyzed  
 1326 over 200 cases occurring since World War II where the US employed forces to  
 1327 reinforce or modify foreign actors' behaviors. Their criteria for success was  
 1328 whether or not the targeted actor(s) behaved in the manner desired by the  
 1329 policy's aim. Blechman and Kaplan analyzed the rate of realization of  
 1330 antagonists' and protagonists' behavior sought by the U.S. in instances where  
 1331 force was employed as an aspect of the policy shift, both in the short term (6  
 1332 months) and longer term (3 years).<sup>4</sup> (Blechman and Kaplan) Table I is a  
 1333 summary of analysis of 33 substantive case studies. Although published in  
 1334 1978, the study's context and analysis may be worth consideration as military  
 1335 institutions adapt to the contemporary environment unfolding across Asia and  
 1336 Europe. Regarding the military dimension's role in countering these malign  
 1337 alternative approaches, Blechman and Kaplan's effort may offer insights as to  
 1338 optimal and most effective applications of force.  
 1339




**Table 2. Illustrative Example of Russia's Modern Approach**

1342 In Force without War, Blechman and Kaplan examine three general  
 1343 categories of the US' use of force. The first regards countering an antagonist's  
 1344 use or threatened use of force against another actor. The second regards an  
 1345 actor's support to a third party, while the third centers on support to regime  
 1346 authority. In terms of the approach of the US commitment of force regarding  
 1347 an incident, the authors describe two primary modes. First, the US force was  
 1348 seeking to reinforce existing behavior; to deter the antagonist from behaving in  
 1349 a manner detrimental to US interests; and to assure potential protagonists so  
 1350 that they will continue or abstain from a behavior relative to US interests. The  
 1351 second is to modify or change a direction of behavior to compel antagonists  
 1352 (short of armed conflict) to either act in a manner aligned with the US or to stop  
 1353 behavior running counter to US interests.; and to induce a potential  
 1354 protagonist to initiate beneficial or cease harmful actions. (Blechman and  
 1355 Kaplan)

1357 "Favorable outcomes occurred far more frequently when the objective was  
 1358 to reinforce behavior (assure and deter) than when it was to modify behavior  
 1359 (compel and induce), both in the short and long term."<sup>5</sup> (Blechman and Kaplan)  
 1360 "Even when greater levels of force were used, positive outcomes occurred more  
 1361 often when the objective was to compel an adversary than when the objective  
 1362 was to induce a friend." However, in some cases positive outcomes in the short  
 1363 term were often associated with the engagement of forces exercising clearly  
 1364 visible manifest activities – even when the concern focused the difficult mode of  
 1365 modifying behavior. As time passed along with the incidents criticality, the  
 1366 frequency of positive outcomes declined dramatically. (Blechman and Kaplan)  
 1367 Finally, the US' experience in this space highlights that within the universe of  
 1368 international relations, aspects of finality and clear conclusions are elusive and  
 1369 any gains must be maintained.

1370



Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, *Force without War: U.S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument*, The Brookings Institute: 1978

Table 3. US Effectiveness in Conditions of Competition

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
1374 “In the short term, positive outcomes occurred more frequently when US  
1375 armed forces previously had been used in the region. Favorable outcomes  
1376 occurred much less often in regions where US force had been used  
1377 infrequently.”<sup>6</sup> (Blechman and Kaplan) The authors speculate that a  
1378 “demonstrated willingness to engage in major conflict in a region before an  
1379 incident heightened the regions’ actors’ sensitivity to US signals of resolve...”  
1380 “So, a demonstrated willingness to act may be especially effective. Conversely,  
1381 in regions where the US armed forces were used infrequently in the past years,  
1382 actors may have been more prone not to take a US threat seriously.”  
1383 (Blechman and Kaplan)

1384  
1385 “Positive outcomes did occur proportionally more frequently in the short  
1386 term when a treaty existed, or a senior US officials led with a narrative easily  
1387 interpreted as a commitment or supportive of a desired outcome relative to the  
1388 unfolding incident. Lessor numbers of outcomes are associated with narratives  
1389 that trailed the commitment of force or communicated by more junior US  
1390 leadership.”<sup>7</sup> (Blechman and Kaplan). In the short term, outcomes were more  
1391 frequent when US force numbers fluctuated in the time period before the  
1392 incident, as compared to a static or non-existent presence.<sup>9</sup> (Blechman and  
1393 Kaplan). One finding recognizes that the USSR was a capable competitor  
1394 throughout the period associated with the study. When the USSR employed or  
1395 communicated the willingness to use force, the US experienced a dramatic  
1396 decrease in the percentage of positive outcomes relative to when Moscow wasn’t  
1397 involved.

1398  
1399 In many cases, the Soviet Union may have not been the central  
1400 antagonist, but still influenced the situation and affected the US’ percentage of  
1401 positive outcomes. For ease of analysis, the authors divided “the sample  
1402 incidents into the following groups: 1) incidents in which both the Soviet Union  
1403 and American allies were participants and the Soviet Union also was a  
1404 participant; 2) incidents in which both American and Soviet Allies participated  
1405 but the Soviet Union did not; 3) incidents in which an American ally  
1406 participated but neither the Soviet Union or ally did not.”<sup>10</sup> (Blechman and  
1407 Kaplan)

#### 1408 1409 **A Framework for Competition**

1410  
1411 Many of the observed antagonistic approaches are limited, but may not  
1412 necessarily be exercised through proxies. As these issues are matter of great  
1413 powers in direct competition, the actor in question should be considered both  
1414 an antagonist and protagonist.



1415  
1416

1417 An activist approach should consider all methods and capabilities within  
 1418 DoD’s toolbox that can be brought to bear to coerce favorable behavior, but  
 1419 recognize aspects of the antagonist’s policy that can’t be changed (accept) and  
 1420 delimit what the joint force can still modify. Although varying degrees of  
 1421 assurance, deterrence, and exposing the truth exist within the aforementioned  
 1422 conditions of cooperation, they are usually applied individually and only as  
 1423 necessary. JCIC considers all the tools normally associated with Shaping,  
 1424 Deterring, and leveraging/seizing the Initiative as well as capabilities  
 1425 associated with armed conflict and consolidation and stabilization.  
 1426 Recognizing there is always latent and potential antagonistic behavior, JCIC’s  
 1427 framework for competition focuses on behavior and leverages multiple ideas  
 1428 simultaneously to control escalation and orient on the circumstance without  
 1429 the constraints of joint phasing’s artificial boundaries. Early indications and  
 1430 identifications of propensities to change behavior allow actions to orient on  
 1431 reinforcing existing behavior  
 1432

<b>Assure</b>	<p><b><u>-Contain the consequences:</u></b> <u>Assure</u> the competitor that the US response is commensurate and oriented on the specific behavior creating the circumstance, not an opportunistic veiled excuse for escalation.</p>
<b>Deter</b>	<p><u>Deter</u> the competitor from continuing along the current behavior's vector to thwart additional future actions and prevent mobilization of additional capabilities, or by obvious denial and escalation of intentions and commitment.</p>
<b>Accept/ Expose</b>	<p><b><u>-Adapt to and Modify changes in antagonistic behavior</u></b> <u>Recognize</u>, <u>Accept</u>, and <u>Expose</u> a change in the competitor's behavior; appreciate the implications of the actor's change and accept the changes that cannot be quickly undone. Employ a narrative to unmask the behavior and champion a better vision</p>
<b>Delimit</b>	<p><u>Delimit</u> fix, set or define the limits of acceptability for the competitor's behavior and its corresponding implications</p>
<b>Unconvent'l Measures</b>	<p><b><u>-De-construct the competitor's actions.</u></b> Employ nuanced <u>Unconventional Measures</u> to indirectly or directly counter the competitor's actions, de-legitimize their policy's or pursuit's aims, and obfuscate and bewilder their vision of the future</p>
<b>Induce</b>	<p><u>Induce</u> leverage or incentivize the competitor's favorable behavior as well as other associated actors relevant to the circumstance, or within the competitor's sphere of influence.</p>
<b>Compel</b>	<p><u>Compel</u> antagonists (with their acquiescence) to either act in a manner commensurate with US interests or cease behavior running counter to US interests.</p>

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After unmooring all the Department's tools from the notional bins of Shaping, Deter, Seize the Initiative, the joint force can consider how informed combinations of capabilities could be applied to reinforce existing behavior. When the joint force recognizes imminent change before it unfolds the ideas of assurance and deterrence are feasible. Alternatively, late recognition of change in a competitor drives US actions to both reinforce and modify existing behaviors, and therefore, de-construct the antagonists' actions. Once a state

1478 puts new and contrary policies to work, a competitor has to account for many  
1479 more variables. The key to countering these actions is simultaneously  
1480 presenting a diverse array all the capabilities and dilemmas in selected from  
1481 across DoD's tool kit.

1482 Success begins with heightened assurance that is that the response is  
1483 designed specifically to address the circumstance and deterrence of the  
1484 antagonists' additional future actions and mobilization of additional  
1485 capabilities, or by obvious denial, and escalation of intentions. Most is  
1486 important is that the circumstance remains within a condition of competition.  
1487

1488 With the risk of escalation mitigated, the path to resolution continues by  
1489 orienting on the specific behavior of the circumstance. Continued adaptation  
1490 is characterized by reinforcing successful actions. When the antagonistic  
1491 behavior begins to wane, the inclination will be to "draw down" the effort.  
1492 Successful campaigns seek to consolidate gains throughout to ensure the  
1493 success "sticks" Successful resolution may well include outcomes  
1494 acceptable to multiple actors or include the original antagonistic competitor.  
1495 Additionally, successful resolution creates new interests to protect and  
1496 advance. Success may well include acceptance of changes created by the  
1497 antagonists within international norms that cannot be reversed anytime soon.  
1498 The antagonist will have an expanded interests as well. Such is the nature of  
1499 limited confrontation and warfare. With resolution, the anticipated result  
1500 should be a new international homeostasis – again, with new interests on all  
1501 sides.  
1502

1503 JCIC's campaign construct does not assume that any country can  
1504 permanently secure its desired conditions in conditions of competition, but  
1505 consolidating the gains as a fundamental aspect will be critical. This inherently  
1506 ambiguous and uncertain strategic environment will demand constant  
1507 reassessments of ongoing campaigns. Maintaining the initiative and  
1508 consolidating gains as they occur is critical as is avoiding the temptation to end  
1509 military efforts once a situation appears stabilized. Maintaining strategic gains  
1510 in conditions of competition will require continued engagement.

1511 Additive to the existing campaign construct, JCIC offers the joint force a  
1512 model to employ dynamic combinations of activities previously considered only  
1513 within the activation of a campaign based on deliberate plan or declared crises.  
1514 To compete with adversaries short of armed conflict, JCIC offers a logic the  
1515 Joint Force to campaign in the intellectual gap between the theater campaign  
1516 and armed conflict. Military activities, working in concert with other military  
1517 and non-military organizations will seek retain the strategic initiative or, when  
1518 necessary, regain the initiative to alter a trend that runs counter to U.S.  
1519 national security objectives. As described by Blechman and Kaplan, success in  
1520 the space between peace and war is characterized by antagonists' and  
1521 protagonists' desired behavior; these problem sets do not readily lend

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1522 themselves to solutions that include decisive operations and “winning quickly”  
1523 JCIC describes a model with utility in guiding the joint force toward informed  
1524 and effective applications of the military dimension across the universe of  
1525 known, emerging, and anticipated patterns of competition below armed  
1526 conflict. JCIC’s enhanced campaign construct offers relevant terms, and  
1527 intellectual frameworks that seek to account for both DoD’s historical  
1528 experiences and the anticipated patterns the joint force can expect to confront.

1529           To overcome the challenges inherent in competitions below armed  
1530 conflict, the joint force will work to align military activities with other elements  
1531 of power. Additionally, the joint force will synchronize with the activities of  
1532 other governmental departments and agencies to enable and reinforce the  
1533 narrative as an essential element in achieving operational level objectives, not  
1534 simply accomplish security cooperation tasks with the idea of a narrative  
1535 sprinkled on after the fact. For example, military activities conducted in  
1536 countries outside of a combat zone require coordination with the ambassador  
1537 and the country team if they are present and the Department of State when  
1538 they are not. JCIC’s integrated campaigning will consider how military  
1539 activities can support diplomatic, informational and/or economic efforts to  
1540 counter an adversary or, where required, articulate how these instruments of  
1541 power can support military efforts. JCIC’s method of achieving this alignment  
1542 is in leveraging JCIC’s factors of campaign design that seek inclusion of  
1543 participants outside the DoD. Because the Joint Force is the most resourced  
1544 entity in the national security apparatus, the responsibility may often fall upon  
1545 the military to lead coordination efforts even though the Joint Force will clearly  
1546 not dictate how other departments and agencies pursue and achieve objectives  
1547 in their respective areas of responsibility.

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
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**Appendix F: A Framework for Consolidation**

1553           JCIC’s enhance campaign construct accounts for what always follows the  
1554 military defeat of an antagonist. In order to make the military victory mean  
1555 anything, the aftermath has to be seen as an integral part of the war. First, the  
1556 joint force secures the victory and then enables the translation of the military  
1557 success into an advantageous outcome. JCIC views joint force campaigning as  
1558 decisive only in the aggregate and when the result is the meaningful change  
1559 sought by the war’s aims. JCIC recognizes and describes the patterns and what  
1560 occurs in the transitions and offers a logic to think through these patterns. In  
1561 the wake of military victory, America’s initial efforts have many times been  
1562 incomplete, characterized by understandable national excitement and pride,  
1563 but then transitioning to a strategic exhale, and followed initially with  
1564 minimalist and contradictory policies relative to the country’s view and  
1565 intentions for securing the victory.

1566  
1567           Pick an era’s major circumstance and compare, the similarities are eerily  
1568 consistent. The consequences of the political, social, and economic upheaval  
1569 following the Civil War overwhelmed the first two years of Presidential  
1570 Reconstruction. In the aftermath of the [Spanish-American War of 1898](#), where  
1571 Spain ceded its colony of the Philippine Islands, the situation quickly  
1572 transitioned into another conflict manifested by a continuation of the same  
1573 circumstances. On February 4, 1899, just two days before the U.S. Senate  
1574 ratified the Treaty of Paris, intense fighting broke out between American forces  
1575 and Filipino nationalists and continued for at least three years. Afterwards,  
1576 American forces faced instability for another decade. In the wake of the  
1577 Armistice, the AEF was initially against providing an occupation force to help  
1578 ensure the allies established a new order across Europe and Asia. As skilled  
1579 and insightful as Roosevelt was as a war-time President, before WW II ended he  
1580 thought the US’ commitment to Europe wouldn’t find support at home beyond  
1581 1947.

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
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**Table X. Patterns of Known Transitions During Consolidation**

Similarly, many folks’ grand hopes for regime removal in Iraq and Afghanistan were quickly dashed by reality of the known patterns. As such, it should be no surprise that the DoD is still committed and campaigning in both those countries and beyond. JCIC describes the joint forces’ purpose of the force beyond military victory. Additionally, JCIC recognizes that the aftermath of the conflict is still part of the war and the war’s policy. Furthermore JCIC recognizes the joint force plays an essential role and makes unique contributions in carrying out that by translating the victory into real change by establishing and enforcing a new international order. Only DoD can provide the necessary backbone and connective tissue, no matter which USG element is in charge.

**Trend of U.S. Consolidation/Commitment Beyond Armed Conflict 1898-2015**



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**Table XI. Trends of U.S. Consolidation and Commitment Beyond Armed**

These patterns of necessary transitions that follow military defeat of a country are well-known, JCIC seeks to further institutionalize these transitions within DoD’s models and processes. What historically occurs for the vanquished is significant political reformation, social restructure, and extreme economic downturn. What evolves overtime are new political arrangements, social orders, and economic systems. This is manifested within the environment by abstract but very real and powerful forces previously unforeseen or sidelined. These forces emerge and bring to bear new and expanded political stakes and circumstances. This reality can confound or even

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1610 derail the victor's vision of the future.<sup>1, 2</sup> (Rose, Smith) Historically, the US  
1611 can be a bit slow to recognize how these circumstances can re-characterize the  
1612 conflict and cause the military victory to become almost irrelevant. On the  
1613 other hand, when the US has been able to recognize this reality and keep up  
1614 with unfolding events, the joint force has been able to guide, steer, or at least  
1615 effectively react in a manner that influences the new emerging orders. What  
1616 then follows is new and favorable environment where other elements and  
1617 capabilities of US and allied power can be brought to bear in an informed and  
1618 effective manner. After several years, what can emerge is a new and acceptable  
1619 security situation.

1620

1621 The facts are that civilian leaders have always leveraged and depended  
1622 upon the military's continued control over waters, territory, air space, and  
1623 people beyond armed conflict to determine and enforce a new international  
1624 homeostasis. Historically, this facet of the campaign can continue for years or  
1625 even decades. Successful US-led campaigns account for the deep  
1626 understanding required, amount of force and simultaneity needed, and time  
1627 necessary to deliver and enable sustainable outcomes. Successful campaigns  
1628 seek to consolidate gains as they materialize for good reason. The joint force  
1629 should expect to navigate and transition through several distinct, but  
1630 overlapping conditions. These are:

1631

- 1632 1) A re-characterization period where the political stakes in the wake of  
1633 armed conflict dramatically expand and may invariably drive frequent  
1634 adjustments to the campaign and changes to the range the range of  
1635 possible outcomes. This period is filled with risk and uncertainty to  
1636 the degree that the military victory can be lost or become irrelevant.
- 1637 2) Creation of favorable conditions where the US can effectively bring to  
1638 bear other elements of national and allied power.
- 1639 3) Establishing an acceptable security situation;
- 1640 4) Developing an initial bi-lateral partnership.
- 1641 5) Transition to an enduring commitment to perpetuate our gains and  
1642 realized advantages.

1643

1644 With that in mind, consolidating gains requires the Joint Force campaign  
1645 in physical battlegrounds and in other contested spaces such as perception by  
1646 populations, criminality, and political subversion. JCIC recognizes that the  
1647 military has in undivided interest in ensuring the policy achieves its aims. As  
1648 such, JCIC doesn't seek to leverage terms such as military end state,  
1649 termination criteria, and exit strategy as a matter of campaign design. Instead,  
1650 JCIC favors ideas of security the victory and outcomes through the  
1651 consolidation of gains and perpetuation of outcomes, which are historically  
1652 accurate and reflective of America's successful transitions. This experience is  
1653 characterized by a long series of methodical and informed transitions leading to  
1654 the accomplishment of those aims.<sup>3, 4, and 5</sup> (Cohen, Buley, and Freedman)

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- <sup>10</sup> 'Compellence –Forcing an opponent to do something whereas deterrence is getting an opponent to not do something by threatening to impose costs. See T. Schelling- *Arms and Influence* and Alexander George (clean up language later)
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